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INTRODUCTION
Th is study is about God, but it starts with ‘me.’ Th is self-centeredness 
seems to refl ect the perspective of modern Western thinking quite 
accurately; it all starts with me. Modern autonomy and individualism 
have created an atmosphere in which all our thinking not only auto-
matically starts with our own self but also seems to be forced to do so. 
Not only can I think for myself; I have to. As Fichte put it at the end 
of the 18th century, “At every moment, throughout our whole life, 
we are always thinking I, I, I, and never anything else but I.”1 What 
used to be true only for the intellectual elite has been democratized. 
Th e I has become the accepted point of departure for every human 
being. Nonetheless, I-hood, or the ordinary, daily state of being that I 
am most familiar with, is a philosophical enigma. My ability to say ‘I’ 
comes with the capacity to lead my own life, to experience a measure 
of control over my actions. At the same time I am aware of what I do, 
and aware of my awareness, and the awareness of the awareness, ad 
infi nitum. What is it about me that I can feel a sense of infi nity and 
know about my own mortality at the same time? Who am I?
Th ere are quite severe limitations in phrasing the question about 
human existence in terms of ‘Who am I?’ but we have no idea how to 
escape this paradigm. Being an I, an individual, having a life of our 
own, seems to be our only sense of certainty from Descartes up until 
the present day. At the same time, however, it is a source of existential 
insecurity. If this I is all I have to rely upon to make my life worth-
while and if all my interactions are based upon my own free choice, I 
have become very vulnerable and isolated indeed. Vulnerable because 
the moment I lose control there seems to be nothing left . Aft er all, it 
is me who is in charge of making my life and giving it meaning, is it 
not? Isolated because I lack all natural togetherness. I meet other I’s 
in whom I recognize the same drive to shape their lives in meaningful 
ways. To some of them I am related, in blood or in friendship, but 
I am not at all sure where in my I-hood I can fi nd the grounds for 
1 Fichte, SW 1, 501. For this and the other references, see the bibliography and the 
specifi c chapters. Unless stated otherwise, translations are mine.
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that relation. Even less clear is my togetherness with humankind as 
a whole. We are no longer connected in any fundamental way. Who 
are we?
Th e emphasis on individual choice, life, and feelings also has a huge 
impact on present-day Western religiosity. It is no longer obvious that 
we remain in the tradition in which we were born and raised. We 
are overwhelmed by a vast range of alternatives in the general confu-
sion of the ‘reli market.’ Religiosity has become a personal choice and 
is thus progressively more closely associated with private experience. 
Even though the search for personal experience of the Divine is of all 
ages and cultures, one can suspect that the great importance that is 
ascribed to it in contemporary Western religiosity is linked with the 
development in modernity that places the I on the foreground. As Karl 
Rahner puts it about half a century ago, “Th e devout Christian of the 
future will either be a mystic, one who has ‘experienced something,’ 
or he will cease to be anything at all.”2 Modern religiosity is about the 
personal experiences of the I; it is about me and God, in that order. It 
has become rephrased as, Who am I to God?
In the overwhelming off er of publications oriented towards the 
enigma of I-hood and its possible reference to something beyond 
(meta) the physical two general groups can be distinguished. Firstly, 
there is the naturalistic literature, such as Owen Flanagan’s, Th e Prob-
lem of the Soul, that views the I’s metaphysical questions as remnants 
of old-fashioned, but familiar pre-scientifi c worldviews that it can-
not seem to let go off .3 It is merely a lack of understanding of the 
intricacies of the human brain that brings forth Such Nonsense!, as 
is another title in a long line of books that want to educate us about 
the roots of our religious misconceptions.4 Th e idea that people think 
‘God’ when the complexities of life overwhelm them, which was for-
merly explained with concepts like ‘projection’ or ‘father complexes,’ 
has been remolded in the terminology of genes and neurons nowa-
days. Th e big, bad Unconscious that ruled our lives has now become 
the hegemony of dendrites, synapses, and neurotransmitters. Both 
infl uences are beyond our grasp, but dictate who we are and how we 
conceive of life. Th e message is surprising parallel: this I that feels 
2 Rahner, Schr 7, 15. See 6.2. 
3 See Flanagan 2002.
4 De Regt, Dooremalen 2008. Th e original Dutch title is: Wat een onzin!
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pressured to control the whole world on the one hand is really at a loss 
when it comes to its own self-conscious I-hood on the other.
Secondly, the contemporary seeker of metaphysical answers is con-
fronted with a range of semi-scientifi c literature and trainings directed 
at personal growth, or ‘fi nding oneself’ in whatever form, based on 
oft en irrationalistic and haphazard types of spirituality with self-made 
healers, mediums, and rituals. Surprisingly, quite a large number of 
medical doctors and natural scientists is active in this range, respon-
sible for a vast production of books with titles such as Why God Won’t 
Go Away, Born to Believe (Andrew Newberg, MD), Th e God Gene 
(Dean Hamer, geneticist), Eindeloos bewustzijn (Pim Van Lommel, 
MD).5 Th eir medical jargon and scientifi c credentials apparently qual-
ify as a sound basis for metaphysical speculations. We must face the 
fact that nowadays the most popular theology is practiced by medical 
doctors and (neuro)scientists with a predilection for metaphysics, not 
by theologians.
Th e question about the relation of the I to anyone or anything 
beyond the physical is no longer dealt with within the domain of 
theology exclusively, or even predominantly. Th eology seems to have 
neglected or missed this religious ‘turn to the I.’ Th ere are, of course, 
intelligent theological anthropologies, Karl Rahner’s for example, 
which will be studied in the course of this project.6 However, the 
theological argument concerning the human subject in relation to the 
Divine in oft en diffi  cult and dogmatic jargon has failed to inspire those 
outside the theological community. Th e vocabulary and the themes of 
theology are no longer self-explanatory to non-theologians, or even 
to new generations of theology students. Th e result is that the aver-
age intelligent, interested, but theologically uneducated reader turns 
away from Christendom as it has been shaped by church and theol-
ogy in his or her search for meaning. It seems as if the hunger for 
spirituality has become equaled by the aversion for institutionalized 
religion and terminology. At the start of the third millennium, theol-
ogy is threatening to lose its status of knowledgeable participant in 
the discussion about God, or what a human I can know or experience 
about an all-encompassing Divine in which it can understand life to 
5 Th e last title is Endless Consciousness in English. See Bibliography for all titles 
mentioned.
6 See Chapter 6. 
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be lived. People are searching elsewhere for answers to the question, 
Who is God to me?
Th e oft en oversimplifi ed ‘theology’ that is thus generally available 
forms a very fragile protection against those philosophies that try to 
convince the modern I to stop fi nding the meaning of its life beyond 
the physical. Given enough time and research grants, the neurosci-
ences will succeed in solving the enigma of I-hood and there will cease 
to be a need for metaphysical inquiries, they appear to reassure us. 
Th is study, on the contrary, challenges the hubris of the natural sci-
ences and its belief that a further unraveling of the laws of nature will 
make metaphysics superfl uous in the human quest for the fundamen-
tal questions about the ground of its I-hood. It also refuses to go along 
with the oft en-irrational discourse of quasi-spiritual theories of I-hood. 
Th is project constitutes a search for a viable, rational metaphysics for 
the 21st century that takes the question concerning the human I and 
its aspect of something more than the merely physical as its point of 
departure. It attempts to be sparing in its use of dogmatic, ‘standard,’ 
theological jargon while at the same time being led by an intuition 
for the merits of a long tradition of metaphysics as developed within 
the broad horizon of a Christian worldview. It insists on asking about 
I-hood, its ground, and the meaning of conscious life in the broader 
setting of the question, Who is God?
 The Route of the Project
Th e previous fi ve questions concerning the I and its possible relation 
to something or someone beyond the purely physical form the focus 
of this project. In the search for an antidote to the seeming hegemony 
of naturalistic explanations of I-hood, the subject philosophy of Dieter 
Henrich (1927) stands out. In contemporary philosophical language, 
he provides a sharp analysis of the ambiguity of what it means to be a 
self-conscious being in the world. He claims that contemporary meta-
physics should start from ‘conscious life’ [bewusstes Leben] with its 
daily experiences of ambivalence and anxiety that provoke the self-
aware subject to philosophize. In his view, self-conscious I-hood is a 
philosophical enigma that leads beyond the physical.
Henrich’s metaphysics fi nds its basis in the type of thinking that 
is described as German idealism, which seems an odd choice for a 
theory of subjectivity two centuries later. Is not a philosophy of the I 
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that leads to metaphysical musings passé? Has the road from the I to 
what was referred to in those days as the Absolute not turned out to 
be a dead-end street in the history of philosophy? Has it not been a 
philosophical enterprise that has not only exhausted its own possibili-
ties but also yielded results that have proven downright dangerous to 
humankind? Has the foundationalism of German idealistic philoso-
phies with its propagated metaphysics of identity not proved to be 
a dangerous excess that served to justify the destruction of all other-
ness? Th ese common arguments for its rejection that have dominated 
the second half of the 20th century notwithstanding, Henrich sticks to 
the conviction that the type of speculative thinking that takes a fl ight 
towards the end of the 18th century can still constitute a valuable 
point of departure in our times. Provided that certain philosophical 
conclusions be modifi ed and that the arguments of the modern criti-
cism of metaphysics be taken into account. Henrich’s major modifi -
cation of the metaphysics of idealism is the assumption of a unitary 
ground of self-consciousness that is unavailable for human cognition; 
it is darkness or obscurity [Dunkelheit].
Th e merits and the shortcomings of Henrich’s analysis of I-hood 
and his metaphysics will be discussed at length in the relevant sec-
tions of this text. Th e discontent with the conclusion that this ground 
is totally beyond knowing, devoid of all content, however, has been 
my incentive to turn to the thinkers of this era itself and their origi-
nal questions. Two young authors, both graduates from the famous 
Tübinger Stift , Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775–1854) and 
Johann Christian Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843), stand out. In a 
brief but essential period in the history of philosophy, from approxi-
mately 1795 to 1810, they lay the foundations for an entirely new and 
daring metaphysics. Besides the required courses in traditional theol-
ogy and philosophy both young men study the writings of Immanuel 
Kant (considered dangerous for young ministers to be) and become 
enamored with Baruch de Spinoza (a downright heretic, a panthe-
ist). Both refuse to become Lutheran ministers against the wishes and 
expectations of their parents and professors. Th e former turns to phi-
losophy, the latter does so for a short while (and writes an intriguing 
text about the ground of the human I) before he decides that poetry is 
a superior medium for expressing the metaphysical.
Th is excursion into the land of German idealism itself has turned 
out to be enlightening, in particular the discovery that the issues are 
still surprisingly up-to-date. So is the attempt to break away from 
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standard, solidifi ed terminology. Of the two young thinkers, Schelling’s 
early work forms a beautiful illustration of the problems and the apo-
rias associated with thinking the link between the I and the Divine. 
He is a brilliant and creative thinker who is convinced of his ability 
to build one grand philosophical system in which God, nature, and I-
hood will neatly fi t. Aft er Kant has tried to convince his students that 
knowledge of the Divine is impossible, Schelling sets out to build a 
system that will prove him wrong. He plans to integrate Kantian free-
dom, Spinoza’s Deus sive Natura, and Fichte’s absolute I in one great 
sweep of philosophical genius and prove that all that is emerges from 
a unitary Absolute that is within the grasp of human refl ection.
Hölderlin, on the contrary, never supports the foundationalism of 
his fellow Stift ler. He maintains that the Absolute, or God, cannot be 
known but merely be intuited, not thought, but ‘divined.’ Absolute, 
divine unity expresses itself in beauty, in nature, in love. Hölderlin 
gives up on a career in philosophy and throws himself into poetry, 
“which alone will survive all other sciences and arts.” Instead of mas-
tering the Divine in thought, he wants to “wrap it in song.”7 With 
this move, he takes yet a diff erent side in the heated debate about the 
metaphysical. Is it the exclusive domain of knowledge, that of faith, or 
is there an intermediate realm called (intellectual) intuition?
Th e debate around the term intellectual intuition [intellektuelle 
Anschauung] that rages in philosophy during the brief but crucial 
period that forms the focus of this project illustrates the turn-about 
that takes place in philosophy aft er and because of Kant. A distinct 
split occurs between the possible ways to ponder the metaphysical 
question of the I and its possible openness to its absolute ground. 
Whereas Hölderlin tries to fi nd his solutions in the border regions of 
the human mind where the I and divine unity tend to merge, in the 
land where the artist and the mystic dwell, Kant disdainfully rejects 
the term intellectual intuition as a human faculty and thereby erects a 
fence between philosophy and theology. One that can only be scaled, 
it is said, by what Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743–1819) calls a salto 
mortale into faith. Knowledge belongs to the domain of the physical. 
For knowledge, we need a human mind that categorizes what is off ered 
to it by the senses. Where perception is impossible, so is knowledge. 
Th erefore, the metaphysical can never be the object of philosophy. 
7 Hölderlin, StA IV, 298; StA II, 119. See Chapter 4 and 5.3 for the references.
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Beyond the physical not the land of reason is to be found, but that of 
faith. Th e only escape left  to Hölderlin is the art of poetry.
Th e ‘Kantian fence’ still stands, and those with (intellectual) intuitions 
and negligible artistic talents are forced to choose between philosophy 
and theology. Th e rare contemporary philosopher who still ventures 
beyond can only speak of the obscurity or the darkness of the meta-
physical ground of self-consciousness. Within the boundaries of phi-
losophy, it can only be maintained that a unitary ground needs to be 
assumed in all its obscurity, in Henrich’s view. It is this darkness of 
its ground that explains the fact that self-conscious I-hood is a source 
of existential insecurity. With the refusal to elaborate on the nature 
of this unitary ground of self-consciousness, he escapes the idealis-
tic foundationalism and he chooses to stay within the clear limits of 
philosophical reason. And yes, perhaps Henrich has gone as far as 
philosophy will allow. It seems indeed the prerogative of the philoso-
pher to be allowed to stop there. To quote Rahner, the philosopher can 
“abstain from speech about this mystery, speech which the theologian 
must utter.”8 In Rahner’s view and my own, theologians need to utter 
what philosophy (and the natural sciences) can either deny or avoid. 
Th ey are the ones who venture meta physics because they do not thrive 
within the boundaries of a rationality that seems restrictive. Somehow, 
they cannot ignore their intuitions of a larger whole in which a human 
life is embedded that Christendom refers to with the term ‘God.’ On 
the other hand, also the average theologian of the 21st century can-
not live by blind faith and accept what sounds irrational. Hence, there 
appears to be a need for a new language about I-hood, God, and the 
intuited connection.
Th is study hopes to take a fi rst step towards meeting this challenge 
with the help of Hölderlin’s metaphysics. To Hölderlin the precari-
ous balance between all-encompassing unity and individuality was the 
core of his experience of the human way of being, summarized in one 
of his poems as, “Well men can see, that they will not follow the way 
of death and maintain the measure, that man shall be something in 
himself.”9 How can a person be an individual (“something in himself ”) 
without disappearing in the masses, wasting away in the anonymity of 
8 Schr. 3, 40. Rahner makes this statement about Heidegger. See 6.3. 
9 Th e poem is Th e Only One. See 4.6. 
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unity with family, friends, and even with the entire human race (“the 
way of death”)? How can we be an I in the all-unity of the world? How 
can we hold on to singularity in a context of unity? Th is is not just a 
dilemma of a sociological or psychological nature for Hölderlin; it is 
the very foundation of his metaphysics. Th e unitary ground of all that 
is can only be realized, come alive, in a new unity of singular I’s.
Th is view of the I and its unitary ground might still form a valu-
able correction of contemporary, western thinking that seems based 
on views concerning the I that concentrate on its rights, its singularity, 
and its free choice. We have learned to view the I as an independent 
entity that decides when and where to relate, or refrain from relating. 
We are that, but we are not only that. We are born into a pre-exist-
ing unity for which we feel responsible, in which we think to have a 
say and to which we believe we can contribute in a meaningful way. 
Th erefore, mature I-hood always seems to be searching for a balance 
between individual needs and the well-being of the whole.
Moreover, there seems to be a surprising parallel between this meta-
physical dilemma of mature I-hood between unity and individuality 
as posed by Hölderlin and a Christian concept of God. Aft er all, a 
unitary, divine ground in every human being is not alien to Christian 
thinking. However, it is only one aspect of the way the connection 
between God and human being is thought. Besides a God who is (in) 
all, hence immanent, the basic Christian experience of God also recog-
nizes a God who is vis-à-vis people, Another, transcendent. Christen-
dom wants to hold on to the God who is interior intimo meo, as well 
as to the God who is superior summo meo, in Saint Augustine’s more 
experiential language. Th e latter transcends all that is and appeals to 
all who are to work towards the realization of a peaceful unity in the 
world. Th ese two sides of God as both unitary ground and personal 
appeal seem diffi  cult to combine in thought. Nonetheless, I agree with 
Peter Strasser that the challenge of theology today is to think God as 
“simultaneously personal and all.”10
Th e all-ness of God receives ample attention in the metaphysics of 
a unitary ground. However, the emphasis on God as ground appears 
to overshadow God’s personhood. Hence, the challenge is to integrate 
this essential aspect. Th e mystery of this God, who is the one, most 
interior ground of every I in the world as well as the One who tran-
10 Strasser 2002, 191. 
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scends all who are, is the driving force behind this project. Who is this 
unitary God in whom we are embedded but who addresses us at the 
same time? Th is unitary God challenges the all of distinct I’s to realize 
divine presence here and now in a peaceful unity of singular I’s. How 
can we think this God of our deepest intuition in a metaphysical lan-
guage that is new but does justice to an age-old monotheistic tradition 
at the same time?
 The Choices Made
Every study is limited and has to make a selection from the possible 
approaches and a wide range of literature, a veritable mer à boire, and 
no choice is absolute. Hence, particular decisions require explanation 
and substantiation.
 Chapter 1: I-hood
Th e subject philosophy of Dieter Henrich has been chosen because it is 
unique of its sort. It is the result of the thorough study of metaphysi-
cal and linguistic models of self-consciousness. It concentrates on the 
question what it means to be a thinking subject in the world, an I. It 
is not concerned with the physical aspects of the human way of being. 
Th is is barely a limitation since nowadays ‘Who am I?’ seems to have 
become a question about the complex human mind, or the brain, but 
not as much about the body as a whole. Th e dominant partners in the 
dialogue concerning the ground of I-hood – if partnership and dia-
logue are the correct terms for the present situation of segregation –
are the cognitive and the neurological sciences. Henrich’s model of 
I-hood will be introduced in connection with two metaphysical the-
ories of self-consciousness that were the center of the debate in the 
late 18th century: the refl ection model and the production model. In 
an excursus the naturalistic view of I-hood will be provided for com-
parison because Henrich’s monistic metaphysics of the one, unitary, 
unknowable ground of self-consciousness is opposed to the naturalistic 
model of matter as the sole ground of all that is and its resulting rejec-
tion of anything beyond matter. Th is discussion will serve to underline 
the need for a metaphysics instead of a physics of self-consciousness 
in order to do justice to the complexity of the phenomenon. It will 
not give an overall view of naturalistic theories available nowadays; 
it merely sketches some lines of thinking and general shortcomings. 
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Moreover, this chapter will deal with the issue of subjectivity and not 
yet discuss Henrich’s view of the ground of I-hood. Th e latter will have 
to wait until the sixth chapter aft er we have looked at the two 18th 
century views of the I’s ground.
 Chapter 2: From the I to the Absolute
Th e development of metaphysics in the period from 1795 to 1810 that 
will constitute the focus of this project is deeply infl uenced by two 
people, namely Kant and Spinoza. Th is chapter will off er brief exami-
nations of the Kantian epistemology and his metaphysics of freedom 
and Spinoza’s metaphysics in order to appreciate the problems asso-
ciated with dualism (Kant) as well as substance monism (Spinoza). 
German idealism can be viewed as the attempt to rescue metaphysics 
from the dualism of Kantian epistemology with elements of Spinoza’s 
philosophy. However, Spinoza’s view of unity, his Substance, his Deus 
sive Natura, turns out to be insuffi  cient for safeguarding (Kantian) 
freedom. Th is is unacceptable at a time when the echoes of liberté, 
égalité, and fraternité are heard far beyond the French borders. Th e 
philosophical revolution that comes about in German idealism is 
considered the intellectual equivalent of the French Revolution. Th e 
I comes to be viewed as the imperial gateway to the metaphysical, 
a realm about to be conquered by the human intellect. Th is chapter 
forms a historical overview of the heated debate about the philosophi-
cal puzzles to be solved.
 Chapter 3: Schelling: Th e I and its Ground
Once the philosophical landscape has been laid out, we will turn to 
Schelling, the child genius. He is only fourteen years old when the 
French Revolution takes place, but he is just about ready to enter the 
Tübinger Stift  to start his college education. He is the perfect illustra-
tion of the intellectual enthusiasm and confusion that grips Germany 
during that time. He philosophizes as if his life depends on it in a 
desire to build a philosophical system in which the subjective and 
the objective, the I and Nature, are not only proven to be reconciled 
in one Absolute ground but to arise from it as well. It is a beauti-
ful example of what comes to be called absolute idealism. His oft en 
frantic writing results in a number of publications that approach the 
problem from a seemingly endless number of angles. When all fail, 
the terminology of the I and the Absolute is abandoned in favor of 
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that of freedom and God in his famous essay On Human Freedom. 
Even though none of his philosophical attempts succeed in overcom-
ing Kantian dualism, these eff orts form an excellent illustration of the 
diffi  culties involved in developing a modern, rational metaphysics. 
Only Schelling’s early writings are included in this study. Hence, the 
chapter will not provide an overview of Schelling’s entire philosophical 
oeuvre. Not because Schelling would have said nothing worth study-
ing aft erwards, but because of the fact that we are concerned with the 
philosophical attempts to think the Absolute, and these are the focus 
of his early work.
 Chapter 4: Hölderlin: Th e I and its Ground
A greater contrast than that between Schelling and Hölderlin cannot 
be found in those crucial years of German idealism. He chooses an 
entirely diff erent path to accomplish the same task of shedding light 
on the issue of the connection between the I and its ground with an 
entirely diff erent outcome. Both the path and the outcome are interest-
ing. To start with the latter. Hölderlin concludes that the one ground 
of self-consciousness, which he calls Being [Seyn], is unavailable to 
human thinking powers. Being can never be the object of science 
because it is pure unity, hence not objectifi able. And the self-con-
scious I can never reach this unity with its powers of thought because 
it has been torn apart by its own self-consciousness. Pure unity and 
consciousness are mutually exclusive to Hölderlin. However, since 
they are also mutually dependent, there must be ways from the pure 
unity of Being to the conscious I and vice versa. Here is where the 
entirely diff erent path comes in; Hölderlin fi nds the solution in poetry 
as the gateway to and from the metaphysical. Th erefore, his meta-
physics would be incomplete, if his poems were ignored. Th at makes 
for methodological complications that a theologian, even when not 
entirely unfamiliar with (biblical) verse, has to consider. Th e decision 
to treat Hölderlin’s poetry purely as an extension of his metaphysics is 
allowed, in my opinion, because Hölderlin himself uses his verse as a 
medium to unfold his metaphysics. His turn to poetry is never meant 
as an abandonment of his metaphysical project.
At this point another comment needs to be made. It might seem an 
odd choice to discuss the metaphysics of German idealism and ignore 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Aft er all, the term has become so 
closely associated with this man that one could easily forget that he 
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was only one of the thinkers involved. One reason to favor his fellow 
students at the Stift  is that Hegel’s thinking seems to have matured 
later than Schelling’s and Hölderlin’s. Toward the end of the 18th cen-
tury and the beginning of the 19th, the focus of this study, Hegel is 
still following the philosophical debate rather than steering it. Both 
Schelling and Hölderlin are the more creative and innovative partici-
pants at that point in time. Later in life, however, Hegel and Schelling 
become great competitors. Hegel is rightfully remembered as the Ger-
man idealist par excellence since he has the better career and produces 
more well-known works of German idealism. Nonetheless, his meta-
physics leans heavily on foundations laid by Schelling and Hölderlin, 
their decisions, successes, and failures. Since it is not my objective to 
defend the outcome of German idealism but to show the diffi  culties 
involved in a narrowly rational metaphysics, I believe that Schelling is 
the better choice for this project.
 Chapter 5: Intellectual Intuition and Metaphysics
Th e possibility or impossibility of a ‘narrowly rational metaphysics’ is 
the subject of the fi ft h chapter on intellectual intuition. Even though it 
can be debated whether this English term is the best possible transla-
tion of the German intellektuelle Anschauung, it does convey its use 
by the generation that forms the focus of this research quite well. 
Intuition is, as it still is in contemporary speech, a term for the grey 
area between knowledge and insights that can be labeled as inspired 
or mere fantasy, between what is considered real and (perhaps) imag-
ined. It is a term that has not endured in philosophy, or in theology 
for that matter. In the Christian tradition it has survived as mysticism, 
and in line with Rahner’s prediction, it thrives in contemporary spiri-
tuality. Intellectual intuition as it plays a role in metaphysics in the 
late 18th and early 19th century is a diffi  cult subject of which relatively 
little thorough study has been made, with Xavier Tilliette as perhaps 
the sole exception.11 In the short time span of our focus, the concept 
undergoes a dramatic transformation. From Kant’s meaning of intel-
lectual intuition as God’s understanding of the essence of all things-
in-themselves, it changes to a human ability. In a sarcastic essay, Von 
einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie, Kant 
11 See Tilliette 1995. 
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calls it a “mystical inspiration” that is “the death of all philosophy.”12 
It is Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) who fi rst links the term to the 
human I. For Fichte intellectual intuition reveals the ‘I am.’ It is the 
capacity of the I to come in touch with its own absoluteness, the abso-
lute I.13 Both Schelling and Hölderlin reinterpret it as a human fac-
ulty of immediately experiencing absolute unity. Th e former (briefl y) 
treats it as a philosophical tool to master the Absolute, whereas for 
the latter it comes closer to the mystical experience of religious tradi-
tions. Th ey are, however, united in their use of the term to attempt to 
bridge the divide between reason and faith, thinking and believing. It 
forms a prelude to the divide that is still generally accepted between 
the domains of philosophy and theology. Intellectual intuition thus 
appears to herald the death of rational metaphysics.
 Chapter 6: Th e Absolute Ground versus God
Th e failure of the concept of intellectual intuition also explains why 
two authors share this sixth chapter: a philosopher and a theologian, 
a representative of the land of reason and an ambassador of the land 
of faith. We will return to Dieter Henrich once again and study his 
‘philosophical metaphysics’ of the unitary ground of consciousness 
in order to see how a contemporary philosophy of subjectivity leads 
to a metaphysics of an unknowable, unitary ground that is obscu-
rity, devoid of all positive content. It is this obscurity of the ground 
that leads to religion, Henrich maintains. He does not approve of the 
term Absolute for this one ground; he prefers All-Unity [All-Einheit] 
because it allows for individuality and the I’s experience of freedom in 
a context of unity, in his opinion.
Subsequently, the metaphysics of a theologian, Karl Rahner (1904–
1984) will be studied. Th ere are several reasons for this particular 
choice. First, Rahner agrees with Henrich that a contemporary meta-
physics has to start with the human ability to say ‘I’ and the I’s inher-
ent capacity to have an awareness of the infi nite horizon of its thinking 
powers. Secondly, his metaphysics can be separated from his more 
12 Kant 1928, 398. 
13 Th is issue forms the core of the so-called anthropologische Wende, the anthropo-
logical turn, both in philosophy and theology with the consequence that in contempo-
rary “spirituality” the questions “Who am I?” and “Who is God?” tend to merge. 
14 introduction
dogmatic theological elaborations.14 It is his early work, Spirit in the 
World and Hearer of the Word, in which he is concerned with lay-
ing a metaphysical foundation for the I. Th e third reason for choos-
ing Rahner as Henrich’s theological counterpart is that also Rahner 
is convinced that the ground of human I-hood is a mystery, beyond 
the grasp of the human intellect. However, in contrast to Henrich he 
does not view this ground as entirely obscure since the I is Hearer of 
the Word; it has the capacity to hear words from the other side of the 
Kantian fence.
Hence, this chapter will compare the similarities and the diff erence 
between two types of metaphysics from the 20th century: one from a 
philosopher and one from a theologian. Th erefore, this chapter can 
explicitly deal with what are considered to be the diff erences between 
the unitary ground of a philosophical monism and the one God of 
theology. What is the diff erence between the Absolute and God?
 Chapter 7: God – Beyond Me
Th e fi nal chapter will discuss the fi ve central questions of this project. 
All authors of this study will help to formulate a possible answer to 
three of them: Who am I?, Who am I to God?, Who is God to me? 
With respect to the other two – Who are we? and Who is God? –
Hölderlin will have the dominant voice. In his view, a metaphysics of 
conscious life that connects I-hood with a unitary ground can only 
succeed if it takes unity as the essence of the human way of being. 
Grounded in the unity of Being, human I’s strive for peaceful unity, to 
have the oneness of the ground refl ected in the harmonious together-
ness of I’s in the world. On the other hand, unity should not imply loss 
of I-hood. Hence, a metaphysics of conscious life should search for a 
balance between the recognition of the singularity of each individual I 
and the I’s longing for unity. Life on earth should be the unity of Being 
realized, come alive. From Hölderlin it can be learned that the major 
question concerning conscious life should rather be phrased as, Who 
are we? In we-hood, both the togetherness of I’s and the individual’s 
independence and singularity are fundamental.
14 Later in life, his writings become more concerned with an explanation of Chris-
tian faith based on his early metaphysical anthropology. Some have commented that 
Rahner’s dogmatics is too explicitly linked to this metaphysical foundation. 
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Th is view is refl ected in the title of this study, which brings us to 
the fi nal question of this project, Who is God? ‘God – Beyond Me’ 
constitutes a criticism of the idealistic attempt to fi nd God through 
pure I-hood that can fi nd its ground and ideal in life separate from a 
world of other I’s. God is not to be reached solely in the interior of 
I-hood. Furthermore, the title questions the I’s ability to grasp God or 
the absolute ground in thought. God is beyond me; God exceeds my 
intellectual faculties. Nonetheless, the intuition of God as the unitary 
ground and the ideal of conscious life lived in peace and harmony can 
and should be the object of metaphysics. Th is results in a metaphys-
ics of We-hood. A concept of God as We-hood respects the two lines 
in the Christian tradition of God’s personhood and all-ness. It cor-
rects the oversimplifi cation of a concept of God as merely immanent 
ground of I-hood with its inherent danger of self-absolutization. God 
as ‘We’ is the ground of every I of the world and thus endows I-hood 
with the capacity for both individuality and unity. God as the ideal of 
We-hood forms a challenge to every I of the world to contribute to a 
unity in which each individual and his or her singularity is respected 
and enhanced, to realize We-on-earth.
CHAPTER ONE
I-HOOD
Th e question ‘Who am I?’ comes to be an urgent one towards the end 
of the Middle Ages. When the existence of God is doubted more and 
more, the subject, the self, the I, the ‘Me’ of the title, or whatever term 
is used, is dealt the part of trustworthy foundation: subiectum. René 
Descartes is the fi rst to fi nd the starting point of epistemology in the 
cogito, the indubitable certitude of the I that is capable of thought. 
According to Nancey Murphy, two sets of epistemic vocabulary are 
available to Descartes and his contemporaries. Th e fi rst set is “related 
to ‘scientia’ and [has] to do with demonstrative reasoning and cer-
tainty.” Th e second set of terms is “related to ‘opinio’, which [refers] 
to all that falls short of demonstrative reasoning.” Th e trouble with 
scientia arises with voluntarism and its elevation of divine omnipo-
tence and freedom: “What could be deduced about the natural order 
if God could intervene to change it any time?”1 With the increasing 
doubt about scientia a greater burden was placed on opinio, but opin-
ions must be judged by probability, which depends upon approbation 
of the proposition by authorities. How to trust authority in the time of 
Reformation where multiple authorities claimed truth for confl icting 
opinions? When the trusted epistemic basis came to reel, Descartes felt 
the need to fi ght the resulting skepticism and look for a new indisput-
able and rock-solid foundation for all knowledge. Th is foundational-
ism has dominated modern epistemology for centuries. 
Self-consciousness is the certainty that I have of my own existence. 
Even if my senses are deceived and if all that I experience is false, there 
must still be something that is deceived and that has experiences. Self-
consciousness ensures that I have absolutely no doubt that I am the 
real owner of my perceptions, feelings and thoughts. Th is phenom-
enon that is very familiar to most of us on a daily basis remains one 
of the major challenges of modern philosophy. 
1 Murphy 1990, 4.
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Th e key is this: in so far as it merely encounters the world, the ‘I’ is not 
itself encounterable . . . And if it cannot be encountered, it rather obvi-
ously cannot be encountered falsely. Th e source of Descartes’s certainty, 
then, lies in the unencounterability of the self in experience.2 
Th e fundamentum inconcussum of epistemology is indubitable because 
it is unobservable. Th is has caused some philosophers and neuro-
scientist to declare it a fi ction; for others it is an entirely biological 
phenomenon that is not observable yet but will be fully clarifi ed as 
the neurosciences progress; and still others view it as the puzzle that 
provokes us to philosophize and theologize, our gateway to the Great 
Beyond. 
Th e connection between the soul, as a most intimate self, and God 
is well-known theme in religious traditions. It is not until the period of 
German idealism, however, that an explicit philosophical link between 
subjectivity and metaphysics, between the I and the Absolute is made. 
Th is not only changes the perception of subjectivity; it also transforms 
the concept of God. Th e I is the gateway to the eternal, the boundless, 
the Absolute, and somehow this certainty of my own existence, this 
familiarity with myself, is thought to be extendable towards this Abso-
lute. It becomes within my grasp, it can be thought, it can be known. It 
is no longer an almighty and ominous Th ou: it is within reach in and 
through me. Th e I becomes omniscient and omnipotent: the Absolute. 
Th e consequence is a hubris that has strayed so far from Christian 
humility that it is (rightfully?) branded pantheistic. But before we take 
a closer look at this development in the next chapter, let us start where 
modern thinking usually starts: with Me. 
Aft er a brief phenomenology of I-hood to get an initial feel for the 
philosophical complexities associated with the familiar term I in 1.1., 
two models of self-consciousness from the 18th century will be looked 
into (1.2.). Th ese constitute the basis for Dieter Henrich’s contempo-
rary, metaphysical model of I-hood that will be studied in 1.3. In an 
excursus, another popular model of I-hood that claims it to be a physi-
cal rather than a metaphysical challenge will be discussed.
2 Powell 1990, 1f.
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1.1. A Brief Phenomenology of I-hood 
All people, with the possible exception of the very youngest and the 
most mentally impaired, seem to be able to think of themselves as a 
‘me,’ and this ability to say ‘I’ seems to separate us radically from other 
species. Homo sapiens is not a chunk of nature with a little human 
icing on top. It seems impossible to isolate an animal remainder from 
a purely human existence. “All that is natural changes when intro-
duced into the human domain,” Ludwig Heyde asserts. If we were 
to describe all of the characteristics and the complete biography of a 
person in minute detail, “something would still be left  out.” 
Th is something is referred to in terms of the I, the self, subjectivity, etc. 
It points at something that transcends, that is metaphysical in the origi-
nal sense of the word: beyond the realm of time and space. Its value is 
infi nite: it transcends all objectifi cation, all determination. Ecce homo: 
see the one who can never be presented adequately.3 
Th ere is an unmistakable and mysterious grandeur in human I-hood. 
It is inextricably one with its biology and its chemistry and surpasses 
it at the same time. It is based in brain tissue and neurotransmitters 
without being fully determined by these. It can think heaven while 
planted in the earth. 
Let us fi rst take a closer look at some diff erent aspects of this amaz-
ing phenomenon of I-hood. 
1. Familiarity
Th is I that I refer to as my self I experience as unique. It distin-
guishes me from the things and the people that surround me, all 
that is not-I. It is the natural point of departure of my (modern) 
thinking; it is my starting-point for interacting with the world; it 
off ers me the one perspective that only I with my unique physique, 
psychological make up, my biography, and my hopes and dreams 
can take. Th is I is more familiar to me than anything or anyone 
else in the world. Even my children and others for whom I would 
give my life (sacrifi ce this I-hood!) are outside this indisputable and 
fundamental familiarity of my I-hood.
3 Heyde 2000, 16; 71.
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2. Body
Th e realization ‘I am’ is not entirely separate from my corporality. 
My physical self is easily distinguished from the people whom I 
encounter: I do not feel their pain, I do not have the same images 
on my retina, and when I talk I do not really hear what I sound 
like to them. Nonetheless, my body is but a small portion of what 
I spontaneously call ‘me.’ Even if I surprise or disappoint myself 
with my behavior, if large portions of my body get paralyzed or 
amputated, if my face gets mutilated beyond recognition, if one 
morning I wake up deaf and blind, I am still ‘me.’ I may mourn 
what has been lost, I may stammer that I am no longer who I used 
to be, but I am still an I. Th ere is a TV-commercial for a probiotic 
that answers the question ‘Who takes care of you all your life?’ with 
‘Your body! Why not do something back?’ Th ere apparently is an I 
that has a body. Th e two: the I and its body do not fully overlap.
3. Personality
My I-ness also has something to do with my psychological make-
up. I have certain character traits, and there is a measure of continu-
ity in my reactions to people and situations. I am quite patient or 
rather short-tempered; I am usually cheerful or rather the moody 
type; I am impulsive or I tend to wait which way the wind blows. I 
also have preferences: I love chocolate or I prefer tuna salad; I like 
hymns or I prefer jazz; I love dogs or I prefer cats. I also have my 
specifi c talents and shortcomings: I can sing well or I am a good 
soccer player; I have no sense of direction or I cannot remember 
faces. I have my own typical fears and doubts: I am scared of spi-
ders or I cannot stand mice; I worry that I will never be able to stop 
smoking or I fear making a fool of myself when speaking German.
4. Synchronic identity
At any moment of the day I get bombarded with all sorts of stimuli. 
I hear traffi  c in the street; I hear a person laugh in the hallway; I 
see the letters appear on my computer screen; I feel my fi ngers 
touch the keys; I realize that I am thirsty; I wonder how my sister’s 
important meeting is going; and I feel that my shoulder muscles are 
cramped from typing. Nonetheless, I do not doubt for even a single 
moment that it is me who is experiencing all this. Th is aspect of my 
selfh ood is referred to as synchronic identity. Th is is the unity of 
my consciousness at any moment in time; I recognize all diff erent 
mental states that take place simultaneously as my own.
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5. Diachronic identity
Even aft er a good night’s sleep, I wake up in the morning as the 
same me. I remember what happened the day before, and I know 
what I had planned to do today. Memory is an important aspect 
of my sense of self. For John Locke (1632–1704) this ‘sameness of 
consciousness’ was even the main aspect of I-hood. Sidney Shoe-
maker has modifi ed Locke’s theory and speaks of person-stages. 
Two stages belong to the same person if and only if they are the end-
points of a series of stages such that each member of the series is 
memory-connected with the preceding member.4 
My sense of I-ness accompanies me through time.
All these aspects are part of that what we call subjectivity, the self, the 
I, or self-consciousness. 
Me versus the Rest of the World
Th e sense of being an I arises at a very young age and seemingly spon-
taneously. Th ose of us who are lucky enough to escape the horrors of 
severe psychiatric disorders, such as multiple personality syndrome, 
schizophrenia, and other serious mental dysfunction, develop a sense 
of familiarity with ourselves that accompanies us throughout the 
course of our life. Th e awareness of being a unique and individual I 
fi rst arises as the emphatic need to distinguish ourselves from those 
who surround us in early childhood. As soon as we start to discover 
this domain that we call ‘I,’ we seem to spend a great deal of energy in 
confi rming its boundaries. Th is is my territory and all who enter are 
loudly made aware of their trespassing. Th e constant and oft en tire-
some ‘no’ of two-year-olds with the intermittent but equally emphatic 
‘I do it’ seems to be an early expression of the awakening of self-con-
sciousness. All parents who have struggled with their toddlers’ terrible 
two’s know this all too well. Th is need to view the I as fully indepen-
dent individuality seems to come to a climax during adolescence. We 
need to detach from the unity with parents and realize that we have 
a life to live that is ours and ours alone. Self-consciousness is accom-
panied by a sense of separation from the world and the other I’s that 
4 Shoemaker 1984, 81.
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surround me. Being an I means being over and against an entire world 
of not-I’s. 
Where our own I stops and the rest of the world starts, seems 
demarcated by clear boundaries. Th e most basic limitations of our 
own self we have become acquainted with at a very young age: a 
cookie jar on a kitchen counter is beyond our grasp and defi nitely 
a not-I. Gradually we learn to distinguish between the not-I that is 
subject to the strict laws of nature (an ice cream cone dropped onto 
the pavement will be lost forever) and a not-I that is an I of its own. 
Sometimes these latter not-I’s can be called in as a very useful way to 
overcome certain less fl exible laws of nature. Mothers might just turn 
out to be providers of a brand new ice-cream cone when we loudly 
express our deep despair with the one lost. Th en again, sometimes 
we get confronted with human boundaries that seem even more rigid 
than our own. All parents have seen the bewilderment in the eyes 
of the young child who encounters another forceful I in the shape 
of another little emperor pulling at the same toy. Somewhere in the 
process of growing up we learn to distinguish between the not-I that 
is not itself an I and other I’s. We gradually start to realize that all 
these other I’s have this same sense of being an I. Th is relativizes 
the uniqueness of our own perspective. It forces us to stop viewing 
our surroundings as territory that is still beyond our reach but that 
can be annexed whenever we feel the need. We cannot expand our 
I indefi nitely; and it is the encounter with other I’s that makes this 
clear to us. 
My Interrelatedness with Others
However, what only seems to serve to distinguish me from the rest of 
the world also becomes the foundation for connection. Th is similar 
consciousness, this comparable sense of selfh ood that we recognize in 
others entices us to get into relationships. We can relate, and we feel 
invited to explore the overlap with others. We hurt when we witness 
the suff ering of others, and the laughter of a child in the street can 
brighten our day. I-hood not only distinguishes me from others; it also 
forms a basis for connection, for intimacy. I can meet you, get to know 
you, and love you. You can comfort me, make me see the world from a 
diff erent perspective, and call me your friend. We live in a community 
of I’s. However, the connection goes further. I do not always relate to 
the rest of the world as other.
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Surprisingly enough, it is neuroscientifi c research that seems to indi-
cate a certain degree of fl exibility in the boundaries between what we 
experience as I and the outside world. Johan den Boer, a professor of 
Biological Psychiatry at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands, 
reports about research that was done with a patient suff ering from what 
is called hemineglect. Aft er a stroke in a certain area in the right hemi-
sphere “these patients ignore information that is off ered to them in the 
left  visual fi eld.”5 Th is eff ect, however, is dependent upon the distance 
between the object and the body. When objects within arms’ reach are 
presented to the left  visual fi eld, hemineglect occurs. However, objects 
that are at a distance further than the length of an arm (in the so-called 
extrapersonal space) can be pointed at by means of a projection light-
pen. However, when the patient is given a stick that is long enough to 
reach the object in the extrapersonal space, hemineglect again occurs. 
It turns out that an artifi cial extension of the patient’s body causes a 
remapping in the brain of far space as near space. 
When the patient used the stick to reach for the object of interest in 
far space, the tool was coded as part of the patient’s hand . . . causing an 
expansion of the representation of the body schema.6 
My physical boundaries can expand; my I changes when I am han-
dling tools. 
Moreover, my brain’s sense of my boundaries not only changes 
when an object is placed in my hands. A neurological phenomenon 
exists that might support the possibility of real connections between 
individuals called mirror neurons. Th ese are nerve cells in specifi c 
areas of the brain that not only fi re when someone performs certain 
actions herself, but also when she observes the same action performed 
by another individual. Th ese neurons have been directly observed in 
primates and appear to exist in the human brain as well. Watching 
someone else ride a bicycle activates my own ‘bicycle-riding experi-
ence.’ Mirror neurons are believed to mediate understanding of other 
people’s goals and intentions, and our ability to predict and explain 
the mental states of others. Some studies suggest a link between mir-
ror neuron defi ciency and autism.7 If we posses a system in our brain 
5 Den Boer 2003, 210.
6 Berti and Frassinetti 2000, 418.
7 See, for example, L.M. Oberman et al. 2005, “EEG evidence for mirror neuron 
dysfunction in autism spectrum disorders”, In: Cognitive Brain Research, 24, 190–198. 
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that is able to fi re in synchrony with other brains, our association with 
those who surround us can no longer be considered as something 
merely external. We relate internally. You and I sympathize and syn-
chronize. Th ese fi ndings challenge us to speculate about the fl uidity of 
the boundaries between the I and the rest of the world. If a stick in my 
hand manages to change the boundaries of what the brain considers to 
be me, and if watching another dance activates ‘dancing’ in myself, it is 
no longer clear-cut where I stop and the rest of the world begins. 
Th is type of research might be confusing since we have learned to 
think of ourselves as separate from others. If my neighbor decides 
to go for a bike ride, it is his choice and none of my concern. Th en 
again, there are relationships in which we seem to accept a connec-
tion that is more intimate and demarcation lines that are less strict. 
Th is is particularly the case in love relationships where we occasion-
ally experience momentary loss of me-you boundaries. A love song 
by George Moustaki talks of lovers suff ering each other’s pains and 
sleepless nights. He sings: “I do not know where you begin; you do 
not know where I fi nish.”8 We may simply call this the poetical stam-
mering of a fool in love. However, we do seem to accept the existence 
of close connections between people that go way beyond the interac-
tion of physically well-defi ned bodies. We seem to honor things like 
premonitions about calamities about to happen to loved ones. We can 
hardly ignore the reports of people who feel the impending death of 
a geographically distant family member, of mothers who ‘know’ the 
moment their emigrated daughters go into labor. 
Especially in the parent-child relationship, we accept an intimacy 
that defi es the strictness of the I-not-I separation. Antjie Krog describes 
her experiences as a radio journalist reporting the hearings of the vic-
tims of apartheid in front of the South-African Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission. She reports about the mother of the murdered Phila 
Ndwandwe who bursts into tears when she receives proof of the death 
of her daughter who disappeared many years before saying: 
I cannot bear the fact that for all these years she has been in a grave less 
than ten kilometers away from me and that I did not know it. I did not 
feel it. My initial grief seems such a luxury all of a sudden.9 
J.H.G. Williams et al. (2001), “Imitation, mirror neurons and autism”, In: Neuro science 
and Biobehavioral Reviews, 25, 287–295.
8 “Je ne sais pas où tu commences, tu ne sais pas où je fi nis” (George Moustaki). 
9 Krog 2004, 15.
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In this statement, we hear echoes of a connection that defi es the regu-
lar I-not-I opposition. A mother apparently has to be aware of the 
whereabouts of her child, even in death. 
Apparently, we can participate in a unity with other people that 
goes way beyond the interactions between independent individuals. 
We can sympathize to a degree that surpasses all ethical duties. Maybe 
the time is ripe to change our views concerning our subjectivity. 
Maybe we should put the emphasis more on the aspect of connection, 
of unity, and less on isolated and autonomous I-hood that lives for 
itself, develops itself, and merely reaches out to others occasionally. 
Th is sketch of I-hood lays out some of the fundamental aspects involved. 
Th e major aim of this chapter is to present the ins and outs of a con-
temporary and authoritative model of self-consciousness developed by 
Dieter Henrich in the second half of the 20th century. Since Hen-
rich’s theory is infl uenced by the two older models that dominate the 
philosophy of the 18th and the 19th century, the so-called refl ection 
model and the production model, these will be discussed beforehand. 
Th ey form a good illustration of some of the aspects that make self-
consciousness such a philosophical enigma. Immanuel Kant, among 
others, uses the refl ection model. Even though Kant is aware of some 
of the diffi  culties associated with this model, it is Johann Gottlieb 
Fichte who fi rst fully realizes its shortcomings and spends most of his 
philosophical career trying to come up with a solution: the production 
model. Both the two older and Henrich’s contemporary model assume 
a metaphysical aspect to our subjectivity. Th ey claim that I-hood can-
not be explained within the constraints of physical models. It points 
beyond (meta)physics. 
1.2. Two Models of Self-Consciousness in German Idealism
A quick look at the empiricist tradition provides the background for 
the Kantian model of self-consciousness. For empiricism, the single 
perception is the only source of knowledge. David Hume (1711–1776) 
maintains that he is unable to think self-consciousness apart from a 
concrete perception. 
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I 
always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, 
light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself at 
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any time without a perception, and never observe any thing but the 
perception.10 
Th is observation seems true enough. When we turn our attention to 
our own mind, we are unable to observe an I over and above the whole 
of perceptions, impressions and sensations. I can perceive my body 
parts and my behavior, but no direct observation of my I-hood seems 
possible. Even though the neurosciences have made progress in locat-
ing diff erent areas in the brain responsible for diff erent types of func-
tions, up until now the I cannot be located nor observed in or outside 
the brain or the body in general. However, non-observability in this 
narrow sense of the word cannot be proof of non-existence. 
Furthermore, Hume’s theory runs into problems when he tries to 
think the connection between the separate sensations. For Hume the 
I is a construction of more basic entities; it is a bundle of perceptions. 
Nonetheless, we experience a continuity of consciousness and one 
single self who has all these diverse experiences. Th e question is how 
these concrete singular sensations, perceptions, and impressions can 
all belong to one singular consciousness and can be connected over 
time. When Hume states that he never encounters himself without 
concrete experiences, he overlooks the fact that things like sensations, 
impressions, and perceptions already have to contain some property 
that connects it to an I in order to be able to distinguish the person 
with the specifi c experiences from that what she is experiencing. If it 
were not for an accompanying sense of self, a person would not rec-
ognize her experiences as her own. 
1.2.1. Th e Refl ection Model of Self-Consciousness
In the chapter on paralogisms in the Critique of Pure Reason [Kritik 
der reinen Vernunft ] Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) agrees with Hume 
that the I is unobservable. It is “a condition that precedes all experi-
ence and makes the latter itself possible.”11 Even though this I as the 
common root of the two stems of human cognition, namely sensibility 
and understanding, is vital for all knowledge, it cannot be perceived 
10 Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Sect. 6. Of personal identity, SB 252.
11 KrV, A107. Th e translations are based upon the 1998 Cambridge Edition of 
Th e Critique of Pure Reason, translated and edited by P. Guyer and A.W. Wood. See 
Bibliography. 
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and is “to us unknown.”12 Contrary to Hume’s bundle theory, how-
ever, Kant argues that the subject must be a unity. 
Now no cognitions can occur in us, no connection and unity among 
them, without that unity of consciousness that precedes all data of the 
intuitions, and in relation to which all representation of objects is alone 
possible. Th is pure, original, unchanging consciousness I will now name 
transcendental apperception.13 
Hence transcendental apperception refers to the unitary, experienc-
ing subject that makes possible the necessary synthesis of experiential 
contents. 
Given Descartes’s view of the self as simple, substantial, and unitary, and 
Hume’s view that the self which experiences is no more than the set of 
those experiences, Kant argues [with Hume; CvW] that we cannot know 
the I to be substantial . . . At the same time, the I does exist [in agreement 
with Descartes; CvW], but as a necessary form of representation, a logi-
cal operator within the domain of our cognition.14
Kant distinguishes between two aspects of this unitary I:15
1. Th e synthetic unity of apperception (Identity)
Th is property of the I enables it to connect its representations. Expe-
rience requires the capacity to “synthetically bring about a determi-
nate combination of the given manifold;” the representations need 
to be unifi ed and related to an object in a determinate way.16 In 
order to yield intelligible experience all my representations must 
be brought together as mine: “all unifi cation of representations 
requires unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them.”17 
12 KrV, A15.
13 KrV, A107.
14 Powell 1990, 7f.
15 In English translations of the German das Ich several alternatives are used such 
as the I, the self, the Self, and the ego. Th e latter I fi nd undesirable since it is too closely 
associated with the negative aspect of being an I, such as egotism, having a large ego, 
ego-tripping, etc. Sometimes I will use ‘the self.’ However, since the German language 
also knows the term das Selbst, I do not usually prefer it. In any case, I do not see 
any justifi cation for capitalizing ‘the Self ’ since the German language, in contrast to 
English, capitalizes all its nouns. Overall, I will mostly stick with the plain and simple 




2. Th e analytic unity of apperception
Th e I think must be able to accompany all my representations; for oth-
erwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought 
at all, which is as much as to say that the representation would either be 
impossible or at least would be nothing for me.18 
Th e thought ‘I think’ can accompany all of my representations. Th is 
does not mean that the ‘I think’ must actually accompany each of 
my representations as long as the possibility exists for me to recog-
nize the representation as mine in an act of refl ection.
Transcendental apperception is consciousness of thinking. It is purely 
intellectual, independent of experience, and we do not even have a 
concept of it. “I am conscious of myself not as I appear to myself, nor 
as I am in myself, but only that I am.”19 Of self-consciousness, “that 
which I must presuppose in order to cognize an object at all,” I know 
nothing other than that it is.20 
Th us the subject of the categories cannot, by thinking them, obtain a 
concept of itself as an object of the categories; for in order to think 
them, it must take its pure self-consciousness, which is just what is to 
be explained, as its ground.21 
Self-consciousness itself is empty. In order for anything to be thought 
by this self-consciousness, all predicates pertaining to what is being 
thought must refer to something given to self-consciousness for think-
ing. Self-consciousness is a 
for itself wholly empty representation, . . . a mere consciousness that 
accompanies every concept . . . recognized only through the thoughts that 
are its predicates, and about which, in abstraction, we can never have 
even the least concept; because of which we therefore turn in a constant 
circle, since we must always already avail ourselves of the representation 
of it at all times in order to judge anything about it.22 
Th e model that Kant uses for self-consciousness has been named the 
refl ection model of self-consciousness. It is based on a tradition called the 
representation model of consciousness. It assumes that consciousness 
18 KrV, B131f.
19 KrV, B157.




is always consciousness of something, which implies a division in 
a subject of consciousness (the one who has consciousness) and an 
object (that of which consciousness is had). If self-consciousness is 
conceived according to this model, a subject-I directs its attention at 
something and recognizes this object as itself (object-I). Hence the 
subject has consciousness of itself: self-consciousness. 
Dieter Henrich has pointed out the diffi  culties that are associated 
with this model. First, the refl ection theory is circular. Refl ection is 
performed by a subject. Th is subject must be conscious of what it does 
while it is initiating this refl ection. Th erefore, that which is brought 
to “explicit consciousness through refl ection must be present, at least 
implicitly, so that it can call forth the act of refl ection which is directed 
to it.” Consequently, the self that appears explicitly has to be presup-
posed. “Th e refl ection theory can at most explain explicit experience 
of self, but no self-consciousness as such.” Furthermore and regardless 
of whether the I meets itself through an act of refl ection or otherwise, 
it must be able to distinguish itself from anything that is other than, 
diff erent from itself. In order to arrive at an identifi cation of itself, the 
I must already know under what conditions it can attribute that which 
it encounters, or that with which it becomes acquainted, to itself. Th e 
I must have some notion of itself beforehand.23 
Th erefore, the refl ection model turns out to be a dead-end street. 
How could the subject-I possibly recognize this object-I as itself ? 
Either the I that initiates the refl ection is already conscious of itself in 
which case the theory is circular. Th at what is to be proven, has to be 
presupposed: self-consciousness. Or the I has no awareness of itself in 
which case it is incomprehensible how it would ever come to recognize 
itself as itself.
Th e theory starts from the assumption that entities which have self-con-
sciousness can execute acts of refl ection which enable them to isolate 
their own states and activities thematically and to bring them to explicit 
consciousness.24 
However, there must be an immediate awareness that the self has of 
itself preceding all possible self-objectifi cation. Refl ections can ele-
vate self-consciousness to the status of self-knowledge, but they can-
not bring it into existence. Self-consciousness is not self-knowledge. 
23 Henrich 1970, 265. 
24 Ibid., 10. 
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Self-conscious beings have a pre-refl ective familiarity with themselves 
that precedes all refl ection. Hence, we must conclude that the refl ec-
tion model cannot give an adequate description of self-consciousness. 
We will return to these diffi  culties in 1.3.4. 
1.2.2. Fichte’s Attempts to Escape the Refl ection Model
For Kant the transcendental apperception is the ‘highest point’ of his 
Critique of Pure Reason in that it combines the two roots of knowl-
edge: the categories of understanding and the raw material concerning 
the outside world that the senses provide. It is the foundation of all 
knowledge but unknowable in itself. He writes: 
[Of this I] we cannot have any concept whatsoever, but can only revolve 
in a perpetual circle, since any judgment upon it has always already made 
use of its representation.25 
Kant does not seem too uncomfortable with this conclusion and is 
surprised to fi nd that a young generation of enthusiastic followers are 
intrigued by exactly this enigmatic I. 
Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) is the fi rst to fathom the full 
complexity of the I. An inexplicable self as it is represented by Kant is 
unsuitable as the foundation of knowledge in Fichte’s opinion, and the 
diff erent versions of his Wissenschaft slehre [Science of Knowledge] are 
subsequent attempts to solve the problem of self-consciousness. Fichte 
eloquently expresses his objections to the refl ection model in the next 
quote. Th e basis of the errors of other philosophical systems, even the 
Kantian, he writes, is that
Th ey view the I as a mirror in which an image is refl ected; but their mir-
ror does not see itself, for that mirror it takes a second mirror and so 
forth. As a result, what they see is not an explanation but merely refl ec-
tion. Th e I in the Wissenschaft slehre on the contrary is no mirror but an 
eye; it is a mirror that refl ects itself, an image of itself; through its own 
seeing the eye (the intellect) becomes its own image.26
Th e refl ection model originates in optics. A beam of light is sent from 
a light source, hits something, and is refl ected. Th e refl ection model 
sees the I as a mirror, Fichte argues, and in this mirror an image is 
visible. However, for the mirror (the I) to be able to see itself, another 
25 KrV, A345; B403f. 
26 GA IV, 2, 49. 
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mirror (I) has to be presupposed, ad infi nitum. Hence, the refl ection 
model has to presuppose what it wants to make visible. Because of the 
philosophical diffi  culties associated with the refl ection model of self-
consciousness, Fichte develops the production model.
In response to the shortcomings of the refl ection model, Fichte 
poses the following formula for self-consciousness in the 1794 Wis-
senschaft slehre, “Th e I posits itself absolutely as positing.”27 Karen Gloy 
analyzes this formula as follows: 
1.  To posit is the usual translation in this defi nition of the German 
setzen.28 Th e German setzen has two connotations: a practical one 
that means to produce, create, or eff ect and a theoretical one that 
means to determine. Th e two are not as far apart as one might 
think, and Fichte combines both in his formula. 
a.  In the practical sense the I brings itself into being, it causes its 
own existence [Dasein]; its being there. 
b.  To produce its own being in the theoretical sense means to cause 
it as a specifi c, determined way of being [Sosein]; its being such. 
When something is, it always has specifi c properties. Hence 
when the I poses itself, it brings itself into being as a specifi c, 
determined being. 
2.  As positing. ‘As’ refers to a given that is not only intuited but also 
known, hence grasped conceptually. It denotes something in phi-
losophy that can be specifi ed in a term. Term comes from terminus 
in Latin and means border. To be able to grasp something in a term 
means to demarcate it in a fi eld of possibilities. Th is self-positing is 
activity and knowing about the activity at the same time.29
3.  Absolutely is opposed to relatively or relationally. Absolute comes 
from the Latin absolvere which means to detach, to isolate. As 
opposed to the relative and relational, the Absolute is without nec-
essary relations. Hence, it is also beyond the cause-eff ect relation. 
It has no cause, no presupposition, no ground. Th erefore, the act 
27 GA I, 2, 409.
28 Unfortunately, much is lost in the translation. As Peter Heath and John Lachs 
point out in the Preface to their English translation of Fichte’s work, “’Posit’ falls short 
because it is a colorless word that has little value in philosophy and none in ordinary 
language, and completely lacks the rich suggestiveness of the German original” (Heath 
and Lachs 1982, xiv).
29 Th is element of both activity and knowing about the activity will play a central 
role in Henrich’s analysis of the inner structure of self-consciousness. See 1.3.5. 
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of positing is without all further ground. Th is implies that there is 
nothing that precedes or grounds the I. Th e I produces itself. 
4.  Itself. Just positing is not enough to guarantee that the self is not 
positing something that is totally diff erent from itself. Th e refl exive 
pronoun demands the identity of the product and the producer and 
of the activity and the awareness of the activity: the I that posits 
itself is self-production and self-consciousness combined. It is the 
triumphant positing ‘I am!’30 
Hence, there are three diff erences between the refl ection and the pro-
duction theory of self-consciousness:
1.  Th e refl ection model departs from an I that is pre-existent, whereas 
the production model does not yield an I until the end of a process; 
the I is produced by this process.
2.  Th e direction diff ers. In the refl ection model the direction of the 
subject is refl ected, turned back upon itself. Th e production model 
works with a one-sided relation of dependence; there is a cause and 
an eff ect.
3.  Th e refl ection model is indiff erent towards the role of the I in the 
relation; it can be an active and dynamic I or a static one. Th e pro-
duction model on the contrary has an I that plays an active and 
spontaneous role in the relation.31 
Fichte has gone through diff erent stages in the development of his 
model of self-consciousness. Henrich distinguishes three; Gloy argues 
that there are just two.32 Both agree that there is a late stage that dif-
fers signifi cantly from the fi rst. Th is is the stage in which Fichte makes 
use of the image of the eye, as in the quote at the beginning of this 
section. Here he defi nes the I as “an activity in which an eye has been 
inserted.”33 Th is obscure defi nition is diffi  cult to interpret. For Gloy it 
expresses the relationship between self-consciousness and the Abso-
lute. Th e eye is the symbol for consciousness that is directed at itself, 
self-consciousness as a whole, and the activity signifi es the Absolute. 
Hence, the question arises whether self-consciousness is the Absolute 
30 See Gloy 2004, 209–215.
31 Ibid., 210.
32 Ibid., 223f. and Henrich 1982c.
33 GA II, 6, 150.
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or whether it is inserted in the Absolute. In Gloy’s opinion, it is obvi-
ous in the formulation that for Fichte self-consciousness itself is not 
the Absolute. Both are called absolute, but a gap remains between 
absolute self-consciousness and the Absolute. 
Th ese two models of self-consciousness are important for this 
research for several reasons. Th ey form the philosophical background 
for both Schelling’s and Hölderlin’s theory of the relation between the 
I and the Absolute, as discussed in Chapter 3 and 4 respectively. More-
over, they are the starting-point for Dieter Henrich’s contemporary 
model of self-consciousness. Henrich will show in the following sec-
tion why he rejects the refl ection theory as philosophically inconsistent. 
Fichte’s production model is of great importance for all three authors. 
Th e very young Schelling will follow it for a number of years at the 
beginning of his career. But both Henrich and Hölderlin are critical 
because it might represent an unhealthy subjectivism. For Fichte the I 
is its own ground; it makes itself, so to say. Th e I is a powerful entity 
that produces itself and all that is. Th is dangerous lack of modesty is 
already corrected in his time by Hölderlin and has been made explicit 
in the 20th century by Henrich. Both Henrich and Hölderlin argue 
that the I has a ground to which it owes its existence. Th is ground is 
unknown and the I cannot control it. For Henrich this implies that the 
I feels powerless and grateful for its existence, whereas for Hölderlin 
the I longs for the (lost) unity of its ground all its life. Th ese diff erences 
will become clear in the course of this project.
1.3. Henrich’s Metaphysical Model of Self-Consciousness
In the course of the 19th century, the philosophy of subjectivity 
becomes associated with a search for certainty and a foundationalist 
program that has failed deplorably. It is consensus that the outcome 
of German idealism has proven to be disappointing, and Hegel’s 
claims that human knowledge of the Absolute can be achieved are 
unmasked as hubris. Subjectivity is replaced by a focus on external 
forces that shape and control the human mind such as the uncon-
scious, language, and a variety of social and economic forces. Jürgen 
Habermas argues that philosophy has progressed through three major 
paradigms. Aft er the ontological and the subjectivist (mentalist) para-
digm philosophy has now reached a third and superior one: the lin-
guistic paradigm. Other examples of a philosophical turn away from 
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subjectivity are the hermeneutic theories of Martin Heidegger and 
Hans-Georg Gadamer. 
In short, by the time Dieter Henrich34 starts his career as a philoso-
pher during the middle of the 20th century the subject has already 
been declared dead. Nonetheless, he makes self-consciousness the 
starting-point of his philosophy contrary to all 20th century hostility 
towards any attempt to restore the role of subjectivity at the center 
of contemporary thinking. He develops and defends his controversial 
philosophy of subjectivity and attempts to prove that the link between 
a philosophy of subjectivity and philosophical foundationalism can 
be avoided.35 Other than an allegedly outdated focus on subjectiv-
ity, Henrich’s philosophy has been criticized for what Habermas has 
called a “return to metaphysics.”36 Nonetheless, Henrich asserts that 
34 Dieter Henrich was born in 1927 in Marburg. He wrote his dissertation in 1950 
with Hans-Georg Gadamer about the unity of the Wissenschaft lehre of Max Weber. 
Th is is followed in 1956 by a thesis required for postdoctoral lecturing qualifi cation 
[Habilitationsschrift ] called Selbstbewusstsein und Sittlichkeit. Until 1960 he was the 
head of the Collegium Academicum in Heidelberg. From 1960 to 1965, he taught at 
the University of Berlin aft er which he returned to Heidelberg until 1981. From 1981 
until his retirement in 1994, he lectured at the university of Munich. Between 1968 
and 1986, he has held visiting professorships at Columbia University (1968–1973) 
and Harvard (1973–1986). Since 1997 he is a honorary professor at the Humboldt 
University in Berlin. In the more than two hundred works that he has published so 
far, the focus is on the historical reconstruction of the constellation of students and 
teachers who populated the Tübinger Stift  from 1790 to 1793 (the time of Hegel, 
Hölderlin, and Schelling), the University of Jena in the period from 1794 to 1795, and 
the Homburg Circle around Hölderlin and Hegel from 1797 to 1800. In his oeuvre, 
he combines a historical interest with a systematic approach and is considered an 
authority on the philosophy of Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and Hölderlin. His conviction that 
the enigmatic nature of self-consciousness forces philosophy to step beyond empiri-
cal boundaries into metaphysics is inspired by the German Idealists. Especially the 
infl uence of Hölderlin is obvious in Henrich’s assumption of a unitary ground of 
(self-)consciousness that is impenetrable to our powers of cognition. In contrast to the 
opinion that prevails in philosophy nowadays, Henrich believes that self-conscious-
ness should be the central focus of philosophy. In his work, he has attempted to bridge 
the gap between continental philosophy and Anglo-American analytic philosophy. 
Th e philosophy of subjectivity of Henrich and his students (Pothast, Cramer, and 
Tugendhat, a.o.) is oft en referred to as the Heidelberg School. 
35 Th e concept of self-consciousness is experiencing renewed attention in our day 
and age from an unexpected source. Neuroscientifi c research has led to an increased 
philosophical focus on self-consciousness once again. See, for example, Searle (2002), 
den Boer (2003), d’Aquili and Newberg (1999), Carruthers (2000). In addition, the 
analytic philosophy of mind has discovered the uniqueness and the epistemic primacy 
of the ‘fi rst-person perspective’ (see, for example, Frank 1994). It seems as if the sub-
ject has been declared dead prematurely. It was merely in a deep coma and seems to 
be regaining consciousness.
36 Habermas 1988, 267ff . 
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any philosophy that is unwilling to consider the questions that people 
ask in the course of a lifetime about their own being and the meaning 
of their existence is necessarily reductive. A theory that goes beyond 
empiricism might not be able to prove its arguments in the way that 
the natural sciences require, but it may nonetheless shed some light on 
questions that people cannot seem to avoid asking. 
Henrich’s metaphysics of the ground of self-consciousness and his 
defense of a type of speculative thinking that is considered outdated 
by many, will be discussed in Chapter 6. Let us now turn to his justi-
fi cation of a philosophy of subjectivity for the 20th century. 
1.3.1. Henrich’s Defense of a Philosophy of Subjectivity
Th e philosophical emphasis on self-consciousness originates in moder-
nity. Whereas Descartes introduces the cogito for its certitude immune 
to all skepticism, no one prior to Kant derives the formal constitution 
of knowledge as such from self-consciousness. Kant uses the ‘transcen-
dental unity of apperception,’ the ‘I think,’ as a starting point for the 
justifi cation of objective knowledge. However, it is not until German 
idealism that the internal structure of self-consciousness itself became 
the subject of philosophy, as has been mentioned earlier. Even though 
“they all believed themselves to be true Kantians,” the German ideal-
ists refuse to accept Kant’s conclusion that we can have no conceptual 
knowledge of this self that is the epistemic foundation of what makes 
objective knowledge possible.37 Self-consciousness is a disputed philo-
sophical principle from the very start; the idealists meet with opposi-
tion even in their own time. Th e empiricist tradition, with Locke and 
Hume as its most famous proponents, is marked by a general skep-
ticism about subjectivity culminating in Hume’s assertion that the I 
is nothing but a bundle of perceptions and cannot be observed still 
stands fi rm. However, even Hume admits that the I poses a riddle he 
cannot fathom.38 
Also 20th century philosophers like Heidegger and Levinas criti-
cize the concept of self-consciousness as a philosophical principle for 
several reasons. Firstly, it is said to represent a search for an absolute 
37 Henrich 2003, 31. Whenever good translations are available, the text will be 
based on these. In all other cases, they are mine.
38 Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, in: Gloy 2004, 269.
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principle that could be regarded as an ontological and epistemological 
foundation of all that is. Th is ‘forced identity’ annihilates all diff erence 
and otherness. Secondly, it is an attempt of the I to seize control of 
itself in self-refl ection and subsequently of the other as well. Th irdly, in 
a search for a fundamentum inconcussum it identifi es truth with abso-
lute certitude. Fourthly and fi nally, it is allegedly connected to a meta-
physics of presence representing an idea of transcendence that makes 
it fully available and manipulable. Critics of philosophy of subjectivity 
are convinced that it would be better to leave the failure of German 
idealism behind and to concentrate on pragmatism, phenomenology, 
or intersubjectivity. 
However, attempts to reject consciousness and self-consciousness 
as meaningful philosophical concepts have “not succeeded in depriv-
ing the term ‘self-consciousness’ of its currency,” Henrich asserts.39 He 
points out three factors that contribute to this tenacity: subjectivity is 
fascinating in its philosophical stubbornness; it is still considered the 
basis of cognition; it seems to be the best, if not only, starting-point 
for a metaphysical theory. Philosophical anti-subjectivism is based on 
a faulty idea of subjectivity, in his opinion. He proposes a new philoso-
phy of subjectivity that corresponds with the starting-point of German 
idealism for which self-consciousness forms the point of access to an 
absolute unitary ground. Th is does not imply, however, that his con-
clusions should or will be the same as those of German idealistic phi-
losophy. Instead of treating self-consciousness as self-explanatory and 
fully transparent self-presence, the experiences of ambivalence and 
anxiety that provoke the self-aware subject to philosophize should be 
emphasized. Conscious life is experienced as grounded in something 
that is unavailable for human cognition and that we have no con-
trol over. Experiences of darkness or obscurity [Dunkelheit] and of 
gratitude for what has been given to us (by whom or what?) dominate 
Henrich’s metaphysics of self-consciousness.40
It will become clear that Henrich remains skeptical about the pos-
sibility of a theoretical explanation of self-consciousness: scientifi c 
proof according to the standards of the natural sciences cannot be 
provided. However, that should not prevent philosophers from taking 
39 Henrich 1970, 258.
40 In this, Henrich follows Hölderlin’s philosophy rather than Schelling’s absolute 
idealism, as we will see in the course of this research. 
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subjectivity seriously and attempting to provide intelligent answers 
with respect to its structure and its foundations, he believes. Even 
when his conclusions can be criticized, his analysis of the diff erent 
aspects and the problems associated with our mysterious ability to 
know about ourselves is elucidating. Moreover, his insistence on the 
indispensability and the irreducibility of subjectivity, even if it might 
resist all theoretical analysis, is an important antidote for the negativ-
ity that impregnates (post)modern philosophy where the ultimate of 
human existence is supposedly expressed in the sentence “I prefer not 
to.”41 Henrich’s thinking refl ects a concern with the everyday questions 
and anxieties of human life and its search for meaning. He considers it 
the responsibility of philosophy as a scientifi c discipline to make sure 
that the highest that human beings can posses, self-consciousness of 
their being, does not dissolve or perish.42 
Since philosophy should be a refl ection of the way people experience 
their lives and try to make sense of their earthly existence, it should 
not be mere sterile intellectualism, “the kind of theoretically important 
but otherwise irrelevant activity whose motivation is demonstrating 
brilliant and analytical ability.” Philosophy should not be a game or 
a contest for intellectuals, but an interpretation of the questions that 
confront human beings as they live their lives. Philosophical refl ection 
should arise from the fundamental questions about reality as a whole 
and our place within it. As a self-explication of conscious life [Selbst-
verständigung des bewussten Lebens] philosophy should “be consonant 
with the way in which life already understands itself before it turns to 
philosophy.”43 Philosophy should take its starting-point from everyday 
life as people experience it and off er theories of this conscious life that 
are able to transform it.
Th is concern for the existential relevance of philosophy creates a 
certain tension in Henrich’s philosophy that it shares with the theories 
of German idealism. He states, “the Idealists’ program promised to 
bridge the gulf between philosophical theory and the internal expe-
rience of human life.” On the one hand, philosophy is expected to 
41 Th is is a statement of the character Bartleby, the scrivener in a short story of 
Herman Melville. Bartleby tells his perplexed boss “I would prefer not to” whenever 
asked to perform any kind of task. Giorgio Agamben refers to it in his book Homo 
sacer and makes this attitude appear as the ultimate of conscious life in a society cor-
rupted by power and betrayal. 
42 See Henrich 1999, 73.
43 Henrich 2003, 6.
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provide a profound analysis of the way we experience our life, which 
is oft en marked by obscurity, turmoil, and unrest about its true direc-
tion, and to provide cues for its orientation. On the other hand, phi-
losophy is supposed to be a scientifi c discipline capable of analyzing 
and systematizing these elusive and even contradictory tendencies. 
Th erefore, all contemporary criticism notwithstanding, Henrich is 
convinced that the philosophical topics that fascinated the German 
Idealists, such as human reason, freedom, and self-consciousness con-
tinue to be of major importance to any philosophy that wishes to take 
into account the full complexity of the way normal people live and ask 
questions about the why and the whereto of their lives. Furthermore, 
philosophy should not only be “a refl ection on the way that human 
existence is experienced, but it should also present the conceptual 
articulation of a possible ultimate life form.”44 It is this concern for 
the questions and the possible improvement of daily human life that 
provokes Dieter Freundlieb’s claim that Henrich “regards philosophy 
as not just a theoretical enterprise but as a potential source of existen-
tial guidance” and thereby restores philosophy’s role as “care of the 
soul” in a Platonic sense.45
‘Conscious life’ [bewusstes Leben] is a key term in Henrich’s philos-
ophy, but what is conscious life in his terms? Th e word ‘conscious’ 
neither refers to a range of extraordinary states of awareness, which 
people can generate with meditation or psychedelic drugs, nor does 
it amount to a purely rational or studied self-discipline, he asserts. 
However, it is not a life that is focused on natural urges and mere 
fulfi llment of daily needs. A conscious life is more than self-preserva-
tion in the biological sense of securing certain vital functions. Having 
a conscious life means to know about this life and about what aff ects 
it, and to use this knowledge to determine the course of this life or at 
least intervene in it.46 Conscious life is a life that we lead and that we 
have to endow with meaning. 
A modern theory of conscious life has to meet the following 
conditions:
44 Ibid., 29f.
45 Freundlieb 2003, vii. 
46 See Henrich 1999, 13.
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1.  It should do justice to the contradictory alternative starting-points 
of self-insights that are possible.47 Th eories that do justice to the 
complicated phenomenology of life are necessarily multidimen-
sional. Th ey correspond with the experiences of a conscious life 
that knows itself to be caught up in and oriented towards a complex 
of confl icting tendencies and states of mind.
2.  It should permit conscious life to understand itself as a unitary 
structure. Philosophy should provide a critical appraisal of all sorts 
of everyday convictions and integrate well-founded insights into a 
whole that can accommodate new questions and convictions. Even 
though in our times any kind of systematization is looked upon 
with great suspicion, Henrich is an advocate of a philosophical 
design that, as an integrated system, aims at being more than a 
collection of unconnected facts and insights. 
3.  It should be open to the scrutiny of radical inquiry and the prospect 
of scientifi c theory without making itself dependent upon either 
one.48 
Hence as an interpretation of conscious life, philosophy should not 
shy away from the results of other scientifi c disciplines but attempt to 
incorporate those insights instead. As a result, Henrich has engaged 
in a discussion with naturalistic interpretations of the research results 
of the neurosciences on quite a few occasions. Naturalism is highly 
reductive and insuffi  cient as a philosophy in Henrich’s opinion since 
it is unable to integrate subjectivity. However, it is not only from a 
philosophical perspective but also from an everyday point of view that 
it is not acceptable to think about our life in terms of a mere biologi-
cal phenomenon. If we are no more than natural beings with special 
attire, subject to natural laws, whose existence and death are coinci-
dental, then we are deaf to any kind of appeal to provide for a future 
for humanity or to any sort of heroism. Th e only ethics that comply 
with such a self-description are those of resignation, or perhaps of 
solidarity with everything else that suff ers from the smothering of its 
hope and spirit.49 
47 Th e contradictory self-perceptions of conscious life lie in the inevitable tension 
that is inherent in what Henrich calls the basic relation [Grundverhältnis] that we have 
to ourselves and the world. Th is will be discussed at length in 1.3.3. 
48 See Henrich 1982a, 133f.
49 See Henrich 1999, 17.
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Th is latter statement is another illustration of Henrich’s tendency to 
view philosophy as “care of the soul,” as Freundlieb calls it. Th is places 
him in a long and renowned tradition that has almost been forgotten 
in our universities today. To quote Freundlieb once again: 
Henrich’s conception of philosophy is one that was taken for granted 
by most major philosophers from Greek antiquity to German 
idealism. . . . Th is is the view that philosophy is not just a theoretical 
endeavor but also a kind of ‘life form’ or a spiritual and intellectual prac-
tice that transforms, or has the potential to transform, the subject that 
engages with philosophy.50 
Aft er this plea for a theory of subjectivity even for today, Henrich’s 
theory of self-consciousness will be unfolded in the remainder of this 
chapter, starting with the three philosophies on which his theory of 
self-consciousness is based. 
1.3.2. Th ree Classical Approaches to Self-Consciousness
Henrich’s theory of self-consciousness is based on three classical 
philosophies: 
1.  Th e Cartesian-Kantian use of self-consciousness as agency of indu-
bitable certitude that legitimizes all knowledge. Kant’s ‘I think’ as 
the cornerstone of his epistemology opposes the subject to the world 
as a whole.
2.  Th e Hegelian dialectic that enables him to place the self-conscious 
subject within the world. 
3.  Th e Stoic philosophy of the primordial familiarity of the I with 
itself from which the concern for its preservation results. 
1.3.2.1. Th e I Opposed to the World – Th e Kantian Angle51
Kant’s transcendental deduction aims to determine the scope and the 
limitations of what people are able to know. He takes the transcen-
dental unity of apperception [transzendentale Einheit der Apperzep-
tion] as the principle of all knowledge and calls this the “highest point” 
50 Freundlieb 2003, 154.
51 Th is section unfolds Henrich’s interpretation of Kant’s concept of self-conscious-
ness as the ursprünglich-synthetische Einheit der Apperzeption. Th is is not undisputed. 
However, since it forms one of the three cornerstones of Henrich’s theory and it is 
his theory that I am presenting, I will convey his view without elaborating on possible 
alternative interpretations. 
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[höchste Punkt] of theoretical philosophy. Th is unity of apperception 
fi nds expression in the ‘I think.’ Kant’s main interest, however, is not 
the internal structure of self-consciousness itself. 
He does not off er, or aim at, a theory of the nature of self-consciousness. 
He presupposes its unity and identity. Its nature was not a problem for 
him; it was his starting point.52 
Kant believes that it is actually impossible to substantially elucidate 
the structure of this ‘I think.’ Even though he provides us with cer-
tain clues about its nature, “the highest degree of interpretation is 
needed to clarify Kant’s foundational thoughts,” Henrich admits.53 In 
short, Kant’s ‘I think’ is certitude independent of all experience in the 
Cartesian sense; it is a certainty of one’s own being [Dasein] without 
individual features or any kind of diff erentiation. It lacks any kind of 
knowledge about the type of existence, yet it is produced by an act. 
According to Henrich, Kant distinguishes three aspects of self-
consciousness: 
1.  Self-consciousness has an aspect of subjectivity: the ‘mine-ness’ of 
all my thoughts. A thought is not mine because of its content; it is 
mine based on the accompanying thought ‘I think.’ 
2.  Self-consciousness is a unity: all my thoughts form one single 
whole. Somehow, I must be able to connect all types of elementary 
thoughts into one complex structure.
3.  Self-consciousness has an aspect of identity: the subject becomes 
aware of itself as one and the same in all its possible thoughts and 
states of consciousness. Th e ‘I think’ is identical “insofar as one can 
speak of the same ‘I’ in diff erent instances of thinking.” Kant also 
acknowledges this by speaking of “the identity of myself ‘in all the 
manifold of which I am conscious’ (B408).”54
Even though Kant has made attempts at developing his transcendental 
deduction from the aspects of subjectivity and unity, it is the aspect 
of the identity of self-consciousness that enables him to think the I as 
dependent upon a priori categories. 
52 Henrich 2003, 43.
53 Henrich 1989, 251.
54 Henrich 1989, 267.
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Firstly, identity indicates that the subject ‘recognizes’ itself as itself 
in the transition from one thought to the next. To attribute identity to 
the subject means “to attribute a great many diff erent states to it, in 
which it becomes conscious of itself as the same subject each time.”55 
Th is is only possible when self-consciousness is a consciousness of 
transition [Übergangsbewusstsein]. Th e subject has to know what it 
means to progress from one representational state to the next. Kant, 
according to Henrich, has not given a clear answer to the question of 
how this consciousness of transition can be possible without reference 
to specifi c transitions. However, when transitions in consciousness are 
only detectable in actual cases, it is impossible to understand how the 
transitions can be regulated by strictly general rules. It is meaning-
less to think of transition as something unspecifi c and preceding all 
experience. Th at is why it should be thought of as certain modes of 
transition. Th ese modes of transition have to be constant in order to 
make knowledge of the identity of the subject independent from all 
experience and therefore a priori. 
Secondly, the I of an actual ‘I think’-thought can also be the sub-
ject of other ‘I think’-thoughts. Th e identity of self-consciousness does 
not imply that all possible thoughts have to occur as the content of 
one single, actual ‘I think’-thought, but that such an ‘I think’-thought 
can accompany all thoughts of the subject. Henrich calls this inclusive 
unity [inbegriffl  iche Einheit]. 
A totality of possible ‘I think’-instances must be thought in such a way 
that from each of the instances the reference to all other instances is pos-
sible; that is, the reference both to the system as a whole, whose content 
cannot be defi ned as that of a single ‘I think’-thought, and to every other 
individual instance. And consequently all these individual ‘I think’-
instances in the totality, and not just the currently actual one, must be 
thought in such a way that precisely the same reference from them to 
the system as a whole, and every other individual ‘I think’-instance in 
it, is thought as possible. For without the possibility of such a universal 
relation of all ‘I think’-instances to one another which is independent of 
every actual transition and every actual reference, the identity of the ‘I’ 
for all ‘I think’-instances would have no fi xed a priori meaning.56 
55 Henrich 1976a, 72.
56 Henrich 1989, 273.
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Th e apriority of this knowledge is based in the fact that the ‘I think’-
thought does not arise separate from experience, but is not connected 
to any concrete thought content either. 
Th e aspect of identity of self-consciousness thus refers to two a priori 
categories of self-consciousness. Th e awareness of the subject as one 
and the same in all possible ‘I think’-thoughts [Inbegriffl  iche Einheit] 
and the familiarity with the transition from one separate ‘I think’-
thought to the next in such a way that both thoughts are recognizable 
as incidences of one and the same subject [Übergangsbewusstsein]. 
1.3.2.2. Th e I within the World – Th e Hegelian Angle
Kant’s ‘I think’ is a solid point of departure for all the I can know about 
the things of the world. Th ere are, however, certain shortcomings that 
Henrich points out. Kant works with a natural ontology of individual 
objects [Einzeldingen] in a causal (or other) confi guration [Ordnung] 
to one another. Even though this coincides with our familiar concep-
tion of the world, it poses a problem: individuality and confi guration 
are mutually dependent. Objects are just things that appear in a certain 
confi guration; and confi guration is constituted by objects. Hence, one 
cannot say that the ontology of individual things gives an adequate 
description of the world.57 Another shortcoming of Kant’s philosophy 
is that the world of objects is merely a phenomenological world. We 
never penetrate into the world of the Ding-an-sich. Th is is in confl ict 
with our deep-seated conviction that the objects we encounter in the 
world are real. Th is conviction seems to arise from our subjectivity, in 
which we experience our own worldly existence as real. Th erefore, self-
consciousness is not adequately expressed in the ‘I think’; it is rather 
the realization ‘I am.’ Th is ‘I am’ is not just a thought; it is an expres-
sion of the certainty that I have about the reality of my own existence. 
Th is subjective certainty of my own reality is superior in its epistemic 
status to any other type of knowledge. Hence, in the ‘I am’ I seem to 
overcome Kantian dualism and fi nd a unitary ground of my existence 
as both phenomenon and noumenon. Th is forms a challenge to search 
for a philosophy that supports the experience of being a real subject in 
57 See Henrich 1982a, 161.
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a real world. It is Hegel who provides Henrich with a complementary 
model.58 
Hegel’s dialectics pose such an alternative ontology in which the 
mutual opposition of objects and the opposition between object and 
confi guration are made to disappear. Th e ontology of individual things 
is substituted by a monistic ontology of the unity of self-relation [Selbst-
beziehung] and diff erential relation [Diff erenzbeziehung]. Th e thought 
of the independence of the diff erent individual things is given up in 
favor of the thought of the “diff erence with respect to itself.”59 All real-
ity is thought as the “other of itself ” [das Andere seiner selbst]. “Th e 
positive relation is in itself negative; everything is only itself insofar as 
it is also not identical to itself; all unmediated is essentially mediated; 
everything is one only insofar as it is also the other of itself.”60 
In a Hegelian monistic ontology, in as far as something is the other 
of itself, it is a process to stay identical to itself despite all kinds of 
changing states based on its self-referential negativity [selbstbezügliche 
Negation]. Th erefore, something is an individual thing, if it is capable 
of developing diff erences without getting lost in them or disappearing 
altogether. Also knowledge and in particular self-knowledge comply 
with this structure of self-referential otherness [selbstbezügliche Anders-
heit]. Self-knowledge is “the re-appropriation of the self through its 
otherness,” and self-consciousness becomes “knowing itself in the 
other of itself as itself.”61 Th is monistic conception makes it possible 
to overcome the natural antagonism between individual things and 
confi guration, circumvent the Kantian opposition between subjectiv-
ity and objectivity, and thereby situate self-consciousness in the world. 
Self-consciousness is simultaneously divided within itself as subject 
versus object and identical to itself. Hegel also argues that the I is both 
general (everyone is an I) and particular (everyone is unique in this 
I-ness). Th is simultaneous presence of the general and the particular, 
of identity and diff erence within subjectivity, allows Hegel to think the 
Absolute as subjectivity. 
Substance must be thought of as subject because the One that is the 
ground of everything is an activity that is essentially cognition, specifi -
cally cognition of itself. Th e One is not just knowable and the ground of 
58 Again, it is not Hegel’s metaphysics that is discussed here, but a brief review of 
Henrich’s integration of Hegelian ontology in his own system.
59 “Diff erenz gegen sich selbst” (Henrich 1982a,174).
60 Henrich 1982b, 199.
61 Ibid., 203; 175.
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all cognition, but it is the one Reality that is constituted by its epistemic 
self-relation. It is subject in this sense. But it is not just subject. It is the 
totality of what is real – as subject and thus also as substance.62 
Hence, Hegel’s dynamic monism (thus named because it is character-
ized by internal countermovements) overcomes Kantian dualism by 
incorporating all diff erences in the unity of a preceding ground, the 
Absolute, the One. Hegel believes that the Absolute, the One, and the 
way in which the diff erentiated world emerges from this unity can 
be known. Th is is where Henrich no longer agrees. No ontology, not 
even a monistic one that radically diff ers from our natural ontology, 
must ever lose sight of its origin in the subject with its only fi nite and 
limited faculty of reason, he believes. 
We will not study the Hegelian model here. In Chapter 3, we will see 
a similar type of reasoning when taking a closer look at the absolute 
idealism of the young Schelling who was also convinced that the Abso-
lute could be grasped by the human mind. In Chapter 6, we will see 
how Henrich’s metaphysics is closer to Hölderlin’s philosophy that is 
discussed in Chapter 4 since both believe that indeed a unitary ground 
must be postulated, but this ground is and remains beyond human 
powers of cognition. 
1.3.2.3. Self-Preservation – Th e Stoic Angle
In addition to the basic categories of self-consciousness mentioned 
above – being opposed to the world and being in the world – Henrich 
recognizes a third essential aspect of self-consciousness, namely self-
preservation. For his ideas concerning this element, he refers to the 
philosophy of the Stoa.
Stoicism maintains that something of a primordial fi re works in 
the world and in all beings. Th e participation in this fi re results in a 
sense of familiarity of a being with itself that precedes its relation to 
the world. In this self-familiarity (pre-refl ective self-consciousness) the 
drive for self-preservation originates and the human being experiences 
its reality. Modern philosophers such as Th omas Hobbes have picked 
up the Stoic theory of self-preservation. In contrast to traditional 
views, his anthropology asserts that the essence of life is to move from 
62 Henrich 1978, 205. Th e translation is Freundlieb’s. See Freundlieb 2003, 83.
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goal to goal; hence life is desire. Th e fear of destruction is linked to 
the fear to be stopped in the desire for the next goal. “It is the essence 
of people to resist the danger of destruction – it is self-preservation.”63 
Th us self-preservation becomes the foundation of modern anthropol-
ogy, ontology, and ethics. 
In Henrich’s interpretation self-preservation is the result of the 
experience of self-consciousness that it is not its own master. Self-
consciousness originates from and depends on a ground over which it 
has no control whatsoever. 
Self-consciousness comes into being in a context that cannot be under-
stood from its own powers or activity. And it arises in such a way that 
it is fundamentally aware of this dependency. Th erefore it must under-
stand itself from the necessity to preserve itself.64 
As a result, Henrich does not view the modern striving for progress 
with its unrestrained drive for technology and manipulation of the 
natural environment as arrogance or self-confi dence but rather as the 
fearful response of a being that is aware of the fact that it cannot guar-
antee its own existence and activity. Our subjectivity is aware of its own 
fi nitude and dependence. It knows that it has not brought itself into 
being and that it cannot prevent its own death. Th erefore in Henrich’s 
philosophy subjectivity is almost the opposite of the manifestation of 
the unstoppable drive towards self-assertion and self-empowerment. 
Th is raises the question of what the ground or origin may be of 
this self-consciousness subject that is not capable of providing its own 
foundation. Two parameters play a role in the answer:
1.  Since self-preservation is thought as radically opposed to preserva-
tion by an ‘Other,’ the ground of self-consciousness can never exist 
outside the self.
2.  Th is ground is not to be encountered as any kind of object. 
Hence the task is to think self-consciousness, which is concerned with 
its own self-preservation, in such a way that it is not its own cause, but 
that its ground can be understood as its very own essence. Henrich is 
not against a possible religious consequence of this thinking. Rather 
63 Henrich 1982b, 84. 
64 Ibid., 100.
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than Christianity, however, he sees Eastern religions as a philosophi-
cally consistent next step. 
Henrich’s thoughts on the ground of consciousness and on religion 
will be pursued in Chapter 6 aft er we have looked at the metaphysics 
of Schelling and Hölderlin fi rst. Now we will try to understand how 
these classical insights into self-consciousness return in Henrich’s con-
cept of the basic relation [Grundverhältnis]. 
1.3.3. Th e Basic Relation [Grundverhältnis]
In everyday life, there are a number of things that we take for granted 
in our relationship with the world. Henrich refers to this basic relation 
with the world as Grundverhältnis; a series of unquestioned convic-
tions about ourselves and the world.65 Th is Grundverhältnis can be 
divided into three aspects:
1. Self-consciousness
We know the world as a set of individual things [Einzelnen] in a 
certain causal (or other) confi guration [Ordnung]. Of these things 
we know certain properties and states. Even though a thing can 
change and can sometimes be hard to distinguish from another, we 
have ways to fi nd it back, to know it as the thing we were looking 
for, to ‘re-cognize’ it. But in this process we are known to make 
mistakes. Th is makes us realize that there is a diff erence between 
these things and ourselves. Consider, for example, the following 
situation: we see a person walking on the other side of the street, we 
take her for a family member, but upon closer inspection we realize 
we were mistaken. In contrast, when a person in a ‘normal’ state 
of mind walks down the street, she is never in any doubt that it is 
really she who is doing the walking there and then. Th is knowledge 
is immediate, i.e. not mediated by anything whatsoever. It is not the 
result of reasoning or deduction, it cannot be learned from other 
people, nor proven with hard evidence. It is a pre-refl ective famil-
iarity with myself as me. Th is is the aspect of self-consciousness in 
the Grundverhältnis.
65 See Henrich 1982a, 104.
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2. Subject
We can be wrong about ourselves in the sense that we can attribute 
characteristics and moods that are incorrect. I can consider myself 
more intelligent, courageous, tactless, or clumsy than I really am. 
Nevertheless, I have absolutely no doubt about the fact that I am and 
that it is me that I contribute all these (possibly faulty) characteristics 
to. Th is certainty is my starting-point in all my dealings with the 
objects that I encounter in the world. In this sense I have my unique 
perspective from which I view the world. I am opposed to the world 
as a whole. Th is is the subject-aspect of the Grundverhältnis.
3. Person
However, we also fi nd ourselves in the world. We know that we 
are only one among the many individual people and objects in this 
world, and we can describe ourselves just as we can describe all the 
other things that we come across. On the one hand, this enables us 
to enter into relationships with the other ‘things’ in the world. On 
the other hand, it makes us aware of our situation as a mere ‘world-
thing’ in the world order. We are one among many and this forces 
us the put our unicity into perspective. Th is is the person-aspect of 
the Grundverhältnis. 
None of these three aspects can exist independently from the others. 
Th ey are interwoven into “an inextricable unity,” and none of them 
can explain or cause the other two.66 I have an awareness of the fact 
that I am that does not result from perceptions or deductions. It can-
not be learned or copied from others: I have self-consciousness. I have 
no doubt whatsoever about the fact that I really am, and this certi-
tude is the basis of my encounter with and knowledge of everything 
in the world: I am aware of myself as subject. From this familiarity 
with myself, I am able to describe myself, to think about myself, and 
to make the distinction between myself and other self-conscious sub-
jects. I can relate to myself and to those that I share this world with: 
I am aware of myself as person. To follow the sequence backwards: 
whenever I am aware of myself as a person, I “understand [myself] as 
a person with subjective life.”67
66 Ibid., 107.
67 Ibid., 114. Both the self-consciousness aspect and the subject aspect of the 
Grundverhältnis distinguish between the way that I know of myself in a pre-refl ective 
familiarity and that I know of the rest of the world. Henrich is not consistent in his 
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Th is Grundverhältnis as the natural, everyday starting-point of our 
relation with ourselves, other people, and the world as a whole is thus 
characterized by internal contrast. From one point of view we are the 
centre of the world and from another we are a fragile and passing 
‘world-thing.’ Th e way in which we experience our lives has an aspect 
of self-centeredness, of self-suffi  ciency. Th ere is nothing that is more 
familiar to us than our own existence, and we simply cannot think the 
world without our own unique perspective. We know of our unique-
ness and consider ourselves valuable. At the same time, however, we 
realize that all the people around us know themselves to be equipped 
with a similar uniqueness. Th is awareness of being only one among 
many puts our life into perspective. Th e world can and will continue 
without us. Our unique point-of-view is not indispensable at all, and 
we have no control over its origination or its continuation. We are 
one among many and at the same time capable of a self-suffi  cient exis-
tence. “We are originally both of these, person and subject, and we are 
the one only insofar as we are the other.”68
To Henrich the Grundverhältnis is not only an indivisible whole 
from the point of view of its functioning. Th e three aspects of being-
subject, being-person, and self-consciousness also arise simultane-
ously. Th ey can only come into being as a whole; whether and when 
they do is beyond our control. Th e Grundverhältnis cannot be copied 
from or taught by others. It simply appears at a certain moment in our 
development or perhaps during a more prolonged period in our lives. 
Unnoticed we enter into it, and we have no idea of the how, when, or 
why: the Grundverhältnis has unthinkable origins. However, as soon 
as we have taken this step, there is no way back. We can only think 
those things that can be thought within the limits of and departing 
from the Grundverhältnis. In all our thoughts, acts, speech, and inter-
actions we are the self-conscious, unique, and self-suffi  cient starting-
point but at the same time undisputedly dependent upon each other 
and on the world as a whole. We have no idea of what lies before or 
beyond. Henrich recognizes the possibility of partial or fragmentary 
access to certain preliminary stages of the Grundverhältnis by way 
of early childhood experiences and experiences of pure awareness. 
descriptions of the Grundverhältnis; sometimes he distinguishes three aspects and at 
other times just two whereby the fi rst two are collapsed and merely referred to as 
subject. We will return to this problem later in this section.
68 Ibid., 137.
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However, he does not think that these constitute a true way back to 
the origins of our world experience. Th e Grundverhältnis irreversibly 
replaces such preliminary stages.69 
In order to clarify the coherence and the ambiguity of the Grund-
verhältnis from a diff erent perspective, Henrich turns to the analytic 
philosophy of mind and language. His starting-point is the use of 
propositions that take the subject-predicate form.70 He comes to the 
following analysis of the Grundverhältnis: 
1. Self-consciousness
a.  Indexicals (such as ‘here, this, now’) enable us to distinguish 
between similar things in the world: this pen is red and that pen is 
blue. Indicating functions, however, refer to a speaker with a spe-
cifi c point of view. Someone who can say I and employ language 
at a certain time and place while being aware of this personal 
perspective (Someone who knows herself in closer proximity to 
the red than to the blue pen). Without this self-conscious I the 
use of these indicators would be pointless.
b.  When elementary propositions of the subject-predicate form are 
about more abstract states of aff airs, self-consciousness becomes 
evident in a diff erent way. A statement can prove to be right or 
wrong. Propositions of the form ‘it seems’ or ‘it appears’ real-
ize the possibility of relating to one’s own states of belief in an 
affi  rmative or negative way. (It appeared to be a nice day for a 
long walk until I got caught in the rain. Th e dog seemed friendly 
enough until it bit me.) Th is ‘it appears’ implies a ‘me,’ someone 
to whom things appear in a certain way. A speaker exists who 
knows how to distinguish herself from the matters she voices 
opinions about. She is someone with self-consciousness.
2. Person
So who is this being with self-consciousness? Looking at the indexi-
cals the most obvious answer is: She who makes use of language at 
a specifi c place in time. Indexicals fi x the position in place and time. 
69 Ibid., 110. Hence, according to Henrich we are always aware of the duality in our 
most basic perspective. In Chapter 5, we will see where this viewpoint diff ers from 
Hölderlin’s, Fichte’s, and the early Schelling’s. 
70 By attributing predicates to a subject, we are able to distinguish one individual 
thing from another: a DVD is round and a computer screen is rectangular; my eyes 
are green and yours are blue. 
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Th us, it seems to follow that only a being that is located in space 
and time can be possessor of self-consciousness. In short, a person 
as a world-thing, one among the many other world-things. 
3. Subject
However, the above explanation becomes problematic, when we 
take a closer look at proposition of the ‘it appears’ or ‘it seems’ 
form. He or she to whom something seems to be the case is defi ned 
by “the entire context of the history of his or her beliefs and his or 
her successful or failed justifi cations,” Henrich asserts. Th is con-
text distinguishes this particular person unequivocally from all 
other persons. Th is person who preserves her sense of self across 
the stages of her history of beliefs has a peculiar form of identity 
independent of all spatiotemporal identifi cation; she is a subject.71 
Or worded diff erently: 
As regards the linguistic expression for self-consciousness, the I, the 
twofold meaning of identity associated with it can be marked thus: the 
fi rst person singular singles out its user according to his or her identity 
in a twofold way. In the case that the I is directly correlated to a ‘he,’ 
‘she,’ or ‘you,’ it is person among persons. However, if the I is corre-
lated to the ‘it’ of the third person neuter, it is subject. We understand 
ourselves equi-primordially as one among others and as one over and 
against the entire world.72 
As a user of indexical functions, I am able to localize myself in the 
world, to see myself as one among others. Nonetheless, if there is not a 
pre-existent familiarity with myself, how would I be able to distinguish 
myself from pens, dogs, and the weather? In order to be able to trust 
my own indicating, it is impossible to rely on my powers of perception 
since this would make my use of ‘I’ dependent upon self-perception 
resulting in the circularities of the refl ection model.73 Whenever I am 
able to localize myself in the world, I already have to know what it 
means to be an I. Such self-consciousness is obviously more than the 
ability to recognize myself in an image or a set of properties. Knowing 
about me as myself means being aware of myself in a way that is far 
more basic, ‘predicate-less’ even. Being able to attribute properties to 
myself – no matter how unrealistic – and to have opinions – no matter 




how unfounded – arises from the ability to create a distance between 
myself and my self-knowledge. It is the I as a subject who can do that.
It could be argued that subjectivity precedes intersubjective control, 
that the unity of the world is initially and fundamentally perceived 
as the totality of what lies outside this indubitable certainty of the 
subject. From this, the unity of the world would arise as everything 
that does not participate in the immediacy of the subject. However, 
Henrich is opposed to the Cartesian-Kantian viewpoint that takes the 
subject-aspect as the sole point of departure for our understanding of 
the world. He reason as follows: I can be wrong in my opinions about 
the world. I can be wrong in my perceptions, but the certainty that I 
have about my own subjectivity does not depend on any perception 
or intersubjective affi  rmation. My subjectivity is not the result of the 
experience of contrast to other subjects.74 Nonetheless, he disagrees 
with the claim that subjectivity brings the world as such into exis-
tence since the opposite is equally true: self-consciousness can only 
set in with the emergence of the world as such.75 We need the world 
and the interaction with objects and other people in order to realize 
that we are on the one hand inevitably in this world and on the other 
hand inescapably opposed to it. Th erefore, we have to say that the 
world that we encounter, even though we also fi nd ourselves part of it, 
does not truly enclose us. Neither does it clarify who or what we are.76 
Moreover, subjectivity is not simply a property of a person. All our 
properties such as name and physical characteristics we could imagine 
diff erently. We can step back, as it were, and look at ourselves with 
a diff erent set of properties. However, we cannot step back from our 
subjectivity; it is what does the stepping back. 
A few comments might be in order at this point. All Henrich’s 
explanations of the Grundverhältnis clearly distinguish between the 
subject- and the person-aspect. Whenever he describes the circum-
stances of conscious life, he always points out the duality of being 
a subject on the one hand and being a person on the other. How-
ever, self-consciousness as the last element of a triangular structure as 
described in this section does not become evident in many of his texts. 
74 See Henrich 2007, 61.
75 See Henrich 1982a, 140.
76 See Henrich 1999, 25.
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Sometimes it either appears to arise at a diff erent level, and at other 
times it merges with the subject-aspect. It seems as if self-conscious-
ness as the pre-refl ective certainty of my own existence is, contrary to 
Henrich’s explicit claims, the implicit basis of both the subject- and 
the person-aspect. I need to be an I, a self-aware being, before I can 
oppose myself (!) to the rest of the world as a whole and relate to other 
individuals as others (not-I’s). I can agree with Henrich that experi-
ences of the duality of my ‘me-ness’ confi rm my basic self-awareness. 
However, whereas the subject-aspect and the person-aspect seem to 
complement and defi ne one another and become more explicit in the 
course of a conscious life, self-consciousness as basic self-awareness 
seems to be their constant prerequisite. Dieter Freundlieb seems simi-
larly disoriented by Der Grund im Bewusstsein where he encounters 
what he calls a “superordinate subject in Henrich’s theory” for which 
there is “no systematic place.”77 Without getting into Freundlieb’s 
argumentation or agreeing with his rather off -hand suggestion that 
“perhaps the idea of the subject-object split within the subject must be 
abandoned altogether,” it illustrates the confusion that Henrich seems 
to create by sometimes claiming a triangular structure for the Grund-
verhältnis and usually just mentioning a person-subject duality. 
Furthermore, being a world-thing seems an inadequate descrip-
tion of personhood. Being one among many as a relativization of our 
uniqueness is but one side of what Henrich calls the person-aspect of 
the Grundverhältnis. We are not isolated entities that happen to bump 
into one another from time to time. Knowing that the familiarity with 
ourselves is shared by all those who surround us, forms a strong bond 
between individuals. It is the foundation of our interactions. Th ose of 
us who have been caught talking to the cactus in the windowsill or, 
even more embarrassingly, to the printer or the coff eemaker know that 
thinking of the ‘things’ that surround us as subjects comes naturally. 
Henrich’s theory is an enlightening analysis, in the Greek sense of the 
word, a laying apart, a dividing up of what it means to say ‘I,’ but it 
overemphasizes the duality of I-hood: the subject is over and against 
the rest of the world, and the person is desperate to prevent itself 
from drowning in a stream of ‘world-things.’ In 1.3.6. we will see how 
Henrich has tried to correct this oversight in his latest work Denken 
77 See Freundlieb 2003, 79f. For Der Grund im Bewusstsein, see Henrich 1992a. 
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und Selbstsein without entirely succeeding.78 Henrich is much better at 
thinking individuality than togetherness. As a result, his metaphysics, 
which is supposedly monistic, is affl  icted by inherent dualism none-
theless, as we will see in Chapter 6.
Th is criticism notwithstanding, Henrich’s theory off ers valuable 
insights into the contradictory tendencies in which conscious life is 
lived. Self-consciousness, being a subject, and being a person are inex-
tricably connected, but no element can be deduced from the other(s). 
As soon as philosophy tries to reconstruct instead of take the complex 
as its starting-point, it will be forced into circularities. Th erefore, one 
should understand these circles as a symptom of a false methodical 
orientation, Henrich rightfully claims. Th e elements of this complex 
arise simultaneously and without our infl uence. Th ere might be pre-
liminary stages, and it is defi nitely true that in the course of a life-
time basic self-awareness develops into a truly conscious life that can 
be clearly articulated, but we have absolutely no control over the fact 
that our I-hood arises and whatever it is that it arises from. Further-
more, even though the development of a fully mature self-conscious-
ness obviously depends on the right external stimuli, Henrich points 
out that its true ground is totally and completely endogenous. In this 
respect, his philosophy of subjectivity agrees with the neurosciences 
(ignoring the huge methodical and factual diff erences).79 
Does all this mean that we simply have to be satisfi ed with the con-
clusion that our conscious life is determined by something that is fully 
beyond our powers of understanding, or is there something more to 
be said about (self-)consciousness? Is it possible to point out some-
thing like an inner structure? Henrich thinks so. In the next section 
Henrich’s attempts to clarify the pre-refl ective sense of being an I will 
be elaborated upon.
1.3.4. Towards a Th eory of Self-Consciousness
Th e characteristics that a person contributes to herself can be true or 
false. Every statement about a person can provoke the legitimate ques-
tion whether such a person actually exists in the real world. Even when 
a specifi c person with certain features truly exists, a subject could ques-
tion whether she actually is that specifi c person. As a simple example 
78 Henrich 2007. 
79 See Henrich 1999, 62f. 
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of this possibility, Henrich reminds us of the condition of a person 
struck with amnesia. Such a person is truly subject, she has a real 
sense of being an I, of an existence that is hers and hers only. Never-
theless, she has no idea of the characteristics and relationships that 
would ‘normally’ identify her such as name, address, occupation, fam-
ily members, and friends. She is unable to connect the two aspects of 
conscious life: being a person and being a subject. She knows without 
a doubt, however, that she is. Th e awareness ‘I am’ cannot be mediated 
by anyone or anything, it does not result from deductions or indica-
tions, and it cannot be learned or copied from others. Self-conscious-
ness as a pre-refl ective familiarity with oneself is not caused by any 
thoughts or perceptions. It precedes self-knowledge and all knowledge 
in general. In the ‘I am’ the I’s thinking and its being coincide. Th e 
reality of the ‘I am’ seems to be the source of our sense of what is real 
in the world. 
Th e pre-refl ective awareness ‘I am’ is what Henrich refers to as self-
consciousness. It is very familiar to us and accompanies our every-
day dealings with ourselves, the people around us, and the world as 
a whole. We wake up to it every morning; and when we go to sleep, 
we never fear to wake up alienated from it. When contemplating self-
consciousness, however, even the simplest thoughts seem to lead to 
circularities. In order to think ‘I am,’ I have to already be. Nevertheless, 
I cannot be an I without the ability to think ‘I am.’ Wherever there is 
self-consciousness, something is described as self-consciousness. How-
ever, if this description is available in the fi rst place, then actual self-
consciousness is already present since what the concept indicates can 
only be understood from the state of aff airs to which it applies. “Th us 
self-consciousness is again presupposed, if it is to be possible in the 
fi rst place.”80 Furthermore, if self-consciousness exists, it is because 
consciousness somehow knows about itself. But insofar as conscious-
ness knows itself, it can only be thought of as self-consciousness. 
All this seems to make a philosophical description of self-conscious-
ness a hopeless task. Henrich has attempted to approach this enigma 
from several diff erent angles. His endeavors to develop a philosophy 
of self-consciousness have led him to the conclusion that any theory 
of self-consciousness must meet at least three conditions.
80 Henrich 1982a, 172.
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First, any theory of self-consciousness should avoid the pitfalls of 
the refl ection theory that 
starts from the assumption that beings that have self-consciousness can 
execute acts of refl ection which enable them to isolate their own states 
and activities thematically and to bring them to explicit consciousness.81 
Refl ection is indeed a possibility of beings capable of self-conscious-
ness, but that does not prove that refl ection is the basic structure of 
self-consciousness. Self-consciousness can never be defi ned or proven 
by means of refl ection. Th e ‘I think’ must be preceded by an ‘I am’ 
that cannot be grasped by our powers of refl ection. Henrich’s insights 
concerning the shortcomings of the refl ection theory of self-conscious-
ness have become known as the fi rst and the second Henrich-diffi  -
culties in the philosophy of subjectivity that were already mentioned 
briefl y in 1.2.1.
If self-consciousness is the result of an act of refl ection, a subject of 
this refl ection has to be presupposed. If I am able to refl ect on myself, 
some kind of ‘me’ has to be already available. 
If we assume that refl ection is an activity performed by the subject – and 
this assumption is hard to avoid – it is clear that refl ections presuppose 
an ‘I’ which is capable of self-initiating activity since the ‘I’ as a kind 
of quasi-act cannot become aware of its refl ection only aft er the fact. 
It must perform the refl ection and be conscious of what it does at the 
same time as it does it . . . Consequently; in refl ection, a consciousness of 
the subject is presupposed. Th erefore, the refl ection theory can at most 
explain explicit experience of self, but not self-consciousness as such.82
In order to be able to know that my self-consciousness concerns me 
and not someone or something else, I somehow need to be aware 
of myself as me beforehand. I will only be able to identify myself 
among all kinds of representations that I am capable of, if I already 
know of me.
Th e ‘I’ must have some notion that it is itself of which it becomes aware 
in self-consciousness. To this end, it is not requisite that it have any sort 
of conceptual knowledge of itself or that it be able to give a description 
of itself. But, in any case, it must be able to assert with certainty that in 
self-consciousness it is familiar with itself.83




In short, either the I is already conscious of itself; then the theory is 
circular and one presupposes a priori what one wants to explicate. Or 
the I is not conscious of itself and has no acquaintance with itself; then 
it cannot be understood how it could ever come to be able to recog-
nize itself, to predicate anything to itself, or distinguish itself from its 
surroundings. Th erefore the refl ection model of self-consciousness is 
inadequate. 
A second condition for a theory of self-consciousness is that it should 
start from a pre-refl ective familiarity with the phenomenon ‘conscious-
ness’ that seems to arise simultaneously with consciousness itself. In the 
article Self-consciousness. A Critical Introduction to a Th eory [Selbstbe-
wusstsein: Kritische Einleitung in eine Th eorie], Henrich tries to solve 
the riddle of self-consciousness through an analysis of consciousness.84 
Although he later admits that this model is unable to avoid circularities 
not unlike the ones the refl ection model gets caught up in, it is still an 
interesting analysis of the phenomenon self-consciousness. 
Henrich asserts that “self-consciousness cannot be understood 
without an analysis of consciousness,” but he notes that the term 
‘consciousness’ is oft en used rather ambiguously.85 Some consider it 
to be limited to that (learning) state where attention and discrimina-
tion of objects is evident, whereas others speak freely of consciousness 
in connection with states that are a lot more diffi  cult to describe, such 
as dream-consciousness. For Henrich consciousness is our ‘normal’ 
waking state that has a certain level of attention associated with it. 
Hence, something that we encounter on a daily basis. Since the transi-
tion from sleeping to waking and the diff erence between these states 
are familiar to us, we barely pay attention to this actually very odd 
phenomenon of “a world arising from nothingness, connected with 
the past only through memory and recognition.”86 
Nonetheless, its daily occurrence from a very young age does not 
suffi  ce as an explanation of our familiarity with the phenomenon. We 
seem to have a certain direct familiarity with consciousness that goes 
beyond our experience with the diff erence between waking, dreaming, 
or dreamless sleep. Neither is it the result of learning; it is a prerequi-
site for learning. Henrich speculates,
84 Henrich 1970. 
85 Henrich 1970, 258; 259f.
86 Ibid., 260.
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One is tempted to say that it is more likely that consciousness has access 
from itself to us, than that we have a method by which we make it acces-
sible to us.87 
It is not something that we can bring about or control in any way. 
Th e appearance of consciousness does not seem to be the result of our 
actions, since it takes consciousness to act. Our lack of initiative not-
withstanding, the moment we are conscious, we have an inexplicable 
familiarity with this state of being. Consciousness accompanies our 
waking thoughts, images, experiences, and movements. “In conscious-
ness there is no appearance of anything without something like an 
appearance of consciousness itself.”88
For any type of observation, consciousness has to be presupposed. 
Nevertheless, the state that we call consciousness itself cannot be 
observed. Consciousness as a condition for the ability to observe, can-
not itself belong to the class of entities that can be observed or known 
directly. Neither can consciousness be made accessible to investiga-
tion through something called ‘introspection.’ Henrich maintains that 
introspection is restricted to the domain of mental states that can be 
localized relative to the body such as feelings and emotions. Since 
many cognitive operations like thoughts and imagination have no 
direct association with the body, consciousness can never be observed, 
neither through the senses that are directed outwards nor through 
introspection, according to Henrich. 
Th e familiarity of the phenomenon of consciousness and Daniel 
Dennett’s bold book title Consciousness Explained notwithstanding, 
it turns out to be extremely diffi  cult to philosophically explain con-
sciousness.89 In order to avoid the type of circularities of the refl ection 
model consciousness should not be described as a performance, a con-
scious act of any kind. A term is needed that creates the arena in which 
refl ection can play its role. If refl ection is a performance, conscious-
ness that is its prerequisite “must be described, in contrast to it, as an 
event.” Consciousness is an event of a special sort. It is utterly singular 
and has no connection to anything else. It is impossible to have two 
cases of consciousness that overlap. Th e familiarity of consciousness 
with itself does not include other consciousnesses. Nevertheless, it is 
87 Ibid., 271.
88 Henrich 1970, 260.
89 See Dennett 1993. 
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an event that enables other events like perceptions and feelings, which 
obviously can be related. Consciousness itself, however, does not take 
place within a system and has no relation to any state that is without 
consciousness. Since it is actually only the condition for the possibility 
of a certain type of relation, dimension or medium might be a better 
word, Henrich concludes.90
Consciousness of anything without consciousness itself being 
known at the same time, and vice versa, is impossible. We are con-
scious of a state of aff airs only in the context of conscious life in 
which (implicit) familiarity with consciousness is always present. Th is 
coexistence of consciousness and familiarity with consciousness is not 
self-identifi cation. Once again, Henrich is eager to avoid the circular-
ity of the refl ection theory: consciousness cannot be its own object. 
“Consciousness is not its own master: it does not bring itself into exis-
tence through self-objectifi cation.”91 Here Henrich’s struggle with the 
diff erence and the link between consciousness and self-consciousness 
becomes quite clear. At times he seems to equate the two, for example 
when he writes, “Th us the task is to describe consciousness so that it 
is neither knowing self-reference nor identifi cation with itself.”92 On 
the other hand, he makes a distinction and this brings us to the third 
and fi nal condition for a theory of self-consciousness. 
Th irdly, such a theory of self-consciousness should be concerned 
with the relationship between consciousness and self-consciousness. 
Consciousness as we know it is always associated with an I. Th is does 
not mean, however, that the I controls the occurrence of conscious-
ness or determines its structure. On the contrary, “upon awakening a 
horizon of the world spreads itself out in which we then fi nd ourselves 
again as the one awakening.” Moreover, when falling asleep conscious-
ness does not end with some kind of “rudimentary experience of self, 
as one would expect to be the case if it was essentially dependent 
upon or related to a self,” Henrich remarks.93 As a consequence of 
this type of deliberations and in an attempt to avoid any type of cir-
cularity inherent in refl ection models, Henrich prefers the assumption 
of an I-less fi eld of consciousness that precedes the self-conscious I 
and all intentional acts. Within this selfl ess fi eld of consciousness, an 





I can establish itself and become the active principle of organization 
within. Th anks to the fact that it belongs to this fi eld the I is aware 
of itself and aware of itself as real. Because the I is an element of the 
dimension consciousness that is familiar with itself from the start, self-
consciousness is also pre-refl ective familiarity of the I with itself.
Hence, the I belongs to the fi eld of consciousness, but it is not its 
fundamental phenomenon, only a mode of its organization. Self-con-
sciousness is clearly grounded in something that is not its own product 
and that it cannot control. However, this cannot imply that there is no 
room for an active part for the I. Whatever this I might be, it is at least 
an active principle of organization in the fi eld of consciousness. Hence, 
in an originally I-less fi eld of consciousness an I becomes active. 
Th e three conditions discussed in this section have illustrated some 
important properties of self-consciousness and requirements for a phi-
losophy of subjectivity. To summarize: Firstly, assuming any kind of 
refl ectivity as part of self-consciousness will result in circularities that 
should be avoided. Secondly, a theory of self-consciousness must be 
closely linked to a theory of consciousness. Th irdly and fi nally, in such 
a theory self-consciousness should not be interpreted as its own cause 
but nonetheless be accredited with an active role. Th is is important 
information, but it still says very little about a possible inner struc-
ture of self-consciousness. It is however to be expected that such a 
complex structure exists. Th e fact that we are able to make a distinc-
tion within self-consciousness between an I to which we attribute all 
kinds of properties and an I that does the attributing might be a fi rst 
indication. Even though Henrich does not claim a defi nitive theory of 
the nature of self-consciousness, he thinks to be able to raise a corner 
of the veil with the assistance of Fichte. In the various versions of his 
Wissenschaft slehre Fichte progresses through several stages of clarify-
ing the complexity of self-consciousness. In an article called Fichte’s 
Original Insight, Henrich comes to a description of four elements that 
constitute the inner structure of self-consciousness in which he tries to 
combine the aspects of activity and pre-refl ective familiarity.94
94 Henrich 1982c. Chapter 5 on intellectual intuition will provide a more elaborate 
discussion of Fichte’s views on the prerefl ectivity of the I. 
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1.3.5. Analysis of Self-Consciousness Based on Fichte
Henrich argues that Fichte was the fi rst Kantian to realize that self-
consciousness must be an immediate (unmediated) awareness of the 
self. On the basis of Fichte’s analysis, Henrich comes to the following 
four elements constituting self-consciousness:
1.  Self-consciousness must be conceived as an activity. It is my self-
consciousness that enables me to experience my thoughts as a 
unity, that I can recognize myself in a variety of situations, that I 
have a sense of my (future) possibilities, and that I try to protect 
my life from all sorts of threats. I can relate to myself, and it is 
inconceivable that this can be the outcome of any activity other 
than my own. Th at I am capable of all this seems to be the result of 
the simple fact that ‘I am.’ 
2.  However, this aspect of activity in itself does not explain the way 
in which I achieve awareness of my own activity. Th is leads to the 
second aspect of the basic structure of the I. Th e activity of the I is 
at the same time self-awareness of this activity. When I put myself 
in relation to myself, this activity is always accompanied by the 
awareness of this activity. Th ere is a unity of the activity and the 
awareness of the activity that is a priori rather than outcome. It is 
exactly in the unity that both aspects become possible.
Th ese two elements (the activity in the self-relation and the awareness 
thereof ) form the basic structure of the I, but it takes two more aspects 
to understand the nature of self-consciousness in its entirety. Henrich 
calls these secondary but equally necessary. 
3.  Th e I needs a concept of itself as this unity of activity and awareness 
that it cannot bring about by itself. “It must rather presuppose that 
it can utilize it” before it can come to know of its own self-produc-
ing activity. Th is third element enables the I to distinguish between 
what is real and what is possible. Without it we would not be able to 
understand how we always know of our self-consciousness in a dou-
ble perspective – namely of what we really are and of an open hori-
zon of what can become real in and through us at the same time.95 
95 Henrich 1982b, 67f.
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4.  Th e fourth element complements the third. Th e I recognizes this 
unity as real; it is the capacity of the I to see itself as the reality of 
the unity of activity and knowing of the activity. Henrich refers to 
what Fichte calls the “intuitive presence of the totality of the ‘I’ ” 
[die anschauliche Gegenwart des Ganzen Ich]. Th e I cannot know 
itself solely on the basis of a concept; it has to have an intuition that 
guarantees its reality. It is this element of intuition that expresses 
the certainty that I have of my own existence.96
Together these four aspects form the unity of self-consciousness and 
they cannot exist separately. Even though the fi rst and the second ele-
ment form the basic structure of the I, the third and the fourth are 
indispensable: “the I has no knowledge of itself unless the intuition 
and the concept of the I are inextricably bound together with one 
another.”97 Only in the unity of all four elements self-consciousness is 
a reality, ‘I know that I am.’ In this formula Henrich sees the possibil-
ity of combining the pre-refl ective familiarity of the I with itself with 
an active role for it. Th is unity constitutes the essential reality of the I, 
but the four elements are the modes of its reality and also the aspects 
that any theory of self-consciousness has to take into account.98 
Th ree comments about the inexplicability of self-consciousness may 
be in order here. First of all: For his analysis of the structure of self-
consciousness, Henrich is indebted to Fichte to a large extent. How-
ever, he deviates at the point where Fichte talks of the ‘being-for-itself’ 
[Für-sich-Sein] of the subject in an anonymous, abstract sense in which 
individual I’s are no more than manifestations of their ground. Even 
when Henrich’s earlier attempts struggle with a similar tendency to 
connect an I to a pre-existing fi eld of consciousness (an it), he believes 
that an analysis of self-consciousness should not start from an anony-
mous being-for-itself, but from a being-for-myself [Für-mich-Sein]. 
Awareness of the I can only arise out of the I itself. Th us, it becomes 
96 In Chapter 5, we will see how Fichte develops a theory of intellectual intuition, 
which he tries to link to Kant’s transcendental unit of apperception. Th is intuition of 
the (absolute) I is transformed by Schelling and Hölderlin into an intuition of some-
thing beyond the mere “I am.” It becomes an intuition of the unitary ground of all that 
is. Henrich obviously refuses to take this step. He maintains that we cannot go beyond 
the Grundverhältnis in order to experience the oneness that precedes it. 
97 Henrich 1982c, 29f.
98 See Henrich 1982b, 69.
62 chapter one
necessary to think from within the I, beyond it, into a transcendent 
ground as a real possibility of the existence of this I. Th is metaphysical 
move will be discussed in Chapter 6 aft er we have looked more closely 
at the original German idealistic attempts that it is based on. 
Th is brings us to the second comment: Self-consciousness is com-
pletely at a loss when it comes to cause of or reason for its genesis. 
Henrich uses the term obscurity [Dunkelheit] to indicate the enigma 
of this I that is on the one hand activity and on the other hand unable 
to control its own occurrence.99 With Hölderlin, as will be shown in 
Chapter 4, Henrich claims that the ground of self-consciousness is 
beyond human powers of cognition. He asserts that it is 
not to be brought to any kind of presence that would then make it avail-
able for some sort of demonstration or proof. To present this ground 
would mean that the knowing self-relation could be surpassed which in 
turn presupposes that it could fi rst be explained adequately.100 
Th e unknowability of self-consciousness can function as a reminder 
of the transcendence of the ground from which it arises. It is precisely 
this aspect where Henrich’s and Hölderlin’s philosophy of subjectivity 
merge that enables them to ward off  the criticism of hubris and self-
absolutization of which German idealism in general has been accused. 
Th e spirit of modernity is not seized by the fever of subjectivism that 
ends in the pure will to power, Henrich asserts. Th e fact that modern 
man is aware of his freedom to make decisions about the way he leads 
his life means something other than repression of the fact that it is not 
he himself who gives this power to realize himself. What has to pre-
serve itself but has no control over its origins and continuation does 
not feel lord and master over its life but rather insecure and grateful 
for its existence instead.101 
Th irdly and fi nally, in Henrich’s opinion there is no causal relation 
in the Cartesian sense that my thinking (cogito) is the cause of my sense 
of reality (ergo sum). Even though Henrich is never explicit about this, 
he admits to an intuitive aspect in I-hood that might be a unique kind 
of knowledge that cannot be described within a Kantian framework. 
 99 He speaks of the “Unverfüglichkeit des Auft retens von Selbstbewusstsein für 
sich selbst” (Henrich 1982b, 81).
100 Henrich 2001, 56.
101 See Henrich 1982b, 81. Th e obscure ground of consciousness and Henrich’s 
views on freedom will be discussed in 6.1.1. and 6.1.2. 
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Kant’s dualism never succeeded in integrating the noumenal and the 
phenomenal worlds that seem to merge in the self-conscious subject. 
It is the conviction of German idealism in general that somewhere 
within the I dualism can be transcended and that at least the beginning 
of this step across the Kantian divide into unity can be experienced 
by and in this self. Intellectual intuition [intellektuelle or intellektuale 
Anschauung] is the term used. Henrich does not want to make that 
step explicitly. He rather thinks in terms of the Grundverhältnis in 
which self-consciousness is always linked with an awareness of my 
torn existence as a subject with a unique position opposed to the world 
as a whole and as a person who is just a passing thing in the world. Th e 
term intellectual intuition as it functions in the late 18th and early 19th 
century will be discussed extensively in Chapter 5. We will now turn 
to one last topic in Henrich’s view on I-hood. As was said, in 1.3.3. 
he tends to overemphasize duality at the detriment of the I’s ability to 
experience unity. Being an I is prior to being-with, in Henrich’s view. 
He maintains that self-consciousness does not arise as a result of the 
experience of contrast to other I-sayers who surround me.102 Nonethe-
less, relationality belongs, like the self-relation, to the elementary facts 
of our lives. Let us therefore turn to some of Henrich’s thoughts on 
the subject’s co-existence with other subjects.
1.3.6. Th e Subject’s Being-With [Mitsein]
In his early work, Henrich depicts the person-aspect of being an I 
primarily as an isolated individual, a ‘world-thing.’ In the course of 
his career, he seems to have become aware of the shortcomings of 
this view and tries to develop a more relational concept of the person. 
Important aspects in the subject’s being with other subjects, Mitsein, 
are body, language, and social confi gurations.
All being-with [Mitsein] of subjects is mediated through the body 
[Leib], Henrich asserts.103 Even if our bodies are objects [Körper] in this 
world, we do not relate to them as to all other objects. As Leib the body 
mediates the subject’s position in the world, it must be permeated with 
a kind of sensing awareness of itself. Th is is called proprioception and 
102 See Henrich 2007, 61. 
103 He makes the distinction between the German Leib, as the experienced body 
and the Körper as the object in the world. Since “body” is ambiguous, I will be using 
the German terms. 
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could be viewed as the counterpart of self-consciousness. Even when 
proprioception, sense of being-in-my-body, is not the same as my sub-
jectivity, being-me, there are striking parallels. Neither the awareness 
that we are nor this relationship with our bodies, we can bring about 
by ourselves. My Leib is also the medium in which the dynamics of my 
subjectivity fi nd expression in a way that can never be fully steered by 
my intentions. Th e Leib is closely connected to and expresses subjectiv-
ity. Th is is the reason that interaction between people does not require 
constant explanation. We do not detect the Körper of others that we 
subsequently interpret as their Leib. We immediately perceive the Leib 
of another. Th is is only possible when two complementary processes 
that precede consciousness take place instantaneously: the conversion 
of the self-perception in a bodily expression and the perception of the 
expression as such through others. Th e extremely complex processes 
that somehow surpass the diff erence between self-perception and the 
perception of another are the core of our being-with. Even when Hen-
rich thus attempts to overcome the total isolation of the I and create 
at least the possibility of openness, he is in a hurry to assert that this 
mechanism can never undo the distinctiveness of diff erent subjects.104 
In general, he still seems unwilling to allow for any type of fundamen-
tal togetherness for individual persons. 
Nonetheless, when young children come to (self-)consciousness, 
they always do this in a context of intersubjectivity, and more specifi -
cally in a cultural and linguistic setting, he agrees. If raised in a setting 
in which language is absent, no language will ever be acquired. It is 
therefore not inconceivable that subjectivity should be grounded in 
the linguistic interaction system of a community. Aft er all, ‘I’ is only 
meaningfully used in connection with ‘you’ and ‘we,’ and language 
is much more than a medium to inform others of what has already 
been articulated soundlessly. It off ers unique opportunities to the 
intellect that it would never possess without it. Nonetheless, neither 
intelligence nor subjectivity can be explained by the use of language, 
Henrich argues. We are not born with a language but only with the 
ability to learn a language, and we communicate before we acquire a 
language. We only meaningfully use ‘I’ and ‘you’ aft er we have reached 
a more than rudimentary self-consciousness. Even if we start from a 
primitive ability to utter sounds, just hearing sounds will not lead to 
104 See Henrich 2007, 181–186. 
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an awareness of myself as their initiator. It takes a degree of self-con-
sciousness in order to be aware that it is me producing the sounds. 
An adult who is talking will normally not hear the sound of herself 
talking. And if she does, it results from a stepping back from herself 
speaking. Th is stepping back does not generate self-consciousness; the 
ability to step back is caused by it.105
In Henrich’s view, language refl ects the duality of the Grundverhält-
nis. Language is not only the medium for one-on-one contact. Even 
though human beings are born with the ability to learn languages, 
these themselves are pre-given to theirs users. Languages belong to 
large groups of people and by acquiring a language, the child grows 
into a specifi c culture. In that sense, we are determined by our culture 
and the social confi gurations in which we grow up and live our adult 
lives. Th e awareness of living in a social context makes us realize that 
we are not our own ground. We oft en experience the hegemony of 
these social structures, but the fact that they are imposed upon us does 
not imply that these confi gurations are independent of our subjectiv-
ity. Th ey remain the product of subjects. Even if we are profoundly 
changed because of our position within, they do not aff ect our subjec-
tivity as such, according to Henrich.106 
Each social interaction is characterized by dependence, if only 
because of the necessary mutuality. Th e situation and the spectrum 
of our actions have been brought about by others, and in our actions 
we are limited by the other people involved. Knowing that one stands 
in a social confi guration makes us more aware of the fact that we are 
not grounded in ourselves but subject to external limitations. Even 
though it is clear that people can be radically changed by the fact 
that they belong to social structures, these changes do not aff ect their 
subjectivity as such. Henrich is convinced, the importance of being-
with notwithstanding, that our ability to be an I precedes our rela-
tionality. Our subjectivity is not the result of intersubjectivity; it is 
the condition for its possibility. Even if Henrich seems aware of the 
fact that his concept of the self-conscious I results in isolated indi-
viduals [Einzelnen] without any essential interconnection, these later 
attempts do not succeed in overcoming this limitation, in my opin-
ion. Since being-with is obviously not the major concern of Henrich’s 
105 Ibid., 155–160. 
106 Ibid., 188–193.
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philosophy, I will not elaborate here. Th e theme will be picked up 
again in Chapter 6 where Henrich’s views of the ground of conscious-
ness and freedom will be discussed. 
Henrich’s major opponent in contemporary philosophy appears to be 
naturalism as the types of philosophies that deny (the need for) the 
metaphysical to explain I-hood. In advance of elaboration in Chapter 
6, I will provide a description of naturalism in the following excur-
sus. Henrich’s interest in naturalism is not just a private preoccupa-
tion. Th ere are several reasons to discuss naturalism in the context of 
a metaphysical project. First, naturalism, or philosophical materialism, 
says that matter is all there is and that everything should somehow 
be explainable according to the laws of the natural sciences. It has its 
roots in the empiricist tradition, one of the philosophical positions 
that Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason intended to correct. Apparently, 
arguments of the empirical tradition have challenged the more meta-
physically inclined philosopher for several centuries at least. In addi-
tion to that, both naturalism on the one hand and Henrich’s theory of 
the unknowable ground of (self-)consciousness on the other are said 
to be representatives of a form of philosophical monism. In the case 
of naturalism, matter is the one and only ground of all that is, and this 
ground is ultimately within reach of knowledge since it obeys natural 
laws. In Henrich’s philosophy, as will become clear in Chapter 6, the 
unitary ground of consciousness is beyond the empirical and therefore 
ultimately beyond human cognition. 
Excursus: A Naturalistic Model of I-hood
Naturalism is a generic term for a broad fi eld of philosophical theo-
ries that have only one thing in common: the assertion that life in 
its full complexity can be explained by natural laws alone. Th e mind, 
consciousness, and self-consciousness are considered material events; 
processes that can be localized in and explained by the workings of the 
human brain. According to Peter Carruthers
Naturalism is the belief that all of the events which occur in the world 
are natural ones, happening in accordance with causal law. So there are 
no miracles, and everything which happens can in principle be provided 
with a causal explanation, or is subsumable under laws.107 
107 Carruthers 2000, 4.
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For naturalism, there is no such thing as an I-hood that reaches beyond 
the realm of physics, something that would require the necessity of 
metaphysical musings. Th e human brain has been formed as the result 
of natural selection and is programmed for survival according to the 
same Darwinian laws that guide the origins and the adaptation of other 
organs and species. As the biologist and professor of systematic theol-
ogy, Ulrich Lüke characterizes this reductionistic type of thinking with 
Julian Huxley’s words: the “nothing else buttery.” We are nothing else 
but a mammal from the order of the primates.108 Our incapacity to fully 
understand all the biochemical, physiological, and other natural pro-
cesses in the brain causes us to think beyond the physical and invent 
terms like transcendence, self, and God, according to Steven Pinker. 
We can well imagine creatures with fewer cognitive faculties than we 
have . . . So why should there not be creatures with more . . . or diff er-
ent ones? . . . [Th ey] would be amused by the religious and philosophi-
cal headstands we do to make up for our blankness when facing these 
problems.109 
Human I-hood is not an enigma that calls for metaphysics; it is a phe-
nomenon that results from the natural workings of brain tissue. Most 
naturalists also reject the concept of freedom. Our decisions are deter-
mined by basic neurological processes; they are the result of biochemi-
cal reactions and biological structure. How could a non-material free 
will infl uence these? In short, the entire world with its multiplicity of 
creepy crawlers including homo sapiens is the result of and subject to 
natural laws. Metaphysics is a left over from times that human beings 
were too primitive to know about these laws. Even theologians will 
come to realize this in the (near) future.
Th e following sections will give a general overview of naturalistic 
thinking. Th ere is of course no such thing as ‘the average naturalist.’ 
Th is means that the following will not do justice to both the intricacies 
and the simplicities of individual naturalistic philosophies. First of all, 
three forms can be distinguished: 
1.  Metaphysical naturalism. It denies the existence of anything beyond 
the domain of the natural sciences.
108 See Lüke 2004. Th e title of the book, Das Säugetier von Gottes Gnaden, means 
Th e Mammal of God’s Grace. 
109 Pinker 1997, 562. 
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2.  Semantic naturalism. Th is is the conviction that (philosophical) 
explanations of phenomena should not be independent from the 
domain of the vocabulary of the natural sciences.
3.  Methodological naturalism. Th is is the certitude that the domain 
and the method of philosophy is the same as that of the natural 
sciences.110
We will mostly occupy ourselves with the naturalism of three authors: 
Owen Flanagan, Daniel Dennett, and Andrew Newberg.111
Self-Consciousness
Flanagan asserts that the problem is that we are caught between two 
confl icting grand images of who we are: “the humanistic and the sci-
entifi c.” Th e humanistic says that
we are spiritual beings endowed with free will – a capacity that no ordi-
nary animal possesses and that permits us to circumvent ordinary laws 
of cause and eff ect. . . . Th e scientifi c image says that we are animals that 
evolved according to the principles of natural selection.112 
Even though many details in the scientifi c image are still lacking, he 
thinks to be able to conceive of an anthropology that is more “robust 
and authentic” than the truths of perennial philosophy and classic lit-
erature, and that shows “how to conceive of mind, morals, and the 
meaning of life from the perspective of the scientifi c image.”113
Th e fi rst step consists of what he calls “desouling persons,” which 
means that we need to “demythologize” them.114 Human beings are 
intelligent animals looking for meaning but this does not justify the 
conclusion that this intelligence is a gift  from a higher intelligent being 
and their lives can only be meaningful if meaning “is imposed by an 
110 See Perler 2003, 18–21.
111 Flanagan is James B. Duke Professor of Philosophy at Duke University in North 
Carolina. Dennett is Distinguished Professor of Arts and Sciences and Director of the 
Center of Cognitive Studies at Tuft s University in Massachusetts. Newberg is Associ-
ate professor in the Departments of Radiology and Psychiatry at the Hospital of the 
University of Pennsylvania, adjunct assistant professor in the Department of Religious 
Studies, and Director of the Centre for Spirituality and the Mind at the University of 
Pennsylvania.




inexplicable and undefi nable alien being.”115 He asserts that the reason 
why it is so diffi  cult to adopt the scientifi c image is 
the story in which our life is embedded and from whose perspective it is 
shaped. Once we reach an age where we do have some control, we work 
from the image, from the story that is already deeply absorbed, a story 
line that is already part of our self-image.116 
Even though there might be other, more convincing stories “conser-
vatism reigns. You will be, as we say, messed up if you try to remake 
yourself with wholly new cloth.”117 He himself was raised a Roman 
Catholic but admits a “more than passing interest in Tibetan Bud-
dhism” since it “provides a way of thinking about human nature that is 
more congenial than our own to the view suggested by contemporary 
mind science.”118
Dennett also asserts, “the Self – or the Soul – is really just an abstrac-
tion.”119 Nevertheless, he believes that a person is more than a mere 
physical entity: “A person is not just a body; a person has a body.”120 
He even seems to contradict himself when he admits, “People have 
selves.”121 However, for Dennett this self is a “fundamental biological 
principle” that we need in order to distinguish “self from world, inside 
from outside,” which again is necessary for our survival.122 Animals 
also protect their outer boundaries with things like shells or with com-
plicated architectural constructions like the dams of beavers and the 
castles of termites. However, the most amazing and intricate construc-
tions are made by Homo sapiens.
Each normal individual of this species makes a self. Out of its brain it 
spins a web of words and deeds, and, like the other creatures, it doesn’t 
have to know what it is doing; it just does it. Th is web protects it, just 
like the snail’s shell, and provides it a livelihood, just like the spider’s 
web. . . . Th is ‘web of discourses’ . . . is as much a biological product as any 











“Our fundamental tactic of self-protection, self-control, and self-defi -
nition is . . . telling stories.” However, we do not consciously and delib-
erately design our narratives. “Our tales are spun, but for the most 
part we don’t spin them; they spin us. Our human consciousness, and 
our narrative selfh ood, is their product, not their source.”124 Th is self 
Dennett calls the “center of narrative gravity.” It is the inevitable con-
sequence of a brain that tries to survive. Th e human tactic of survival is 
so magnifi cent that it can even yield immortality, in Dennett’s view. 
Your existence depends on the persistence of that narrative . . ., which 
could theoretically survive indefi nitely many switches of medium, be 
teleported as readily (in principle) as the evening news, and stored indef-
initely as sheer information. . . . you could in principle survive the death 
of your body as intact as a program can survive the destruction of the 
computer on which it was created and fi rst run.125 
In sum, we do not have to let go of concepts like I-hood and immor-
tality even if we accept nothing beyond the physical: all it takes is a 
mortal body with a human brain that can tell a decent story!
Religion
It would seem that naturalistic theories stop here. Matter is all there 
is; anything that cannot be explained from natural laws does not exist. 
Our subjectivity is a biological construct or a fi gment of our imagina-
tion, and metaphysical inclinations are the left over of our upbringing. 
Moreover, the texts produced in the naturalistic fi eld known to me 
have a strong tendency to ridicule any type of metaphysical thinking. 
Th e emotional content of the debate seems enormous on the side of 
those who do as well as those who do not assume anything beyond the 
physical. Th ose who claim their view to be scientifi cally more robust 
oft en seem to feel the need to make a caricature of metaphysical ideas. 
Th ey speak of it in terms of miracles and simplify dogmatics to a point 
where it is no longer taking seriously by most modern theologians 
either. Furthermore, some authors tend to be quite inaccurate in their 
use of philosophical and theological terms: the self is equated with 
the soul; immortality is the equivalent of teleportation of the autobi-




content might be carved into their brain tissue during the childhood 
stage, but is does not seem to have developed since.
Nonetheless, proponents of naturalistic theories turn out to be quite 
attached to certain values beyond the physical such as love, beauty, 
self-consciousness, and free will. Dennett even reassures his readers 
that were the concept of consciousness “to fall to science” we do not 
have to fear the loss of the things that we value. When we “understand 
consciousness – when there is no more mystery – consciousness will 
be diff erent, but there will still be beauty, and more room than ever 
for awe.” He reminds us what has happened “in the wake of earlier 
demystifi cations.” Aft er all, 
fi ery gods driving golden chariots across the skies are simpleminded 
comic-book fare compared to the ravishing strangeness of contemporary 
cosmology, and the recursive intricacies of the reproductive machinery 
of DNA make élan vital about as interesting as Superman’s dread kryp-
tonite.126 
Flanagan hopes to be able to show that we can preserve much of what 
we mean when we speak of “‘mind’, ‘soul’, ‘the self ’, and ‘free will’ 
without continuing to endow them with that part of their meaning 
that comes from their religious or theological roots.”127 Th at is all we 
can and may ask of life, he asserts. 
If this is not enough, if you feel that you really need the concepts of the 
soul and its mates to refer to real things, then you want more than any 
philosophically respectable theory can provide.128 
A respectable philosopher does not meddle with metaphysics!129 
Th e rejection of the metaphysical notwithstanding, there is a good 
deal of interest in religiosity among naturalists. Some attribute the 
phenomenon to our penchant for mystery. Carruthers, for example, 
complains,
126 Ibid., 25.
127 Flanagan 2002, xv.
128 Ibid., xiv.
129 Apart from the fact that ridicule is hardly convincing, academic argumentation, 
I believe that it is counterproductive to oppose the natural sciences to philosophy and 
theology, Darwinian laws to the concept of creation, and neurological research to 
philosophy. Metaphysics is not opposed to physics; it merely recognizes that there is 
more than natural laws are and will be able to explain.
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It is a somewhat depressing fact about human beings, indeed, that claims 
which are cloaked in an aura of mystery have natural and powerful 
attraction for us.130 
Others consider religion benefi cial in the sense that it diminishes fear 
of death and hence reduces stress and enables us to handle the inse-
curities of a life that is constantly threatened by disease and war. Reli-
gion becomes the ultimate strategy of survival for the fearful animal 
rationale.131 Still others believe that religiosity is part of reality and that 
the existence of God might even be proven scientifi cally. It is the latter 
group that we will turn to briefl y. 
Andrew Newberg and the late Eugene d’Aquili, a radiologist and a 
psychiatrist respectively, researched mystical experiences recorded by 
meditating Zen Buddhists and Franciscan nuns. Th ey recorded their 
neurological fi ndings and theological musings in two books: Th e Mys-
tical Mind and Why God Won’t Go Away.132 On the basis of the “huge 
database of studies” they state that 
no matter what happens to us or what we do, there is a part of the brain 
that becomes activated. . . . the brain appears not only to react to every-
thing that happens to us, but is eminently responsible for everything that 
we do or experience.133 
Th e mystical experience, which they refer to as Absolute Unitary Being 
(AUB), is “likely ‘caused’ by the total deaff erentation of the orientation 
association areas on both the left  and right side.”134 It is not necessary 
to elaborate on the road that led to this assertion here.135 Essential is 
their argument that the mystical experience is “likely ‘caused’ ” by the 
isolation of certain areas of the brain. Sometimes their text allows us 
to interpret this ambiguous statement as if the brain is the cause of 
an experience of some sense of unity that we associate with God. At 
other times they seem to suggest that there is indeed a God who has 
provided us with an antenna for divine reception, in which case God 
130 Carruthers 2000, xiv.
131 See, for example, Voland and Söling 2004. 
132 See Bibliography.
133 D’Aquili and Newberg 1999, 45.
134 Ibid., 199f.
135 In my master thesis, I have done an extensive study of their research and its 
philosophical conclusions and found neither particularly convincing. See Van Woezik 
2005.
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would be hard-wired into the human brain and therefore “won’t go 
away,” as the title of the book indicates. 
In any case they assure us that the mystical experience is “real,” since 
they have solid evidence that the mystical experience of our subjects 
– the altered states of the mind they described as the absorption of the 
self into something larger – were not the result of emotional mistakes 
or simple wishful thinking, but were associated instead with a series of 
observable neurological events, which, while unusual, are not outside the 
range of normal brain function. In other words, mystical experience is 
biologically, observably, and scientifi cally real.136 
According to Perler, all three forms of naturalism can be found in this 
approach: Th e claim that mystical experiences are real because they 
can be observed by neurological means (metaphysical naturalism); 
the mystical experiences is considered “not outside the range of nor-
mal brain function” (semantic naturalism); and the neurobiological 
method is taken as starting-point and reference for the interpretation 
of the mystical experience (methodological naturalism). Newberg likes 
to call this area of research “neurotheology.” 
Naturalism claims to be scientifi c since it departs from material 
laws. It is indeed interesting to see how a bunch of empirical data will 
lull people into thinking that the meta-empirical conclusions fall in the 
scientifi c category. We should not forget, however, that also natural-
ism does not provide knowledge about the existence of the world and 
about human consciousness but only an interpretation. Th ese material 
or natural laws can predict how matter will behave under certain cir-
cumstances, but it can never explain why matter exists without step-
ping beyond its own domain. As a result the programs of naturalistic 
self-explication transcend their own domain in which things can be 
proven, just like metaphysical concepts do. Th erefore, they are unable 
to falsify the latter.137 
Freedom
Freedom is a philosophical topic that is traditionally closely related to 
subjectivity and the metaphysical. In its ungraspability, it turns out to 
be equally problematic within the naturalistic model. An immaterial 
free will is an illusion according to naturalism. Even though nuances 
136 Newberg and d’Aquili 2001, 7. 
137 See Müller 2001, 51.
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exist, the naturalist attitude towards freedom seems characterized well 
by Dick Swaab, a Dutch neuroscientist. He writes, 
Th e brain remains a machine of which we could theoretically predict, if 
we knew the input and the workings in detail, with a reasonable degree of 
certainty what would be the output under specifi c circumstances . . . Th e 
fact that this is (still?) impossible . . . does not prove free will.138 
Free will cannot be proven within the domain of the natural sciences; 
hence, it does not exist. Th is is the implicit or the explicit conclusion of 
naturalism. Th e alternative is determinism, the view in which we have 
absolutely no control over our lives and are the puppets of a bunch of 
fi ring neurons.
Neurological research aimed at proving or disproving freedom, 
determinism against free will, or at least the naturalist’s conception 
thereof, is not new. Already in 1963, Grey Walter, a British neurolo-
gist, designs a laboratory setting in which he presents slides to experi-
mental subjects. Th ey are told to push a button whenever they are 
ready to switch from one slide to the next. However, instead of con-
necting the projector to the pushbutton, it has been wired to an elec-
trode in the relevant motor area of their brain. Th e subjects become 
thoroughly confused because the next slide will appear whenever they 
are about to push the button but right before the conscious decision 
is taken. Ulrich Lüke, both biologist and theologian, summarizes the 
naturalistic conclusion as follows: 
Neurobiology proves that we don’t do what we want, but we want what 
we do. Only aft erwards does our brain fi nd the reasonable motives for 
things we have long since done.139 
Th is is in line with Flanagan’s description of so-called epiphenomenalism.
Epiphenomenalism says that the existence of conscious deliberation 
is not evidence that this deliberation is important in the causation of 
action. Roughly, the idea is that conscious deliberation or choice is itself 
a side eff ect, or aft ereff ect, of the relevant causal processes, in the way 
sizzling is a side eff ect of frying eggs or, if you accept the James-Lange 
theory of emotion, fearing the bear comes aft er you run. Th e fear doesn’t 
cause you to run.140
138 Swaab 2001, 83.
139 See Lüke 2003, 64. 
140 Flanagan 2002, 116f. Flanagan himself comes with a less extreme point of 
view.
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Wolf Singer, head of the Max-Planck-Institute for Brain Research in 
Frankfurt, maintains that free decisions are non-existent as well. Some-
one does what he does because he could not have acted otherwise at a 
given point in time, if so he would have. Cold-blooded murderers just 
have the bad luck of having a very low killing-threshold. Of course, 
we should protect society from these individuals, but instead of speak-
ing of accountability and sending them to jail by way of punishment, 
we should rather consider it a measure of protection and safekeep-
ing. His justifi cation for this point of view runs as follows: Since the 
same basic neurological processes are involved in unconscious and 
conscious decisions and since the former are deterministic, so must 
the latter be.141 Th e faulty conclusion that we have a free will might be 
the result of early childhood experiences, Singer asserts. Babies do not 
distinguish between self and the outer world, but they are embedded 
in a social environment from which they get the message time and 
again: “Don’t do that, otherwise I will do this.” Nolens volens the child 
has to draw the faulty conclusion that it is free to do things.142
Gerhard Roth, physiologist of behavior at Bremen University, has 
another explanation that circles around the diff erence between grounds 
versus causes. He maintains that the impression that people’s actions 
have grounds (motives) instead of causes comes from the fact that 
the real drives, or rather the stimuli that make us act, are not acces-
sible. Grounds are causes that appear meaningful to us, hence in line 
with our intentions, because the causal origins remain hidden from us. 
Th erefore, we ascribe them to ourselves and have a sense of freedom. 
Much could be put forward as criticism. Let me just make four 
points. Firstly, there is (still?) no proof that the same and only the 
same neural processes are involved in conscious and unconscious 
decisions. Secondly, if this should be the case and the result should be 
such diff erent processes as both conscious and unconscious decisions, 
then why not assume them giving rise to both free and unfree deci-
sions? Th irdly, Singer’s easy acceptation of cultural infl uences on the 
child’s neural system (thinking that it is a free individual), makes you 
wonder how this “mental causation” of matter came about. Fourthly, 
Roth seems to forget that if these stimuli, which determine our actions, 
141 See Lüke 2006, 211.
142 Ibid., 212. 
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are inaccessible, it is impossible to decide whether to call them causes 
or grounds, to speak of caused actions or free decisions.
Th e rejection of free will might sound scientifi cally bold and inter-
esting, but it is not in line with the way we live our daily life. We feel 
free to decide (within limits), we feel accountable (within limits). We 
are impressed by the heroism of some and despise the cowardice of 
others. Even among naturalists, a large degree of reserve towards the 
assumption of total determinism and the tendency to rescue at least 
a measure of freedom for the human way of being can be observed. 
Dennett writes, “I am confi dent that these fears [of seeing values like 
morality, free will, and love ‘fall to science’] are misguided.” Flanagan 
states, 
Even if human agency cannot be explained in terms of a miraculous, 
otherworldly faculty of unconstrained will, we humans might . . . by vir-
tue of our complex nature, abilities, and staying power, be major con-
tributors to both our own lives and that of the world around us.143 
Moreover, brain researchers themselves question the conclusion of 
Walter’s original research and many of its more recent and more 
sophisticated versions of which Benjamin Libet’s is the most popular.144 
Johan den Boer of the Department of Biological Psychiatry, School for 
Behavioral and Cognitive Neurosciences of the University of Gronin-
gen, argues that according to almost all critics the problem remains 
that conscious decisions are not localized somewhere but spread over 
the entire brain. It is therefore hardly possible to pick one particular 
point in time as the moment that the conscious decision is taken.145 Th e 
whole discussion is counterproductive, he asserts. Th e danger of the 
way in which the topic of free will is oft en brought under discussion is 
that there should be an absolute distinction between determinism and 
freedom. However, all our actions show gradations of accountability 
and determinism. Moreover, because of the way we experience free 
will subjectively, we cannot escape the idea that we are free to choose 
from a set of alternatives. Finally, it is likely that the range of alterna-
tives is not only limited, but that certain alternatives will appear more 
attractive as a result of the complex interaction of genetic, biological, 
143 Dennett 1993, 25; Flanagan 2002, 68.
144 For a description, see Lüke 2006, 213. What all these experiments have in com-
mon is that they believe to prove that the decision comes aft er the act.
145 See Den Boer 2003, 248.
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and social variables.146 A complex of determined, determinable, free-
ing, and free variables seems to be what constitutes human behavior. 
Th e Dutch legal system appears to refl ect this modern understand-
ing of freedom. In the past, people were usually either convicted as 
criminals and sent to prison – hence, as mentally healthy individuals 
they were punished for the wrongness of their actions. Or they were 
judged to be of unsound mind – hence sick people – and confi ned to 
mental institutions to protect society and in the hope that psychiat-
ric treatment would cure them. It seemed to suggest a clear demarca-
tion between the healthy who were considered free to act otherwise 
and thus to be blamed for their mistakes and the insane who could 
not help themselves. Nowadays, convictions are more oft en a mix of 
punishment in prison combined with psychiatric treatment, as if most 
judges are of the opinion that most criminal behavior is partly deter-
mined (a wrongly programmed brain) and partly the result of free 
choice (and therefore punishable). Th is seems to be in line with cur-
rent knowledge of the brain. 
Assuming an immaterial freedom beyond the physical brain that 
would enable us to choose how to act in absolute freedom is unre-
alistic, but so is the alternative of picturing us as pre-programmed 
machines. Th anks to the cleverness of high-tech research apparatus, 
science has made impressive progress in unfolding the vulnerable 
complexity of our brains. As a result, the philosophical limitation of 
this type of research no longer comes to mind; namely, if the natu-
ral sciences declare the physical to be their object, how can they ever 
prove or disprove the reality of anything beyond the physical?
Th is brief sketch of naturalism was just meant to show the lack of neu-
roscientifi c basis and philosophical solidity of at least some of its con-
clusions. As even Andrew Newberg asserts, “At present, neuroscience 
is more of an art than a science, particularly in the way it evaluates 
complex mental processes. It is fi lled with assumptions, conjectures, 
postulates, and rationalizations.” How come then that natural scien-
tists claim expertise in the fi eld of art, philosophy, and theology alike? 
“A picture may be worth a thousand words, but a single brain scan can 
generate a dozen hypotheses and an equal number of doubts.”147 How 
146 Ibid., 255. 
147 Newberg and Waldman 2007, 26f.
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come then that only naturalistic answers are considered scientifi cally 
sound? What we have are small physical pieces of the puzzle of the 
human ability to think and act. Th e scientifi c experiments no doubt 
display great intellectual ability and technical skill, but these do not 
guarantee great philosophy. Th ese experiments may, indeed, serve to 
warn the philosopher and the theologian against an all too easy ‘spiri-
tuality’ in the literal sense of positing human capacities apart from or 
above our physical way of being. Th e enigma of human (self-)con-
sciousness, our being an I, an individual with a sense of freedom and 
conscious of being an I, clearly has a physical component. However, 
conclusions of the ‘nothing else buttery’ kind are unfounded, both in 
a spiritual and in a material sense. 
Having progressed a decade into the 21st century, we must con-
clude that there is no reason for positing a ‘nothing else but’ material 
basis of I-hood. A recent and well-sold book from a Dutch cardiolo-
gist, Pim van Lommel, who attempts to prove that there is an infi nite 
consciousness apart from the functioning of our individual brains and 
that we “tune” into is merely another and touching attempt of a phy-
sician to philosophize.148 Let us not be too impressed with physicians 
and physicists alike: metaphysics is an entirely diff erent discipline. As 
long as we do not expect successful brain surgery from a philosopher 
or a theologian, let us please not overestimate the philosophical or the 
theological talents of the brain surgeon or the cardiologist. I agree that 
in the former case the consequences are much more disastrous in the 
short-term, nonetheless the latter are no success either and can set the 
stage for a way of thinking that is also quite unhealthy. 
1.4. From Here Onwards
Th e puzzle of what constitutes I-hood has not been solved in this 
chapter, but valuable insights into its philosophical complexity have 
been obtained. Th e obvious inadequacies of all too simplistic natural-
istic theories have been unfolded. Even though we must concede that 
our ability to say ‘I’ in a meaningful way is dependent upon normal 
functioning of the brain, our neurophysiology does not explain the 
emergence of (self-)consciousness. Illness or accidents can destroy 
148 Van Lommel 2007. 
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our sense of being an I, and normal brain functioning is therefore 
a conditio sine qua non for (self-)consciousness as it is encountered 
in human beings. Nevertheless, no neuroscientifi c research has been 
able to explain why the particular brain physiology and anatomy of 
human beings enable a meaningful use of the word ‘I’ or pinpoint the 
biochemical processes or neurological structures that are responsible 
for this ability. 
Henrich appears to be right when he maintains that naturalism 
rather seems the result of those explanations of the human mind that 
believe to be able to avoid or surpass the natural and that have thus 
remained (and will always remain) successful.149 Th eories that claim 
that human consciousness is a res cogitans that need not and does 
not interact with the res extensa of grey and white matter are no lon-
ger viable. Who we are and what we think is most intimately con-
nected with our physical way of being an I. Scientifi c facts about our 
body, our brains, must be taken seriously in any theory of subjectivity. 
Nonetheless, the fact that my life as an individual is dependent upon 
baffl  ingly complex organs does not make my physiology the cause of 
my existence. Nor does it off er a philosophical explanation of what it 
means to be an I in the world. 
Self-consciousness, without which life as we know it would be 
unthinkable, remains an enigma. It arises in some early stage of our 
life, and we do not know why, when, and how this happens. It cannot 
result from certain skills or a particular ability to understand. It is as 
fundamental to the sort of life that we think peculiar to humans, as 
it is diffi  cult to understand. Th e human I is, as Ludwig Wittgenstein 
once put it “the boundary – not a part – of the world.”150 Joyce Carol 
Oates gives a beautiful description of the paradoxical aspect of I-hood 
when writing,
My body is a tall column of light and heat . . . Th e ‘I’ doesn’t exist! – but 
it behaves as if it does, as if it were one and not many. In any case, with-
out the ‘I’ the tall column of light and heat would die . . . Th e ‘I,’ which 
doesn’t exist, is everything.151 
Th e I may exist, be everything, or not exist. However, it is not really 
dead as long as it still feels the need and the ability to confront itself 
149 See Henrich 2007, 173. 
150 Ludwig Wittgenstein (1921), Tractatus logico-philosophicus 5.641. 
151 Th e quote is from Schneider 2008, 158. 
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with questions about itself and its origins. Th ese questions challenge 
us to look beyond the empirical, meta physics. 
For a better insight into the ability to say ‘I,’ we have turned to one of 
the more successful metaphysical models of I-hood developed by Dieter 
Henrich on the foundations of two major theories of self-conscious-
ness from the 18th century, namely Fichte’s attempts to overcome the 
shortcomings of the refl ection theory in his own production model. 
Henrich gives a thorough account of the philosophical complexity of 
our ability to say ‘I.’ A philosophical theory that considers itself to be 
a self-explanation of conscious life has to depart from our everyday 
relationship to reality, in his opinion. Conscious life presupposes self-
consciousness in its most elementary form of knowing-about-oneself, 
an awareness of me as myself. It is this knowing about the mine-ness 
of all my thoughts, feelings, acts, needs, desires, etc. that is a prereq-
uisite for conscious life. Somehow the I knows about itself, but this is 
no regular knowledge. Th e I is capable of refl ection, which results in 
an explicit consciousness of itself. However, the activity of the I that 
we refer to as refl ection should not be confused with a primary and 
pre-refl ective awareness called self-consciousness. Interpreting this 
self-awareness as refl ection leads to circularities. 
Henrich has tried to clarify the complex phenomenon by approach-
ing it from diff erent philosophical viewpoints in the course of his 
career. He makes use of the analytic philosophy of language on several 
occasions. In another attempt, he assumes a fi eld, or a dimension, of 
consciousness in which an I becomes active as its principle of organi-
zation. All these studies have contributed greatly in demonstrating the 
inevitable duality in our knowing about ourselves. What characterizes 
the everyday reality of our self-conscious life is that it is caught in 
the unsolvable tension of self-centeredness on the one hand and self-
relativization on the other, that Henrich calls the Grundverhältnis. We 
are simultaneously aware of our unique perspective on reality and of 
our position of being one amongst many, a mere world-thing. Since the 
conditions of being a person can never explain subjectivity and since 
subjectivity cannot grasp the reality of being a person in this world, 
conscious life remains in the dark where its own nature and origins 
are concerned. Moreover, we have no control over the existence of our 
I. Th is generates a sense of insecurity and worry about its preserva-
tion. In the course of this project, we will see how Henrich’s approach 
results in a theory of the unitary ground of self-consciousness that is 
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characterized by darkness or obscurity [Dunkelheit]. Th is is a reac-
tion to the outcome of German idealistic philosophies that have been 
philosophically disqualifi ed on more than one occasion as dangerous 
foundationalism propagating a metaphysics destructive of all other-
ness in its search for a fundamentum inconcussum. Henrich attempts 
to circumvent its mistakes and aporias by making the ungraspability of 
the ground the focus of his metaphysics, as we will see in Chapter 6.
Before proceeding in Henrich’s metaphysical line of thinking, how-
ever, we will take a few steps back in time in order to let two represen-
tatives of the era called German idealism speak for themselves. Th e fi rst 
name that comes to mind when mentioning this phase in the history 
of philosophy is, of course, Georg Wilhelm Hegel. His metaphysics 
has become so closely associated with the term German idealism, that 
most of its critics have concentrated on his philosophy. Nonetheless, 
not he, but his fellow students of the Tübinger Stift , the two Friedrichs, 
Schelling and Hölderlin, will be discussed in this study. Without dis-
qualifying Hegel’s accomplishments in the least, both Schelling and 
Hölderlin laid the groundwork for the epoch and for large portions 
of Hegel’s work. In my opinion, they are better representatives of the 
struggle, the aporias, and the creativity of German idealism. Since I 
am not interested in defending the outcome of idealistic philosophy 
but merely in the type of questions and complications that led it along 
its path, I have chosen these two brilliant young men. Th ey constitute 
a beautiful illustration of the philosophical struggles of a metaphysics 
that takes I-hood as its point of departure and they come to very dif-
ferent solutions as we will see in the course of this study.
German idealism is a reaction to the philosophy of Kant, the “all-
destructor” [Alleszermalmer] who has done away with classical metaphys-
ics as knowledge of God. However, with this “Copernican Revolution” 
he has created an unbridgeable distance between the physical and the 
metaphysical, between the human and the divine. God has become the 
great Unknown, a mere postulate of reason. A whole generation of 
young philosophers/theologians revolts, not only against an old theol-
ogy that continues to hold on to truths that have become philosophically 
untenable aft er Kant, but also against a philosophy that does away with 
their deepest religious experiences as unreasonable. Th ey refuse to live 
their lives cut off  from what they experience as its very Source; present 
even when ungraspable, intuited even when unthinkable. Th ey feel con-
fi rmed in their quest for a more immanent concept of God by the his-
torical events taking place before their very eyes: the French Revolution. 
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To them it is an announcement of new times. It shows that everything 
in the world can and will become diff erent.
“Kingdom of God” [Reich Gottes] is their slogan. But what kingdom 
are they raving about? Where and when will it come? Will it be located 
in this world or in some Great Beyond? Will it come in history or is it 
beyond time? Who or what is this God who will reign? Th e idealistic 
concept of God has been called pantheistic, and those defending it 
have even been called atheists. Whether it is truly Christian in nature 
or (slightly) heterodox is not their major concern. Th ese are truly reli-
gious, young people trying to fi nd a new language that was to reunite 
God and world. It is a theology full of reasoning, a philosophy full of 
religion, vibrant with life, longing for the deifi cation of self-conscious 
beings, struggling to reinstate the beggars fallen from grace, to raise 
the I to its position of the proud image of God.
Th e term ‘Absolute’ comes to be the keyword. It is the one ground 
from which all that is has originated. It is God, but then again it is 
not. It is the God of the philosophers (of German idealism). It is to be 
proof of my ability to transcend me. It is to connect the I with God, 
self-consciousness with infi nity. Th e term Absolute comes from the 
Latin absolvere, which means to detach and to isolate. As opposed to 
relative and relational, the Absolute is without relations. Hence, it is 
also beyond the cause-eff ect relation. It has no cause, no presupposi-
tion, no ground. It is in se, a se, and per se. Th e Absolute is a unity 
that is characterized by the exclusion of any kind of plurality, diff er-
ence, or relation. In this unity, the parts merge indistinguishably. It is 
what remains when all plurality is eliminated. It is not identity, and it 
cannot even be called absolute unity since these terms are contrasted 
to plurality. Th e Absolute is the unthinkable, the Absolute is totally 
transcendent. As Fichte writes in 1802 in a letter to Schelling: 
Th e Absolute itself is neither Being nor is it Knowing, nor is it the identity 
or the non-distinction of the two: rather, it is just that – Absolute – and 
everything else that might be said about it would make things worse.152 
Th e project of idealism could be described as the attempt to under-
stand the Absolute as subjectivity, expressed in Lessing’s motto, “I am 
it: Hen kai Pan.”153 Or as Novalis puts it, “One succeeded – he lift ed 
152 In Gloy 2004, 234.
153 Th ere are diff erent Greek formulas for Lessing’s Hen kai Pan. Other than the 
one that will be discussed in 2.4., there is an epigram of 1780 in Lessing’s own hand-
writing that says: Hen Ego kai Panta. See Yasukata 2002. 
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the veil of the goddess in Sais – But what did he see? He saw – miracle 
of miracles – himself.”154 Th e secret of metaphysics is considered to be 
related to self-consciousness. German idealism has been interpreted 
as the expansion of the Kantian transcendental subject into full-blown 
subjectivism. Hence the Kantian transcendental self that is essentially 
only a construct to explain the possibility of a single objective expe-
rience gradually becomes converted into a metaphysical principle. 
Frederick Beiser, however, argues that not subjectivism but the 
critique of subjectivism, the attempt to establish a satisfactory form of 
realism, was indeed the driving impulse behind the development of Ger-
man idealism . . . Rather than making nature the product of the transcen-
dental subject, the absolute idealist did the very opposite, deriving the 
transcendental subject from its place within nature.155 
He maintains that Schelling, and especially the early romantics such as 
Hölderlin, “disputed the thesis that the Absolute can be described as 
something subjective . . . [Rather, it] must be interpreted as something 
impersonal, neutral, or indiff erent.”156 
Whether Beiser is right and to what degree Schelling and Hölderlin 
fail or succeed might become clear aft er they have stated their own 
case. Chapter 3 will provide a detailed discussion of the philosophy 
of the early Schelling, the child genius who is ready for university at 
the age of fi ft een and who is convinced that his superior mind can 
think subjectivity, objectivity, the Absolute, and even God into one all-
encompassing system. In Chapter 4 Hölderlin, the poet and the mel-
ancholic, the one who is by very nature the transitional fi gure between 
German idealism and Early German romanticism, will be allowed to 
make a contribution. However, in order to really appreciate the dif-
fi culties that they are up against and that they attempt to solve in dif-
ferent ways, we must fi rst give a sketch of the philosophical landscape 
that is theirs at the very start of their careers. Th erefore, we will now 
turn to what could be called the overall project of German idealism: 
the question of how to philosophically penetrate into the Absolute 
through the gateway of self-consciousness.
154 In Die Lehrlinge zu Sais [Th e pupil in Sais]. Th e quote is from Müller 2006, 206. 
155 Beiser 2002, 3f.
156 Ibid., 5.
CHAPTER TWO
FROM THE I TO THE ABSOLUTE
Th e term ‘German idealism’ is not univocal, but it is possible to point 
out some general characteristics of the type of philosophy originating 
in the late 18th century in Germany. Th e German idealists have an 
enormous confi dence in the power of human reason and speculative 
philosophy enjoys a period of uninhibited and luxuriant growth. His-
tory is thought to have progressed to the point where the nature of 
reality is to be grasped by human consciousness at last. Andrew Bowie 
asserts
Th e common aim of the German idealists from Fichte onwards, is noth-
ing less than the completion of metaphysics, the understanding of the 
‘Absolute’ . . . in the light of Kant’s critiques of dogmatic metaphysics.1 
Th e Absolute is claimed to be knowable, hence the proper object 
of the science of philosophy. Aft er Kant has clearly stated the exact 
opposite – beyond the physical we know nothing – ‘metaphysical 
knowledge’ sounds like a contradiction in terms. Nevertheless, Ger-
man idealists think themselves true Kantians and at the same time 
endeavor to know the Absolute. Th e key to knowledge of the Absolute 
is thought to be found in our subjectivity, in the immediate conscious-
ness of our own existence. Th e awareness ‘I am’ is to be the fi rst step 
towards understanding ‘all that is.’ Let us start with a short overview 
of the Kantian ‘Copernican Revolution.’ 
2.1. Connecting Kant and Spinoza
In the second half of the 18th century, the philosophical climate changes 
radically due to the Critiques of Immanuel Kant. Fundamentally new 
in Kant’s thinking is the insight that how the world is encountered by 
us is the result of how our mind functions. We obtain knowledge by 
applying the categories of our rationality to the raw material that the 
senses provide us with. Hence, Kant denies that knowledge is passive 
1 Bowie 1993, 2. 
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reception. What we know about the objective world is at least in part 
product of the knowing, subjective, mind: knowledge demands a syn-
thesis of understanding and sensibility. In his own famous words: 
Without sensibility no object would be given to us, and without under-
standing none would be thought. Th oughts without content are empty, 
intuitions without concept are blind . . . Furthermore, these two faculties 
or capacities cannot exchange their functions. Th e understanding is not 
capable of intuiting anything, and the senses are not capable of thinking 
anything. Only from their unifi cation can cognition occur.2 
Knowledge arises from two roots that each have separate functions 
and that do not overlap but depend upon “unifi cation.” 
Th e fi rst consequence of this statement is clear-cut: the empirical 
root of knowledge cannot be ignored. With the exception of logical 
and mathematical truths, knowledge is only possible with respect to 
things that can be perceived. Hence, we can never have any knowledge 
of God, Kant maintains. 
Th us the highest being remains for the merely speculative use of reason 
a mere but nevertheless faultless ideal, a concept which concludes and 
crowns the whole of human cognition, whose objective reality cannot of 
course be proven on this path, but also cannot be refuted.3 
No knowledge is possible of God, not even of God’s existence or non-
existence, is a conclusion of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787). 
As a fi rst and earthshaking result, traditional metaphysics is disquali-
fi ed since it grounds its theory in principles that are beyond the scope 
of the human intellect. 
But there is more. Th e Kantian duality can also be explained in 
favor of the other root: the enigmatic human mind with its categories 
of understanding is dealt the part of active contributor in this process. 
Somehow, this I that is aware of itself and its ability to know about 
the world is the key to all there is to know. It is this I that unifi es the 
two roots. Th e followers of Kant are convinced that if they can fi nd 
out more about this puzzling subjectivity, they will have a means of 
access to the metaphysical. All it takes is some further exploration of 
the I. Kant is not wrong; he has just stopped too soon. It is all a mat-
ter of exploring Kant’s blind spot. Philosophy and theology are in an 
uproar. Kant has brought about a major shift  from theocentrism to 
2 KrV A51/B75.
3 KrV A641/B669. 
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egocentrism. Th e philosophical universe is turned upside down in 
such a way that the human subject has become its very center. 
Nonetheless, not all has been solved. Despite Kant’s ‘Copernican 
Revolution,’ his philosophy is unable to tie all of its own loose ends. 
First, the split between the noumenal and the phenomenal world raises 
a fundamental problem: How does the subject know the object when 
they appear to be in separate worlds? Some underlying unity has to 
be assumed in order to solve this fundamental question of epistemol-
ogy. Knowledge only becomes possible, if we can somehow connect 
subject and object, mind and matter, the ideal and the real. Th is can 
only be done by means of metaphysics, as is the conviction of the new 
generation. Aft er all, our entire life is based on the assumption that we 
really know ‘what’s going on around us,’ that there is a real interaction 
between subject and object. 
Furthermore, Kant is unable to connect his epistemology and his 
ethics. He agrees that the idea of God is very persistent in people. Rea-
son seems impelled to form three transcendental ideas even though 
they cannot be proven to correspond to objective reality. Th ey remain 
as ‘regulative’ ideas or ideal limits of our thinking. Th ese are the ideas 
of: 1. the sum-total of all appearances – the world; 2. all contents of 
consciousness – the soul; 3. all perfection – God. Th e idea of God 
is perfectly conceivable; one can coherently think of God. Neverthe-
less, any kind of knowledge claim with respect to God, even regarding 
God’s mere existence, is impossible. Th is God of whom we can know 
nothing, not even if He/She/It exists, turns out to be indispensable for 
Kantian ethics. In order for morality to be reasonable, there must be an 
authority that ultimately matches real happiness with the worthiness 
to be happy proven by a moral life style. Hence, it is morally necessary 
to assume the existence of a supreme moral ruler who will ensure this, 
according to Kant. God is indispensable for justifying morality. 
In addition to that, Kant makes matters even more confusing 
for his students in maintaining that in our morality we are in fact 
in touch with something metaphysical, absolute, or unconditioned. 
What “for theoretical purposes would be transcendent, is for practical 
purposes immanent,” he asserts. As John Macquarrie puts it, freedom 
“is a breach in the phenomenal order, giving access to the noumenal 
realm.”4 Although speculative reason cannot establish the reality of 
4 Critique of Practical Reason, in: Macquarrie 1984, 8. 
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freedom, it is a postulate of moral life. Kant calls freedom the fact of 
reason [Faktum der Vernunft ] and Klaus Müller elaborates, “Th e tie of 
all our actions to an unconditional norm is so directly and fundamen-
tally inscribed in our reason that it neither needs nor allows further 
agreement.”5 Kant provides his followers with an I that has a sense of 
freedom mysteriously connecting it with the metaphysical. Hence, the 
I may not have knowledge beyond the physical, but it knows about its 
freedom. We may not know, if God exists; but if he does not, every 
attempt at being a good person becomes total nonsense. Apparently, 
even Kant agrees that the I knows more than what the senses provide 
it with. It seems as if unraveling a few philosophical knots will bring 
God within reach of the I. Th e door to the Beyond is unlocked; who 
will dare to open it?
Th is becomes the challenge of the new generation of thinkers. Kant 
has sentenced traditional metaphysics to death, but the price is a radi-
cal dualism. Th e noumenal world has been severed from the world 
of the phenomena. Faith has become opposed to reason, theology to 
philosophy. Religion has been reduced to ethics. A whole generation 
of young metaphysicists, who are well educated in classical philosophy 
and theology, is caught in the controversy of the dogmatism of their 
theology teachers and the critical idealism of their idol Kant. Th eir ter-
rifi c minds revolt against the theological ‘truths’ that they are forced to 
absorb in the classrooms; but their religiosity rejects a philosophy that 
turns God into a mere divine bookkeeper.
Th e concept of God, however, is not the only thing aff ected by the 
Kantian ‘Copernican Revolution.’ Th e human I has become stuck 
between two worlds. If the subject is transcendental, it is necessarily 
beyond knowing since knowledge can only arise through a synthesis 
of understanding and sensibility. If the subject is empirical, however, 
then our knowledge will never penetrate into the reality of the sub-
ject, the thing-in-itself. Hence, the corner stone of Kant’s epistemology 
remains an enigma that needs to be presupposed without our being 
able to found it or know it. A principle that is no more than a regu-
lative idea is philosophically unsatisfactory, to say the least, but it is 
even more disturbing from an existential point of view. What is most 
familiar to me and forms my starting-point in all my dealings with the 
world on an everyday basis, my sense of being an I, would be declared 
5 Müller 2006, 54.
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either non-existent (materialism or naturalism) or unreachable for my 
intellect (dualism). 
It is exactly the striking parallel between the unknowability of a God 
who keeps coming to mind and the enigmatic character of an I that 
is transcendental but seems to dictate my everyday point of view in 
the world that forms an irresistible invitation to the thinkers of the 
late 18th century. It suggests that solving one mystery might also pro-
vide the solution to the other problem. Th e transcendental subject is 
beyond (meta) physics, as is God. A radically diff erent metaphysics is 
called for; one that does not betray Kant but supplements him; one that 
brings the unknowable God within reach of this transcendental I.
Baruch de Spinoza’s philosophy appears to hold the key to the solu-
tion for the young admirers of Kant. His refusal to consider the ratio-
nal and the material as ultimately separable domains promises a way 
out of Kantian dualism. When Spinoza writes, “mind and body – are 
one and the same individual thing, conceived now under the attribute 
of Th ought and now under the attribute of Extension,” he suggests 
that a unity underlying all multiplicity can be thought and has to be 
thought.6 Th e earthly contradictions of thinking versus being, of mind 
versus body, the I as noumenon versus the I as phenomenon can be 
resolved in a unitary Absolute. It is a realm in which all that is can 
ultimately be united, one unitary ground that somehow gives rise to 
the multiplicity of all the phenomena. Th is Oneness forms the source 
from which our separate individualities proceed, the ultimate context 
in which our interactions with each other should take place, and the 
backdrop for our dealings with the Divine. Our alienation from this 
unity is a fact of life, but not the ultimate fact. In that respect Spinoza’s 
philosophy comes closer to the truth than Kant’s in the eyes of the 
young generation. 
Th e infl uence of Spinoza for thinkers of the late 18th century can 
hardly be overestimated. To quote two: Hegel writes, 
When one enters the fi eld of philosophy, one must fi rst be Spinozist. Th e 
soul must bathe in this ether of the one Substance in which everything 
that one has held for true is absorbed.7 
6 E. II, 21, Sch. (CW 259). Th e English translations are from Samuel Shirley. See 
bibliography Spinoza 2002.
7 Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, 373.
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And Schleiermacher exclaims, 
the holy rejected Spinoza! Th e high world spirit permeated him, the Infi -
nite was his beginning and end, the universe his only and eternal love. In 
holy innocence and deep humility he was refl ected in the eternal world 
and saw how he too was its most lovable mirror; he was full of religion 
and full of holy Spirit; for this reason, he also stands there alone and 
unequaled, master in his art but elevated above the profane guild, with-
out disciples and without rights of citizenship.8 
Many more texts could be quoted to demonstrate how the philosopher 
who once was a “dead dog” has been revived to become everyone’s 
favorite pet.9 
In order to understand the philosophies of German idealism, it is nec-
essary to learn more about the major concepts of Spinoza’s philoso-
phy. Let us therefore make an eff ort to get acquainted with the very 
basics of Spinozism. 
2.2. Baruch de Spinoza
In our day and age, the term pantheism has become fi rmly linked with 
the Jewish philosopher Baruch de Spinoza.10 Th is, however, is not the 
term that accompanies him during his lifetime. His orthodox Jewish 
upbringing notwithstanding, he goes astray and is branded an atheist 
and excommunicated from his synagogue at the early age of twenty-
three. Th e cherem document of this expulsion has been preserved and 
 8 Schleiermacher, Über die Religion, 245. Both are translated from Müller 2006, 
139, and 115.
 9 Lessing makes this characterization in the 1780’s. See 2.3. 
10 Baruch, Benedict, or Bento de Spinoza (1632–1677) is born as the son of a prom-
inent merchant of the Portuguese-Jewish community of Amsterdam in the Nether-
lands. He belongs to a family of Sephardic Jews with a history of exile fi rst from Spain, 
later from Portugal, and in the case of Spinoza’s father maybe even from France. Th e 
majority of European countries of the time bar Jews or impose severe restrictions on 
them. Th erefore, most have outwardly converted to Christianity in order to escape 
persecution but continue to observe some form of Judaism in secret. Th ese are called 
conversos or marranos, which literally means swine. As a community, they suff er many 
internal confl icts as a result of the betrayal of their own religion and the pressure of 
having to practice one in which they do not believe. Moreover, they have to live under 
the constant scrutiny of the Inquisition, always suspicious of the sincerity of their 
conversion. Many emigrate and wind up in the Netherlands with its tradition of rela-
tive tolerance concerning religion. In Amsterdam, the Jewish community is allowed, 
at least informally, to practice its religion openly during the 17th century. Offi  cial 
permission for public worship is given in 1619 and full citizenship in 1657.
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is remarkable for the harshness of its wording. In addition to forbid-
ding the members of the Jewish community to have anything to do 
with him, it speaks of his “evil opinions and acts; abominable heresies; 
monstrous deeds” and orders his excommunication.
By decree of the angels and by the command of the holy men, we excom-
municate, expel, curse and damn Baruch de Espinoza, with the consent 
of God . . . Cursed be he by day and cursed be he by night; cursed be he 
when he lies down and cursed be he when he rises up. Cursed be he 
when he goes out and cursed be he when he comes in. . . . the Lord shall 
blot out his name from under heaven.11 
What could a young man who describes himself in a letter as one 
“who utterly dread[s] brawling” possibly have said or done to bring 
this upon himself ? Maybe the answer is in the same letter in which 
he writes, “I do not diff erentiate between God and Nature in the way 
all those known to me have done.”12 Richard Mason suggests that the 
Jewish community may have attempted to rebuild a damaged ortho-
doxy aft er centuries of secret and private religious practice in most 
European countries. 
One reason for Spinoza’s expulsion from his synagogue may have come 
from a wish by its members to show to themselves – and their Christian 
neighbours – that they had drawn clear limits to what they could stand. 
Spinoza may have exceeded those limits.13 
In any case, Spinoza must have provoked fi erce emotions; an attempt 
on his life is made. If his philosophy is indeed the reason for this dra-
matic turn of events, it is a vivid illustration of the value attached to 
the absolute void between the monotheistic God and a created world. 
An all too worldly God is not the God of Jews and Christians but an 
idol at best. Worshippers of such a God are called heretics or atheists 
in the 17th century, and they still risk to be labeled as pantheist in the 
21st.14 
11 In: Nadler 1999, 120.
12 L. 6 (CW 776).
13 Mason 1997, 4.
14 Aft er his excommunication Spinoza dissociates himself from the Jewish com-
munity and changes his name to the non-Jewish Bento of his native language or the 
Latin Benedictus. He never again joins any religious community or group. However, 
his friends and contacts are mostly protestant among whom several Collegiants, a 
Christian group without any hierarchical structure and known for its fl exibility on 
confessional matters and the free character of its services. Th e perception that he is 
an atheist is widespread and prevents him from publishing most of his work during 
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Th e term ‘atheist’ might strike a present-day student of Spinoza as 
very odd since the word ‘God’ abounds in the Ethics, and its fi rst part 
even has the title “Concerning God.” According to David Bell, 
Spinoza’s discussion of God was held to be pure show, and Johannes 
Colerus, Lutheran minister at Th e Hague and a reliable biographer of 
Spinoza, despite his hostility, answers that ‘the God of Spinosa is a mere 
Phantom, an imaginary God.’15 
Nevertheless, even if Spinoza’s God seems incompatible with the per-
sonal and transcendent God of late 17th century Jewish and Christian 
theology, God’s existence is beyond doubt for Spinoza. He does not 
even seem to feel the need to convince those who think otherwise. 
Without further argument he states, 
Note that, although many may say that they doubt the existence of God, 
they have in mind nothing but a word, or some fi ctitious idea they call 
God. Th is does not accord with the nature of God.16 
It is not the existence or non-existence of God that is the problem; the 
image of God is really at stake. His opponents’ God is a legislator and 
a judge who proclaims laws, rewards those who obey in servitude, and 
punishes those who trespass. In contrast, the laws of Spinoza’s God 
follow “by an inevitable necessity from [his] nature.”17 Th is is not the 
personal, free God of monotheism; and to deny the existence of such 
a God makes him an atheist as far as his opponents are concerned. He 
does in fact fi ercely reject an anthropomorphic image of God.
Some imagine God in the likeness of man, consisting of mind and body, 
and subject to passions. But it is clear . . . how far they stray from the 
true knowledge of God. . . . by body we understand some quantity having 
length, breadth and depth, bounded by a defi nite shape; and nothing 
more absurd than this can be attributed to God . . .18 
his lifetime. As he writes in a letter, “I am naturally afraid that the theologians of our 
time may take off ence, and, with their customary spleen, may attack me” (L. 6 = CW 
776). Shortly aft er his death in 1677, his works are indeed prohibited as blasphemous. 
His philosophy is considered atheistic, perverted, and dangerous for the minds of 
good monotheists. Th is opinion is to prevail for at least another century following 
his death.
15 Bell 1984, 4.
16 TEI. 54, note s (CW 14). 
17 L. 43 (CW 879).
18 E. I, 15, Sch. (CW 224f.). 
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Th is rejection of a personal deity makes Spinoza an atheist, indeed. 
However, he is not an atheist in the common sense of non-believer but 
in the sense in which it has also been used by Dorothee Sölle.19 Spinoza 
was an a-theist; he did not agree with the prevalent theistic image of 
God as “omniscient, merciful, wise, and so forth.”20 So who or what 
is this God of Spinoza on which the Absolute of German idealism 
becomes modeled? Is he really “everywhere, could not be spoken to, 
did not respond if prayed to, was very much in every particle of the 
universe, without beginning and without end,” as Antonio Damasio 
puts it?21 In any case, his concept of God is apparently stretched too 
far to still be called (mono)theistic. 
An extensive study of Spinozism is not within the scope of this research. 
Based on selected passages from Spinoza’s work and some esteemed 
contemporary experts, an interpretation will be provided of Spinoza’s 
concept of Divinity, his views on the relationship between the God 
and world, on free will, and on the diff erence between philosophy and 
religion.22
2.2.1. Substance or Deus sive Natura
Just as his atheism is considered an open-and-shut case during his 
lifetime and in the century aft er, Spinoza’s famous “God, or Nature” 
[Deus sive Natura] is supposed to immediately classify him as a pan-
theist in contemporary theology.23 But is it as simple as that? In a letter 
he writes, 
As to the view of certain people that the Tractatus Th eologico-Politicus 
rests on the identifi cation of God with Nature (by the latter of which they 
understand a kind of mass or corporeal matter) they are quite mistaken.24 
Apparently, Spinoza agrees that God cannot be identifi ed with the 
simple sum-total of the world. So who is this God whom he calls not 
19 See Sölle 1968. 
20 ST. I, VII (CW 57).
21 Damasio 2004, 22.
22 Namely: David Bell, Jonathan Bennett, Frederick Copleston, Edwin Curley, Don 
Garrett, Brad Gregory, Richard Mason, Klaus Müller, Arne Naess, and Harry Austryn 
Wolfson. See bibliography. 
23 E. IV, Pref. (CW 321). Certain translations capitalize Nature and others don’t. 
Since Spinoza uses it as a synonym for God, I will use a capital “N.” For the same 
reason Substance will be capitalized. 
24 L. 73 (CW 942).
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“corporeal” on the one hand and “Nature” and “an extended thing [res 
extensa]” on the other?25 
Spinoza distinguishes two ways to view Nature: Natura naturans 
and Natura naturata. Natura naturans is “that which in itself and 
conceived through itself ” and “God insofar as he is considered a free 
cause,” it says in the Ethics. Or Natura naturans is “a being that we 
conceive clearly and distinctly through itself, and without needing 
anything beside itself,” as he words it in the Short Treatise.26 Natura 
naturata, in contrast, is “all the modes of God’s attributes insofar as 
they are considered as things which are in God and can neither be nor 
be conceived without God.”27 What he means by “modes” and “attri-
butes” will be discussed in 2.2.2.; for now it suffi  ces to say that modes 
are the multitude of things, and even thoughts, of the world. Spinoza 
does not simply identify God and Nature as in the most trivial concep-
tion of pantheism. Natura naturans is God and Natura naturata is in 
God. Whatever this distinction might mean; Nature and God are not 
simply the same thing. 
On the one hand, Spinoza, like every person, is confronted with a 
world full of seemingly independent entities. On the other hand, he is 
unwilling to accept this fragmentation as the ultimate truth. Natura 
naturans and Natura naturata are two sides of the same coin. Deus 
sive Natura is all there is and all that can be conceived. Viewed from 
the perspective of unity, God is Natura naturans; and viewed with 
respect to multiplicity, God is Natura naturata. However, Spinoza does 
seem to want to make a distinction between his own philosophy and 
traditions that tend to place God over and against nature. On the same 
page of the Short Treatise he adds, “Th e Th omists likewise understand 
God by it, but their Natura naturans was a being (so they called it) 
beyond all substances.”28 Th ere is a diff erence with the accepted theol-
ogy: Spinoza’s God is not the transcendent, perfect Being that is high 
above the world. God is right here, in the middle of all worldly dif-
ferentiation as the image of its unifi cation. 
Th e term “Substance” is another word that Spinoza oft en employs 
to emphasize the unitary aspect of Deus sive Natura. “Th ere can be, 
25 E. I, 15, Sch. (CW 225); E. II, 2 (CW 245).
26 E. I, 29, Sch. (CW 234); ST. I, VIII (CW 58).
27 E. I, 29, Sch. (CW 234).
28 ST. I, VIII (CW 58).
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or be conceived, no other Substance but God.”29 Whereas “for every-
thing a cause or reason must be assigned either for its existence or 
for its non-existence,” Substance is “self-caused.” Its nature “can be 
conceived only as existing” and it “is in itself and is conceived through 
itself.”30 For its existence Substance depends upon nothing or no one 
but itself. Spinoza’s Substance is self-caused and it always remains the 
same through change. Moreover, its essence involves existence, it is 
unique, and it is infi nite. Th ese terms echo longstanding ideas about 
the plenitude of divine perfection. Let us see how Spinoza interprets 
them.
Th e conclusion that this one single Substance, God, “necessarily 
exists” might strike the modern reader as just another version of the 
ontological argument.31 Don Garrett gives a very clear overview of Spi-
noza’s proofs of the necessary existence of God, its implications, and 
its relation to traditional ontological and cosmological arguments.32 It 
is not the objective of this study to go into details and take position 
in the debate about the validity of Spinoza’s proofs. Garrett concludes 
that Spinoza “believes he has succeeded in showing that the essence 
of God must involve his existence – a truth which could be directly 
discovered,” “in much the same way that one sees immediately what 
is involved in the essence of a triangle.”33 In addition, Iris Murdoch’s 
translation of “necessary existence” seems to do justice to Spinoza’s 
God-Nature. She writes, “Th e defi nition of God as having necessary 
not contingent existence” implies that “God cannot be particular, a 
contingent thing, one thing among others; . . . God’s necessary exis-
tence is connected with his not being an object.”34 
Besides necessity, unicity is another characteristic of Substance. 
Th ere can be only one single Substance with nothing outside of it. It 
is all-embracing totality. “In the universe there cannot be two or more 
Substances,” neither two “of the same nature or attribute” nor “one 
produced by the other.”35 According to Edwin Curley, Spinoza’s argu-
ments in this respect rely on Cartesian assumptions. 
29 E. I, 14. (CW 224).
30 E. I, 11, Pr. 2 (CW 222); E. I, Def. 1 and Def. 3 (CW 217).
31 E. I, 11 (CW 222).
32 See Garrett 2001a.
33 Garrett 2001a, 22;20.
34 Murdoch 1992, 395.
35 E. I, 5; E. I, 6 (CW 218f.).
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Suppose we have two entities with the same attribute. . . . What is it which 
makes them distinct from one another? Not their attribute, since that, 
by hypothesis, is the same. Not their modes, since modes, by defi nition, 
are inessential, transitory states of the substance to which they belong, 
which cannot be used to distinguish one substance from another.36 
Ergo, only one Substance can exist. Spinoza’s thorough study of Des-
cartes’ dualism has shown him where this system fails to connect the 
res extensa with the res cogitans. Th e use of the pineal gland as the 
necessary link of the physical and the mental in one single person is a 
last resort that is hardly convincing, even to Descartes himself. Spino-
za’s solution is to start with the assumption of an underlying, ultimate 
unity in which the complexity of the world is founded, ultimate unity 
of mind and body, of God and Nature; one unitary Substance. From 
this unitary starting-point, he tries to think multiplicity and division, 
both real but not ultimate reality.37 
In addition to necessary and unique, ultimate reality, Substance 
can only be infi nite otherwise “it would have to be limited by another 
Substance of the same nature.”38 Only one Substance can exist that is 
“absolutely infi nite.”39 When explaining the infi nity of Substance, Spi-
noza notes how diffi  cult it is for people not to think of infi nity as some 
sort of superlative of time, measure, or number; hence divisible. How-
ever, notions of this kind “are nothing more than aids to the imagina-
tion.” Th e infi nity of Substance implies that it cannot be conceived 
as “composed of parts or bodies really distinct from one another.” 
Moreover, infi nity has to do with eternity, “that is, the infi nite enjoy-
ment of existence.”40 In the sense of eternity, infi nity is not divisible 
either; we cannot distinguish portions of duration in it. In this infi nity 
of Substance or God the whole of nature is necessarily included. As 
Richard Mason puts it simply but quite adequately, “If you take seri-
ously the claim that God is infi nite, how can you then say that any-
thing in nature can be excluded from God?”41 Nevertheless, the claim 
36 Curley 1994, xxiif.
37 Many have debated about possible circularities, inconsistencies, and contradic-
tions in Spinoza’s theory. Th ese are interesting and important in their own right, but 
for the present purpose it suffi  ces to just accept Spinoza’s own conclusion that there 
is only one Substance.
38 E. I, 8, Pr. (CW 219).
39 E. I, 15, Sch. (CW 225).
40 L. 12 (CW 788f.).
41 Mason 1997, 38. 
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that nature is a part of God is also mistaken in Spinoza’s view for then 
God would be divisible and unity would not be the basis of all that 
is. Th erefore, Nature is God. Th en we are precisely where we started: 
Does Spinoza’s Deus sive Natura plainly identify God with nature in 
the sense of the world, as we know it? Spinoza answers in the negative, 
but how does this one, infi nite, and necessary God-Substance-Nature 
relate to the multitude of things and people encountered in the world? 
“Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without 
God.”42 Nothing can exist outside God or be understood apart from 
God. How does this sense of unity comply with our daily experience 
of independent entities? How can unity be thought in the midst of the 
separation and contradiction of our reality? Are those who ridicule 
Spinoza right that positing one Substance as the ultimate reality only 
leads to incoherence? Quoting one of Spinoza’s early critics, David 
Bell writes, 
We are quite wrong, argues Bayle, to say ‘Th e Germans killed ten thou-
sand Turks’; following Spinoza we should say, ‘God modifi ed into Ger-
mans killed God modifi ed into ten thousand Turks’, and it means that 
‘God hates himself, asks favours of himself and refuses them; eats him-
self, slanders himself, and executes himself.’43 
In order to do more than caricaturize Spinoza’s theory concerning the 
relationship between the unity of Substance and the multiplicity of the 
world, the terms ‘attribute’ and ‘mode’ should be looked into. 
2.2.2. Attributes and Modes of the One Substance
According to Spinoza, there is one “Substance consisting of infi nite 
attributes.”44 What could it mean? In a certain way, attributes are Sub-
stance; they do not exist independently from this Substance. As Spi-
noza puts it, 
By Substance I understand that which is in itself and is conceived through 
itself; that is, that whose conception does not involve the conception of 
another thing. I understand the same by attribute, except that attribute 
is so called in respect to the intellect, which attributes to Substance a 
certain specifi c kind of nature.45 
42 E. I, 15. (CW 224).
43 Bell 1984, 5.
44 E. I, Def. 6 (CW 217).
45 L. 9 (CW 782).
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An attribute is the “specifi c kind of nature” that the intellect attributes 
to Substance, and reversely, attributes are ways in which Substance 
expresses itself to our intellect. According to Curley, we should “iden-
tify Substance with its attributes, or rather, with the totality of its attri-
butes.” Attributes are “those most general structural features of the 
universe which are captured by the most general laws of nature.”46 
Curley’s defi nition may be correct, but it is awkward. “Laws of 
nature” is an ambiguous choice of words and ignores the fact that of 
the infi nity of attributes only a minimal portion can actually be “cap-
tured” by the intellect. Spinoza states explicitly that of the infi nity of 
attributes of this one Substance only two are accessible to us: thought 
[cogitatio] and extension [extensio]. In modern language “laws of 
nature” are associated with physical laws, hence those laws applicable 
to the attribute of extension. Even including something like the “laws 
of thought” would not do justice to the fact that Substance is much 
more than extension and thought, in Spinoza’s view. Substance con-
sists of infi nite attributes, only two of which we can grasp to a certain 
degree. Hence, people can understand only a fraction of the infi nity 
of the attributes of Substance. Th e relation between Substance and its 
attributes is probably best understood as analogous to that between 
Natura naturans and Natura naturata. Th ey are two sides of the same 
coin; God is simple as one Substance, but understood as complex by 
way of infi nite attributes.
Substance is the unity of infi nite attributes, but the individual attri-
butes are distinct from one another, according to Spinoza. “Each attri-
bute of the one Substance must be conceived through itself.” Th is does 
not imply that attributes are fundamentally separate. 
Although two attributes [should] be conceived as really distinct, that is, 
one without the help of the other, still we cannot deduce therefrom that 
they constitute two entities, or two diff erent substances.47 
Hence, we could describe Nature as a physical system and as a sys-
tem of thought. Both descriptions would be right but neither would 
exhaust the complete and true being of God. First, we only know two 
of the manifold; and secondly, our limited intellect could never con-
ceive of them as merged into the one single unity of Substance. Once 
again, Spinoza’s ‘pantheism’ turns out to be more than a plain identi-
fi cation of God and world.
46 Curley 1969, 16; Curley 1991, 49.
47 E. I, 10; E. I, 10, Sch. (CW 221).
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Moreover, in this construction of one Substance with two knowable 
attributes, we easily recognize the student of Descartes. Th e res extensa 
and the res cogitans more or less return as the two sides of reality 
as perceived by people. However, in Descartes’ philosophy mind and 
matter could not really make contact. Th is put the human being in an 
impossibly dualistic position; mind and body, spirit and matter, were 
pulled apart in a way that belied our everyday experience. What is 
seemingly distinct nonetheless feels intimately connected. Th e ‘solu-
tion’ of the pineal gland as the go-between or the antenna was just a 
desperate attempt to make it work; ‘it’ being both the human organism 
and Cartesian dualism. With Spinoza’s philosophical solution the dis-
tinction remains real but not ultimate reality. Unity is. Looked at from 
the human point of view at least one distinction can be made within 
this unity: mind and body. Th at is Spinoza’s fi rst step. 
Nevertheless, it is not enough to describe the diversity that we are 
confronted with on an everyday basis. So far we have one infi nite Sub-
stance that the intellect can understand in terms of two attributes: cogi-
tatio and extensio. But how can we conceive of all that surrounds us, 
the multitude of fi nite things, all the contingent things of the world, 
all the bodies, and all the minds? In order to achieve this, another 
term is necessary, namely ‘mode.’ It is “as though God were the ocean 
and God’s fi nite modes, the existential duration of which is transi-
tory, the waves and ripples on the ocean’s surface,” Copleston writes 
poetically.48 Spinoza’s language is far less lyrical: “Nothing exists but 
Substance and its modes,” he states in the Ethics.49 Hence, the question 
arises, What is a mode?
In the Short Treatise, a clear link is made between mode and attribute. 
What a particular individual “has of Th ought . . . is a mode of that attri-
bute we call Th ought,” and similarly his body is “nothing else than a 
mode of the other attribute which we call Extension.” Th ese modes 
are fi nite, but the attributes of which they are manifestations are infi -
nite and remain “unchanged.”50 Modes are individual things through 
which God’s attributes are expressed in a certain and determined way. 
Harry Austryn Wolfson calls the universe “the sum of the modes.”51 
Th is may be true in a certain respect. Nonetheless, Deus sive Natura, as 
48 Copleston 1946, 43.
49 E. I, 28, Pr. (CW 233).
50 ST. App. II (CW 104).
51 Wolfson 1983, 75.
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Spinoza understands it, is more than a simple addition of all its modes. 
It is more than a mere collection; it is an expression of the all-perva-
sive divine Unity. It is all the faces of eternity. It is infi nity itself. 
Only Substance and its modes exist, it was said. But if there exists 
only one Substance, how do all its modes exist? Spinoza’s answer to 
this is, “All things that are, are either in themselves or in something 
else.” Substance is “in itself ” and modes are “in something else.”52 
Modes exist “in” Substance. What this could mean has been debated 
extensively by Spinoza scholars. Some, like Wolfson, describe Spinoza’s 
conception of the relation between mode and Substance as the Aristo-
telian “species in genus.”53 Others, such as Harold Henry Joachim, deny 
the reality of fi nite particulars in Spinoza’s system.54 Joachim identi-
fi es the distinction between Substance and modes with that between 
things and properties, or subjects and predicates, but Curley disagrees. 
He asserts that even though Spinoza uses traditional terms, his “use 
of these terms is highly idiosyncratic.” Substance is not the substra-
tum in which modes inhere as Lockean qualities.55 He maintains that 
Spinoza’s philosophy does not make much sense, if we simply inter-
pret him “along the lines of some one or another of his predecessors.” 
He calls it “one of Spinoza’s principal novelties that he breaks with 
this long tradition.” Modes, or individual things, really exist. Th e rela-
tion of individual things with God is not the relation of a predicate to 
its subject. Th e relationship is “one of causal dependence, not one of 
inherence.”56 Every existing thing has a cause. While modes rely upon 
an external cause for their existence, Substance is causa sui. 
Now another question arises. If there is only one Substance “in” which 
a multitude of modes exist, it may be asked how this Substance can 
be necessary and immutable whereas its modes strike us as obviously 
52 E. I, Ax. 1; Def. 3; Def. 5 (CW 217).
53 Wolfson 1983, 75.
54 See Joachim 1901.
55 Curley 1991, 36; Curley 1969, 18; Curley summarizes a common 17th century 
account of the relation between substance and its qualities based on John Locke’s 
theory as follows:
1. A substance is the substratum in which qualities are said to inhere, exist, or subsist. 
2. A substance of a particular kind is a collection or combination of qualities plus the 
substratum in which they inhere.
3. Th e substratum does not inhere in anything else, hence exists or subsists by itself.
4. Th e substratum supports and unites the qualities.
5. Th e substratum itself is not perceptible to the senses. Its existence must be inferred 
from the qualities that can be perceived (Curley 1969, 4f.). 
56 Curley 1969, 36; 21; 37. 
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contingent and ever-changing. Individual beings come and go, and in 
contrast to God-Substance they do not seem to exist by necessity. 
Even when they exist, we can conceive them as not existing . . . Hence it 
is clear that we conceive the existence of Substance as of an entirely dif-
ferent kind from the existence of modes.57 
Th e answer to this is also related to causal dependence. 
It can be observed that “each particular thing is determined by 
another particular thing to exist in a particular manner,” for a particu-
lar period of time.58 Individual things exist as the result of an infi nite 
number of causes spreading out through the whole of Nature. 
Because the chain of causes is hidden from us, then that thing cannot 
appear to us either as necessary or as impossible. So we term it either 
‘contingent’ or ‘possible.’59 
“For practical purposes it is better, indeed, it is essential, to consider 
things as contingent” since “we plainly have no knowledge as to the 
actual co-ordination and interconnection of things – that is, the way 
in which things are in actual fact ordered and connected,” Spinoza 
concludes in the Th eological-Political Treatise.60 Th ings in nature come 
and go. Plants and animals are eaten, things decompose, people get 
sick, age, and die. All things in nature change all the time, and eventu-
ally all disappear. Th is endless process of change seems inevitable, but 
pointless and random nonetheless. However, since we are stuck in the 
middle, we are unable to see the totality of causes that spread through 
this infi nite, eternal Deus sive Natura. In truth, “a thing is termed ‘con-
tingent’ for no other reason than the defi ciency of our knowledge.”61 
If we could look at the universe from the outside, we would under-
stand that in reality “nothing in Nature is contingent” since “God is 
the immanent . . . cause of all things.”62 
Spinoza struggles to do justice to a world of seemingly independent 
entities without giving up on the concept of an underlying unity. A 
unitary ground is what the German idealists are aft er, and they fi nd it 
57 E. II, 45, Sch. (CW 271).
58 Ibid.
59 E. I, 33, Sch. 1 (CW 236).
60 TPT. 4, 2 (CW 427).
61 E. I, 33, Sch. (CW 236).
62 E. I, 29 (CW 234); E. I, 18 (CW 229).
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in Spinoza’s Substance. With Spinoza, Kantian dualism can be over-
come and the way opened for a rational metaphysics. God might just 
be graspable in and through Nature. Nevertheless, it is still a long 
stretch from connecting the subject, as it is understood in the late 
18th century, with the Absolute. Th e main obstacle is Spinoza’s notion 
of freedom. He starts the Appendix of the fi rst part of the Ethics with 
these words:
I have now explained the nature and properties of God: that he necessar-
ily exists, that he is one alone, that he is and acts solely from the neces-
sity of his own nature, that he is the free cause of all things and how so, 
that all things are in God and are so dependent on him that they can 
neither be nor be conceived without him, and lastly, that all things have 
been predetermined by God, not from his free will or absolute pleasure, 
but from the absolute nature of God.63 
It is the fi nal topic that appears to be the stumbling block. A book 
with Ethics as its title has to deal with freedom, and freedom in the 
Kantian sense in order to be acceptable to the generation of German 
idealism. Hence, an important aspect of the “nature and properties of 
God” remains to be discussed. What does Spinoza mean when he calls 
God the “free cause” that “predetermines” all things not from his “free 
will” but from his “absolute nature”? What is freedom in the Spinozis-
tic sense of the word? How free a mode am I?
2.2.3. Free Will and Intention
Spinoza asserts, “I place freedom, not in free decision, but in free 
necessity.”64 God does not act from freedom of will; “God acts solely 
from the laws of his own nature, constrained by none.”65 Th is implies 
that freedom, as freedom of choice, does not exist in God. God’s laws 
are God’s laws; and God’s strength is in the necessity of these laws, 
not in the freedom to ignore them or suspend them. Th e ability to 
change them owing to whatever urge or choice would only weaken 
God’s freedom. God’s free necessity is the inevitability of these laws. 
Freedom is the ability to follow nothing other than one’s own nature. 
“Th at thing is free which exists and acts solely from the necessity of its 
own nature” and “that thing is constrained [coactus] which is deter-
mined by something else to exist and to act in a fi xed and determinate 
63 E. I, App. (CW 238).
64 L. 58 (CW 909).
65 E. I, 17 (CW 227).
102 chapter two
way.” God’s freedom exists in the fact that there is no external power 
or entity that makes him act in a certain way. “Although God exists 
necessarily, he nevertheless exists freely because he exists solely from 
the necessity of his own nature.”66 God is not constrained by anything 
outside of him since there is no such thing. His freedom is the neces-
sity of the laws that proceed from his very own nature. 
Spinoza is well aware of the novelty and the strangeness of this 
point of view. He writes, 
Many will ridicule this view . . . for this reason alone, that they are in the 
habit of attributing to God another kind of freedom very diff erent from 
that which we . . . have assigned to him; that is an absolute will.67 
However, because of the inadequacy of their knowledge people think 
in terms of the will of God, according to Spinoza. “Th ere is no end 
to questions . . . And so they will go on and on asking the causes of 
causes,” until they take refuge in “the will of God – that is, the sanctu-
ary of ignorance.”68 Th e idea of divine free agency is pointless. God 
as an anthropomorphic, free decision maker is just a fi gment of the 
limited human imagination. In reality, God cannot act or choose with 
a particular goal in mind. God does not want anything because that 
would imply that he desires something that is lacking. However, lack 
means imperfection and God is perfect. Spinoza therefore concludes, 
It is only in concession to the understanding of the multitude and the 
defectiveness of their thought that God is described as a lawgiver or 
ruler, and is called just, merciful, and so on. [However], in reality God 
acts and governs all things solely from the necessity of his own nature 
and perfection, and his decrees and volitions are eternal truths, always 
involving necessity.69 
God acts by the necessity of his own nature and all things are prede-
termined, it was said. Th ings could not have been produced by God in 
any other way or in any other order than is the case. 
All things depend on the power of God. For things to be able to be 
otherwise than as they are, God’s will, too, would necessarily have to be 
diff erent. But God’s will cannot be diff erent (as we have just shown most 
66 L. 58 (CW 908).
67 E. I, 33, Sch. 2 (CW 236).
68 E. I, App. (CW 241).
69 TPT. 4 (CW 432).
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clearly from the consideration of God’s perfection). Th erefore neither 
can things be diff erent.70 
Since individual things are ultimately manifestations of God, all mani-
festations are determined. “Particular things are nothing but . . . modes 
wherein the attributes of God fi nd expression in a defi nite and deter-
mined way.”71 
Hence, also human free will is a misconception. “Human freedom 
which all men boast of possessing” consists solely in this, “that men 
are conscious of their desire and unaware of the causes by which they 
are determined.” However, “every single thing is necessarily deter-
mined by an external cause to exist and to act in a fi xed and deter-
minate way.” Because we are ignorant of the causes but aware of our 
desires, we tend to see ourselves as free agents acting according to our 
own intentions. Spinoza considers this absolute nonsense; all things 
proceed with the greatest perfection by “a certain eternal necessity of 
nature.”72 In Mason’s words, 
I may believe that the reason for my action is a ‘fi nal cause’ in the form 
of an intention referring to the future, but my belief has to be under-
stood in terms of my inability to see backwards to the beginning of the 
chain of causes which makes me act as I do, including the causes which 
make me believe that my action is explained by an intention.73 
Spinoza claims that how we are and what we do is predetermined. We 
have no freedom to act diff erently; we only think we do. Only because 
we do not have a clue about all the things and circumstances that 
cause us to act in a certain way and because we have certain desires, we 
tend to interpret our behavior as the result of our freedom of choice. 
Th is seems to be the conclusion; and prima facie quite a few natural-
ists would heartily agree, as we have seen in the previous chapter.74 
However, Spinoza’s view is more complex. How, for example, would 
we have to interpret what he writes in the Preface to the Th eological-
Political Treatise? 
70 E. I, 33, Sch. 2 (CW 237). 
71 L. 58 (CW 908).
72 Ibid.
73 Mason 1997, 126.
74 See the explanation of epiphenomenalism that is characterized by Flanagan as, 
“fearing the bear comes aft er you run. Th e fear doesn’t cause you to run” (Flanagan 
2002, 117). We act as we do because our brain “makes” us act. Th e thoughts that we 
take to be the cause of our actions are no more than an epiphenomenon. 
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Everyone should be allowed freedom of judgment and the right to inter-
pret the basic tenets of his faith as he thinks fi t, and . . . the moral value of 
a man’s creed should be judged only from his works.75 
How can there be freedom of judgment in beings that are predeter-
mined? And how can they be judged from their works, if they are not 
free agents? Does Spinoza simply contradict himself ? 
Arne Naess argues that Spinoza assumes degrees of freedom. People 
act from a mixture of causes; some of these are external and some 
follow necessarily from their own nature. Of the external causes they 
tend to be unaware. He gives the following example. If it rains, we can 
decide to put up an umbrella; and we have good grounds for taking 
the freedom to do so at its face value. Even so, upon close inspec-
tion, several determinants for this behavior could be listed including 
external ones, such as the rain, bad health, our clothing, vanity, the 
joy of using the new umbrella, etc.76 People are not absolutely free. For 
Spinoza, to be absolutely free means to exist “solely from the necessity 
of [one’s] own nature” and to be “determined to action by [one]self 
alone” and only God is free in that sense.77 People are free to a certain 
degree only, and more free is the person who lives “by the guidance 
of reason.”78 
Apparently, there is a way out of predeterminism. People can 
increase their degree of freedom by progressing on the road to perfect 
knowledge. Reasoning is “like a staircase by which we can climb up to 
the desired place . . . to become united with [the highest good]; which 
union is our supreme happiness and bliss,” Spinoza asserts in the Short 
Treatise.79 “Th e more, therefore, we consider man to be free, the less we 
can say, that he can neglect to use reason,” he maintains in the Political 
Treatise. Hence, “the free man cannot neglect reason, he is not forced 
to use reason, but he necessarily uses it, this belonging to his very 
nature or essence as a free man,” Naess asserts.80 Reason belongs to 
the essence of human nature, and its use leads to greater freedom even 
when human freedom will never be absolute. Reason can free people 
to a certain extent from the dependency on the emotional needs that 
75 TPT. Pref. (CW 393).
76 See Naess 1974, 20.
77 E. I, Def. 7 (CW 217).
78 E. IV, 37, Pr. (CW 339).
79 ST. II, XXVI (CW 100).
80 Naess 1974, 17.
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can enslave a person; and reason can prevent us from being “guided by 
fear.”81 Th e training of reason enables people to reach a higher step on 
the staircase to knowledge. Th e more we act from the necessity of our 
reasonable nature, the closer we get to the true freedom of God. True 
virtue is “nothing other than to live by the guidance of reason.”82 
Th erefore, when Spinoza asserts that all should be free to choose 
their faith, this does not refer to the simple freedom to choose as we 
please, whatever and whenever. Th at is not freedom but unreason-
able, unfree unpredictability, in Spinoza’s view. True freedom requires 
knowledge of our true nature, and this can only be acquired by careful 
training of reason. Hence, when Spinoza asserts that it is important to 
the safety of the state to grant “to the individual citizen the right to 
have his own opinions and to say what he thinks,” he does not sim-
ply express the modern belief in the democratic freedom of opinion 
where anyone gets to express whatever comes to mind, no matter how 
uninformed or hurtful to others.83 Th e type of freedom that Spinoza 
demands is for those who have learned to take true freedom for what 
it really is: the necessity of their true, reasonable nature. If this impor-
tant condition is met, he not only considers it safe for society to grant 
this free use of reason; he even makes it a condition for peace and 
religiosity. 
Not only can this freedom be granted without endangering piety and the 
peace of the commonwealth, but also the peace of the commonwealth 
and piety depend on this freedom.84 
We are not simply nature and unfree, but neither are we in the pos-
session of absolute freedom. Spinozism calls for the training of rea-
son in order to increase our freedom. But how can we train reason? 
Is philosophy the way? How come, then that it leads to union with 
the highest good? “Spinoza is concerned with separating religion and 
philosophy and show how both can coexist in a tolerant civil state,” 
81 E. IV, 63, Pr. (CW 353).
82 E. IV, 37, Sch. 1. (CW 340).
83 TPT. Pref. (CW 393). Th is type of “freedom” seems to have become a specialty 
of Western societies. In the Netherlands, at least, certain politicians embrace it as a 
means to attract voters. Perhaps I may recommend some careful training of reason 
in the Spinozistic sense in order to rise above the urge to make the most outrageous 
accusations concerning non-Western cultures and religions.
84 TPT. Pref. (CW 390).
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Gregory asserts.85 Is het right, or are religion and philosophy closer 
connected than this statement suggests? 
2.2.4. Th e Role of Philosophy and Religion
Th e Th eological-Political Treatise unfolds Spinoza’s ideas about reli-
gion but hardly mentions the nature of God, whereas in the Ethics the 
emphasis is reversed. Knowledge about the nature of God is philoso-
phy, and this knowledge is to be provided by reason. Philosophy and 
reason seem to have very little to do with religion for Spinoza. 
Th e aim of philosophy is, quite simply, truth, while the aim of faith . . . is 
nothing other than obedience and piety. . . . [Philosophy] must be con-
structed by studying Nature alone, whereas faith . . . must be derived only 
from Scripture and revelation.86 
Spinoza views religion as a human ethical, social, and ritual activity 
that hardly enhances knowledge. 
I do not go so far as to maintain that nothing whatsoever of a purely 
philosophic nature is to be found in Scripture’s teaching . . . But this 
much I will say, that such affi  rmations are very few, and of a very simple 
nature.87 
Th ese simple affi  rmations are listed on two occasions in the Th eological-
Political Treatise. In Chapter 5 it says that according to the Bible “there 
is a God, or Being who made all the things and who directs and sus-
tains the world with supreme wisdom.” It also states that “he takes 
the utmost care of men, that is, those of them who live moral and 
righteous lives.” Finally, it says that “he severely punishes the others 
and cuts them off  from the good.”88 In Chapter 14 these biblical affi  r-
mations are extended as follows: 
[1] God . . . exists, supremely just and merciful . . .; 
[2] God is one alone . . .;
[3]  God is omnipresent, and all things are open to him, . . . [with justice] 
he directs everything;
[4]  God has supreme right and dominion over all things. He . . . acts by 
his absolute decree and singular grace. All are required to obey him 
absolutely, while he obeys none;
85 Gregory 1989, 37.
86 TPT. 14 (CW 519).
87 TPT. 13 (CW 510f.).
88 See TPT. 5 (CW 441).
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[5]  Worship of God and obedience to him consists solely in justice and 
charity, or love towards one’s neighbor;
[6]  [Only those] who obey God . . . are saved;
[7] God forgives repentant sinners.89 
Th ese simple assertions barely qualify as philosophical in Spinoza’s 
opinion. In a letter he writes that high speculative thought has nothing 
to do with Scripture, in his view. “For my part I have never learned, 
nor could I have learned any of God’s eternal attributes from Holy 
Scripture.”90 
However, he has “found nothing expressly taught in Scripture that 
was not in agreement with the intellect or that contradicted it,” and 
he is “completely convinced that Scripture does not in any way inhibit 
reason and has nothing to do with philosophy, each standing on its 
own footing.”91 Scripture neither assists nor obstructs the attainment 
of knowledge about God. It can even be of value for the education of 
humankind, because philosophy as
the process of deduction solely from intellectual axioms usually demands 
the apprehension of a long series of connected propositions, as well as 
the greatest caution, acuteness of intelligence, and restraint, all of which 
qualities are rarely to be found among men. So men prefer to be taught 
by experience rather than engage in the logical process of deduction 
from a few axioms. Hence it follows that if anyone sets out to teach 
some doctrine to an entire nation – not to say the whole of mankind 
– and wants to be intelligible to all in every detail, he must rely entirely 
on an appeal to experience, and he must above all adapt his arguments 
and the defi nitions relevant to his doctrine to the understanding of the 
common people, who form the greatest part of mankind.92 
Not all people are philosophers. Actually, in Spinoza’s opinion most 
lack the intelligence and the discipline to follow “a long series of con-
nected propositions.”93 Th at is where religion is a useful instrument. 
Th e role of Scripture is to teach a few basic concepts to common 
people. However, true knowledge of God is neither taught nor com-
manded in the Bible. 
89 TPT. 14 (CW 517f.).
90 L. 21 (CW 827).
91 TPT. Pref. (CW 392).
92 TPT. 5 (CW 441).
93 Th ose who have studied the Ethics know exactly what he means!
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God has asked no other knowledge from men but knowledge of his 
divine justice and charity, this knowledge being necessary not for philo-
sophical understanding, but for obedience to the moral law.94 
Th e true task of religion is to eff ectuate morality.
Nevertheless, religious traditions are a severe disappointment to 
Spinoza. Th ey not only fail to teach simple concepts and basic morality 
to common people; they also have been corrupted. Th ey have become 
immoral institutions that impose their own inventions on others as 
divine doctrine and that suppress those who demand the freedom to 
philosophize. 
God’s religion degenerated into base avarice and ambition. Th e very tem-
ple became a theatre [in which] the light of reason is not only despised 
but is condemned by many as a source of impiety, merely human sup-
positions are regarded as divine doctrine and credulity is looked upon 
as faith; and . . . other ills too numerous to recount here.95 
Religion no longer teaches the pure and simple doctrines of Scrip-
ture but has become an instrument of domination. Hence, Spinoza is 
unwilling to accept the authority of religious traditions unquestion-
ingly. He wishes to test Scripture with his own critical reason “consci-
entiously and freely, and to admit nothing as its teaching which I did 
not most clearly derive from it.”96 
All this must have formed a solid basis for the outrage his philos-
ophy provokes in the religious leaders and theologians of his time. 
Maybe even more than the rejection of an anthropomorphic, transcen-
dent God, it is this insubordination that stigmatizes him as an atheist 
and precipitates his expulsion from the Portuguese-Jewish commu-
nity. Nevertheless, it strikes a modern reader as an extremely harsh 
measure for a young man who also writes that the ultimate goal of 
both religion and philosophy is human blessedness [beatitudo] and 
that “all our activities and likewise our thoughts must be directed to 
this end.”97 However, since “men’s ways of thinking vary considerably 
and diff erent beliefs are better suited to diff erent men,” society should 
be organized in such a manner that as many as possible may attain it 
94 TPT. 13 (CW 514).
95 TPT. Pref. (CW 390f.). 
96 Ibid.
97 TEI. 16 (CW 6).
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as easily and surely as possible.98 Th e road to beatitude for the rational 
person is through philosophy and for the common person through a 
purifi ed form of religion without superstitions. Ultimately, it does not 
matter where a person gets her wisdom; what matters are the results. 
We cannot know anyone except by his works. He who abounds in 
these fruits – charity, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithful-
ness, gentleness and self-control . . . he, whether he be taught by reason 
alone or by Scripture alone, is in truth taught by God, and is altogether 
blessed.99
It turns out that Spinoza’s philosophy is not cold rationality; it is what 
(also) leads to beatitude, and that is not the same as knowledge. We will 
see the same ‘religious drive’ in the philosophy of Hölderlin in Chapter 
4. Both religion and philosophy have the same goal: to be “taught by 
God” and become “blessed.” Nonetheless, Spinoza is condemned for 
his alleged atheism, an accusation that is to stick for at least another 
century before it changes seemingly abruptly. In order to understand 
this turn of events, a closer look at the fate of Spinozism in the century 
following the death of its unfortunate originator is needed. 
2.3. The Early Reception of Spinoza’s Philosophy
A few decades aft er Spinoza’s death the anonymous author of Für-
stellung Vier Neuer Welt-Weisen (1702) summarizes his philosophy 
viciously and coarsely as follows, “Th ese are the abominable doctrines 
and hideous errors which this shallow Jewish philosopher has (if I may 
say so) shit into the world.” Th e tone is set! Spinoza is one of those 
“fools who justly deserve to be put in the madhouse” (Dippel, 1709); “a 
threat to Christianity” (Leibniz, 1670); the author of “pestilent” books 
(Morhof, 1688); “a mocker of religion”; and “an enemy of the human 
race” (one of the characters in Herder’s Gott, 1787); still spoken of as 
a “dead dog” (according to Lessing) in the 1780s.100 Most of his critics 
never reach a more than superfi cial knowledge of Spinoza’s philoso-
phy. David Bell writes, 
 98 TPT. Pref. (CW 391).
 99 TPT. 5 (CW 444).
100 In: Bell 1984, 1–11.
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Th e attitude to Spinoza that was prevalent in Germany prior to the 1780s 
was determined by the fl ood of refutations and denunciations, and was 
certainly not the product of a widespread knowledge of his work.101 
A German translation of the Ethics only becomes available in 1744, 
and the Th eological-Political Treatise does not appear until 1787. No 
matter how misconceived, the cumulative eff ect of the refutations is 
“that Spinoza’s system [is] presented as paradoxical, nonsensical, per-
nicious, and blasphemous.”102 
Th e ignorance of many critics notwithstanding, several aspects can 
be summarized in Spinoza’s philosophy that might have struck his 
contemporaries as outrageous and dangerous. 
1.  Probably the most disturbing element is his doctrine of necessity. 
Human freedom as an absolute free will is non-existent and free 
decision is limited at best, according to Spinoza. All that is, is the 
result of God’s necessary nature which is the highest possible form 
of freedom since it depends on absolutely nothing external. Th e 
denial of absolute freedom was taken to be “equivalent to a doc-
trine of ‘blind necessity’ or fatalism which rendered vice and virtue, 
as well as human eff ort, meaningless.”103 Hence lack of freedom is 
considered a threat to morality and society.
2.  Spinoza’s distinction between the intellectual elite and the masses 
in matters of moral autonomy and the rationality of religion is not 
in keeping with the democratic spirit that is awakening in the 18th 
century. 
3.  Most theology departs from the point of view that Scripture is true 
and divine, whereas Spinoza claims that it should be the other way 
around: truth and divinity should spring from understanding and 
testing Scripture. His conclusion that he has found nothing in the 
Bible that contradicts reason does little to appease his opponents. 
He is not only convinced that it off ers very little in terms of knowl-
edge of God, but he also maintains that it cannot off er anything 
that goes beyond reason. 
4.  Spinoza’s God cannot be thought as personal, as a being equipped 
with consciousness and freedom. 
101 Bell 1984, 1.
102 Ibid., 5.
103 Ibid., 4.
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5.  Spinozism does not satisfy the desire of classical theism to keep a 
perfect God and a corrupt world strictly separate. Referring to one 
of Spinoza’s major critics, Pierre Bayle, Bell writes, “Th e attribu-
tion of extension to God does violence to the principle of divine 
immutability, for extension or matter is the theatre of change and 
corruption.”104 Even though Spinoza explicitly denies that he iden-
tifi es God with the natural world, he is accused of confusing the 
two. Th ese accusations seem to be based largely on hearsay. Johann 
Georg Wachter concedes in 1706, that readers of Spinoza confuse 
God and nature; “but from which of Spinoza’s works do we have it 
that he is himself the originator and teacher of this confusion?”105 
6.  Spinoza is accused of atheism by many of his contemporaries and 
of pantheism by ours. Some might argue that it is indeed only a 
very fi ne line separating the two. “Th e charge that pantheism is 
atheistic is as old as pantheism itself,” Levine asserts.106 When the-
istic predicates are excluded, the only judgments that are left  are 
those about nature. Jonathan Bennett writes, 
Spinoza was a pantheist, in that he identifi ed God with the whole of real-
ity. Th us he agreed with the atheist that reality cannot be divided into 
a portion which is God and one which is not. Although pantheism and 
atheism may seem to be poles apart, with one saying that everything is 
God and the other that nothing is, in the absence of an eff ective contrast 
between God and not-God we should not be quickly confi dent that there 
is any substantive disagreement at all.107 
Bennett’s argument is far too simplistic, of course. Th e distinction 
God-not God is not in a supernatural versus a worldly realm; it is 
rather the diff erence between the ideal and the (imperfect) reality 
of the world.108 
From a classical theistic point of view, the bitter antagonism that Spi-
noza evokes among theologians during his lifetime and in the cen-
tury following his death is perhaps not really surprising. All the more 
intriguing is the question, What changes to make him interesting 
to a later generation of philosophers? How does a philosopher who 
104 Bell 1984, 5.
105 In: Bell 1984, 16.
106 Levine 1994, 3.
107 Bennett 1984, 32.
108 See Chapter 7.
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denounces free will ever become appealing to a generation of thinkers 
whose ethics is dominated by Kantian freedom and whose only con-
nection with God is this freedom? How can someone who asserts that 
“the proper order of philosophical enquiry” has to begin with “divine 
nature” ever catch the attention of thinkers whose perspective has 
taken a 180–degree turn and see human I-hood as the starting-point 
of all philosophy?109 Let me name a few possibilities.
It could be his “hunger for the infi nite,” the fact that he seeks “some-
thing whose discovery and acquisition would aff ord [him] a continu-
ous and supreme joy to all eternity,” that makes him irresistible to 
German idealists.110 Moreover, the drive to fi nd a system of thought in 
which contradictions are reconciled in a peaceful unity must have been 
enormous in the turbulent times of the French Revolution of which 
German idealism has been called the theoretical equivalent. Philosophy 
has become a struggle to think unity in the midst of mental and social 
chaos. Furthermore, the end of the 18th century is a time in which 
history seems to reach a point of no return. In the spirit of liberty, fra-
ternity, and equality, every human individual becomes signifi cant. As 
the time of the monarchs versus the anonymous masses is disappearing 
in the West, also God can no longer ‘aff ord to’ reign from high above. 
Spinoza’s renunciation of all religious authority may have appealed in 
an age where autonomy is the password. Schmidt-Biggeman’s remark 
that Spinoza’s conception of participation in the one divine Substance 
enabling knowledge “through consubstantiality” coincides with this 
tendency. Since all participate in the Divine as its modes and all can 
have knowledge of the divine truth through the divine attribute of cogi-
tatio, the private, individual experience of truth during moments of 
enlightenment or through the enhancement of the intellect can be uni-
versalized without necessary mediation of religious laws and an institu-
tion like the Church.111 Finally, the renewed interest in ancient Greek 
literature and philosophy with its divinization of natural phenomena 
109 E. II, 10 Sch. = S 70.
110 Copleston 1946, 43; TEI. 1 = S 233.
111 See Schmidt-Biggemann 1989, 155–161. Many of the great thinkers of German 
idealism have a pietistic background that propagates private “mystical” experiences, 
hence direct and momentary insights into the divine mystery. Schmidt-Biggemann 
also adds that Christology loses its function as a consequence. As will be shown in 
Chapter 4 this need not be true. For Hölderlin, among others, Christ remains a central 
fi gure. 
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reawakens an appreciation of the religious quality to nature. Deus sive 
Natura: it sounds like an echo from revered Antiquity. 
Th e time spirit of the second half of the 18th century is ready for a 
new image of God and man.112 Spinoza’s system opens possibilities for 
a new conception that bridges the divide and brings God and world 
closer together. Th e arena in which this ‘German Revolution’ is fought 
is called the pantheism controversy.
2.4. Pantheism Controversy
Towards the end of the 18th century, a heated correspondence takes 
place between Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743–1819) and Moses Men-
delssohn (1729–1786). Th e topic of this dispute is Gotthold Lessing 
(1729–1781). Shortly before his death, the latter has allegedly admitted 
to Jacobi in a personal conversation to no longer believe in a personal 
God, and he has declared himself a Spinozist. He is reported to have 
said, 
Th e orthodox concepts of the divinity are no longer for me; I cannot 
stand them. Hen kai Pan! I know naught else . . .; and I must admit, I 
like it very much.” Upon Jacobi’s response that he would then be in 
agreement with Spinoza, he answers, “If I am to call myself by anybody’s 
name, then I know none better.113 
Th is is the spark that ignites the so-called pantheism controversy [Pan-
theismusstreit] and the turning point in the reception of Spinoza’s phi-
losophy. A respected philosopher has admitted at least a measure of 
affi  nity with the theory of one who has been largely dismissed as a 
blasphemous fool. 
In the history of the reception of Spinoza this is perhaps its prime signif-
icance: it meant that Spinoza could no longer be dismissed with rhetoric 
and hyperbole, but had to be reckoned with as a serious philosopher.114 
112 Woman is yet to wait another century or two to be granted similar rights. In 
large parts of the world and in many religions she is still waiting for her rightful 
share.
113 Jacobi 1988a, 85. All translations of the relevant publications are from Gerard 
Vallée. For the German text see Jacobi 2000. 
114 Bell 1984, 71.
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Th e central issue of these conversations is the concept of God and the 
question of the relationship between God and the world. According 
to Gerard Vallée, 
When Lessing said to Jacobi: ‘Th e orthodox concepts of the divinity are 
no longer for me,’ . . . he seems to dismiss the questionable representation 
of a God separated from the world . . . He seems to reject all anthropo-
morphic thought that not only ascribes to God ‘our wretched way’ of 
thinking, but also throws an unbridgeable gulf between us and a God 
‘out there.’115 
To Jacobi this makes Lessing an atheist because Spinoza does not 
acknowledge the absolute transcendence of God. Jacobi is convinced 
that “even the best of minds will concoct absurdities when it attempts 
to explain everything.” One must simply “know the line of demarca-
tion where the inexplicable begins,” otherwise “we shut the eyes of the 
soul, with which it contemplates God and itself.”116 Nevertheless, Less-
ing asserts with Spinoza that such a line cannot be drawn. He rejects a 
Christian theism that places God outside the world and opposes faith 
to reason. 
Jacobi is convinced that this is a pantheistic misconception and the 
“natural” consequence of human reason left  to its own devices. He 
writes, “I, for my part, asserted that there can be no natural philosophy 
of the supranatural and yet the two (the natural and the supranatural) 
are obviously givens.”117 Th e conviction that everything is explainable 
constitutes a rationalism that can only lead to determinism and athe-
ism, in Jacobi’s opinion. Speculative reasoning can never prove the 
existence of a transcendent and personal God. It can only conceive of 
an immanent infi nite (Hen kai Pan) and identify God with 
an inherent cause of the world . . . devoid of both reason [Verstand] and 
will” is to eliminate God as a distinct personal being. All metaphysical 
systems that rely upon reason alone are necessarily atheistic. Th erefore, 
Jacobi declares that he believes “in an intelligent personal fi rst cause of 
the world.118
To Jacobi, Spinoza is a prime example of the errors that ensue from a 
rationalist epistemology. He is appalled by the pretensions to rational 
115 Vallée 1988, 13.
116 Jacobi 1988a, 95; 96.
117 Ibid., 97.
118 Ibid., 88; 87. 
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knowledge about the Divine. “Th e prime element of all human knowl-
edge and action is faith.” It takes what he calls a “salto mortale,” a leap 
from speculative knowledge into faith, from the head to the heart.119 
As the rationalist Mendelssohn puts it, 
[Jacobi] tries to persuade us that, once someone has reached the precipi-
tous peaks of metaphysics, there is no recourse but to turn one’s back on 
all philosophy and plunge head fi rst into the depths of faith.120 
According to Jacobi, “we are all of us born within faith, and in faith we 
perforce continue, just as we are all born within society and in society 
we must continue.” We possess
an immediate certainty which not only needs no proof but even totally 
excludes all proofs . . . Conviction through proofs is second-hand cer-
tainty and rests on comparison; it can never be altogether certain and 
total. Now every taking-to-be-true [Fürwahrhalten], which does not 
have its origins in rational grounds, is faith, then conviction based on 
rational grounds must itself come from faith and from faith alone must 
draw its strength.121 
All reasoning is ultimately grounded in faith. Everything else is sec-
ond-hand and second-rate, is Jacobi’s passionate conviction.
In contrast, Mendelssohn is a fi rm believer in rational arguments 
and rejects Jacobi’s plunge into faith. He recognizes no conviction save 
that grounded in reason. “Th e existence and authority of the Supreme 
Law-giver must be recognized by reason, and there is no room here 
for revelation or faith.”122 Mendelssohn has become acquainted with 
Spinoza’s philosophy at a considerably younger age (in the 1750s). In 
his Philosophische Gespräche [Philosophical Dialogues], he achieves 
an objective tone in his approach of Spinoza in contrast to all the 
emotional refutations that have been published before. He insists on 
Spinoza’s errors, but he does not attack him. He even praises him to 
a certain degree, and he believes that Spinoza need not be danger-
ous to morality. Aft er this early occupation with Spinoza, however, 
he has given him little subsequent thought. Hence, at the time of his 
119 Ibid., 123; 88. 
120 Mendelssohn 1988b, 140. 
121 Jacobi 1988a, 120. Th is “immediate certainty” will be at the basis of a term that 
is to become very important in German idealism: intellectual intuition. It will then 
serve as an immediate access to the Divine. See Chapter 5. 
122 Mendelssohn 1988b, 139.
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dispute with Jacobi he is forced to draw on his interpretation of 1755. 
His understanding of Spinoza has become rigid, and he is “well aware 
that the proofs and the species of reasoning that satisfi ed him [are] no 
longer fashionable, or acceptable, but he [clings] with tenacity” to his 
enlightened belief in speculative reason.123 
In addition to defending his own familiar theories that have been 
satisfactory for most of his professional life, Mendelssohn has another 
reason for his dispute with Jacobi. He attempts to rescue Lessing, who 
has been an intimate friend for more than thirty years, from the implied 
accusation of atheism.124 To this end, he makes a distinction between 
two kinds of pantheism: a full-fl edged pantheism versus a “purifi ed” 
[geläutert] or “refi ned” [verfeint] form. Th e fi rst type (Spinoza’s) does 
not make any diff erence between the fi nite and the Infi nite. Spinoza 
confuses intensive and extensive infi nite: his God is constituted by an 
infi nite number of fi nite entities.” Hence, its unavoidable consequence 
is atheism. Th e second kind “postulates a world that does not exist 
outside God and [in which] the world is the product of God’s thought
 . . . ‘Conceiving, willing, and creating are one with God.’”125 Th is type 
he attributes to Lessing. Th is refi ned pantheism is “totally compatible 
with the truths of religion and morality.”126 
Vallée maintains that this is really panentheism, which 
postulates a dipolar nature of the divinity according to which God, 
through his relative aspect, includes the world and, through his absolute 
aspect, is distinct from the world. In its perfect form it consists of fi ve 
factors found simultaneously: God is eternal, he is capable of change, 
he is self-aware, he knows the world, he includes the world [not in his 
essence but in his actuality].127 
However, Mendelssohn would probably have rejected this label of 
panentheism. He says, “We live, move, and are as eff ects of God but 
not in him,” which in turn sounds a whole lot more Spinozistic than 
he would probably care to admit.128 In his defense of Lessing, 
123 See Bell 1984, 76.
124 As he writes accusingly to Jacobi, “A friend entrusts a confession to his ear, and 
he betrays it to the public; a friend, as his life is drawing to a close, makes him the 
confi dant of his frailty, and this he uses to stain the man’s memory for all posterity” 
(Mendelssohn 1988b, 133).
125 Bell 1984, 29.
126 Mendelssohn 1988a, 73.
127 Vallée 1988, 47. Note the diff erences with Spinoza’s God.
128 Mendelssohn 1988a, 36.
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Mendelssohn was trying to have things both ways: fundamentally Less-
ing was [pictured as] a defender of rational religion, a theist, but if he did 
have an inclination towards Spinozism, it was of the harmless, purifi ed 
variety.129 
From what starts out as a private correspondence between two schol-
ars four publications result.130 As the dispute advances, the tone of the 
publications becomes less scholarly and more truculent. Th e authors 
accuse each other of hypocrisy, vanity, vindictiveness, indiscretion, and 
betrayal. Both men are convinced to be the one who has understood 
Lessing best. And both are interested in using his name for their own 
cause: Mendelssohn’s rationalism and Jacobi’s defense of faith and his 
desire “to overturn the epistemological principles of rationalism itself.” 
Neither gentleman seems to have gained the desired personal victory. 
Jacobi on the one hand feels misunderstood and ridiculed by his col-
leagues while on a fully respectable mission to defend Christian faith. 
Mendelssohn becomes even more thoroughly confused and never 
manages to understand what Jacobi’s exact position is with respect to 
Spinoza. His parting words about Jacobi are, 
I can make as little sense of his practical principles as I can of his theo-
retical ones. Circumstances being what they are, little can be accom-
plished by discussion, I believe, and the best course to follow is to part 
company. Let him return to the faith of his fathers, submit restive reason 
to the triumphant mighty dicta.131 
By then the dispute between Mendelssohn and Jacobi has created a 
storm involving all the major intellectual fi gures in Germany. Even 
when Spinoza’s name becomes the immediate center of the heated 
129 Bell 1984, 76.
130 1. Mendelssohn’s Morgenstunden oder Vorlesungen über das Daseyn Gottes 
[Morning Hours or Lectures on the Existence of God] in 1785 intended as a laudatio, 
but it turned into an apology of his friend Lessing; 2. Jacobi’s Über die Lehre des Spi-
noza, in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn [Letters to Mr. Moses Mendelssohn 
on the Doctrine of Spinoza] also published in 1785, in which Jacobi reveals Lessing’s 
“Spinozism.” It is meant to be a refutation of what he fears will be a characterization 
of Lessing in favor of Mendelssohn’s rational theism; 3. Mendelssohn’s reaction to 
Jacobi in An die Freunde Lessings. Ein Anhang zu Herrn Jacobi’s Briefwechsel über die 
Lehre des Spinoza [To the Friends of Lessing. Appendix to Mr. Jacobi’s Correspondence 
on the Doctrine of Spinoza] in 1786; 4. Jacobi’s Wider Mendelssohns Beschuldigungen 
in dessen Schreiben an die Freunde Lessings [Against Mendelssohn’s Accusations in his 
Writing to the Friends of Lessing] also from 1786. 
131 Vallée 1988, 148.
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debate, the controversy itself is a refl ection of the philosophical ten-
sions of the late 18th century, not an investigative analysis of Spinoza’s 
thought. Th e ensuing debate revolves around two central issues:
1.  Whether a Spinozistic philosophy necessarily leads to atheism, or if 
a diff erent type of pantheistic thinking can be envisioned.
2.  How Spinozism can be combined with freedom in the Kantian 
sense since Spinoza’s determinism is unacceptable to these modern 
thinkers.
Ironically, it is this Über die Lehre des Spinoza, in Briefen an den 
Herrn Moses Mendelssohn of Jacobi, a fi erce opponent of Spinozism, 
that re-introduces Spinoza in 1785. Contrary to his intentions, it gives 
an interpretation of Spinoza’s philosophy that arouses the interest of 
his contemporaries. Since Jacobi supports his arguments by quoting 
from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, also Kant unwillingly becomes 
involved in the debate. Kant, of course, agrees with Jacobi on the 
inadequacy of rational knowledge where God is concerned and rejects 
Mendelssohn’s reliance on rational common sense. Nevertheless, he 
emphatically disagrees with Jacobi’s advocating faith and revelation as 
“a supposed secret sense for perceiving the truth.”132 Owing to Jacobi’s 
booklet, Spinozism is introduced as an acceptable metaphysical posi-
tion provided that Kantian thoughts on freedom can be integrated. 
About a century aft er his death Spinoza is revived by a man deter-
mined to achieve the exact opposite: the disqualifi cation of all ratio-
nal metaphysics! From an “abominable heresy” Spinozism becomes a 
defendable philosophical position. Th e hostility towards Spinoza with 
accusations of atheism, fatalism, and pantheism give way to an atti-
tude of adoration towards the end of the eighteenth century. And Spi-
noza undergoes a metamorphosis from “dead dog” to “felled oak tree” 
(Schiller), one who “still strengthens the heart” (Zweig) and even “the 
brother of Jesus” (Hauser), a “God-intoxicated man” (Novalis), and a 
“saint” (Ausländer) whose ascetic lifestyle is praised.133 
132 See Kant’s Was heist: Sich im Denken orientieren? [What Does it Mean: To Ori-
entate Oneself in Th inking?] of 1786. 
133 In: Müller 2006, 148–158.
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2.5. Merging the Absolute with the God of the Bible
Once Spinoza’s philosophy is accepted as a serious philosophical posi-
tion, attempts are made by the thinkers of the late 18th through the 
early 19th century to merge the Absolute, the monistic Hen kai Pan as 
the Greek version of Deus sive Natura, with the God of the Bible. One 
of the catalysts is the German philosopher Carl Leonhard Reinhold 
(1757–1825), a Jesuit priest converted to freemasonry and an enthusi-
astic student of Kant. He writes a booklet called Die Hebräischen Mys-
terien oder die älteste religiöse Freymaurerey [Th e Hebraic Mysteries or 
the Oldest Religious Freemasonry].134 
In it, he argues that Moses, raised as an Egyptian prince, has been 
fully initiated in the Egyptian mysteries of which the two foundations 
are the unity of God and the rejection of polytheism. Th e religion of 
the common Egyptian, however, is polytheism. In this society, the 
Hebrews form the lowest class; they are slaves. Th e hatred between 
the Hebrews and the Egyptians is undisputed. Nevertheless, aft er four 
hundred years of being forced to live under Egyptian law, it could 
hardly be prevented that the Hebrews are infl uenced by Egyptian mor-
als, customs, and religion. Th ey have become polytheists like most 
Egyptians. Reinhold fi nds support for this thesis in the book Joshua 
where it says, “Now fear the LORD and serve him with all faithfulness. 
Th row away the gods your forefathers worshipped beyond the River 
and in Egypt, and serve the LORD.”135 Moses has the diffi  cult task to 
make these uneducated slaves, who worship a multitude of gods and 
continue to make their idols even in the desert, accept the idea of one 
God. However, the true nature of this God he could not reveal to his 
people for two reasons. First, this all-unitary [All-Eine] God of the 
Egyptian mysteries is beyond the understanding of regular people. It 
takes a long period of study, preparation, and gradual initiation into 
His secrets in order to be able to meet this God face-to-face [epop-
teuein]. Only a few are chosen. Secondly, this God, as the all-encom-
passing One, is unfi t as the foundation of a society. 
Hence, Reinhold maintains that the God of the Old Testament is an 
interpretation of the God of the Egyptian mystery religion that takes 
the limited intellectual and religious capabilities of his simple followers 
134 See Reinhold 2001.
135 Joshua 24,14; See Reinhold 2001, 30–37.
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into account. Th e way Moses introduces his God to them is through 
the idea of a tutelary god [Schutzgott], a national protective deity. He 
names him JHWH.136 Th is name, meaning I am who is or I am who 
I am, is reminiscent of the J-ha-ho or Jao, the highest deity of the 
mystery religion of Isis. And, according to Reinhold, this is the only 
time in the Bible that Moses’ real God surfaces, namely in Ex. 3, 14 
where he introduces himself with the following words, “I am who I 
am. Th is is what you are to say to the Israelites: ‘I AM has sent me to 
you.’” Reinhold, who departs from the Septuagint, reads this as: I am 
the essential being; I am all that is.137 Th is he interprets as Hen kai Pan. 
Reinhold does not take this “I am all that is” for a real name but for 
true namelessness. Th e nameless God of the Hebrews is the God of the 
Egyptian mysteries. Th is God can have no name since he is the only 
one, all that is. A name is only necessary to single out one individual 
in a multitude; and naming gods only makes sense in a polytheistic 
setting. If God is the only one, there is no need to distinguish him by 
naming him.138 
Th us the Jewish tetragram, the foundation of the new mosaic reli-
gion, is equated to the secret object of the Egyptian mystery religion 
of whom it is said: 1. “He is one, of himself alone. And to this One 
all things owe their existence,” in a verse from a hymn by Clemens of 
Alexandria;139 and 2. “I am all that is, was, and will be. No mortal has 
lift ed my veil,” in an inscription on a statue representing the veiled 
goddess Isis in the temple of Sais in Egypt. It was passed down by 
Plutarch around the turn of the fi rst century. Th e God in All and the 
God of (mono-)theism are conceived as one and the same by Rein-
hold. Assmann asserts that Reinhold is eager to demonstrate that bib-
lical revelation leads to the Egyptian quote, since it would break down 
the walls between Christians, Jews, Muslims, and pagans and lay the 
foundation for the reconciliation of the religions.140 Th is inscription of 
Sais comes to play an important role in the metaphysics of German 
idealism. Th e poet Johann Christoph Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805) is 
thrilled by Reinhold’s thesis and publishes an essay called Die Sendung 
136 Reinhold calls him Jehovah.
137 Ἐγώ ει ̧μι ὁ ὤν.
138 Th is thought also occurs in a passage from the Corpus Hermeticum: God is one, 
but the one does not need a name. He is the nameless Being. 
139 Reinhold 2001, 41.
140 See Assmann 1998, 183f.
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Moses [Th e Mission of Moses] in the Th alia and also uses the inscrip-
tion in a ballad.141 Th anks to Schiller’s enthusiasm, Reinhold’s thesis is 
spread outside the world of freemasonry. 
As we have seen in the preceding, Reinhold’s view does not come 
unexpectedly. He and his contemporaries have rediscovered the phi-
losophy of Spinoza and recognize echoes of the Hen kai Pan of both 
ancient Greek and Egyptian philosophy.142 Reinhold has studied Wil-
liam Warburton who in turn rests his theory on Ralph Cudworth, the 
17th century Platonist, who has reconstructed the Egyptian mystery 
doctrine as pantheism in his Th e True intellectual System of the Uni-
verse of 1678. When Warburton asserts, 
Th e doctrines delivered in the Greater Mysteries concern the universe. 
Here all instruction ends. Th ings are seen as they are; and Nature, and 
the workings of Nature are to be seen and comprehended,143 
Reinhold must have seen an unmistakable link with Spinoza. God and 
world can no longer be thought as divided by an immense void; there 
cannot be two realities but only one. Th e problem with Moses’ primi-
tive people is, according to Reinhold, that reason is still undeveloped. 
Moses attempts to introduce an entire people of uneducated slaves to 
the divine mysteries that are normally only revealed to a chosen few 
aft er a long period of preparation. In order to translate the true divine 
mystery to a level of truth that his people can grasp, an important 
transformation takes place: what becomes knowledge to the initiates 
has to remain blind faith for the Hebrews. It takes violent force and 
miracles to force this blind faith upon them. Th e German idealists 
feel that the time is ready for the next step in history. Th ey see it as 
their task to carry this faith into the dimension of reason once again. 
Th e time has come that God can be known! Spinoza and Kant are to 
bring the Deus who is also Natura within reach of the transcendental 
subject. 
141 See Schiller 2001. For the relevant verse in Schiller’s ballad Über das Erhabene 
of 1793, see Assmann 2001, 188.
142 Reinhold has even worked on a dissertation on Spinoza. It is never fi nished 
because in 1787 he accepts a professorship in Jena.
143 In: Assmann 2001, 179.
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2.6. The I and the Absolute
German idealism can be viewed as the various attempts to combine 
the philosophies of Kant and Spinoza. On the one hand, they wish to 
overcome Kantian dualism while retaining major roles for the subject 
and its modern sense of freedom, and to bring the ground of all real-
ity within reach of the I. On the other hand, the enthusiastic followers 
of Kant fi nd two aspects lacking in Spinozism that they think vital 
for any philosophy: the Kantian views on freedom as an imperative 
experience and the role of the subject. Spinoza mistakenly posited the 
Absolute as an object. It is Fichte, an overwhelming personality and 
defender of his (absolute) I, who wants to make sure that the subject 
fi nally gets the philosophical status it deserves. In his opinion the error 
of pre-Kantian metaphysical systems in general is the fact that they 
present the I, the subject, as determined by the object, hence as passive 
dependence. Fichte is convinced that the exact opposite is true: it is 
the activity of the subject that determines the world of objects, nature. 
From this, he draws the conclusion that the Absolute must be subjec-
tive. It is through our own subjectivity that we are in touch with it. In 
Fichte’s view, we become aware of the Absolute, the Unconditioned, in 
the ‘I am.’ Within our subjectivity is an infi nite aspect that Kant largely 
ignores. In fact, he silently presupposes the ‘I’ as absolute ground even 
though he is not aware of it. Fichte’s objective is to expand the Kan-
tian critical system with an active role for the human subject. He calls 
his system critical idealism. It is idealistic in the sense of taking the 
subjective as the Absolute rather than the objective. It is critical in the 
sense that it departs from the assumption that the Absolute must be 
immanent to humans: it is in the I. 
Frederick Beiser distinguishes between two fundamental forms of 
idealism that prevail towards the end of the 18th century: the subjec-
tive idealism of Kant and Fichte, “according to which the transcenden-
tal subject is the source of the form but not the matter of experience,” 
and the absolute idealism of Hegel and Schelling “according to which 
the forms of experience are self-subsistent and transcend both subject 
and object.”144 Beiser describes absolute idealism as the result of four 
steps beyond Fichte’s subjective idealism:
144 Beiser 2002, 11.
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1.  Subject-object identity is not something of self-consciousness, as 
Fichte maintains, but it exists only in the one universal Substance, 
the Absolute.
2.  Th is Absolute does not have a purely regulative status, it is not just 
an ethical ideal; it has a constitutive role, it is an existing reality. 
3. Th is Absolute is knowable.
4.  Nature is not a projection of consciousness but an independent 
reality with inherent rationality.145
Absolute idealism involves a much greater degree of realism than sub-
jective idealism. Th e Absolute is all that is, somehow including the 
whole of nature. It does not have a merely regulative status; it really is. 
Th erefore, it cannot be reduced to the realm of subjectivity. Subjectiv-
ity may be considered the highest manifestation of the Absolute, but it 
is not the only one. Nature, or the domain of objectivity, is an equally 
real aspect of the Absolute. Besides, subjectivity and objectivity are 
only valid distinctions within the realm of experience and conscious-
ness. Th e very possibility of (self-)consciousness requires a ground 
that transcends it. Th e Absolute as this ground and as the condition 
of the possibility of all conscious experience cannot be caught in such 
terms. Absolute idealism is ‘metaphysical’ in the very sense that Kant 
has rejected: it is speculative and provides theories about the Absolute 
or the Unconditioned [das Unbedingte], which are beyond the Kantian 
realm of the theoretical. For Kant, the fundamental problem with the 
metaphysics of idealism “is not that it is false but that it is speculative, 
going beyond the limits of our cognitive powers.”146 Nevertheless, for 
a new generation it forms the only way out of the dead-end of dual-
ism, the only chance to ever think what forms the core of everyday 
experience: that we really interact with the real things (in themselves) 
of the world. 
2.7. From Here Onwards
In the philosophical context as pictured in this chapter, three young 
men start their studies and meet at the Tübinger Stift , the prestigious 
Lutheran seminary: Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775–1854); 
145 See ibid., 375.
146 Beiser 2002, 35.
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Johann Christian Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843), and Georg Wil-
helm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831). Th e fi rst two will form the subject 
of the subsequent chapters. Schelling is oft en called the last metaphysi-
cian. White describes his work as the last “classical attempt to under-
stand all that exists in terms of the transcendent Absolute in which it 
is grounded.”147 His persistent attempts and ultimate failure to solve 
the philosophical problems of his time form an excellent illustration of 
a line of thinking that has inspired generations of philosophers, some-
times only as proof of the philosophical unfeasibility of the idealistic 
project. In the course of the 19th century, metaphysics becomes “the 
bogeyman of positivists, pragmatists, neo-Kantians, and postmodern-
ists alike,” as Beiser puts it.148 It is declared dead, and Schelling plays a 
major role in digging its grave. As a result of the effi  cacy of his attack 
on Hegel and his own inability to provide a more viable system, he 
inadvertently contributes to the “radical rejection of the tradition 
stretching from Plato to Hegel.”149 
It has been said about Schelling that he returns to his Lutheran roots 
later in life. Th e Freiheitschift  (1809) might be the fi rst step away from 
philosophy as the science that the young Schelling wants it to be and 
back towards the career that the father has in mind when he enrolls his 
son in the Tübinger Stift , the Lutheran seminary.150 Schelling’s shift  of 
attention towards theology that fi rst stirs in 1809 and becomes his defi -
nite line from the 1820’s onwards, can also be, and has been, viewed as 
proof of his inability to outdo Hegel. Indeed, he never achieves a higher 
synthesis than Hegel. When Schelling obtains Hegel’s chair in Berlin a 
few years aft er the latter’s death, he sets out to present his alternative 
positive philosophy and sentences Hegel’s (and his own) prior nega-
tive philosophy to the role of mere preliminary. It has been argued that 
the later Schelling’s positive philosophy shows his conviction that it is 
impossible for a system of reason to ground itself. Whether Schelling’s 
rejection of positive philosophy is wisdom or intellectual inability is 
not important in this investigation. I do not think that Schelling ever 
solves the problem of the relationship between the human being and 
147 White 1983a, 2.
148 Beiser 2002, 466.
149 White 1983a, 2.
150 Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und 
damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände [Philosophical Investigations Concerning the 
Essence of Human Freedom and Related Subjects]. For the reference, see the next chapter.
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God philosophically. I want to use his diff erent attempts to illustrate 
the philosophical diffi  culties associated with such a project. I believe 
that in the time called German idealism reason is stretched as far as it 
will go without yielding the results that are hoped for. 
So why bother with a philosophy that has dug its own grave? Bei-
ser gives the following justifi cation for his fascination with German 
idealism. 
Th e German idealists not only foresaw but lived through and responded 
to the collapse of foundationalism; their subtle and sophisticated response 
to this crisis makes them of abiding relevance today.151 
Th is might be a good reason to study a philosophical system whose 
content is apparently passé. Another incentive is the theological dis-
qualifi cation of Schelling and his fellow Stift ler. Th ey have been cat-
egorized and rejected as pantheists and are therefore supposed to be 
irrelevant for any theology that is to be Christian. Fuhrmans’ assertion 
that what has been called pantheistic tendencies in German idealism 
are better characterized, in case of Schelling at least, as a theistically 
structured theology with typical modern characteristics has found 
minimal reception in Christian theology. Nevertheless, already more 
than half a century ago he believes that Schelling’s tendency to see the 
Absolute as giving worth to the worldly instead of treating it as a mere 
shadow of the Divine is of considerable value for any modern Chris-
tian theology.152 Th at might be the major impulse to study his various 
systems two centuries later. 
Another relevant question is, Why study Schelling and not the 
German idealist par excellence: Hegel? Indeed, an occasional defense 
of Schelling’s work in its own right notwithstanding, the history of 
philosophy has had the “tendency to treat Schelling as a foot stool” 
instead of taking him as a fi gure in his own right, Beiser maintains. 
Th is he fi nds undeserved. Even when Hegel portrays him as such, it 
is a caricature of Schelling’s contribution to the development of Ger-
man idealism. It is Schelling who fathers the absolute idealism that 
Hegel defends and systematizes, according to Beiser.153 In addition, 
Emil Fackenheim asserts that even though Schelling is “indisputably 
the originator” of both absolute idealism and existentialism, “it has 
151 Beiser 2002, 9.
152 See Fuhrmans 1954, 13–18.
153 Beiser 2002, 465. 
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come to pass that the credit for absolute idealism has gone to Hegel, 
and that for existentialism to Kierkegaard. Schelling is widely forgot-
ten.”154 Two arguments for studying the German idealist Schelling 
instead of Hegel. What makes (the early) Schelling most interesting, 
however, is the speed or perhaps even the impulsiveness of his writing. 
Before the ink has dried on one publication, another set of thoughts 
is underway. His philosophical musings are published before Schelling 
has a chance to really fathom them himself. He never admits to mis-
takes or gaps in his reasoning; he either claims to be misunderstood by 
his critics and accuses his opponents of lack of intelligence and their 
criticism unworthy of an answer, or he promises another book that 
will put all of its predecessors in the right perspective. It makes for a 
vivid illustration of the philosophical obstacles on the road form the 
I to the Absolute. 
Nonetheless, once again Schelling will serve as a “foot stool” to a 
degree. Th e next chapter will illustrate the struggles of a representa-
tive of a generation of brilliant and ultimately religious thinkers. It 
will reveal the hubris of human reason taken to the utmost and the 
persistency of trying ever new avenues to reach the ultimate goal of 
the metaphysician: thinking the Great Beyond. Th e focus will be on 
the fi rst two decades of Schelling’s philosophical career where he is 
fi ghting the dawning realization of his ultimate inability to discursively 
know the Divine. Hence, the following chapter does not claim to do 
justice to Schelling’s entire philosophical career, nor to his later turn 
towards theology. It focuses on the period between 1795 and 1810, 
with an occasional excursus into Die Weltalter of 1813.155 It merely 
wants to give an account of the struggle of discursive reason with and 
its ultimate capitulation before the Divine. It serves to uncover the 
complex of philosophical problems that was ‘in the air’ at the turn of 
Schelling’s century. Schelling is a perfect example of the persistency of 
the brilliant philosopher who believes that his intellect should be capa-
ble of thinking anything, if only he sets his mind to it. What makes 
Schelling of interest is the type of questions he dares to raise; the per-
sistency of his attempts to reveal why there is something rather than 
154 Fackenheim 1996, 51.
155 Th e Ages of the World. Several versions of this work have been conceived from 
1811 onward. Schelling remains preoccupied with it throughout the rest of his life. 
He never considers it good enough to be published, and it isn’t until aft er his death 
by his son Karl.
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nothing; his profound desire to know the ground of human individual 
existence as we experience it. None of these questions has ceased to 
fascinate in the twenty-fi rst century. 
Schelling’s metaphysics is indeed interesting in itself, but it will 
acquire more depth when off set against the thinking of his fellow 
Stift ler Hölderlin in Chapter 4. We will then see how within the same 
philosophical context entirely diff erent choices are possible. Th e major 
diff erence is in Hölderlin’s claim that the absolute ground of (self-) 
consciousness is not knowable. Where Schelling sticks to philosophy 
in the period of time that forms the focus of this research, Hölderlin
turns away from the ratio towards to poetry as another means to 
explore the metaphysical domain. 
CHAPTER THREE
SCHELLING: THE I AND ITS GROUND 
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling has been called an absolute idealist.1
According to Frederick Beiser, 
Absolute idealism is the doctrine that everything is a part of the single 
universal organism, or that everything conforms to, or is an appearance 
of, its purpose, design, or idea.2 
Th e idealistic conception of the Absolute can be understood as the 
synthesis of three theses: 1. monism, “the universe consists in not a 
1 Schelling is born in Leonberg, a small town near Stuttgart, on January 27 in 1775. 
He is the son of a Lutheran parson who is also a well-known orientalist and becomes 
professor at the higher seminary of Bebenhausen (near Tübingen) when Schelling is 
two years old. Young Friedrich receives a traditional, pietistically oriented education. 
Being a brilliant student, he is admitted to the Tübinger Stift  at the age of fi ft een where 
also Hegel and Hölderlin, his senior by fi ve years, are enrolled. Th e Stift  knows a strict 
regime with prescribed clothing (a monk-like uniform), obligatory religious services, 
set visiting hours, and curfew. Although the authorities try to isolate the young stu-
dents, the smoldering dissatisfaction is augmented by the spirit of freedom of the 
French Revolution that blows over into Germany. Schelling is one of its most out-
spoken proponents. Since the duke Karl Eugen (1737–1793) from whom the Stift ler 
receive stipends does not permit any form of insubordination, this nearly causes his 
expulsion in 1793. Another source of turbulence in the Stift  is Kant’s philosophy of 
freedom. Th e attempts of seminary professors to domesticate it by making the postu-
lates of practical reason into theological dogmas do not succeed (see Henrich 1997b, 
31–54). Aft er graduation in 1795 the twenty-year old takes a position as tutor (as do 
Hegel and Hölderlin, and many other graduates from the Stift  who are unwilling to 
become Lutheran ministers). He is in charge of the education of the sons of the rich 
Leipziger family Riedesel, his junior by only a few years. He uses his stay in Leipzig 
to study law and the natural sciences and conceive the foundation of his philosophy 
of nature. In 1798 this yields him a professorship at the University of Jena thanks to 
the infl uence of Goethe. Here he comes in close contact with Early Romantic circles 
(the Schlegel brothers, Novalis, Tieck a.o.) and meets his future wife Caroline, then 
married to the oldest Schlegel, August Wilhelm. Due to his confi dence in his own 
ability to achieve a grand philosophical system that will surpass Kant, Spinoza, and 
all of the great names of philosophy, Schelling is not easy to get along with. He likes 
to outdo his colleagues. He cannot handle criticism very well, and many friendships 
suff er from his arrogance. Even his own son, and biographer, writes about his “deeply 
rooted . . . tendency to take pleasure in exposing the ridiculous or castigating what was 
mediocre” (Letters I, 22. Plitt Aus Schelling’s Leben. In Briefen). Even though Schelling 
enjoys a long and successful career, his last major work is published in 1809 when 
he is only in his mid thirties. Schelling survives both of the other Stift ler; he dies in 
1854.
2 Beiser 2002, 352.
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plurality of substances but a single substance;” 2. vitalism, “the single 
universal substance is an organism, which is in a constant process of 
growth and development;” 3. rationalism, “this process of develop-
ment has a purpose, or conforms to some form, archetype, or idea.”3 
Let us see how Schelling’s idealism matches this characterization. 
3.1. Philosophical Stages and Teachers
Several stages have been distinguished in Schelling’s philosophical 
development.4 A rather detailed subdivision is the following:
1.  In the mid 1790’s, the young Schelling is an eager admirer of Fichte 
whose studies of Spinoza have convinced him that a viable philoso-
phy can only begin with the Absolute as the singular ground of all 
that is. At this point he calls it the absolute I, in line with Fichte. 
Th is preoccupation with an all-encompassing unitary Absolute as 
the ground of all that is will last his entire life.
2.  Philosophy of nature [Naturphilosophie] (1797–1800) in which all 
of nature is regarded as productivity. Th is is a radical turn away 
from the mechanistic conception of nature that prevails at the time. 
Beiser summarizes its objective, 
Rightly, Schelling saw that the problem of dualism would be surmount-
able only if philosophers rethought the nature of matter itself. If matter 
is only bare extension, and if mechanism is the paradigm of explanation, 
then the only options are dualism and materialism. But neither is satis-
factory. If the former makes mental-physical interaction mysterious, the 
latter fails to recognize the sui generis status of mental life.5 
3.  Transcendental idealism (1800) forms an attempt to explain the 
activity of the thinking subject (consciousness) and the “uncon-
scious” productivity of nature as parallel movements that can be 
mediated by art.
3 Ibid.
4 Th e number of stages or even diff erent philosophies attributed to Schelling varies 
wildly. Some – such as Hartmann in Geschichte der Metaphysik II of 1899–1900; Drews 
in Die Philosophie im ersten Drittel des 19ten Jahrhunderts of 1912; and Fuhrmans in 
Schellings Philosophie der Weltalter of 1954 – divide his philosophy in two periods, 
while others (such as Windelband in Geschichte der Philosophie of 1880) distinguish 
as many as fi ve.
5 Beiser 2002, 466.
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4.  Philosophy of identity (1801–1804) in which apparent opposites 
such as mind-matter and ideal-real are viewed as only diff erent 
aspects of the same One. 
5.  Philosophy of Religion (1804–1854) 
a. Philosophy of Freedom (–1815) 
b. Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation (1827–). 
Th is stage is oft en referred to as Schelling’s positive philosophy or 
theology. Schelling himself opposes it to the negative philosophy of 
his earlier stages, which he compares to Hegel’s Logic. 
No matter how many stages are distinguished, Schelling’s philosophy 
has known many turning points, contradictions even, and he has pro-
duced a number of distinct systems. In his young years, he tends to 
either ignore the discrepancies, blame his critics for a lack of insight 
into the coherence of the whole, or claim that the earlier texts are mere 
preliminaries to the real system that is to be explained next. At a more 
mature age, he seems to admit the lack of cohesion when he writes that 
diff erent philosophical systems “should exist in conjunction as do the 
diff erent systems in an organism.”6 As Emil Fackenheim puts it, 
Schelling does lack system and thoroughness . . . If Schelling never worked 
out any of his systems, this is in part because his systematic tendency 
was forever at war with his aporematic.7 
Th e blindness to this aporematic element causes critics to view his 
systems as disconnected. However, the newer systems spring from the 
problems created by the older ones. In his later years, absolute ide-
alism becomes mere negative philosophy, no more than a necessary 
preface to a metaphysics proper, or positive philosophy. His student 
Heinrich Lisco writes, 
6 SW 9, 213. Th e fi rst part of the reference refers to the volume of the Sämmtliche 
Werke edited by his son Karl F.A. Schelling and published by J.G. Cotta in Stuttgart 
and Augsburg, 1856–1861. Th is edition has two divisions: the fi rst has ten volumes 
and the second has four. I will number from 1–14. Th e second part of the reference 
provides the page number. Th e translation of the early works of Schelling is based 
on the work of Fritz Marti (See Schelling 1980a through 1980d in the bibliography). 
However, I have taken the liberty of making slight adaptations in order to harmonize 
the translation with my own terminology and that of other authors I will be citing. 
Sometimes a more literal and perhaps less literary translation is chosen in order to 
more closely express the German meaning of a word.
7 Fackenheim 1996, 110.
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Schelling was more consistent in his development than the usual view 
assumes, but . . . this consistency is more in persistent problems than in 
adherence to (the same) solutions.8 
Xavier Tilliette, one of the best known Schelling interpreters, speaks of 
une philosophie en devenir [a philosophy in the making].9 
Whatever the explanation or the justifi cation, it is easy to point at 
the tensions between statements in subsequent works of Schelling or 
even within the same publication. I will not attempt to solve apparent 
contradictions. Sometimes, at least, they are what they seem: contra-
dictory. Nevertheless, it would be unjust to discard all that Schelling 
has said as incoherent, and therefore failed, attempts at building a sys-
tem. All these twists and turns notwithstanding, it could be said that 
Schelling’s focus circles around one persistent problem: the relation of 
the empirical (I) to the Absolute or God. In the opinion of Schelling 
and many of his contemporaries, Spinoza’s philosophy off ers the solu-
tion for the connection between the Absolute and nature. However, it 
does not account for two focal points of modern philosophy: subjec-
tivity and freedom. Schelling seeks to integrate a free Kantian subject 
and an Absolute with Spinozistic qualities. Gutmann asserts,
It is the constancy of the concern to adjust, harmonize, reconcile by 
discovering a basis of unity, identity in diff erence in which apparent 
contradictions are eliminated, that marks . . . all Schelling’s works.10 
Alan White writes, 
One gets the feeling that Schelling saw in the teachings of Spinoza, 
Leibniz, Kant, and Fichte all the pieces he would need to construct his 
account of the whole. In each work . . . he tries to fi t the pieces together; 
when one attempt fails, he attempts a rearrangement.11 
Th e result is a certain amount of “jumpiness” in his thinking. Schelling 
is “relatively easy to infl uence in his philosophizing,” and this causes 
a lack of continuity.12 His youthful contribution to German idealism 
defi nitely never becomes the desired, all-encompassing system that 
explains it all.
 8 Gutmann 1936, xxviii.
 9 See Tilliette 1970.
10 Gutmann 1936, xxixf. 
11 White 1983a, 28.
12 Fuhrmans 1954, 80.
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A brief sketch of the most important contributors to Schelling’s phi-
losophy will provide the lines of thinking that Schelling thinks worthy 
of integration into one large system. At the same time, it forms an 
overview of the renowned competition that the child genius wishes 
to outdo. Th ese names have already been discussed extensively in the 
previous chapter. 
1.  Kant  
Schelling’s project is characterized by the refusal to accept the 
Kantian split between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds. Th e 
basic problem of epistemology, how we know our concepts to cor-
respond to real things in the world, remains unsolvable, if there 
is no interaction between the two realms. Th e awareness of the 
limits of knowledge indicates a sort of knowledge distinguishable 
from logical, mathematical, and empirical knowledge. Kant names 
it transcendental. Even though he uses it to prove the reliability 
of the other types of knowledge, Kant never grounds it itself. In a 
letter to Hegel Schelling writes, “Kant has given the results: the pre-
suppositions are still missing. And who can understand the results 
without the presuppositions?” He “proposes to establish the princi-
ples [on which Kant’s thought rests].”13 Th e true philosopher dares 
to venture beyond Kant’s solid ground, even if thereby he “risks 
everything, either to achieve complete truth in all its greatness, or 
no truth at all.”14 Th is statement by a twenty-year-old sets the tone 
not only for his own career, but for half a century of philosophy to 
come: to go beyond the Kantian limits into the forbidden territory 
of metaphysics and to risk everything. 
2.  Reinhold 
“Never, with one exception, has a book been so wondered about, 
admired, hated, criticized, hounded, and – misunderstood,” Karl 
Leonhard Reinhold writes in the Letters on the Kantian Philo sophy 
published in 1786–87 in response to Kant’s fi rst Critique.15 It is 
Reinhold who contributes the insight to Schelling’s thinking that 
philosophy needs a fi rst principle in order to be scientifi c. Reinhold, 
a respected Kantian, wants to provide Kant’s philosophy with the 
13 Letter of 6 January 1795. In: Plitt 2003, I, 73f. 
14 SW 1, 155; 152.
15 In: Snow 1996, 12.
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systematic foundation that he as well considers lacking. A single 
principle located in consciousness has to be found. For Reinhold 
this is the representation [Vorstellung]. Th e young Schelling sup-
ports Reinhold’s foundationalism, but he disagrees with his choice 
of a principle that resides in consciousness. He writes,
To be sure, the act that appears to the philosopher fi rst (as far as time is 
concerned) is the act of consciousness, but the condition of the possibil-
ity of this act must be a superior act of the human mind itself.16 
Consciousness involves a subject and an object, one who has con-
sciousness and something to be conscious of. However, in order for 
the act of consciousness to really refer to the things of the world, there 
must be something to connect the subject and the object. Th is unity, 
as the condition of the possibility of consciousness, must be beyond 
all consciousness.17 
3.  Spinoza 
Th e infl uence of Spinoza on Schelling is no less than that of Kant. 
In agreement with Spinoza, Schelling understands philosophy as 
the study of all reality. Hence, it must begin with the whole, the 
Absolute, which is “from itself and through itself ” [von sich selbst 
und durch sich selbst], a distinctly Spinozistic way of characterizing 
it.18 Also in line with Spinoza, he refuses to consider the ground 
of matter and of thought as ultimately separable. It is necessary to 
presume a preceding unitary ground in order to enable real knowl-
edge of real things-in-themselves. True to his competitive person-
ality, Schelling’s high esteem for Spinoza is expressed in his desire 
to produce “a counterpart to Spinoza’s Ethics” that will topple this 
system by means of its own principles.19 
4.  Fichte 
It is the idea of the primacy of the subject that the early Schelling 
owes to Fichte. For Kant the world we know is at least in part prod-
uct of our own mind, but for Fichte the world simply is the product 
of the I. What we experience as the distinction I versus world is 
just the distinction between the conscious versus the unconscious 
16 SW 1, 100 note *. 
17 We will see this theme surface all through Schelling’s (and Hölderlin’s) meta-
physics. How can an Absolute that encompasses both subject and object become an 
object of knowledge (of a subject)?
18 SW 6,148.
19 SW 1, 159. 
134 chapter three
products of the I. Because the world is the unconscious product, the 
I experiences it as alien, as not-I. With this, Fichte fi rmly objects to 
Spinozism since such a system “is obligated to understand all of the 
features of consciousness as eff ects of the action of external things 
upon the subject,” which is a totally unacceptable conclusion to any 
student of Kant.20 Th erefore, Spinoza’s system is an exact reversal 
of the truth, in Fichte’s view. Subjectivity can never be understood 
in terms of objects. Hence, Fichte searches for an Absolute that 
is immanent to the human I rather than opposed to it. Th e only 
object of unmediated, immediate, knowledge is the I. Th erefore, 
the only possible metaphysics must start with our own subjectiv-
ity, and, reversely, within the subject there is an aspect of infi nity. 
For Fichte it is “the ground of explanation of all facts of empirical 
consciousness that before all positing in the I the I must itself previ-
ously be posited.”21 In Fichte’s system, both practice and theory are 
relations between the conscious and the unconscious self. Since the 
I does not recognize its own unconscious product as itself, it is in 
eternal confl ict with itself. 
5.  Jacobi 
It is Jacobi who inadvertently reawakens the interest of his con-
temporaries in Spinoza with his Spinoza-booklet of 1785, as we 
have seen in 2.4. His attack on all forms of rationalism results in 
the notion that all philosophical systems can be classifi ed as either 
realistic or idealistic. In Jacobi’s idiosyncratic conception, those sys-
tems are idealistic that depend on abstraction, rather than intuition, 
whereas the intuited is the undeniably real. What Fichte and Spi-
noza have in common, according to Jacobi, is the desire to explain 
everything in terms of a single principle. Hence, both systems are 
founded on abstraction and conceptuality. Idealism is no more 
than “Spinozism in reverse.” However, real knowledge of objects 
can never be attained, if immediate intuitive knowledge of objects is 
denied. Jacobi shares Schelling’s conviction that Kant’s philosophy 
must have presupposed certain things. But for Jacobi this is the 
reality of objects. He fi nds this conclusion very confusing because 
“without this presupposition I could not get into the system, and 
with this presupposition could not remain within it.” Discursive 
20 Neuhouser 1990, 56.
21 GA I, 2, 258.
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understanding only produces representations. Since representations 
of God and freedom are impossible, these become inevitably inac-
cessible to us within idealistic systems. Th is is a consequence that 
Jacobi is unwilling to accept. His realism dictates that knowledge of 
the real is based on intuition: “True being . . . is recognized in feeling 
alone.”22 Such an intuition for God Jacobi calls faith [Glaube]. 
3.2. The Absolute as I in the Early Schelling
In 1795, a barely twenty-year-old Schelling is wholly submerged in the 
ongoing philosophical controversy when he writes to Hegel: 
Philosophy must take its start from the Unconditioned [das Unbe dingte]. 
Th e question is simply where this Unconditioned lies, in the I or in the 
not-I. If this question is answered, everything is decided. For me the 
highest principle of all philosophy is the pure, absolute I, that is, the 
I insofar as it is nothing but I, not yet conditioned by any objects, but 
posited by freedom. Th e A and O of all philosophy is freedom.23 
In this short fragment the core of his lifelong philosophical program is 
summarized: the search for the Unconditioned, the Absolute, for the 
“ultimate point of reality on which everything depends, from which all 
fi rmness and all form of our knowledge springs”;24 the question how it 
relates to subjectivity and to the objects of the world; and a vague intu-
ition that the key to all these problems is to be found in the concept of 
freedom. Th is latter intuition is to lie dormant for over a decade and 
will be discussed in 3.4. Whether the Absolute should be viewed as an 
I or a not-I forms the focus of this section. 
“If there is any genuine knowledge at all, there must be knowledge 
which I do not reach by way of some other knowledge,” Schelling 
states in Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie [Of the I as the Prin-
ciple of Philosophy or On the Unconditional in Human Knowledge] of 
1795.25 In daily life, we experience that the regular chain of knowing 
goes from one conditional piece of knowledge to another. Th is being 
the case, we are left  with three options: 1. the whole has no stability; 2. 
22 In: Snow 1996, 35; 36. 
23 Letter to Hegel February 4, 1795, in: Plitt 2003, I, 76.
24 SW 1, 162.
25 SW 1, 149–244. Here SW 1, 162. See Schelling 1980b for the English translation. 
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one must be able to believe that this can go on ad infi nitum; 3. there 
must be some ultimate point on which the whole depends. Schelling 
obviously chooses the third. He sets out to search for this ultimate 
principle of all that is, the “ultimate point of reality on which every-
thing depends, . . . the original ground [Urgrund].” Th is principle can-
not be understood in terms of its relation to anything else. It must be 
“independent of anything superior;” and “it must be not only uncon-
ditioned but altogether unconditionable.”26 It is the Absolute.
Th e next question in the ongoing discussion would be whether this 
principle belongs to the class of objects or to the class of subjects. In 
the aforementioned letter Schelling writes, “For Spinoza the world (the 
object in simple contrast to the subject) was everything, for me it is 
the I.”27 Qualifying this principle as belonging to either the class of 
objects or of subjects determines whether a philosophy is classifi ed as 
dogmatic or critical, respectively. Th is distinction is a major topic of 
philosophical debate in Schelling’s time even though the defi nitions 
are oft en far from clear. According to Kant, dogmatism is 
the presumption that it is possible to make progress from concepts alone 
without having fi rst investigated in what way and by what right reason 
has come into possession of these concepts,28 
whereas criticism starts with this very investigation. Kant’s Critiques 
are directed at those dogmatists who base their theories upon an 
Absolute that is beyond our senses, beyond the scope of the human 
intellect. Hence, Kant views dogmatism as a theory that is founded on 
faith rather than reason. Fichte changes this distinction when he writes 
in the Grundlage, 
Th e essence of critical philosophy consists in this, that an absolute I is set 
forth as wholly unconditioned and not determined by any higher entity
. . . In contrast, a philosophy is dogmatic when it equates or opposes any-
thing to the I as such; and this occurs owing to the ostensibly higher 
concept of a thing (Ens) which is set up, quite arbitrarily, as the highest 
conception. Insofar dogmatism can be consistent, Spinozism is its most 
consistent product.29 
26 SW 1, 164f.; 162; 163f.
27 Letter to Hegel February 4, 1795, in: Plitt 2003, I, 73f.
28 KrV Bxxxv. 
29 GA I, 2, 279f.
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Dogmatism starts from an object, something given, hence something 
conditional. Criticism, in contrast, tries to start from an uncondi-
tional certainty. And for Fichte this Unconditioned, this Absolute, is 
ultimately expressed in the ‘I am.’ As Marti puts it, “In the plainest 
possible terms, criticism is philosophy that starts from the I, whereas 
dogmatism starts from some presupposed It, be it mind or matter.”30 
Th e early Schelling takes part in this debate when he asserts that 
the Unconditioned cannot be an object, for something is object “only 
inasmuch as it is determined by something else . . . [An object] presup-
poses . . . a subject.”31 Th e Absolute cannot be an object since an object 
relies upon a subject to act on it. An object therefore is always relative 
to something, hence not unconditioned, not absolute. Playing on the 
etymology of the German term Unbedingt, which is oft en translated as 
unconditional or unconditioned,32 Schelling writes, 
Bedingen means the action by which anything becomes a thing [Ding]. 
Bedingt [conditioned] is what has been turned into a thing. Th us, it is 
clear at once that nothing can posit itself as a thing, and that an uncon-
ditioned thing is a contradiction in terms. Unbedingt [unconditioned] is 
what has not been turned into a thing, and what cannot at all become 
a thing.33 
An object [Ding] can never qualify as the Absolute, the Unconditioned 
[das Unbedingte] since a thing cannot be “unbethinged” or “unthingi-
fi ed.” With this, Schelling feels he has fi rmly placed himself outside the 
circle of dogmatists and points at what he sees as one of the serious 
fl aws of the Spinozistic system. Spinoza’s error is not in the assump-
tion of the Absolute “but in the fact that Spinoza posited it outside the 
I.” Th en again, even Spinoza never really described his One Substance 
as an object, Schelling argues, because he uses predicates like self-iden-
tical, pure being, and unity, none of which apply to objects. Spinoza’s 
30 Marti 1980, 154.
31 SW 1, 165.
32 I have chosen the latter and will continue to do so. However, either choice is 
artifi cial and unsatisfactory since the English language is unable to grasp the fullness 
of the German expression. Th e English Unconditioned is not a word of common 
speech, and unconditional, meaning something like ‘without conditions,’ has a fairly 
limited use such as in the expression ‘unconditional love,’ a love that does not depend 
on any particular aspect or characteristic of the beloved. In German, on the contrary, 
unbedingt is also part of everyday vocabulary and has connotations like defi nitely, 
without doubt, directly, and immediately. 
33 SW 1, 166.
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Substance was not really an object because “Spinoza did not truly posit 
the Unconditioned in the not-I; rather he turned the not-I into the I 
by elevating it to the Absolute.” Th e result is a complete reversal: He 
made “the I not-I and the not-I I.”34
Now that he has demonstrated that the Absolute cannot belong to 
the class of objects, it would be obvious to view it as subject. And in 
line with Fichte, the early Schelling calls the ultimate principle of all 
reality the absolute I. However, the existence of such an absolute I can 
never be proven objectively. For proof, it would have to be objectifi ed, 
hence belong to the sphere of the conditioned, but the I “is determined 
as unconditioned only through itself.” An I is not thinkable, unless it 
is. And it is not thinkable unless it thinks itself. “Th e principle of its 
being and the principle of its being known must coincide.” Th is Abso-
lute must be immanent to the human I and can only be revealed by 
an insight that grabs you instantaneously, in the immediate awareness 
‘I am!’ And this is a proposition that is self-validating. 
My I contains a being that precedes all thinking and imagining. It is by 
being thought, and it is being thought because it is . . . It produces itself 
by its own thinking.35 
Apparently the Absolute is a subject, and it is closely connected with 
our individual subjectivity. However, the two must not be confused; 
the absolute I is not the same as my individual self-consciousness. 
Schelling makes it very clear that he is not talking about the empirical 
I of which a plurality exist, “each of which is I for itself and not-I for 
the others.” Th e fi nite empirical I is always contrasting itself to the 
not-I and “is nothing at all without it.” 
[Self-consciousness] is not a free act of the immutable but an unfree 
urge that induces the mutable I, conditioned by the not-I, to strive to 
maintain its identity and to reassert itself in the undertow of endless 
change.36 
Th e empirical I manifests itself by the ‘I think,’ hence by the objects it 
opposes to itself in consciousness. Human subjects are determined by 
objects just as much as the other way around. And “the I is no longer 
the pure, absolute I once it occurs in consciousness.” Th e ‘I think’ as an 
34 SW 1, 172; 185; 171.
35 SW 1, 168; 163; 167.
36 SW 1, 183.
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act of refl ection, hence a conscious act, is unable to explain the unity 
of the absolute I. On the contrary, self-consciousness even implies the 
danger of losing the I.37 In its striving for self-preservation, the empiri-
cal I’s main occupation is to isolate itself from and to oppose itself to 
all the not-I’s that threaten its individual existence. Hence, the abso-
lute I, the unity that grounds all that is, is not and cannot be the same 
as the I of the self-conscious individual.
Ergo, the Absolute may not be an object, but it is not simply a sub-
ject either. It must be a unity that “precedes all thinking and presen-
tation” and thus underlies the subject-object diff erence since it takes 
such a unity to be able to grasp the diff erence. Th e Unconditioned 
“can lie neither in a thing as such, nor in anything that can become a 
thing, that is not in the subject.”38 Subject is thinkable only in regard 
to object. It is limited to the domain of knowing, where the knower 
is opposed to the known and also to other knowers. Th e Absolute is 
neither subject nor object. Very early in his career it becomes clear to 
Schelling that to place the Absolute in any category, be it of subjects or 
of objects, is to limit it. Unlimitedness and (self-)consciousness do not 
go together. Since the Absolute must be beyond all limitation, it must 
be beyond the realm of consciousness altogether. With this conclu-
sion it is obvious that Schelling is not only dissatisfi ed with Spinoza’s 
solutions, but the Fichtean terminology notwithstanding he is also 
not convinced that the solution lies with an absolute I. Especially in 
Chapter 5 on intellectual intuition it will become clear how Schelling 
struggles to integrate an Absolute with Spinozistic properties and an 
(absolute) I that is related to a human individual. It results in an indi-
vidual I that is absolutized to dangerous proportions.
In the Philosophische Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kriticismus 
[Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism], Schelling seems 
to conclude that criticism and dogmatism both have equal theoreti-
cal and practical validity and cannot refute each other.39 Th ey are 
both indemonstrable in that the Absolute transcends the limits of 
knowledge. Furthermore, they both provide equally viable solutions 
to the problems of practical reason. Criticism demands a totally active 
37 SW 1, 180. Here we see how Schelling, like Hölderlin as will become clear in the 
next chapter, thinks self-consciousness in terms of the refl ection model and fi nds his 
own method of refuting it.
38 SW 1, 167; 166.
39 SW 1, 281–342. See Schelling 1980c for the English translation.
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subject that asserts itself in order to make the world conform to its rea-
son. And dogmatism calls for a subject that is completely passive and 
denies itself to the point of conformity with the world. Th e problem 
of the nature of the Absolute seems unsolvable.40 
At this point Schelling could have given up on metaphysics alto-
gether, but he does not. At fi rst, he suggests something like intellec-
tual intuition to provide a means of contact with this Absolute that 
leaves opportunities for further development of his metaphysics. Sub-
sequently he decides that if starting from the unity of the Absolute as 
either subject or object does not provide a system, perhaps starting 
from the multiplicity of the world will be a fi rst step towards a solu-
tion. Th is seems to be the path that Schelling takes for the next decade 
in his philosophy of nature. He becomes less preoccupied with subjec-
tivity and the relation between the individual I and the Absolute and 
more interested in the physical world. How does its diversity relate to 
a unitary Absolute? How can this world as a whole emerge from the 
Absolute? In 1796 he writes,
Th e main task of all philosophy consists of solving the problem of the 
existence of the world . . . Th e notion of anything emerging within the 
nonfi nite posits something from nothing.41 
Th e derivation of the fi nite (the empirical I and the natural world) 
from the Infi nite (the absolute I or Spinoza’s God/Substance) is the 
Gordian knot of all philosophy, and Schelling will try his utmost to 
cut it, as we will see next.
Th e following does not claim to be an exhaustive account of Schelling’s 
philosophy at the turn of the 18th century. It merely tries to expose 
some of the problems that Schelling faces and tackles before he is led 
to a radically diff erent approach in 1809 with his Freiheitschrift  that 
will be discussed in 3.4.42 It is mainly meant to illustrate what even a 
brilliant and ambitious young philosopher cannot achieve: thinking 
40 Th e Letters have been conceived under the infl uence of Hölderlin with whom 
Schelling meets several times during the period they are written. In Chapter 4 
we will see how Hölderlin fi rmly sticks to the unknowability of the ground of all 
consciousness. 
41 SW 1, 314.
42 Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und 
damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände, [Philosophical Investigations Concerning the 
Essence of Human Freedom and Related Subjects], SW 7, 331–484. 
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the Absolute and explaining why and how it gives rise to a world of 
I-sayers. No matter whether he starts his endeavors with an Absolute 
as I or It, with the empirical world of things, with the human ability to 
say I, or with the identity of the two, there always remain holes in his 
system. Something always defeats explanation somewhere. Schelling’s 
contribution to German idealism is not the overall system that he has 
in mind at the beginning of his career; it is rather the exploration of all 
the dead-ends and the sometimes brilliant connections between these. 
In his eff orts Schelling has exposed the utter limits of human thinking, 
it appears. 
3.3. Attempts at Cutting the Gordian Knot of Philosophy
Th e period from 1797 through 1804 constitutes the time of Schelling’s 
attempts to construct an all-inclusive philosophical system that is to be 
the antithesis to Spinozism. His ambition is to outdo what he consid-
ers the only rational system of philosophy. In his philosophy of nature 
he starts with the objective; and in his transcendental philosophy he 
starts with the subject. When it turns out that neither approach alone 
can account for the entire system, he tries to combine them into the 
system of identity. According to Beiser, 
Although Naturphilosophie underwent important changes since its origi-
nal conception in 1797, Schelling always held that its main goal is identi-
cal to that of transcendental philosophy: to provide a demonstration of 
the principle of subject-object identity, which is the fundamental pre-
supposition of all knowledge.43 
We will fi rst look at the real side of Schelling’s attempted system of 
philosophy: the philosophy of nature. Subsequent sections (3.3.2. and 
3.3.3.) will elaborate on transcendental philosophy and the system of 
identity, respectively.
3.3.1. Philosophy of Nature
Th e philosophy of nature starts with the objective world. Rather than 
beginning from the subject and investigating the realm of conscious-
ness, the goal is to reveal the one principle underlying the multiplicity 
of the things of the world and study the nature of matter itself. Th is 
43 Beiser 2002, 510.
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induction should not be based on abstractions, an “artifi cial [erkün-
stelte] unity of principles,” but rather on the concrete observations and 
theories of empirical science. Th ese lead Schelling to conclude that 
energy is “the one and the same principle [that] connects inorganic 
and organic matter.” Rather than taking dead matter as such as the 
basis of the objective world, he views matter as consisting of an equi-
librium of attractive and repulsive forces. “Th e greatest diversity of 
matter is nothing other than a diversity in the relationship of these 
forces.”44 In nature are two basic tendencies that mutually limit one 
another: the centrifugal, expanding to Infi nity; and the centripetal, 
contracting into a single point. Each object in nature must therefore 
be seen as the result of these two forces. It comes into existence at the 
zero-point where their opposite directions cancel each other.45 
Th e two basic activities of the mind, to reach outward into Infi n-
ity and to turn inward toward a single point, echo these attractive 
and repulsive forces. Once this parallel is drawn, the challenge is to 
prove that basic natural phenomena as magnetism and electricity nec-
essarily develop up to the level of organisms and even self-conscious 
intellects: 
that it is one and the same universal dualism that from magnetic polarity 
through electrical appearances fi nally loses itself in chemical heterogene-
ity, and eventually resurfaces again in organic nature.46 
If both object and subject are the product of these contradicting 
forces, if “the system of nature is at one and the same time the sys-
tem of our mind [Geist],” then the inaccessibility of the Dinge an sich 
and the resulting dualism could be overcome. Understanding nature 
would ultimately result in understanding the I, and vice versa. “As 
long as I myself am identical with nature, I understand what living 
nature is as well as I understand my own life.”47 
In Schelling’s view, part of the program succeeds; his philosophy 
of nature can construct a world from an underlying natural principle. 
Th is approach results in a radically diff erent view of nature. Nature 
is not a mechanism. It must be viewed as dynamic and active instead 
of as mechanical and passive. It arises from forces that “are in them-
44 SW 2, 347; 350; 275f. 
45 See SW 3, 288.
46 SW 3, 258.
47 SW 2, 39; 47.
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selves already infi nite.” Nature consists of one vast hierarchy of various
stages of organization and development of one living force, that 
Schelling now calls the “world soul.” It passes through ever more com-
plex forms of matter from minerals, to plants, to animals, and fi nally 
ends with the self-consciousness of the transcendental philosopher 
and the creativity of the artistic genius, as representative of the high-
est form of life.48 With this, Schelling believes to have taken a major 
step in overcoming dualism, the “highest task of the philosophy of 
nature.”49 Th e only distinction between mind and body is that of levels 
of organization and not of kind: mind is highly organized matter, and 
matter is less organized mind. 
Schelling’s organic view of nature is not new at the time. Kant has 
also suggested that nature is self-causing and self-generating, with 
some internal sense of direction or purpose, rather than a Cartesian 
mechanism produced by external causes alone. However, for Kant the 
metaphor of nature as an organism only has regulative status (we can 
investigate nature as if it were an organism), whereas Schelling gives 
it constitutive status (it is not a matter of scientifi c method: nature is a 
living organism). Schelling criticizes both dualists and materialists for 
being unable to explain the unity of form and content in an organism. 
We cannot separate the two as if the form were imposed on the con-
tent from the outside, be it by God or some material cause. Form or 
purpose is inherent in the object; the condition for its existence even. 
Now if the form is necessary for the very existence of the object, then 
why not give the idea of life constitutive status?50 Two aspects can be 
distinguished in nature: nature as living activity or productivity and 
nature as product of its own activity. Nature is both. 
Here we see how Schelling, the systembuilder, tries to integrate 
Spinoza’s two aspects of nature: productivity (Natura naturans) and 
product (Natura naturata) with a Kantian view of nature as an organ-
ism. Productivity constitutes the “subjective” aspect of nature and 
product the “objective.” Nature as absolute productivity is completely 
infi nite, but this productivity also results in defi nite products, real 
objects that are distinct from one another. Th ese principles of nature 
extend into reason that proves to be nothing more than “a play of 
48 SW 2, 275; 381. Modesty has never been a limiting factor in Schelling’s view of 
the, his, I. More about the (artistic) genius can be found in 3.3.2. and in Chapter 5.
49 SW 3, 102. 
50 See SW 2, 41–47. 
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higher and necessarily unknown natural powers.” Since nature is abso-
lute productivity, this means that the confl ict between the antagonistic 
forces of attraction and repulsion is eternal. Th e equilibrium cannot be 
anything permanent. Th at is why the products of nature are constantly 
destroyed and recreated. Th e reason that there is something like a 
momentary balance of forces in nature at all is the result of its striv-
ing to return to its original state of pure self-identity.51 Th is ultimate 
goal is unattainable. However, by unifying opposites within the more 
fundamental opposition, a synthesis is reached on a higher level. Th is 
is followed by new opposites to be synthesized, etc. What results is a 
hierarchy of syntheses on an ever higher level where each stage is more 
inclusive than the previous one. Schelling calls these potencies.52 
Schelling’s 1799 philosophy of nature forms the break with Fichte.53 
According to Beiser, two of its assumptions are completely at odds 
with Fichte’s Wissenschaft slehre: 
1.  Its transcendental realism, “the thesis that nature exists indepen-
dently of all consciousness, even that of the transcendental sub-
ject.”54 Schelling claims that nature is something in itself, rather 
than an unconscious product of the I and therefore to be inter-
preted as not-I. Nature is not, as Fichte sees it, “the object and 
sphere of my moral duties and absolutely nothing else.”55 Schelling 
rejects Fichte’s all too utilitarian view of nature as the mere instru-
ment and medium of moral action allows it to be dominated and 
manipulated in the interest of human morality. Nature is not just 
a not-I, alienated: it is another, if less developed or perhaps less 
eloquent, expression of the same Absolute.
51 SW 3, 17f.; 273f.; 289; 309.
52 We will see this term return a decade later in a rather diff erent meaning (see 
3.4.2.).
53 In his two early works, Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur [Ideas towards a 
Philosophy of Nature] of 1797, SW 2, 1–344; and Von der Weltseele [Of the World-
soul] of 1798, SW 2, 345–583 on the philosophy of nature, he still provides a Fichtean 
foundation. In his 1799 Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie [First Outline of 
a Philosophy of Nature], SW 3, 1–268, Schelling virtually abandons this. Idealism and 
realism have equal status as explanations of the Absolute, now becomes his convic-
tion. He starts calling the philosophy of nature the “Spinozism of physics” because it 
posits nature as the Absolute (SW 3, 273).
54 Beiser 2002, 483.
55 GA I, 6, 263.
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2.  Its transcendental naturalism, “the doctrine that everything is expli-
cable according to the laws of nature, including the rationality of 
the transcendental subject.”56 
According to Schelling, Fichte has been unable to rid his philosophy of 
all dualism. Th ere is still an enormous gap between the I and nature. 
Th e only bridge between the two realms is a moral one that sees nature 
(not-I) as the material of moral duty of the I. Th is I imposes its will 
on nature, and it will only be completely realized in performing its 
duty on this not-I. Since the completion of this task is an ideal one, 
the I/not-I dualism will never be completely overcome. If it were, in 
ideal infi nity, nature would lose its independence. To make matters 
worse, even though Schelling has started his philosophy of nature as 
an independent science next to Fichte’s Wissenschaft slehre, by the time 
it reaches completion he sees Fichte’s work as a mere part of his own 
overall system. Fichte, however, remains convinced that there is no 
need to postulate an independent source of activity outside the I. Real 
activity, the activity of the world on the I, is the result of the self-limi-
tation of the I’s spontaneity, the ideal activity. 
Away with those pre-given infl uences and eff ects of outer things on 
me by means of which they supposedly infuse me with a knowledge 
concerning them that is not in them and that cannot fl ow from them. 
Th e ground for supposing something outside of me is not outside but 
inside of me, in the limitation of my own person. Th rough this limita-
tion thinking nature goes in me – out of itself.57 
Aft er several attempts by Schelling to fi nd common ground, the break 
becomes irreversible in the summer of 1801. Not all thoughts that 
sound right can apparently be integrated!
Not only does the philosophy of nature cause a break with his for-
mer mentor and friend, it also proves to be unable to solve the “highest 
56 Beiser 2002, 483.
57 GA I, 6, 204. Klaus Müller comments, “Positing diff erence from the limitation 
of the subject, so that without it diff erence would not exist – much more elegantly 
the problem of identity and diff erence, of Spinoza and Kant, of monism and freedom 
cannot in fact be solved” (Müller 2006, 99). I tend to disagree with Müller. Th e solip-
sism that Fichte’s statement expresses seems to me a dangerous interpretation of both 
monism and freedom. If the world, full of other I’s, merely exists as a result of the 
I’s limitation, I’s can never truly relate, but only swallow each other. Th e persistent 
inability to integrate relationality in idealistic metaphysics and a possible correction 
thereof will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
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task” of philosophy: namely, the question about the cause of “the fi rst 
dynamic separation [Ausseinander]” resulting in nature. 
It is impossible that this (externally) Unlimited transforms itself into 
something fi nite for intuition except by becoming object for itself, that 
is, becoming fi nite in its infi nitude (turned against itself – separated 
[entzweit]).58 
Only a refl ective structure can explain diff erence arising in the abso-
lute unity, in Schelling’s opinion. All of nature must originate from 
the primal self-refl ection of the Absolute: its “primordial involution.” 
But this act, as the “turning point of transcendental philosophy and 
the philosophy of nature,” is beyond the scope of the philosophy of 
nature.59 
Whenever Schelling reaches the ultimate point of the line of the objec-
tive, he inadvertently meets the subjective, and vice versa. Spinoza leads 
to Fichte as persistently as Fichte points at Spinoza. Th e philosophy 
of nature needs transcendental idealism, the “other science.” With the 
project of solving the Kantian dualism as the background for all this 
hard work this must be a frustrating conclusion. However, Schelling’s 
persistence is as unlimited as the Absolute. He starts all over again 
from the subjective end. Let us see where this leads.
3.3.2. Transcendental Philosophy
If the fi nite originates in a primordial act of self-refl ection of the Abso-
lute, the correct method might be “to start with the subjective, as the 
fi rst and absolute, and to let the objective arise from it.” Th e comple-
mentary philosophy of transcendental idealism moves in the direction 
opposed to the philosophy of nature. It starts with the subject and 
seeks to prove that consciousness of external objects necessarily arises. 
Aft er approaching the problem of mental-physical interaction from 
the question ‘What is matter?’, Schelling now starts with its comple-
ment ‘What is mind?’ Th e ordinary experience of the fi nite subject 
is grounded in one fundamental prejudice: “Th ere exist things out-
side of us.” Th is again is based on two primordial convictions: 1. We 
know objects as they really are; 2. We can change the world through 
58 SW 3, 220.
59 SW 3, 250; 268.
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our action in it. Th ese essential but rather precarious convictions are 
vulnerable to doubt. Th e only protection from skepticism lies in the 
immediate and indubitable certainty of my own existence: the absolute 
prejudice “I am.” Hence, the task is to derive consciousness of objects 
from self-consciousness, the fundamental prejudice “there exist things 
outside of me” from the absolute prejudice “I am.”60 
In order to start with the subjective, the philosopher’s fi rst task is 
to become pure subject, by positing himself as such through an act of 
refl ection. He isolates himself from all objects by absolutely interrupt-
ing normal consciousness, which is a constant series of representations. 
In order to make the pure subjective visible, the objective is allowed to 
disappear. Hence, the transcendental philosopher intentionally objec-
tifi es that which only enters consciousness in the refl ective act. Such 
pure self-consciousness, free of all traces of objectivity and free of any 
connections with the objective world, is an abstraction from real-life 
individuality.61 By positing himself as pure subject, the philosopher 
repeats or imitates the act of the primordial ground through which all 
that is has come about. Th us he can observe, consciously, the develop-
ment of this second process. “If there is no more and no less in the 
second process than in the fi rst, then the imitation is perfect, and a 
true and complete philosophy results.”62 As White puts it, “Th e task 
of the transcendental philosopher, bluntly expressed, is to postulate a 
primal act of self-consciousness and then to see what happens.”63 If the 
transcendental philosopher can think a whole world emanating from 
this (pure) subjectivity, he has derived the objective from the pure 
(absolute) subjective. Schelling describes this path of becoming pure 
subject and its subsequent assignment as follows: 
Everyone can regard himself as the object of these investigations. How-
ever, to explain himself, he must fi rst have suspended all individuality in 
himself since it is precisely this that is to be explained. If all bounds of 
individuality are removed, nothing remains behind except the absolute 
intelligence. If the bounds of intelligence are also suspended in turn, 
nothing remains but the absolute I. Th e task now is simply this: how the 
absolute intelligence is to be accounted for by an act of the absolute I, 
60 See SW 3, 342–347.
61 See SW 3, 345.
62 SW 3, 397.
63 White 1983a, 60.
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and how, in turn, by an act of the absolute intelligence, the whole system 
of restrictedness which constitutes my individuality is to be explained.64 
If this approach is successful, self-consciousness could reveal the ori-
gin of the fi nite world in the Absolute. Moreover, 
there could be no one who could still fi nd necessary a world indepen-
dent of the subject aft er having seen how the objective world, with all 
its determinations, develops out of pure self-consciousness, without any 
external aff ection whatsoever.65 
Fichte is back?! To the objection that self-consciousness is not an 
absolute but only derivative starting point Schelling answers, 
Since I want to ground my knowledge only in itself, I do not ask further 
concerning the ultimate ground of that fi rst knowledge (that is, of self-
consciousness), a ground that, if it exists, would necessarily lie outside of 
knowledge. Self-consciousness is the source of light for the entire system 
of knowledge, but it shines only forward, not backward.66 
Th ere might be a unitary ground for self-consciousness. If so, we can-
not know it anyway. Hence, we might as well start with what we can 
know. With this, Schelling seems willing to ignore that it is exactly 
Kant’s comparable nonchalance towards the enigmatic character of 
self-consciousness that provokes Fichte’s line of thought. Further-
more, those of us with a more modest self-image might object to the 
crucial step of accessing our I before and beyond the origination of 
the world.
Modesty is defi nitely not what leads Schelling’s thinking, but he 
does see a problem. Th is pure subjectivity as the absolute ground must 
be unlimited activity (the Absolute must be without limitations). But 
in order for the Absolute to be an I, it must be conscious of itself. 
Th is means that it must intuit itself and necessarily limit itself. “Being 
conscious and being limited are one and the same” for an I. Here 
we encounter a paradox that also Hölderlin is aware of, as will be 
shown in Chapter 4. In limiting itself, the I comes to be. However, “the 
limiting activity [itself] falls outside of all consciousness.” Hence, the 
Absolute acts, but it only sees the results of its acts. It is conscious of 
something that it does not (yet) recognize as itself. It knows its prod-
64 SW 3, 483.
65 SW 3, 378.
66 SW 3, 357. 
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ucts; not itself. Th rough this primordial act of limitation two sorts of 
opposing activity result: the original and continuing productivity, and 
the attempts to know itself as productive. Th ese provide the basis for 
the derivation of content from the Absolute, for “the whole manifold-
ness of the objective world, its products and its appearances.”67 
It might seem that the process ends here. However, the problem is 
not yet solved. It is only pushed back a little. It is not the occurrence 
of a limitation that is inexplicable; “it is rather the manner of this 
limitation itself.” It can be concluded that I necessarily live, in general, 
in a system of necessary principles and categories, “but not that it is 
precisely this one.”68 Schelling might be able to explain that a singular 
Absolute can give rise to a multitude of fi nite things. Nevertheless, it 
still does not clarify how this particular world came to be, or how I 
came to be the specifi c individual that I am. Schelling has not really 
cut the Gordian knot. He has not really derived the fi nite from the 
Infi nite; he has not really explained how the Absolute, which cannot 
have consciousness, can result in consciousness as we experience it 
here and now.
Schelling’s transcendental idealism culminates in art as the ultimate 
solution to the philosopher’s problem. Art diff ers from both philoso-
phy and morality in one important respect: in both theory and moral 
action the conscious I experiences itself as opposed to the world, even 
if this experience can be proven to be untrue by the philosopher. In 
art, on the contrary, this opposition is correctly experienced as an 
internal rather than an external confl ict. Th e artist has conscious aims 
and has consciously mastered certain techniques by hard work. But 
over and above this conscious activity, “something else [ein Anderes] 
is experienced as acting through us.” Th is “other, as it were” is cre-
ative genius, an unconscious and infi nite element that the artist has 
no control over. Th rough the artist the unconscious productivity of 
the Absolute is at work. 
Th e basic character of the work of art is unconscious Infi nity . . . In addi-
tion to what he has placed into it on purpose, the artist seems to have 
67 SW 3, 383; 390; 455.
68 SW 3, 410.
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represented in it by instinct an Infi nity that no fi nite understanding can 
totally explain.69 
Somehow in art the conscious and the unconscious, the fi nite and 
the Infi nite, I and Absolute merge. Art is wholly distinct from truth 
(theory) and goodness (morality) because beauty, contrary to truth 
and goodness, is not merely an ideal that we can strive for but never 
fully achieve. Beauty is indeed present in the work of art. Art is actual 
presence of the Infi nite in the fi nite. Th erefore it produces infi nite sat-
isfaction and absolute harmony. Hence art turns out to be not only 
superior to philosophy; art “achieves the impossible, namely to resolve 
an infi nite opposition in a fi nite product.” Philosophy may raise us to 
oneness in thought, but “art carries the whole man, as he is, to the 
knowledge of the Highest, and in this lies the eternal diff erence and 
miracle of art.” Th e determinate, fi nite, work of art directly presents 
the Absolute. Th erefore, “art is the only eternal revelation there is, and 
the miracle that, even if it had existed only once, had to convince us 
of the absolute reality of this Highest.”70 
Th is theme, to which we will return in relation to intellectual intu-
ition, is rather short-lived in Schelling’s philosophy. It can be seen 
as the result of the infl uence of his intimate associations with Early 
Romantic circles in Jena. Schelling is a philosopher, defi nitely not an 
artist, and he cannot be satisfi ed with a solution besides or beyond 
philosophy.71 He soon maintains that ultimately the philosopher’s 
comprehension of the work of art transcends that of the artist himself. 
Moreover, two apparently independent approaches, the philosophy of 
nature and transcendental idealism, cannot exist alongside each other 
for very long, if they originate in the mind of one who is aft er one 
grand system. Th is becomes his next project; aft er all there is still Spi-
noza to contend with. How can he prove that all that he has asserted 
so far links up perfectly into one single system? Th e system of identity 
is to be the ultimate philosophical system and Beiser calls it “the fi rst 
system of absolute idealism.”72
69 SW 3, 605.
70 SW 3, 619; 626; 630; 618. 
71 Hölderlin, however, who is never directly involved with the group in Jena, will 
indeed turn to art. His poetry seems to do what it promises; present glimpses of the 
Absolute. I will use his verse to elaborate on the relation of the Absolute and the work 
of art in 5.3. 
72 Beiser 2002, 554. 
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3.3.3. System of Identity
Th e two directions of investigation, one starting from the object (phi-
losophy of nature) and the other beginning with the subject (transcen-
dental idealism) culminate in Schelling’s system of absolute identity 
between 1801 and 1804. Years of struggle with the two systems have 
gone by. Aft er giving priority to the subject in line with Fichte, con-
ceiving the subjective and the objective as each other’s complement, in 
the course of time, he tends towards the conclusion that it is entirely 
artifi cial to reverse the order of nature by treating self-consciousness 
as eternal and given, when it is only the product of natural powers. Th e 
self-consciousness of the transcendental I is derived from the laws of 
nature and forms “the physical proof of idealism.”73 He returns to the 
objective as the correct starting-point and maintains that idealism is 
no more than one aspect of the real science of knowledge. Th e circle 
is now closed. In other words, 
that there is a single universal substance, of which the subjective and 
objective are only manifestations, is the fundamental proposition of 
Naturphilosophie; but it is also the sum and substance of Schelling’s 
absolute idealism around 1800.74 
Schelling fi nds himself in “the indiff erence point” that each approach 
has constructed from opposing directions.75 He has come to the in-
sight that the Absolute is neutral, neither subject nor object, but the 
pure identity of the two. Once again, he attempts to start from the 
Absolute, as if it could be somehow “shot from a pistol,” as Hegel 
will complain in 1807.76 Subsequently, he tries to show its relation to 
fi nite entities. Th ereby he not only risks relapsing into dogmatism, but 
he also asserts unashamedly that the present system is the result of 
a consistent and continuous development that he has “always before 
his eyes.”77 Th e Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie [Exhibition 
of My System of Philosophy] of 1801 is a deliberate imitation of the 
format of Spinoza’s Ethics, deducing the fi nite from the Absolute.78 
It is an important work for German idealism in that it claims that 
73 Ibid., 556.
74 Ibid., 506f.
75 SW 4, 108.
76 In the Preface to his Phänomenologie. Hegel 1987, 28.
77 SW 4, 107f.
78 SW 4, 105–212.
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insight into the Absolute cannot be left  on the level of (intellectual or 
esthetic) intuition. It also needs to fi nd an objective, scientifi c form. 
Intuition is a necessary beginning of philosophy, but it should never 
replace conceptualization. Th is is where German idealism and Early 
Romanticism part company. Th e former maintains that the Absolute 
can somehow be accessed by reason, whereas the latter asserts that 
the Absolute is beyond knowing. It might be accessible within some 
twilight zone of rationality such as intellectual or esthetic intuition, 
but not within human knowledge as such.79
Schelling’s system of identity revolves around three fundamental 
propositions: 
1.  Th ere is one single, indivisible substance identical with the universe 
itself. 
2. Th is substance is identical with the principle of identity. 
3.  Th e principle of identity expresses the complete unity of the ideal 
and the real, the subjective and the objective. 
Th e diff erence between Fichte’s subjective idealism and objective ide-
alism is that for Fichte the I is everything [das Ich sey Alles], whereas in 
the objective form everything is the I [Alles sey = Ich], as Schelling puts 
it.80 Both are forms of idealism because they equate the I with every-
thing. Th eir diff erence lies in the reversal of subject and predicate. In 
subjective idealism the I is the subject and the all, or the universe, its 
predicate, whereas in the objective form the universe is the subject and 
the I its predicate. Since in the logic of Schelling’s time the subject is the 
ground for its predicate, the diff erence lies in the logical priority: the I 
for Fichte and nature, the all, for Schelling. Th e subjective idealism of 
Fichte views reason as the product of the transcendental subject, and 
it limits subject-object identity to transcendental self-consciousness. 
Objective idealism, on the other hand, maintains that reason is inher-
ent in the purposive activity of nature itself. It makes the universe the 
fundamental term and the I derived, and it sees subject-object identity 
only in the structure of the Absolute itself. Another distinction is that 
79 In Chapter 5 this theme of intellectual intuition that runs all through German 
idealism will be discussed as it has been interpreted by Fichte, Schelling, and Hölderlin.
80 SW 4, 109.
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the idealism of Fichte is relative in that it attempts to derive the objec-
tive from the subjective, but absolute idealism asserts that both the 
subjective and the objective are diff erent, independent aspects of the 
Absolute. Th e Absolute is the indiff erence point of the two. Absolute 
identity is sheer indiff erence to subjectivity and objectivity. 
Th e Absolute, as Schelling now sees it, is pure self-identity that can-
not go outside itself without self-destructing. Th at leaves him with a 
severe problem where fi nite objects are concerned. On the one hand, 
if the Absolute, the Infi nite, excludes the objects of the world or if its 
unity opposes their diff erence, then the infi nite unity cannot, by defi -
nition, be the Absolute because it can be limited; namely by the fi nite 
and by opposition. Th e Absolute is a unity that excludes all diff erence. 
On the other hand, if the Absolute is the unity of the Infi nite and the 
fi nite, and the identity of identity and opposition that contains all the 
diff erent fi nite things within itself, then it is no longer a true unity. 
Th erefore, the Absolute must somehow include fi nite things, but only 
insofar as they share the same essential nature and not insofar as they 
are distinct.81 
In 1799, Schelling maintains that the “highest task of philosophy” 
is to explain how absolute identity becomes duplicity.82 In 1801, he 
asserts that it is “the basic error of all philosophy” to assume that the 
Absolute has diff erentiated itself in the fi nite world since this would 
imply the self-destruction of the Absolute.83 Diff erence cannot emerge 
from unity. In 1802 he writes, 
Only within the things that belong to appearance are they distinguish-
able and in fact distinguished; the fi nite and the Infi nite are completely 
identical in reality, even though they are conceptually diff erent.84 
And since “the world of appearances is simply nothing in the sight 
of the Absolute,” he seems to assert that the realm of diff erence is no 
more than the fi gment of our imagination. 
Hence you should not believe that particular things or the manifold 
shapes of living substance you usually distinguish are actually contained 
in the real essential universe in the divided manner that you perceive.85 
81 See SW 4, 235f.; 247; 394. 
82 SW 3, 220.
83 SW 4, 119f.
84 SW 4, 258.
85 SW 4, 298; 259.
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Such an Absolute is indeed threatening to become what Hegel ridicules 
as “the night in which all cows are black.” Schelling seems unable to 
accomplish what he considers the highest task of philosophy: explain-
ing a world of diff erentiation, which strikes us as awfully real, as 
emerging from absolute identity. 
A decade of struggle with the Absolute and attempts to approach 
it from the standpoint of either the objective or the subjective or the 
indiff erence point where the two converge, has generated some philo-
sophical results. Moreover, it has brought Schelling fi nancial security, 
a career, and the much-desired fame. However, it has not provided 
the desired philosophical system, and it has not cut the Gordian knot: 
he cannot truly derive the fi nite from the infi nite.86 If he made the 
absolute the cause of the fi nite, he divided it; and if he made the fi nite 
its own cause, he gave it a reality that limited the absolute,” Beiser 
succinctly summarizes the problem.87 
We will skip several, more Platonic, attempts and move on to 1809 
when he tries a diff erent approach altogether.88 No longer does the 
subject-object pair dominate his work; it is freedom that becomes the 
center of his philosophy. Th is is not an entirely new theme as we have 
seen in the quote of 1795 at the beginning of 3.2. Nonetheless, study-
ing Schelling, one gets overcome by a feeling a futility from time to 
time. Asserting apodictic philosophical truths with arrogance only to 
abandon them again a few months and several hundred complacent 
pages later seems to be his style. However, Schelling’s contribution to 
metaphysics seems not so much in the outcome as in his persistency 
in dealing with the same philosophical problem: How can we explain 
(knowledge of ) the things of the world including our own selves out of 
a unitary ground? And how can we relate to this ground? Th e simple 
answer: ‘we can’t’ might be the only correct one, but it was defi nitely 
not Schelling’s attitude to take no for an answer. Anyone who feels the 
same need for answers to fundamental existential problems can only 
marvel at his intellectual stamina and endless creativity. It is almost as 
if he believed that sooner or later he would sneak up on the Absolute 
unseen and catch it in the act of producing the fi nite. 
86 SW 6, 35ff . 
87 Beiser 2002, 576.
88 Th is seems to be the only turning-point that all Schelling-experts agree upon. It 
forms the break between his negative and his positive philosophy. 
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At our point in history, it seems safe to conclude that Schelling does 
not provide us with a convincing metaphysics for the 21st century. 
Nevertheless, in fully exploring also the apparent dead ends, he off ers 
interesting insights in the diffi  culties, the aporias, the paradoxes, and 
the contradictions associated with a rational metaphysics. Further-
more, he seems to have gone the road of naturalism that is so popular 
in contemporary philosophy by placing both the subject and object of 
knowledge within nature as a whole . . . and rejecting it as philosophi-
cally unsatisfactory. Finally, he shows us how the creativity of the 
metaphysicist can be as endless as eternal Life itself. He simply never 
gives up. However, Schelling’s real contribution to philosophy might 
be in the work that will be discussed next. In 1795 he has already 
made the claim that, “the essence [Wesen] of the I is freedom,” and 
because only a free being can philosophize, “the beginning and end of 
all philosophy is freedom.” Even the most basic thought presupposes 
the independence of the subject from the object and thus manifests 
the primordial freedom of the subject.89 Aft er almost a decade and a 
half of near-dormancy, he again picks it up in 1809 in his last major 
published work Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, in which 
he designs a theory that combines a unitary ground of all that is with 
freedom.90 
3.4. Philosophy as the System of Freedom
Schelling starts his Freiheitschrift  by stating that his earlier systematic 
writings have only been preliminary. In overcoming the nature-spirit/
object-subject opposition, the road has been cleared to address the true 
problem of philosophy: “the contrast between necessity and freedom,” 
and the related problems of good versus evil, the will, and personal-
ity.91 With this assertion Schelling seems to view his prior problems 
as either overcome or as no longer relevant. In addition, he resurrects 
one of his oldest intuitions: a successful philosophical system must 
89 SW 1, 180; SW 1, 177. 
90 Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und 
damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände [Philosophical Investigations Concerning the 
Essence of Human Freedom and Related Subjects], SW 7, 331–484. I will be using the 
English translation by James Gutmann as a basis and adapt it whenever necessary to 
match the terms used previously. See Schelling (1936) in the bibliography.
91 SW 7, 333.
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account for human subjectivity, hence for freedom. Th ereby he takes 
the single gateway to transcendence left  by Kant: freedom. Since build-
ing an overall rational system is still his ultimate goal, he now takes up 
the challenge of fi tting freedom into a philosophical system.92 
According to Schelling, the general opinion is that system and free-
dom are inherently opposed because “every philosophy that makes 
claim to unity and completeness is said to end in denying freedom.” 
Spinoza’s was the only rational system, but it could not account for 
freedom. For many of his contemporaries, a system based on one 
single, all-encompassing Absolute simply has to lead to fatalism and 
pantheism. However, the denial or affi  rmation of freedom in gen-
eral is based “on something quite other than the acceptance or non-
acceptance of pantheism, the immanence of things in God,” Schelling 
claims.93 If Spinoza’s system is not able to account for freedom, and 
Schelling agrees that it is not, this is not a consequence of its posit-
ing one single all-encompassing Substance. It is not the fact that an 
absolute unitary ground is posited that makes for its fatalism, but a 
faulty interpretation of groundedness. Th ings are dependent on their 
ground, but groundedness or dependence does not entail complete 
determination. 
One of the examples Schelling comes up with is the dependence of 
off spring on their parents. Th e fact that a human being depends upon 
parents for existence does not determine who a particular person is 
or is not, and it does not exclude this person’s autonomy. Th e same is 
true for the way in which the world is grounded in the Absolute: 
92 SW 1, 315. Dale Snow argues that the Freiheitschrift  is not an attempt at a system 
of freedom, but an abdication from idealism itself (Snow 1996, 141f.). I do not agree. 
I believe that Schelling hopes to achieve a system of absolute idealism for a much 
longer time, if not until the end of his life. At the end of the Freiheitschrift  he writes, 
“We . . . are of the opinion that a clear, reasonable insight must be possible particularly 
into the supreme conceptions, since only thereby can they become truly ours, enter 
into us and be eternally founded. Yes, we go still further and with Lessing regard even 
the development of the truths of revelation into truths of reason as utterly necessary if 
the human race is to be helped thereby” (SW 7, 412). Th is leaves little room for doubt 
with respect to Schelling’s philosophical ambitions. In any case, when he writes the 
Freiheitschrift , his confi dence in the power of reason has not lessened. He introduces 
it as containing “deeper disclosures” of his system (SW 7, 334). He is either very reluc-
tant to admit previous failure or he remains under the impression that he is still in the 
process of gathering pieces of what will once amount to an overall system. 
93 SW 7, 336; 345.
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Th at for which the Eternal is by its nature the ground, is, to this extent, 
dependent and, from the point of view of immanence, is also conceived 
in the Eternal. But dependence does not determine the nature of the 
dependent . . .; it does not declare what this dependent entity is or is 
not.94 
Th at this example is not altogether successful is obvious. Of course a 
person is not fully determined by her parents. Personality, physique, 
and choices may all be quite diff erent. But, thank God, human parents 
can be fairly sure of the (human) nature of their off spring. 
Hence, Schelling not only claims that things can be grounded in 
the Absolute without being determined by it; he goes even further. 
Having a free Absolute for its ground implies absolute freedom for 
the grounded entity. “God can only reveal himself in creatures who 
resemble him, in free, self-activating beings.”95 Th e fact that humans 
are immanent in the Absolute does not prevent their freedom but 
rather affi  rms it. 
Immanence in God is so little a contradiction of freedom that freedom 
alone, and insofar as it is free, exists in God, whereas all that lacks free-
dom, and insofar as it lacks freedom, is necessarily outside God.96 
Th e essence of God is freedom. And, as Schelling claims, free is only 
what “acts according to the laws of its own inner being and is not 
determined by anything else either within it or outside it.”97 Hence, 
free beings can be grounded in the Absolute, depend on it but, as free, 
“take on a life of their own.”98 
According to Schelling, Spinozism fails to account for freedom not 
“because it lets things be conceived in” the Absolute but due to the 
fact that in this worldview only things are posited. Even the eternal 
Substance is viewed as a thing. Consequently it is a lifeless, soulless 
system with a mechanistic view of nature. It is “a one-sidedly realistic 
system” that needs to be “completed by an ideal part wherein freedom 
is sovereign.” All existence must have a real and an ideal side: 
94 SW 7, 346.
95 Schelling tends to use “God” rather than “the Absolute” in the Freiheitschrift . At 
this point in the argumentation the diff erence between the two is not crucial. In 3.4.1., 
it will be explained how he sees the diff erence.
96 SW 7, 347.
97 SW 7, 384.
98 Th is is Snow’s striking translation of für sich fortwirkend. See Snow 1996, 155.
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Idealism is the soul of philosophy; realism is its body; only the two 
together constitute a living whole. Realism can never furnish the fi rst 
principles, but it must be the basis and the instrument by which idealism 
realizes itself and takes on fl esh and blood.99 
Spinoza’s realism needs to be complemented by idealism to constitute 
a philosophical system that describes real life. Fichtean idealism, how-
ever, will not do, in Schelling’s view, since it provides for theoretical 
freedom only, not for its reality. 
It is obvious that, the diff erent approach and vocabulary notwithstand-
ing, the old opponents have not ceased to challenge. What Schelling 
hopes to achieve is an overall system that does justice to both aspects 
of life: subjectivity and objectivity; the ideal and the real; mind and 
matter; Geist and Natur. Only a philosophy that represents the Abso-
lute as the foundation of both the material and the spiritual aspects of 
the life deserves to be called a system. Th is system has to account for 
real freedom as the power for good and evil. Let us now look at the 
role of God and/or the Absolute in this proposed system. Our fi rst 
task will be to get a clearer view of the diff erence between the Abso-
lute and God from Schelling’s perspective. How an entire world can 
be derived from this new understanding of the Absolute, and how evil 
can be a reality in this world will be discussed in subsequent sections. 
Th e following is based on the Freiheitschrift  (1809) and the Stuttgarter 
Privatvorlesungen (1810) with brief detours into Die Weltalter. Erstes 
Buch (1813).100
3.4.1. Th e Absolute and God
One of the questions that Schelling tackles in 1809 is: How can worldly 
beings that are free to commit evil proceed from a unitary and perfect 
ground that has no evil in it whatsoever? 
Either real evil is admitted, in which case it is unavoidable to include 
evil itself in infi nite Substance . . . and thus totally disrupt the conception 
 99 SW 7, 349f.; 356.
100 Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und 
damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände [Philosophical Investigations Concerning the 
Essence of Human Freedom and Related Subjects], SW 7, 331–484; [Stuttgart Private 
Lectures], SW 7, 417–484; [Th e Ages of the World. First Book], SW 8, 195–344. Th e 
translations are based on J. Gutmann (see Schelling 1936 of the bibliography) and 
F. De Wolfe Bolman (see Schelling 1942). 
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of an all-perfect Being; or the reality of evil must in some way or other 
be denied, in which case the real conception of freedom disappears at 
the same time.101 
If everything proceeds from one source, then evil has to be part of 
this One. But this would imply either a contradiction of its absolute 
goodness or a trivialization of evil, which in turn would eliminate the 
reality of freedom. Th is seems to be the major problem of monism 
in a nutshell. However, Schelling asserts, this is not a diffi  culty that 
only the monistic or pantheistic system is faced with; it is true for 
every system that assumes any type of intimate connection between a 
powerful God and the world order. Alan White summarizes, that God 
must be both omnipotent and benevolent, “but if he cannot overcome 
evil he is not the former and if he does not choose to overcome evil he 
is not the latter.”102 At fi rst sight, an easy solution would be to posit a 
second, evil, root next to and separate from (the goodness of ) God. “If 
freedom is a power for evil it must have a root independent of God,” 
Schelling agrees. “Compelled by this argument one may be tempted to 
throw oneself into the arms of dualism.”103 But since he believes that 
monism is the only worldview that can explain real knowledge of real 
things, he has to introduce duality in the one and only Absolute in a 
way that does not annihilate its unity. Th erefore, a reconsideration of 
the Absolute is called for. 
Th e fi rst thing that strikes the reader of the three works mentioned 
above is that the word ‘God’ has become prominent and that terms 
like the ‘Absolute’ and the ‘Unconditioned’ have just about disap-
peared. It would be wrong to assume that Schelling has simply substi-
tuted the term Absolute for God. Th e Absolute, qua Absolute, is not 
God. So how does he defi ne the diff erence between the Absolute and 
God aft er 1809? At this point in his career, Schelling no longer seems 
to feel pressured to choose between idealism and realism. It might be 
said that the scale has tipped towards idealism since he gives priority 
to freedom, but apparently, his focus changes altogether. Th e struggle 
with the subject versus the object no longer seems to fascinate him. 
He stops trying to creep up on the Absolute from either the subject-
side or the object-side. He simply poses an Absolute that is beyond all 
101 SW 7, 353.
102 White 1983a, 116.
103 SW 7, 354.
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opposition, “that is, before any duality at all.” Th e Absolute is “apart 
from all antitheses,” and it is that “in which all distinctions break 
up.” It is “absolute indiff erence,” total absence of all diff erence. Th is 
indiff erence is the primordial ground [Urgrund], or the Nonground 
[Un grund].104 And it is Urgrund, primordial ground, only because it 
is also Ungrund: its indeterminacy is essential to its absoluteness. If it 
were in any way determined or determinable, it would be objectifi able 
and conditioned. 
Th is line of reasoning is not new for Schelling.105 However, the 
emphasis on the ineff ability, the ‘beyond’-character, of the Urgrund 
is. It is absolute indiff erence, and as indiff erence it is not accessible to 
human understanding. It can be articulated only through the conse-
quents that proceed from it. From 1809 onwards, Schelling seems to 
have doubts about the feasibility of a rational system without, how-
ever, being able to completely abandon the dream of a system that has 
accompanied him ever since his early start at the Stift . 
Since there can be nothing outside or before the Urgrund, it must 
be the ground of its own existence. From this, Schelling draws a 
rather surprising conclusion. Since the Nonground is indiff erence, also 
these two principles, ground and existence, cannot be diff erentiated 
or opposed in it. Th ey can only be “posited in disjunction and each 
for itself.” Consequently a duality is posited. Out of this indiff erence, 
instead of undoing the primary distinction between ground and exis-
tence, the Nonground “rather posits and confi rms it.” Th us, Schelling 
asserts that “the only correct dualism, namely a dualism which at the 
same time admits a unity,” is this distinction between the ground and 
the existence of God. Here we see how he is still struggling with these 
new concepts and terms. Th is Urgrund is God. But it is not God proper, 
God’s actual existence, because God as ground, or as foundation of his 
104 SW 7, 406; Some translate the German Ungrund with groundless (e.g. Gutmann), 
others (e.g. White) prefer Nonground. I will use Nonground since groundless means 
having no ground, and the Absolute does: it is its own ground. Furthermore, in the 
German language a perfectly usable synonym exists for groundless that Schelling does 
not use; namely grundlos. Hence, it is Nonground in the sense that this self-ground 
in its ineff ability, its indiff erence, and its inaccessibility to reason barely qualifi es to 
be named the ground. 
105 Already in 1795 he writes, “Th e pity is that, in theoretical philosophy, God is not 
determined as identical with my I but, in relation to my I, is determined as an object, 
and an ontological proof for the existence of an object is a contradictory concept” 
(SW 1, 168, note).
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realized existence, is to be distinguished from God as existing. Th ere is 
God and “that within God which is not God himself.”106 
In an attempt to explain this rather obscure claim he writes, “If 
we wish to bring this Being nearer to us from a human standpoint, 
we may say: It is longing that the eternal One feels to give birth to 
itself.”107 Th ere is a primordial longing in this ground to be born, i.e. 
to exist. It is only a will with a presentiment or intuition [Ahndung] 
of understanding or reason [Verstand], pure blind will, darkness.108 It 
now becomes clear how profoundly Schelling’s language has changed 
compared to his earlier works. Th e concepts of reason make place for 
non-rational terms, such as: will, longing, desire, and birth.109 Th is 
longing elicits a response: 
there is born in God himself an inward, imaginative response, corre-
sponding to this longing, which is the fi rst stirring of divine Being in 
its still dark depths. Th rough this response, God sees himself in his own 
image, since his imagination can have no other object than himself. Th is 
image . . . is the God-begotten God himself.110 
God distinguishes himself from the longing (darkness) by objectifying 
it, and God comes to be. God comes into existence, comes to light, by 
separating from his own dark ground that is contained in himself. 
It now becomes clear in what respect God and the Absolute dif-
fer. Th e Absolute in its indiff erence has no diff erentiations whereas in 
God two principles, ground (darkness) and existence (light), can be 
distinguished. Th ese principles are truly opposed. Darkness opposes 
the attempts at understanding, clarifi cation (light). Th e ground has all 
content but resists revealing itself in actual existence. Longing strives 
to preserve the light by “returning unto itself ” in order “that a basis of 
being might ever remain.” Th e ground is the creative potential, but at 
106 SW 7, 407; 359 note 1; 359.
107 SW 7, 359.
108 Gutmann remarks that Schelling does not always honor the Kantian distinction 
between understanding and reason. See Gutmann 1936, 106. 
109 Tilliette speaks of a language that radiates a “mystical glow” (Tilliette 1975, 98). 
Many have associated this abrupt change with the infl uence of Jacob Böhme (1575–
1624) whom Schelling has started to study extensively. Robert Brown, who has made 
an extensive study of the infl uence of Böhme on Schelling’s philosophy, writes, “Th ere 
is no important evidence of Böhme’s impact upon Schelling until the essay on free-
dom of 1809, which suddenly discloses an unprecedented shift  in his thought” (Brown 
1977, 116). For the infl uence of Böhme, see also Fuhrmans 1954, 108–127. 
110 SW 7, 360f.
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the same time it carries the threat of dark chaos, which Schelling refers 
to as “unruliness” [das Regellose]. Within God there is now a ground 
that “belongs to him himself ” but is “nonetheless diff erent from him.” 
Th is implies that God is personal and that God has a life. In Schelling’s 
view, being personal means being a unity of existence and its ground. 
Personality consists in the connection of “an autonomous being with 
a ground which is independent of it, in such a way namely that these 
two completely interpenetrate one another and are but one being.” 
Hence, God, as the unity of ground and existence, is personal. Th anks 
to these two opposing principles God has a life because “without 
opposition [there is] no life.”111 God has a life that develops. Th ere is 
one tendency to bring all of God to light and another to preserve it all. 
How this leads to creation, real things in and at the same time outside 
God, we will see in 3.4.2. Here we will continue with the other things 
that Schelling has to say about the Absolute and God. 
Another diff erence between the Absolute and God remains more 
implicit. With the contemplation of his own image, understanding 
[Verstand] arises in God, it was said. Th is imagination, this light of 
understanding, is at the same time the Word of that longing. Schelling 
also introduces the German term Geist here that can both be translated 
as mind or spirit. Th e Geist is said to feel the word and the longing 
simultaneously. Th e introduction of terms like imagination, under-
standing, and word shows that this birth of God is at the same time 
the birth of consciousness. Th is personal God who has a life starts to 
gain (self-)consciousness. Here we see the old intuition surface that 
oneness and consciousness do not go together. In order for conscious-
ness to arise, a diff erentiation has to take place: there must be someone 
with consciousness and something to be conscious of. Even self-con-
sciousness, according to the refl ection model, requires a split between 
the I-subject that is conscious and the I-object that it is conscious of. 
Likewise, the “start of consciousness [as] the becoming personal of 
God,” implies an internal division of the absolute unity.112 
Th e Freiheitschrift  is the fi rst step towards Schelling’s new view of the 
Absolute. It is still tentative and immature, but it will form the basis 
for the rest of his philosophical career. Th e year aft er, in the Stuttgarter 
111 SW 7, 361; 375; 394f.; 435.
112 SW 7, 434. We will see the same struggle in Hölderlin’s work in the next chapter. 
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Privatvorlesungen, the two principles in God are basically the same, 
but the articulation takes on a diff erent coloring. 
Th e fi rst principle or the fi rst primordial power is that through which 
[God] is a specifi c, singular, individual being. We could call this power 
selfh ood or selfi shness in God. If this was the only power, God would 
be a singular, isolated being. Th ere would be no creature. Th ere would 
be nothing but eternal confi nement [Verschlossenheit] and deepening 
[Vertiefung] in itself. Th is self-power of God would be . . . a consuming 
fi re in which no creature could live. However, this principle is opposed 
by another. Th is other principle is love. . . . But pure love in itself could 
not be, not subsist; precisely because it is expansive by its very nature, 
infi nitely communicative, it would fl ow away were not a contracting 
primordial power in it. As little as people can only consist of love, so 
can God.113 
God’s personhood becomes more pronounced in this text. His so-called 
selfi shness is not just his ground but forms his real vitality. Indeed, 
“love is God himself, the actual God, the God,” but God’s “selfi shness” 
is the “divine primordial power,” his majesty. A personal God is a lov-
ing God, but one who also has a dark, deep, and powerful side. Again 
we see the split within the Absolute explained not as loss of unity but 
as gain in liveliness, personhood. But whereas in people the dark side 
can get out of control and turn into evil as Schelling will argue in 
3.4.3., God’s darkness remains an “indissoluble unity” with his light 
side. God’s ground fully functions as it is also meant to function in 
people: as vitality, as creative potential. Th e Nonground divides itself 
“only that there may be life and love and personal existence.”114
Th e Absolute of the early Schelling seems to have made place for a 
personal God. A wholly diff erent vocabulary has been pulled into play, 
and entirely diff erent images have arisen. Th e Absolute is an abstract 
philosophical concept, an It, whereas God is a personal being. When 
he starts referring to the Absolute as God, its characteristics become 
his personhood, his life. None of this means, that Schelling has given 
up on philosophy. Aft er all, it is still a system that he is aft er. But 
his ambiguity about the possibility to construct a system becomes 
more pronounced. Aft er 1809, Schelling is no longer convinced that 
the Absolute is completely accessible to reason. With all the twists 
and turns that his philosophy has taken, this is considered the major 
113 SW 7, 438f.
114 SW 7, 408.
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change in his long career by most who have studied him. He starts to 
turn away from what he calls negative philosophy, i.e. a philosophy 
that can only grasp the conceptual, in favor of his so-called positive 
philosophy, Christian philosophy, or theology. Th is is not a conscious 
decision taken at one point in his career and carried through consis-
tently. Th e following example from the Freedom essay is illustrative of 
Schelling’s ambiguity. 
However highly we place reason . . . only in personality is there life; and 
all personality rests on a dark foundation which must, to be sure, also 
be the foundation of knowledge. But only reason can bring forth what 
is contained in these depths.115 
Th e world is founded on, grounded in, the nonrational. Nevertheless, 
it is reason that has to clarify the non-rational?!
Th is new approach off ers new opportunities, but it also has its draw-
backs. Th is God is starting to look all too human. Surprisingly, the 
accusation of anthropomorphism does not seem to bother Schelling 
much. He asserts, “In order to raise God above and far from the human, 
you meticulously take away all understanding and all understandable 
characteristics, powers, and activity” and have thereby turned him into 
a dead God. If we are to conceive of God as personal, as a life, then we 
must “regard him also as wholly human.” We must assume that “his 
life has the greatest analogy with the human, that next to the eternal 
being in him there is also an eternal becoming.” If the abstractions of 
philosophy yield no more than a lifeless concept of God, something 
is wrong. God is a living and life-giving being. Since the highest pos-
sible life-form that we are familiar with is the human being, why not 
take our cues from our own conception of life? A human being is “the 
world on a small scale.”116 Th erefore, 
the processes of human life from the utmost depths to its highest con-
summation must agree with the processes of universal life. It is certain 
that whoever could write the history of his own life from its very ground, 
would have thereby grasped in a brief conspectus the history of the 
universe.117 
In Die Weltalter Schelling’s ideas about the life of God become more 
elaborate and sophisticated. Firstly, he has integrated the idea of 
115 SW 7, 413.
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117 SW 8, 207.
 schelling: the i and its ground 165
freedom in his concept of God. Th e duality ground-existence shift s 
towards necessity-freedom. 
Freedom and necessity are in God . . . Necessity lies at the basis of free-
dom and, as far as there can be such a distinction in God, is the fi rst and 
oldest thing in God himself.118
God’s necessity is prior to his freedom. Even though the God who is 
necessary is also the one who is free, the two are not identical. Schelling 
refers to what is necessary in God as God’s nature. And what a being 
is by nature and what it is by freedom are two quite diff erent things. 
“In creation God surmounts by freedom the necessity in his nature.” 
God’s freedom somehow overcomes his necessity.119 And it is precisely 
in the act of creation that God exercises, or even discovers, his free-
dom, as we will see in 3.4.2. 
Secondly, in Die Weltalter the wording of the primary duality in 
God emphasizes the importance of the negative aspect. God is purest 
love, but love cannot exist by itself. Since love does not seek what is 
its own, it needs another power “to give it a ground.” Th is is the eter-
nal power of selfh ood, of egoity [Egoität]. “To be is se-ity [Seinheit], 
own-ness, seclusion.” Hence, there are two principles in the divine 
nature: the outfl owing, self-giving; and the return onto self, the being-
in-self. God is a Yes, and God is the opposing No. “Th ese contraries 
are equally essential and original . . . and neither is to be derived from 
the other.” At this point, Schelling repeats his dissatisfaction with the 
one-sidedness of a purely idealistic system. In the Freiheitschrift  he has 
criticized Fichte by remarking, “God is more of a reality than a mere 
moral world-order.” Now he is able to characterize idealism’s short-
comings as its persistent eff orts to do away with one of the two roots of 
all that is. “Idealism . . . really consists in the denial or non-recognition 
of that primordial negating power.” Th ereby it ignores the fact that it 
is the No that provokes the Yes, that “negation is everywhere the fi rst 
transition from nothing into something.” Hence, it makes God into 
an “empty Infi nite,” it mistakes Infi nity for perfection. However, the 
perfect “is in itself rounded, completed, fi nished.”120 A real, living God 
needs selfh ood in order to prevent him from dissolving in his own 
infi nity, which implies disappearing into nothingness. 
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A third important change is that whereas in the Freiheitschrift  
Schelling is mainly concerned with emphasizing the dualistic nature of 
the divine, in Die Weltalter he is more elaborate about the “indissoluble 
unity” of this duality in God. Discerning the opposition is not enough, 
if the unity “is not recognized at the same time.” It is indeed “one and 
the same that is the affi  rmation and the negation, the outspreading 
and the restraining.” Th erefore, he now posits a triad of powers. God 
is “an eternal No . . . [and] an eternal Yes. . . . But God is just as eternally 
the third principle or unity of the Yes and the No.” Th ere must be an 
inseparable union of these three; none by itself would fulfi ll the entire 
concept of the necessary nature of God. “Th e negating potency is as 
essential as the affi  rming one, and the unity, again, is not more essen-
tial than each of the opposites is by itself.”121 
Th erefore it must be concluded that the “fi rst nature is of itself . . . in 
a necessary contradiction.” Contradiction is necessary since it is the 
only thing that can provoke activity and life. “Without contradiction 
there would thus be no motion, no life, no progress, but eternal immo-
bility, a deathly slumber of all powers.” In order to demonstrate how 
these contradictory powers come into action, one of the central terms 
of the Freiheitschrift  is reintroduced: the blind will. Willing something 
implies a lack of that something. One only wills what is not there. 
Th at what is willed and is thus intended to be is thereby posited as 
not being. “Every beginning depends on that not being which really 
should be.”122 Since there is nothing outside of the Absolute, it can will 
nothing but itself. 
Th e very fi rst beginning can only lie in such self-willing. But to will 
one’s self and to negate one’s self as being are one and the same thing. 
Th us the fi rst beginning can also only be by negating self as being.123 
By willing (itself ) the Absolute negates itself. “But the divine nature 
does not suff er God to be merely eternal No.” Th us, the affi  rming power 
is aroused. Th e eternal affi  rmation opposes the negating power. As a 
result, the unity of the divine seems torn. Nevertheless, the two oppo-
sites “tend toward unity, or to a convergence in one and the same.” 
Th e negating power can only perceive itself as negating, if there is a 
121 SW 8, 213; 218.
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disclosing power. Reversely, the latter can only act as affi  rming when 
there is something negated, restrained, something to liberate. “Hence 
they posit outside and above themselves a third, which is the unity.” 
Nevertheless, each of the three has the same right to be that, which is. 
Th erefore, having attained its summit, the movement itself returns to 
its beginning. As a result, “primal nature is a life eternally revolving in 
itself,” “an incessant wheel,” and “completely involuntary movement.” 
By virtue of this necessary and unconscious movement it can never 
come to real being. It has to be “delivered from this cycle,” otherwise 
it will remain “in a state of perpetual desire [Begierde].”124 
Th e described process belongs to God’s necessary nature that is only 
the very beginning of the life of God. God’s life, like all other lives, starts 
involuntarily. Or, in the language of the Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen, 
it begins unconsciously “from a condition in which everything is still 
inseparately together.” Th is is his “still musing [stilles Sinnen] about 
himself without utterance and revelation.” God is still entirely caught 
up in himself, it might be said. But in a life a certain development takes 
place. In this eternally beginning life the urge to throw off  the invol-
untary movement lies dormant. Th e seed of freedom, “the longing to 
escape from the eternal cycle [Umtrieb]” is ready to germinate.125 In 
the beginning of the birth process the dark principle rules. With the 
aroused principle of light, the fi rst inkling of consciousness comes into 
being. In a glimpse, “as a vision,” God sees the possibility of creating. 
Th is is the fi rst phase of the life of God in which the world of ideas, 
which is not yet the real world, is born. 
Th e ideas are not mere thoughts, but rather images or visions 
that, as such, already contain traces of bodilyness. Contrary to Plato, 
Schelling views these ideas as volatile and transient. In the idea world, 
actual reality is lacking. Ideas are born from the silent play of the 
powers within God. Th ey are in God without real selfh ood and free-
dom; they are no more than God’s imagination. Nevertheless, the idea 
world is the fi rst, if only ideal, realization of God. “Such prototypes or 
visions [are] a necessary moment in the great development of life.” 
Yet, this stage cannot last. “As the games of childhood, in which later 
life previsages itself, are fl eeting, so, too, that blessed dream of the 
124 SW 8, 225–232.
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gods could not last.”126 Th e ideas, which were “without independent 
life within [God],” long to be realized, to really be. “All life that is 
merely in germ . . . yearns to be raised from mute, ineff ective unity into 
an expressed, eff ective one.”127 God creates the world to raise life from 
a mute to an expressed unity. 
Th is is the turning point between necessity and freedom. Up to this 
point the process is a necessary one. If life progresses from here on, it 
is “only by virtue of a free divine resolution . . . Nothing compels it . . . to 
come forth from itself.” If God realizes his ideas, this is the result of 
a free decision. Th e eruption of the powers and the birth of the ideas 
are necessary and involuntary, but the real world is created in free-
dom. In the plea of the ideas to be realized God understands himself 
as sovereign. God becomes conscious of the fact that he has the power 
to create, and in this God fi rst experiences his freedom. “From now 
on the history of the realization, or of the real revelations of God, 
begins.”128 Let us now take a closer look at this free act whereby God 
creates the world.
3.4.2. God and World
In the fi rst necessary nature of God is blind necessity and a continual, 
involuntary rotation of the powers, whereas creation is a free act, it 
was said. 
If there were nothing except that blind necessity, then life would remain 
in this dark, chaotic condition of an eternally and therefore never-begin-
ning, eternally and therefore never-ending movement.129 
Deliverance has to come from “something else that is outside of it, 
completely independent of it, and elevated above it”: freedom. God 
is “free eternity,” and the “decision of God, to reveal his highest self 
in epochs, came from the purest freedom.” Th is freedom lies exactly 
in the equal rights of the two contradictory primordial powers. If the 
godhead were merely a Yes or a No, then it would have to be one way 
or another, affi  rmation or negation. Th at it is both, and both with 
equal essentiality, is the reason why it is the highest freedom.130 God 
is free to choose between two powers that both have equal rights: con-
126 SW 8, 290; 297. 
127 SW 7, 404; 8, 297.
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tracting selfi shness that does not want the world and expanding love 
that does. He can open up or remain in eternal self-suffi  cient confi ne-
ment [Verschlossenheit]. Hence, God is completely free to either posit 
the world, to create, or to remain what he is in himself: pure godhead. 
Here the terminology shift s again: the Absolute of the young Schelling 
that becomes the Urgrund or the Ungrund in the course of the Frei-
heitschrift  is now referred to as the pure godhead in Die Weltalter. 
Th e Absolute that gives rise to all that is has become the godhead who 
chooses to create the world. 
By this free act the pure godhead breaks out of this eternal cycle 
of alternate positing of the Yes, the No, and their unity. Th e three 
principles become separated and a hierarchy arises. All three powers 
have the same right to be: they are equi-essential and equi-primor-
dial. Only when they “give up being one and the same (that which 
is), there comes to be space and a true ‘above’ and ‘below.’” Schelling 
now speaks of three potencies. Th e fi rst potency is “visible nature”; 
the second potency, a higher one, is the “spirit world”; and the whole 
is animated, “as with one breath,” by the third potency, the universal 
soul. In addition, “outside of and above God’s necessity, which, in the 
three potencies, constitutes eternal nature, . . . is eternal freedom, pure 
willing itself.”131 Even though the three powers or principles have now 
given rise to three separate potencies, it does not mean that the eternal 
One has been split up in three separate realms; nature-matter, spirit-
mind, and the universal soul. Th is third potency is a unity principle 
that permeates all of creation and does not allow a simple subdivision. 
As Schelling puts it,
Th at universal soul whereby the universe is animated . . . [is] the eternal 
bond between nature and the spirit world as well as between the world 
and God, the immediate instrument whereby alone God works in nature 
and the spirit world.132 
Th e universal soul keeps all of creation united and connected with 
God. In other words, creation is permeated by God’s immediate unity 
principle. 
Th e other two potencies, however, are also subject to internal 
opposition. Nature, as the fi rst potency, contains the two contradic-
tory powers, “of which the one always longs for the outside [and] 
131 SW 8, 253; 248; 239.
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the other presses back toward the inside.”133 In nature the negating 
power dominates and pushes the spiritual back inside. But this does 
not mean that the spiritual is conquered or annihilated. On the con-
trary, it becomes the innermost center of nature. It is its very core that 
never stops trying to come out. Here we see Schelling’s conviction that 
nature is spirited and alive instead of a dead mechanism surface once 
again. Nature may be material, but it is not dead matter. It enables 
life and development. It is not merely an obstacle that stands in the 
way of a superior principle. It also shelters it, so to speak. Geist, spirit, 
or mind live thanks to and within nature. Th e negating power forms 
its necessary basis; it provides the creature with a “mainstay,” a “real 
ground,” and “it gives it form, limits it in position, and gives body to 
something that is in itself spiritual and intangible . . . [and] hostile to 
all limitations.” Th ings of the world need the negating ground to give 
them selfh ood, to give them “explicitness,” to enable them to be. Th e 
original negation is “the mother and nurse of the entire world visible 
to us.” Its role or law is to make fast the spiritual again and again, and 
thus to maintain the ground of eternal progress.134 
Th e second potency, the spirit world, has an inner duality as well. 
But this time the situation is reversed: the spiritual is turned outward 
and the dark, primordial power is pushed back inside. Th e diff erence 
between visible nature and the spirit world, “only a higher nature,” is 
that, as corporeal, nature has “its limitation external to it,” whereas 
spirits have their limitation within themselves. “Th e negating power 
is the enclosed and hidden power in it, . . . that hidden power of dark-
ness.” Th is darkness will never dominate; it will always “remain within 
and submissive to the gentle light essence,” and “the law of the sec-
ond potency is to repress the negating original power.” Th erefore both 
nature and the spirit world aim at “raising the Yes over the No,” and 
with each new division more of the center of being is disclosed.135
Th e summit of the progress of nature is the human being in whom that 
heavenly germ at last completely develops, where the highest potency 
is placed above all, and where creation’s artistry just on that account 
celebrates the victory of liberation.136 
133 SW 8, 246. 
134 SW 8, 243–255. 
135 SW 8, 287; 250; 287.
136 SW 8, 279.
 schelling: the i and its ground 171
In the human being this inner “heavenly, soul-like essence” can be 
made the highest principle. (Wo)man “is really the connection point 
of the entire universe,” being the fi rst bond between nature and spirit 
world and mediating “the transmission of the attracting movement 
up into what is highest.”137 People have the freedom to let the unity 
principle reign and thus form the living representation of the highest 
One. Before explaining in the next section how this “heavenly germ” 
nonetheless abuses its divine freedom to commit evil acts, another dif-
fi culty associated with creation should be looked into: namely, time. 
God’s decision to create is a completely free one, and “eternity opens 
out into time in this decision,” Schelling asserts. Th e latter needs expla-
nation. “Since there is no time in God himself, how is he to create the 
world in time?” Schelling wonders. Th e answer, once again, lies in the 
fact that God is the unity of contradictory powers. Th e pure godhead is 
“a consuming No, the eternal power of wrath which does not tolerate 
any being outside itself, whole and undivided,” but “it is also neces-
sarily eternal Yes, empowering love.” Th e negation and the affi  rmation 
are not just properties or parts of the godhead, but the godhead itself. 
God is both. God is the No and the Yes as well as the unity of both. 
Only through the concept of diff erent times can this contradiction 
between Yes and No and their unity be conceived. Because if “God as 
Yes and God as No cannot be in the same time” [Schelling’s choice of 
words is deliberate], it implies that one must be fi rst and that the other 
must come later. But it is important that we understand this the right 
way, Schelling emphasizes. Th e problem is that in modern philosophy 
a correct concept of time is lacking. Past time is considered annulled 
time. Th is is not correct. It cannot be that the preceding is annulled 
by what follows, or absolutely ceases being. Th e past cannot, of course, 
be the present. But it is in the present; namely as something past. Th e 
future is also present now as potential, as something yet to be. It would 
be absurd, Schelling maintains, “to consider being past as well as being 
future as complete non-being.” God’s No is not simply substituted by 
God’s Yes. Th e divine opposing powers must be “at once, in diff erent 
times.”138 
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Of the complexity and the awkwardness of expressing the link 
between eternity and time also Schelling is fully aware. On the one 
hand, he must assert that in God’s eternity, at least logical, progression 
has to be distinguished, otherwise God’s freedom cannot be thought. 
On the other hand he emphasizes, “We must conceive this course of 
events thus,” but “the whole thing can only be considered as having 
happened in a fl ash, since it is conceived as something which happened 
without having really (explicite) happened.” Only by presenting it as 
such, by going “to work piecemeal,” he is able to achieve “the com-
plete concept of the godhead.” However, this separation of primordial 
powers in the pure godhead “recurs eternally and even now in each 
moment, that dark, impenetrable, and unutterable nature becomes the 
all.” Th is whole process is from all eternity. Th e “primordial state is 
posited as an eternal past, a past . . . [that] was the past primordially and 
from all eternity.” With a correct concept of time also the true mean-
ing of eternity becomes clear. Eternity must be considered not as those 
moments of time taken together, but as “coexisting with each single 
one, so that eternity sees only itself (the entire immeasurable eternity) 
in each individual moment.”139 In God’s decision to create simultane-
ity is suspended and changed into succession, and time arises within 
eternity. 
In the same act when God decides on creation, it is then determined 
that God as eternal No is to be the ground of existence of the eternal 
Yes. Th e power of negation “is God only with respect to possibility, 
not in actuality.” Th e ground never dissolves or disappears in this pro-
cess. It remains free and independent, in exclusion and solitude, “until 
its time is fulfi lled, and it must persevere with all its strength, so that 
life may [eventually] be raised to the highest glory.” Consequently, the 
entire unity, all that is, is “not yet the real or realized God.” It is rather 
“the state of possibility (of potentiality) in which God has voluntarily 
placed himself.” Th ere is still “concealed being” posited as future. Nev-
ertheless, the whole of God already is with respect to the possibility (of 
becoming manifest). Th is is how Schelling can think God on the one 
hand both as eternal and immutable and make statements like: “Th ere 
is no becoming in the pure godhead”; “In God is no change [Wechsel 
und Wandel]”; “Now it cannot be thought that God was unconscious 
for a period of time before he gained consciousness.” On the other 
139 SW 8, 304; 254; 242; 254; 307. 
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hand, he can assert that history and the process of nature are “nothing 
other than the process of completely coming to consciousness, God’s 
complete personalization.”140 Th anks to Schelling’s concept of time, 
God can both be and not yet fully be. Th ere is a rest, a potential of 
being, a future.
Creation is Gods turning outwards for Schelling. Th e world does 
not arise from a process of emanation in which the quality of the 
emanated is less than what it emanates from. Neither does he sup-
port creatio ex nihilo. Instead of being produced from nothing, fi nite 
creatures are made out of relative non-being [Nichtseiendes] since the 
principle of ground as the creative potential is opposed to the principle 
of existence. World is revelation, hence progressive realization of God. 
Th erefore, it proceeds towards ever more perfection. God’s life is inti-
mately connected with and involved in the world. 
I posit God . . . as alpha and as omega, but he is not as alpha what he is 
as omega . . . [As alpha] he is the non-unfolded [unentfaltete] God, Deus 
implicitus, only as omega is he Deus explicitus.141 
It is the same godhead from all eternity, but God unfolds in time.
Aft er having discussed the creation of the world, it is now time to 
return to the Freiheitschrift  and see how Schelling deals with the issue 
of real evil in the world. He is unwilling to trivialize evil by reducing 
it to “the so-called malum metaphysicum or the negative concept of 
the imperfection of the creature.” Evil is not just lack of goodness, as 
certain traditions suggest. “Imperfection in the general metaphysical 
sense, is not the common character of evil.”142 Evil is very real, too 
real in our world to be ignored. So how does this evil arise from a 
godhead that has no evil in it whatsoever? An evil root next to and 
independent of God is not an option for Schelling, as we have seen. 
Nonetheless, he is convinced that some degree of duality is needed. 
Th e important notion of opposition has been lost in modern philoso-
phy, and Schelling thinks he can explain why this is the case.143 Des-
cartes, the originator of modern philosophy, has broken the world into 
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body and mind, and has thus “lost unity for duality.” Th is mistake Spi-
noza attempts to correct, but in Spinoza’s philosophy “duality is lost in 
favor of unity.” He concerns himself only with the two opposites, each 
for itself. And without the unity as an active, vital bond of the two, his 
system can only remain in “eternal, immovable, inactive sameness.” 
His “dead substance” cannot explain life and development because 
unity and duality themselves are not brought “into living antithesis, 
and thereby also again brought to unity, philosophy [has] with each 
step become more and more one-sided.” It has been shown how the 
interplay of opposing powers is necessary for the world to come into 
existence. Now it will be explained how this ground-existence duality 
has a side-eff ect that explains the struggle between good and evil. Evil 
is a real power in humans that cannot be ignored, and Schelling even 
calls it the “chief subject in question.”144 So let us take a closer look at 
how real evil comes to be.
3.4.3. World and Evil
Two opposing principles exist in all things, Schelling has stated repeat-
edly, the No and the Yes, the negating and the affi  rming, selfi shness 
and love. In the language of the Freiheitschrift  his favorite pair of oppo-
sites is the dark principle of the ground and the light of understanding. 
Th ese he now applies to explain evil. Th e “principle of darkness . . . is 
the self-will of creatures” that “stands opposed to understanding as 
universal will.” Th e tendency of the dark ground to “return unto itself ” 
operates incessantly in every individual in order to retain a basis of 
being. It is a centripetal force, a contracting, inward power that arouses 
self-will and self-preservation. From the dark ground originates self-
hood, which is not a bad thing in itself; “without [activated selfh ood] 
there would be complete death, goodness slumbering.” Individual 
existence needs a ground. Hence, selfh ood as such is not the problem; 
its dominance is. Evil arises out of the “exaltation of self-will.” When a 
person’s will strives to live for itself disregarding its proper place in the 
whole, selfh ood becomes sovereign instead of “the basis or the instru-
ment.” Selfh ood is the necessary ground of all being, but it should 
remain precisely that: ground [Grund]. It should stay im Grunde, at 
the bottom, underneath, and it should never become the top-principle. 
144 SW 8, 340f.; 7, 373.
 schelling: the i and its ground 175
Th e ground is meant to support, to serve. If it dominates, individuality 
turns to chaos and becomes evil. “All evil strives back towards chaos, 
that is, towards that condition in which the initial center has not yet 
been subordinated to light.”145 Evil is the ground that has gotten out 
of control.
Th e dark principle needs to be counterbalanced by its opposite, a cen-
trifugal force, which Schelling calls understanding, that strives towards 
expansion. As understanding unfolds all that is implicit in the dark 
ground, love arises as the force that holds the distinguished elements 
together. Only when the ground is “subdued through love, goodness 
awakens and becomes actual in man.” Love prevents the ground from 
unleashing evil, but love needs to be provoked. Schelling even states 
that the ground “rouses egotism and a particularized will just in order 
that the will of love may arise in contrast to it.” Love unites what is 
diff erent and independent. Love cannot be in indiff erence, nor in two 
opposites that depend on each other for their existence. No, “this is 
the secret of love, that it unites such beings as could each exist in itself, 
and nonetheless neither is nor can be without the other.”146 Th us, it 
also unites the existent with the ground of existence. 
We see a construction of two opposing principles and a third prin-
ciple of unity similar to the one used in Die Weltalter explaining 
the three potencies. Th e Freiheitschrift  was written some four years 
earlier, when this new approach was only just beginning to form in 
Schelling’s mind, and we see that this idea of two opposites and an 
equally primordial unity of the two is still immature. Since Die Weltal-
ter is never fi nished, the Freiheitschrift  essay is Schelling’s only lengthy 
account of the origins of evil. Th erefore, we have to make do with the, 
sometimes unclear, terminology where these three basic principles are 
concerned.
With these contradictory principles that are active in every human 
being Schelling has explained the possibility of evil in a world that 
arises from one single ground that is in itself wholly without evil. It 
explains why people can be “in” God without being fatalistically deter-
mined by God. Th ey arise from the dark ground in God that “is not 
he himself.” Hence, they have an independence over against God. In 
creating beings that are fully conscious of both principles, “the whole 
145 SW 7, 363; 400; 365; 389; 374.
146 SW 7, 400; 381 (italics CvW); 408.
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power of the principle of darkness” and “the whole force of light,” God 
has created free beings.147 But whereas in God these two principles are 
an indissoluble unity, this unity is lost in the world. People are truly 
free to choose between good and evil. Th ey can choose between two 
divine principles that are both active in them and that are both good 
as such and necessary for individual life. Th ey can either be guided by 
the principle of understanding and love and recognize themselves as 
parts of an unfolding unity, or they can follow the principle of dark-
ness and make selfh ood their ultimate goal. 
However, this freedom to choose evil notwithstanding, individ-
ual life can only fl ourish when there is a balance between the three 
principles: 
1.  Th ere must be selfh ood to support individual existence (the dark 
ground); 
2.  Th e gradual unfolding of selfh ood is roused by understanding (the 
light); 
3. Love acts as the unity that holds it all together. 
If this process gets out of control, the dark ground starts working 
against the individual. Th is selfh ood that is connected with the ten-
dency to turn inward, to contract, can try to drag all that it encounters 
into this selfi sh center, as it were. However, eventually an out-of-con-
trol selfh ood will not serve but only destroy the person because it can 
never be actualized; it is non-being. “Th e beginning of sin consists in 
man’s going over from actual being to non-being, . . . from light to dark-
ness.” Selfh ood is only the ground of actual existence, not real being 
itself. Just like when a single organ is out of accord with the organism 
as a whole and develops a fever, sin is a lack of harmony in the person 
that leads to destruction, Schelling asserts. “Evil in the moral world is 
what sickness is in the bodily world.” An exaggerated selfh ood is evil, 
and “evil . . . is no being but a counterfeit of being, which is real only by 
contrast, not in itself.”148 Real being is a combination of sustaining and 
developing the self, a balance between closing up and opening out, an 
alternation of contracting and expanding. 
147 SW 7, 458; 363.
148 SW 7, 390; 436f.; 409.
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Hence, our life depends on a dark ground that we can never actually 
control, even if we try in evil. Selfh ood can never be raised to complete 
actuality. “Th is is the sadness which adheres to all fi nite life,” Schelling 
remarks. Even when the desire for building a system is still fully active 
in Schelling, it is becoming obvious that the all-controlling I, which is 
associated with it, is losing ground. In what he calls the “deeper disclo-
sures” of his system an element of insecurity creeps in with sadness as 
the result. Schelling has found an interesting solution for the problem 
of the human freedom to do real evil arising from a unitary ground 
that is totally free from evil. It characterizes his way of thinking that 
on the one hand he takes selfh ood to be the mere ground of existence, 
not real in itself, and on the other hand feels saddened by the fact 
that his I will never master the world. Schelling wants to think unity 
because his system demands it, but he values individuality above all. 
In the next chapter we will see how for Hölderlin individuality is an 
obstacle to the unity that he really longs for. But let us proceed with 
Schelling. It could be objected that since sadness and evil seem to be 
an inevitable consequence of God’s desire to gain consciousness, God 
acted irresponsibly and thereby caused evil. Schelling’s question “How 
is God to be justifi ed in view of evil?” will be discussed next.149
3.4.4. Evil and God
With the decision to posit the world God takes a risk since it implies 
freeing the powers that are until then tamed. By separating ground 
from existence, evil can take on a life of its own, so to speak. Th e 
following fragment forms a summary of Schelling’s conception of cre-
ation and its accompanying possibility of evil.
Th e fi rst period of creation . . . is the birth of light. Light . . . is the cre-
ative Word which redeems the hidden life in the depths from non-being, 
raises it from potency to actuality. Spirit rises above the Word and is the 
fi rst being which unites the dark world and the world of light and subor-
dinates both principles to it for the sake of realization and personhood. 
However, the depths react to this unity and maintain the original dual-
ity, but only for ever increasing intensifi cation and for the fi nal division 
of good and evil. Th e will of the depths must abide in its freedom till all 
has been fulfi lled, till all has become real. If it were conquered sooner, 
the good would remain concealed in it together with evil. But the good 
149 SW 7, 399; 334; 394.
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is to be raised out of darkness to actuality in order to dwell with God 
everlastingly; and evil is to be separated from goodness in order to be 
cast out eternally into non-being.150 
Most of this process has been discussed in the preceding sections. Th e 
light of understanding (or the Word) raises the potential of the ground 
into actual existence. Th e process of creation results in real, individual, 
and conscious life. In order for this creative process to continue the 
dark ground must remain independent from the light of understand-
ing. Only thus the entire creative potential can be brought to light. All 
that can be must really come to be. All that is good must be revealed, 
and all that is evil must be unmasked as non-being, as opposed to 
real life. Besides love, Spirit is a term that Schelling uses for the unity 
principle that arises to hold the opposites together. Its exact meaning 
and the diff erence with love is not very clear. Sometimes it seems a 
mere synonym. At other times, Spirit signifi es the living unity of God’s 
ground and existence, hence God’s personal being. In any case, both 
love and Spirit express a form of realization of the unity principle, a 
living unity of opposites. Creation is meant to realize an actual, living 
unity.
Th at God never wills evil as such should be evident from the afore-
mentioned. But is evil merely an inevitable side-eff ect of the creative 
act? At times, Schelling seems to suggest just this. He writes, “that which 
comes from . . . the depths, does not come from God, even though it is 
[also] necessary for his existence.” In addition, he asserts that neither 
God nor the human being can rid himself of the ground; “he can only 
subdue it through love.” Hence, the ground is a possible evil that, once 
unleashed, can only be subdued at best. Nevertheless, God’s impo-
tence with respect to evil seems an unsatisfactory option that causes 
Schelling to take a diff erent approach. He claims that God’s decision 
to create is “a conscious and morally free act.”151 God is fully aware of 
all its consequences, and the claim that God should not have created 
because he foreknew that evil would occur is wholly misguided. 
Th e question why God did not prefer not to reveal himself at all, since 
he necessarily foresaw that evil would at least follow as an accompani-
ment of self-revelation, this question really deserves no reply. For this 
would be as much as saying that love itself should not be . . . that is, the 
150 SW 7, 404.
151 SW 7, 399; 400; 397. 
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absolutely positive should be sacrifi ced to that which has its existence 
only as a contrast.152 
Evil exists only as contrast to goodness and love. It needs to be 
unmasked as non-being and cast out. “Th e end of revelation is there-
fore the banishment of evil from the good, its exposure as being 
altogether unreal.”153 Th e choice to abstain from self-revelation in 
order to avoid evil would sacrifi ce goodness to evil, and real being to 
non-being. 
Creation is meant to produce life. Since the ground makes individu-
ality possible, it enables real life, and as such it provides the oppor-
tunity to realize actual love. “Self-will is aroused only in order that 
love in man may fi nd a material contrast in which to realize itself.” 
Th e ground arouses the self-will of creatures that serves as the oppo-
nent in which love can realize itself. In overcoming the domination of 
selfh ood, love materializes; it takes on fl esh and blood in real people. 
“Goodness without eff ective selfh ood is itself an ineff ective goodness.” 
All that is good must be activated into existence. “If there were no 
division of the principles, then unity could not manifest its omnipo-
tence; if there were no confl ict then love could not become real.” Only 
in conquering real opposition, unity triumphs. “If the identity of both 
principles were just as indissoluble in man as in God, then there would 
be no diff erence – that is, God as Spirit would not be revealed.” God 
as Spirit is a living unity that comes to be thanks to the defeat of dual-
ity. Evil is “necessary for God’s revelation” because only through the 
expulsion of selfi shness goodness and love can be revealed.154 
According to Schelling, (wo)man’s role in this revelation of God 
cannot be underestimated. Aft er all, “God can only reveal himself in 
creatures who resemble him, in free, self-activating beings.” Human 
beings are the climax of God’s self-revelation because of this free-
dom. In their acts they will either free the good or the evil. If a person 
chooses evil and thus allows himself to be led by the self-will of the 
dark ground, this does not make the ground the cause of evil. “Evil 
ever remains man’s own choice; the ground cannot cause evil as such, 
152 SW 7, 402. 
153 SW 7, 405.
154 SW 7, 401; 400; 373f.; 364; 373.
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and every creature falls through its own guilt.”155 Th e human being is 
the center of creation. 
Man has been placed on that summit where he contains within him 
the source of self-impulsion towards good and evil in equal measure; 
the nexus of the principles within him is not a bond of necessity but of 
freedom. He stands at the dividing line; whatever he chooses will be his 
act, but he cannot remain in indecision because God must necessarily 
reveal himself.156 
Only in a human being the Spirit, “that is God as existing” reveals 
itself. If in a man the dark principle of selfh ood and self-will is com-
pletely penetrated by light and is one with it, “then God, as eternal 
love or as really existent is the nexus of the forces in him.”157 A human 
being who has reached a perfect balance between the two principles, 
whose dark ground is completely radiant with the light of understand-
ing, fully realizes eternal love and embodies God.
Th e fi nal purpose of creation is to raise all out of the depth and ele-
vate it into existence, to accomplish God’s complete realization. When 
“God will be all in all, that is, . . . completely realized,” the process of 
creation will end. It starts with the Nonground, a state of indiff er-
ence where all being was in an enveloped state. Th en a dark, blind will 
arises in this Nonground, and it changes from indiff erence into two 
contradictory principles (ground and existence) and their unity. In the 
process, the dark, amorphous unity of the beginning develops into a 
new kind of unity. It is no longer “the identity of the two principles 
but rather the general unity . . . – in a word, it is love which is all in 
all.”158 Th ere will be a unity of individual beings that freely choose to 
be one, to unite in love instead of a unity in which no individuality, or 
life, or freedom can be distinguished. Th e godhead will be most fully 
realized, if its unity assumes being in free and independent beings that 
freely choose to unite. Th is is Schelling’s conception of Hen kai pan, 
of a One that grounds all. 
155 SW 7, 347; 382.
156 SW 7, 374
157 SW 7, 363f.; 389f.
158 SW 7, 404; 408.
 schelling: the i and its ground 181
3.5. From Here Onwards
Th is chapter has provided an elaborate description of Schelling’s diverse 
solutions for the philosophical problems that he was up against. At 
an early age, he sets out to build a system that should combine the 
best of Kant and Spinoza. It should intimately connect the two aspects 
of life that can be summarized as mind and body, Geist and Natur. 
Schelling’s quest starts out as an attempt to reconcile the subjective 
and the objective into one absolute ground. However, for his system to 
be complete, he also has to achieve the reverse: to think the emergence 
of subjects and objects of consciousness from this Absolute. Th e latter 
turns out to be a problem. He remains unable to make the transition 
from the Absolute to the fi nite subjects and objects of the world. He 
needs this unitary Absolute to explain knowledge of the world, but 
starting from the Absolute does not even come near explaining the 
particular world we live in. 
Th ese early philosophical attempts defi nitely qualify as what Beiser 
calls absolute idealism as a synthesis of monism (a unitary Absolute), 
vitalism (development of this Absolute), and rationalism (a purpose in 
this process that is discernible for human beings). It is the latter that 
gets infected with a degree of unknowability around the time the Frei-
heitschrift  is written. Th ere is a dark ground to all reality that cannot 
be fully brought to light within the limits of human reason. Schelling 
still has not mastered the Absolute with his thinking I. He cannot dis-
prove the Kantian rejection of metaphysical knowledge. Duality still 
threatens in every attempt at absolute knowledge. 
In the Freiheitschrift , Schelling takes an entirely diff erent approach in 
order to cope with duality. Th e Yes and the No are complemented with 
their unity in the nature of God; selfh ood (darkness) and understand-
ing (light) are connected in love. Unity is imposed on opposites. Th e 
resulting texts are evocative but oft en obscure as well. Th ey no longer
seem in accordance with the standards of philosophical discourse. In 
the inability to admit defeat, the immense ambition to outdo each 
and every one of his opponents, and the overwhelming rhetoric his 
imagination tends to run away with him from time to time. We cannot 
ignore the contradictions and the lack of clarity in his terminology: 
it is not clear how exactly God, the Absolute, the pure godhead, the 
Ungrund, the Urgrund, the Eternal, and the Infi nite are related. Th ey 
are one and the same, but then again they are not. Th ey are diff erent 
sides of the same medal, but then again how many sides can one medal 
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have? Schelling never gives up, but his attempts at building a system 
all fail. Perhaps the most obvious illustration of this is the fact that Die 
Weltalter, which is to be his masterpiece, is never published during 
his lifetime. He promises its publication on several occasions, he even 
takes a copy to the publishers, only to demand its return. Spinoza and 
Kant are never reconciled in a grand system à la Schelling. 
Nonetheless, the Freiheitschrift  has brought to light an interesting 
view on human freedom. Within a unitary Absolute (a term that is no 
longer used at this point), he is able to think free individuals who can 
do real evil without having to think an evil root in the ground of all 
that is. Selfh ood constitutes the basis for the unfolding of the Divine, 
and it provides creatures with a real ground. Being an I is good, but 
an I that is only directed at its own center is egocentric in the negative 
sense of the word. Only if there is enough willingness to open up, to 
fl ee this self-centeredness, real life develops. We are free to choose our 
own balance between these two inner forces of contracting or expand-
ing. We are free to commit evil or good deeds. If we open up, we con-
tribute to the unfolding of the Deus implicitus into the Deus explicitus. 
Th is is an important conclusion for the present study. 
Schelling’s work is interesting in itself, both for its failures and for 
its profound insights. It will become even more interesting, however, 
when contrasted to Hölderlin’s. Th e latter’s philosophical start at the 
Tübinger Stift  is similar to Schelling’s; so is the intensity of his drive 
to fi nd a metaphysics that can give answers to the questions of his 
time. Nevertheless, the actual solutions are entirely diff erent. Hölder-
lin, whose intellectual abilities are in no way inferior to Schelling’s, 
makes a diff erent choice. His melancholic temperament, his passivity 
and receptivity, and his artistic talents lead him in an entirely diff er-
ent direction: poetry. He appears to have never associated with the 
early romantic circles in Jena, but Hölderlin is, by his very nature per-
haps, a romantic. A large portion of the diff erences between Schelling 
and Hölderlin coincide with those between German idealism and 
the philosophy of early German romanticism. Th e German idealists 
attempt to build a system on the certainty of a fundamental proposi-
tion [Grundsatz] that will serve to justify all knowledge. Th e young 
Schelling hesitates from time to time but never during his publications 
parts with his dream of building a philosophical system based on fi rst 
principles from which all that is can be deduced. 
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Th e early Romantics, on the contrary, are of the opinion that people 
cannot grasp the Absolute or the Unconditioned in thought, and this 
might imply that they can never have adequate knowledge of reality. 
“In early German Romanticism, respect for the fi nitude of our poten-
tial for knowledge (a respect which Kant had already shown) begins to 
be taken seriously,” Manfred Frank asserts.159 He calls the philosophy 
of early German romanticism a version of ontological and epistemo-
logical realism. Ontological realism because it maintains that reality 
exists independently of our consciousness (even if thought plays a role 
in structuring reality). Epistemological realism because it asserts that 
we do not possess adequate knowledge of reality. Th e early romantics 
react skeptically to a philosophy based on an absolute principle. 
Hölderlin calls the unitary ground of all that is “Being”, as we will 
see in the next chapter. Being does not stand for a highest principle 
of thought, but rather for the assertion that since Being precedes con-
sciousness, knowledge can never exhaust the content of Being. Th e 
term Being in early German romanticism also implies a monistic pro-
gram of explanation. But the combination of ontological monism and 
ontological and epistemological realism implies that what cannot be 
known must nonetheless be presupposed as a condition of not only all 
knowledge but also of all that is (omnitudo realitatis) and of the ability 
to experience myself as an I.160 
Th e program of a deduction from a highest principle is transformed into 
an infi nite approximation towards a principle that can never be reached. 
In other words, the fi rst principle becomes a regulative idea.161 
According to the early German romantics, our knowledge has no 
absolute foundation. It is situated in an infi nite progression. Th e “very 
essence [of Romantic poetry] is that it eternally becomes and can never 
be completed,” according to the youngest Schlegel.162 Th e focus shift s 
from the source to the destination, or in theological terms: from cre-
ation to eschatology. Whereas Schelling is occupied with explaining 
how the world came into being, we will see how Hölderlin concen-
trates on its striving towards perfection. 
159 Frank 2004, 24.
160 Ibid., 56f.
161 Ibid., 32.
162 Karl Friedrich Schlegel, in: Richards 2002, 22. 
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German idealism and early German romanticism overlap historically 
during the time that both Hölderlin and Schelling graduate from the 
Stift  and start their intellectual careers, in 1793 and 1795 respectively. 
Th e times are dominated by the French Revolution that is seen as the 
(primordial) birth of a new era. Even when geography makes this 
impossible, German intellectuals consider themselves directly involved, 
the partners of the French revolutionaries. Th ey feel real contributors 
to the changes that are taking place in the world: their thinking is the 
spirit of the revolution. Th e Freiheit that has become the center of 
German philosophy is the liberté that is realized in France. Th oughts 
and words not only interpret the world, but they can change it as well! 
Infected by the initial enthusiasm for an entirely new world arising 
from the ashes of the old one, the three famous Stift ler Hegel, Hölder-
lin, and Schelling, erect a tree of freedom in Tübingen. Other famous 
thinkers such as Schiller, Novalis, Fichte, and the Schlegel brothers 
ardently believe in this French event as a turn for the better as well. 
For many, the enthusiastic support turns into disgust when terror and 
repression are the result of this so-called freedom. For those the French 
Revolution soon becomes the symbol of the tyranny of reason.
Th is disillusion with Enlightenment and the resulting suspicion 
concerning reason dominates early German romanticism. Life must 
be more than reason. Life is also a dark, mysterious, and terrifying 
primal force devoid of all rationality. Th is same conviction is refl ected 
in Jacobi’s sharp distinction between reason and faith. Th e former ulti-
mately leads to despair, fatalism, sterility, and death, and the latter 
leads to a vital connection with reality. It is infl uential because it suc-
ceeds in “capturing the fl avour of a growing disillusionment with the 
Enlightenment and the claims of reason rampant at the time.”163 Th e 
Romantics are not uniformly opposed to the Enlightened emphasis on 
reason. But they argue “that aesthetic judgment [off ers] another, com-
plementary path into the deep structures of reality, a path overlooked 
by most Enlightenment thinkers.”164 Th e words of Johann Gottfried 
Herder obtain new authority: reason is always “reason aft erwards.” 
It works with causality and is therefore unable to grasp the creative 
whole. Causality is predictable, creativity is not. Herder speaks of living
163 Snow 1996, 23.
164 Richards 2002, xvii.
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or lively [lebendig] reason in contrast to abstract reason. Living/lively 
reason submerges in existence, the subconscious, the irrational, the 
spontaneous; in dark, creative life itself. Nature is the euphoria of cre-
ativity but also the threat of the overwhelming [das Unheimliche]. Th e 
powers of nature and history are experienced as numinous.165 We rec-
ognize echoes of this in Schelling’s concept of the dark power in God, 
the unruly [das Regellose]. We will see even more of it in Hölderlin’s 
approach in the next chapter. 
Th e romantic emphasis on creativity involves the increased prestige 
of literature. A quarter of the population has now become potential 
readers. Two and a half thousand diff erent titles are published between 
1790–1800. Th is is as much as was the case in the fi rst nine decades of 
the same century, according to Rüdiger Safranski.166 Th is passion for 
reading elicits a writing fever. Reading adds drama to lives that are 
otherwise uneventful. Th e inability to give a rational explanation is no 
longer a shortcoming but rather a plus. Th e deep secrets of life and 
the dark depths of human feelings become an attractive theme. Espe-
cially novels of secret societies (Jesuits, freemasons, Rosicrucians) are 
popular. Poetry, philosophy, science, and politics fuse in order to show 
that the world is a piece of art. In the journal Athenaeum, which is 
published from 1798 to 1800, the early Romantics “symphilosophize” 
and “sympoetize” in the conviction that art should penetrate not 
only philosophy, but all of life. Poetry is the language that creates the 
sacred space in which the divine can show itself. Romanticism wants 
to “bring to light those hidden possibilities of reality with playful and 
at the same time explorative imagination.”167 A new self-consciousness 
of artistic autonomy, the encouragement to play and sublime futility, 
the promise of the whole in the detail is the context of the generation 
of early German romantics.
It is a reaction to the chill and the rigidity of society. Nature has 
been turned into a self-preserving mechanism. It is devoid of divine 
secrets and is supposed to act according to its own laws that guarantee 
its continuation. Th e mystery, the awesomeness, has gone out of life. 
Romanticism tries to recover the drama, the mystery, the beauty, and 
the passion. Th e romantic idea of religion as the presentation of the 




Infi nite in the fi nite is also its defi nition of art. Th e romantics believe 
that art can revive an old and feeble Christianity. True religion is not 
dogma but explication of creative freedom in people. Another aspect 
of romanticism is a longing for the golden age of Antiquity. Feasting, 
orgiasmus, ecstatic rage, all Dionysian traits, are seen as the attractive 
aspects of the antique religion. 
Safranski calls romanticism “a continuation of religion with esthetic 
means.”168 He lists the following aspects of romantic religion:
1.  Worldly participation in the Divine, a unifi cation of human being 
and God.
2.  Anti-institutionalism. No mediation of the divine is considered 
necessary since the religious experience itself builds community. 
3.  A rejection of offi  cial revelation. All intuition of the universe is 
revelation.
4.  Religion is about feeling, intuition, and experience, not about ethics.
5. In religion feelings of love dominate the experience of guilt.
Th is is just a brief sketch of what we may call the other half of both 
Schelling’s and Hölderlin’s context. And both are indeed infl uenced. 
But whereas Schelling ultimately remains an idealist, Hölderlin favors 
the ideas and the atmosphere of romanticism, as we will see in the 
next chapter. He reads the same books, shares the same admiration for 
Kant and Fichte, and has the same philosophical ambitions. Nonethe-
less, he never develops his own form of idealism.169 His relationship to 
168 Ibid., 13. 
169 Th erefore, I disagree with Beiser that “Hölderlin has been considered the father 
of absolute idealism” (Beiser 2002, 375). Hölderlin was not an absolute idealist, but 
rather an early romanticist. Even if it is Schelling who moved in early romantic circles 
for a short period, he is no more than “a traveling companion to the romantic gen-
eration” (Frank 2004, 55). Hölderlin, on the other hand, is never associated, but he 
shares most of the basic romantic insights nonetheless. In addition, I emphatically 
reject Beiser’s suggestion that “what was merely fragmentary, inchoate, and sugges-
tive in Hölderlin, Novalis, and Schlegel became systematic, organized, and explicit in 
Schelling” (Beiser 2002, 467). I do think that at least Hölderlin goes further. Maybe 
not in his brief philosophical career, but defi nitely as a poet, as we will see in the next 
chapter. Beiser seems to confuse absolute idealism and romanticism since he under-
estimates what a huge philosophical diff erence is made by the romantic emphasis 
on the unknowability and the inaccessibility of what the idealists call the Absolute. 
Th e result is an intensity of feeling in the form of intense longing for the unity that 
overshadows all thought.
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philosophy remains ambiguous throughout his lifetime. “Philosophy is 
once again my almost exclusive occupation . . . Philosophy is a tyrant, 
and I endure its force more than that I subject myself to it by free 
choice,” he writes in 1796.170 Dieter Henrich concludes, 
Philosophy was crucial for him, indispensable, but did not hold out the 
promise of fulfi lling his own nature, which was bound up with the voca-
tion of the poet. Philosophy also brought with it a threat to his inner 
equilibrium, although he always had to return to it precisely during peri-
ods of dejection.171 
Hölderlin is a poet fi rst and foremost, nevertheless he has ambitions 
as a philosopher and hopes for a lectureship during a certain period 
in his life (Jena 1794–1795) and many well-known contemporary phi-
losophers such as Hegel, Niethammer, Schiller, and Von Sinclair take 
his philosophical views seriously. 
Despite his eff orts and obvious talent, he never receives an appoint-
ment as a philosopher. Most of his philosophical endeavors that have 
been passed on are no more than notes. Th ey are fragmentary and 
open for diff erent interpretations and sometimes impenetrable. Th is 
is one of the reasons that it is not easy to reconstruct Hölderlin’s phi-
losophy. From these, however, several things can be understood. For 
example that and why Hölderlin is convinced that there is one ground 
of consciousness, which he calls Being [Seyn] and that this ground is 
beyond the grasp of human knowledge but can be intuited in nature, 
art, and love. 
As time passes, he realizes that his own philosophy and philosophy 
in general will be unable to meet his life’s project, and he starts to con-
centrate on his true profession as an artist. His mature poems show his 
ideas about how the unitary ground is at work in individual human 
beings and in the history of humankind. It is the artist, in particular 
the poet, “the singer,” who foresees the all-reconciliation of the “cel-
ebration of peace” [Friedensfeier]172 at the end of time and has a role in 
enabling its realization according to the poem of the same name. Since 
the tension between an underlying unity and the experienced opposi-
tion and separation in daily life never stops to fascinate him, his poetry 
170 StA VI, 202f. Th e German quotes are taken from the so-called Grosse Stuttgarter 
Ausgabe. See the next chapter. 
171 Henrich 1997b, 69.
172 One of Hölderlin’s later hymns that unfold his eschatology. See Appendix C. 
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is a continuation of his philosophy. Th is means that Hölderlin’s poems 
cannot be ignored in a discussion of his metaphysics. Th erefore, in the 
next chapter we will not only study his explicitly philosophical texts 
but also attempt to distill philosophical and theological conceptions 
from several of his poems.173 
173 Th is is a dangerous undertaking. In an amusing article Howard Gaskill writes, “It 
is certainly true that critics appear to be considerably better at understanding Hölder-
lin than each other” (Gaskill 1982, 166). And Walter Hof calls it “a dialogue between 
those who are extremely hard of hearing” (Hof 1977, 9). Th e secondary literature on 
Hölderlin has taken on huge proportions during the past few decades. Most authors 
seem convinced of their thorough understanding of the work of Hölderlin, but they 
disagree profoundly on most any interpretation of any of Hölderlin’s artistic (and 
philosophical) endeavors. Aris Fioretos writes, “Th e complexities involved in inter-
preting Hölderlin’s work remain considerable . . . It is diffi  cult to avoid the impression 
that we have only really begun to read Hölderlin in the manner his texts demand” 
(Fioretos 1999, 5). Peter Fenves observes that Hölderlin has become “the poet of phi-
losophers” and expresses the risks involved in “using” poetry to unfold one’s own 
philosophy (Fenves 1999, 25: Heidegger, Nietzsche, Adorno to name just a few of the 
greater names). Paul de Man criticizes Heidegger’s interpretation of Hölderlin’s poems 
because of “the manner in which it reduces the original text to a relentless philosophi-
cal discourse that bypasses the complexity and the nuances of the statement.” Th is 
is the risk that a “philologically, historically, and stylistically” uneducated theologian 
runs as well (De Man 1993, 55). However, if I were to limit my research to his (early) 
philosophical prose, I would not only ignore his more mature insights expressed in the 
poems, I would also ignore the fact that for Hölderlin his poetry is the consummation 
of his philosophy. It is capable of expressing what philosophy cannot. Th erefore, I will 
venture into unknown territory. I only claim to present a way in which Hölderlin can 
be understood in my opinion without bending his texts too far.
CHAPTER FOUR
HÖLDERLIN: THE I AND ITS GROUND
Johann Christian Friedrich Hölderlin is educated in the same philo-
sophical context as Schelling.1 Other than the standard courses, many 
of the Tübinger Stift ler study Kant and Spinoza and are elated by the 
events that are taking place in France at the time, as was said. Because 
Schelling is allowed to enter the Stift  at the early age of fi ft een, Hölder-
lin who is his senior by fi ve years only graduates two years earlier. 
He has the same books at his disposal and takes the same courses 
at the Stift . Th e philosophical context of the two young thinkers is 
very similar. Nonetheless, the focus is diff erent. Dieter Henrich views 
1 Hölderlin is born on March 20 in 1770 in southern Germany (Swabia) as the 
son of a jurist in charge of the administration of the secularized possessions of the 
Regiswindis monastery in Lauff en am Neckar and the daughter of a Lutheran min-
ister. He loses his father when he is only two years old, and his beloved stepfather 
(Johann Christoph Gok) dies only seven years later. Hölderlin has a full sister Henrike 
(Rike) who is born a few weeks aft er the father’s death, and from the fi ve children that 
are born from the second marriage only one half-brother, Karl, survives. Hölderlin 
receives a pietistic upbringing and enters the Tübinger Stift  in 1788. Aft er his gradua-
tion in 1793, he is unwilling to pursue a career as a clergyman and becomes a private 
tutor in the household of Charlotte von Kalb in Waltershausen. In 1794–1795, he 
spends six months in Jena whose university is renowned for its philosophy depart-
ment. During this time, he works on his novel Hyperion and makes plans to habilitate. 
Th e offi  cial habilitation procedure requires the defense of a published dissertation, but 
Hölderlin hopes that the fl exible and unorganized practice of the university might 
allow him at least a temporary lectureship based on an exam. However, only a few 
months later he abruptly leaves Jena, fl eeing “from people and books” (StA II, 408) 
and gives up his ambitions to combine lecturing at the university with his vocation as 
a poet. He continues to write philosophical texts, but these concentrate on the theory 
of poetry. In January 1796, he takes a job as a tutor in the household of the Frankfurt 
banker Jacob Gontard and his wife Susette with whom he falls in love. She is the inspi-
ration for the Diotima of his poems and Hyperion. Aft er Hölderlin is forced to leave 
the household because of the relationship, he moves to his friend Isaac von Sinclair 
in the nearby Bad Homburg. He keeps in touch with Susette by letter, and they even 
meet in secret from time to time. Eventually, Hölderlin leaves for his mother’s house 
in Nürtingen and moves on to tutoring jobs in Switzerland and France. Upon his 
return home, he is mentally unstable. When he fi nds out that Susette has died in 1802, 
his mental health deteriorates even further. He is committed to an insane asylum in 
Tübingen in September 1806. Aft er his release, he is taken in by the carpenter Zimmer 
and spends the remaining 36 years of his life in a small room in Zimmer’s home, his 
‘tower.’ Hölderlin dies in 1843.
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Hölderlin’s concept as an integration of the theories of Jacobi and 
Fichte into a Platonian-Kantian foundation.2 Th e infl uence of Kant, 
Jacobi, and Fichte on this new generation has been discussed previ-
ously. Th erefore, only some specifi c points of interest for Hölderlin’s 
work will be highlighted. Th e only name that is new in this list is Plato. 
Not that Schelling has not read and translated Plato, on the contrary, 
but Hölderlin’s work seems to breathe a more Platonic atmosphere. 
So let us start there.
1. Plato
 Plato’s doctrine of the eternal ideas is of major importance for 
Hölderlin. He studies at least the Phaidros, Symposion, and the 
Timaios and is exposed to many (Kantian) interpretations of Plato 
in his Tübinger years. Hölderlin’s conviction that natural beauty is 
a refl ection of primordial Beauty has Platonic characteristics.3 In 
addition, his conception of love combines Kantian freedom with 
the doctrine of Plato’s Diotima. Hölderlin searches for what he calls 
the step “across the Kantian boundary” that strictly separates the 
empirical and the rational roots of knowledge.4 In Plato’s Sympo-
sion, love connects visible beauty and goodness. Th us, Hölderlin 
feels supported in his attempts to combine the origins of beauty 
with those of freedom. Beauty and the morally good both accom-
plish that in the domain of the empirical a glimpse of the intelligible 
world [Vernünft welt] can light up. Earthly beauty can be interpreted 
as a refl ection of the Eternal. Ethics is not the only gateway to God, 
2 Henrich 1992a, 146–160.
3 However, I agree with Pankow that there might be an importance diff erence: for 
Hölderlin there is no return possible to the realm of the ideas. See Pankow 1999, 148. 
Aft er the birth of consciousness, things will never be the same again for a human 
being. Even when certain texts suggest a Platonic return to eternal and unchangeable 
ideas, Hölderlin believes that the unity that will be established at the end of history 
is not the primordial Oneness that we all originate from, as we will see in the course 
of this chapter. 
4 StA VI, 137. Th e original German text in the footnotes is taken from the so-called 
Grosse Stuttgarter Ausgabe. See the bibliography: Friedrich Hölderlin Sämtliche Werke 
(1946–1985). Th e roman numeral refers to the volume and is followed by the page 
number. Th e translation of Hölderlin’s texts is based upon offi  cial translations when-
ever available and suitable. In the bibliography, the following excellent translations 
can be found: for several philosophical letters (StA VI) and Judgment and Being (StA 
IV) by Th omas Pfau, see Hölderlin 1988. Hyperion has been translated by Willard 
Trask. See Hölderlin 1990. Many of Hölderlin’s poems were translated by Michael 
Hamburger. See Hölderlin 1961, 1990, and 2003. 
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Hölderlin agrees with the romantics; Beauty is another divine vehi-
cle. Plato supports him in his desire to understand religion “with-
out our practical reason having to come to our aid.”5
2. Jacobi
 Jacobi’s attempts at disqualifying Spinozism have the opposite 
eff ect of bringing him to the attention of his contemporaries, as we 
have seen. However, his infl uence on Hölderlin is greater than the 
unwilling promotion of Spinozism. In the reconstruction of Spi-
noza’s theory, Jacobi renames Substance to Seyn [Being]. He views 
Seyn as the principle of all reality in all that is real. Th is Seyn is 
necessarily real and cannot be reduced to anything else. We have an 
immediate consciousness of Daseyn. in the sense that it is revealed 
to us, and everywhere that Daseyn is experienced Seyn is revealed 
as well. It is the Seyn in allem Daseyn [Being in all beings]. Both 
Seyn and Daseyn come to us with an immediacy that has no ratio-
nal ground. Jacobi asserts that if our knowledge of the conditioned 
[Bedingte] is founded in the principle of mediation [Vermittlung], 
the terms imply that it is preceded by an Unconditioned [Unbe-
dingtes] that is free from mediation [unvermittelt]. Whereas try-
ing to think God or the Absolute necessarily leads to Spinozism in 
Jacobi’s view, he is convinced that we have immediate [unmittelbar] 
knowledge of a personal God in front of whom we live our lives in 
freedom.6 Jacobi’s rejection of metaphysical knowledge combined 
with an affi  rmation of an intuition for the Divine greatly appeals to 
Hölderlin, as we will see in this chapter and the next on intellectual 
intuition.
3. Fichte
 In Jena, Hölderlin starts following Fichte’s lectures and is greatly 
impressed by the latter’s philosophy as well as his personal-
ity. He combines Jacobi’s theory with Fichte’s Wissenschaft slehre 
as if Jacobi’s Seyn is consistent with Fichte’s absolute I, of which 
we have an immediate awareness through the experience ‘I am.’ 
Consequently, whereas Hölderlin’s contemporaries try to develop 
a so-called Grundsatz philosophy, he denies the possibility of dis-
cursive knowledge of the unitary ground of all consciousness. Seyn 
[Being] is not accessible for consciousness, thus cannot serve as 
5 StA VI, 203.
6 See Henrich 1992a, 58–73.
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such a principle.7 Hölderlin is not out to derive consciousness 
from Being but to prove that consciousness cannot be explained 
within the limits of regular consciousness. Th e result is a short but 
important philosophical outline written in the spring of 1795 on the 
fl yleaf of a book. It is not discovered until 1930 at an auction. Fried-
rich Beissner, the editor of the Stuttgarter Ausgabe, fi rst publishes 
it in the 1961 edition and names it Urtheil und Seyn [Judgment and 
Being]. Before we turn to this text, we will fi rst look at a letter that 
Hölderlin writes to Hegel concerning Fichte’s absolute I.
4.1. Judgment and Being
[Fichte’s] absolute I (= Spinoza’s Substance) contains all reality; it is 
everything, there is nothing outside of it. Th erefore this absolute I has 
no object because otherwise not all reality would be within it. However, 
consciousness without an object is unthinkable, and if I am this object 
myself, then I am as such necessarily limited . . . hence not absolute. Th ere-
fore, within the absolute I, no consciousness is conceivable; as absolute 
I, I have no consciousness, and insofar as I have no consciousness I am 
(for myself ) nothing, hence is the absolute I (for me) Nothing.8
Let us take a closer look at this compact statement that Hölderlin 
writes in response to Fichte’s metaphysics.
1. “[Fichte’s] absolute I (= Spinoza’s Substance) contains all reality; it 
is everything, there is nothing outside of it. Th erefore this absolute I 
has no object because otherwise not all reality would be within it.”
  Apparently, Hölderlin agrees with Jacobi that Fichte’s absolute I 
is the same as Spinoza’s Substance. Both are terms to characterize 
a unitary ground, an Absolute that contains all reality by defi nition. 
For it to have an object, there would have to be something outside 
the Absolute, and that is impossible since the Absolute contains all 
that is. Th erefore, it can never have an object.
7 Th e German language capitalizes all nouns. Since this is not the case in English, 
Seyn can be translated as Being or being. I agree with Th omas Pfau’s decision to capi-
talize since Being signifi es the Absolute, the Supreme for which Hölderlin frequently 
uses the predicate divine. I will therefore capitalize Being and other terms (such as 
Beauty, Love, and Nature) that are for Hölderlin an expression of the divine, unitary 
ground.
8 StA VI, 155.
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2. “However, consciousness without an object is in unthinkable,”
 Consciousness is for Hölderlin always consciousness of something. 
It requires a subject, one who has consciousness, and an object, 
something to be conscious of. Th erefore, consciousness without an 
object is impossible.
3. “if I am this object myself, then I am as such necessarily limited 
. . . hence not absolute. Th erefore, within the absolute I, no con-
sciousness is conceivable; as absolute I, I have no consciousness.”
  Since there is nothing outside the Absolute, it can have no object. 
Hence, the Absolute can have no consciousness. An I, however, 
has (self-)consciousness otherwise it would never be able to say ‘I.’ 
Consciousness is dependent upon a prior separation in subject and 
object. Th erefore an absolute I is a contradiction in terms. If there 
is an I, there must be consciousness, and this I is therefore neces-
sarily limited by an object. Th e Absolute is unlimited and unitary 
and therefore without consciousness.
4. “insofar as I have no consciousness I am (for myself ) nothing”
 (Self-)consciousness is essential for life, as we know it. Without 
(self-)consciousness I am (for myself ) nothing. I do not know about 
me. As far as I am concerned, I might as well be nothing, not here, 
dead, since I have no awareness of the distinction between being 
and not-being, between me and my surroundings.
5. “hence is the absolute I (for me) Nothing”
 Th is situation of I-hood makes for an interesting dilemma: I need 
consciousness to live, but consciousness separates me from the very 
ground of my existence.
Th is short text is a commentary on and criticism of Fichte’s character-
ization of the unitary ground as absolute I. Hölderlin agrees that there 
must be an ‘Absolute’ that precedes and grounds (self-)consciousness, 
but the Absolute, he asserts, can never be an I.
It is this unitary ground preceding all separation and individualiza-
tion that Hölderlin seeks to clarify. In a letter he states,
I want to discover the principle that explains to me the divisions in 
which we think and exist, yet that is also capable of dispelling the con-
fl ict between subject and object, between our self and the world, yes, also 
between reason and revelation.9
9 StA VI, 203.
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Th is principle he calls Being proper [Seyn schlechthin] or absolute 
Being [absolutes Seyn]. Being [Seyn] precedes any kind of separation 
and should be thought without any form of division. Th e essence of 
Being is that it is One, undivided and indivisible unity.
Being – expresses the connection between subject and object. Where 
subject and object are united altogether and not only in part, that is, 
united in such a manner that no separation can be performed without 
violating the essence of what is to be separated, there and nowhere else 
can be spoken of Being proper.10
Hence, Being is where subject and object are united altogether.” Being 
is absolutely unitary, and therefore it precedes every relation of the 
subject to an object. Th e fact that any degree of division is foreign to 
the seamless unity of Being implies that Being has no consciousness. 
Consciousness belongs to the other realm: Judgment.
Judgment [Urtheil ] in the highest and strictest sense is the original 
separation [ursprüngliche Trennung] of object and subject that are most 
deeply united in intellectual intuition. [It is] that separation through 
which alone object and subject become possible, the arche-separation 
[Ur-Th eilung]. In the concept of separation, there lies already the con-
cept of the reciprocity of object and subject and the necessary presup-
position of a whole of which object and subject form the parts.11
Consciousness is consciousness of something and therefore impossible 
without prior division in subject and object, Hölderlin maintains. In 
order for consciousness to arise, an original separation [ursprüngliche 
Trennung] of Being proper in subject and object has to take place. 
Hölderlin interprets the German word Urteil, or Urtheil in the old 
spelling, (judgment) as related to the word Ur-Th eilung (arche-sepa-
ration). An original division, the arche-separation, takes place within 
Being whereby subject and object arise.12
Judgment thus refers to the original separation of a preceding unity 
into parts whose relationship simultaneously reveals and hides this 
unitary origin. On the one hand, a judgment relates two diff erent rep-
resentations to one another and thereby reveals their underlying unity. 
On the other hand, the unity remains hidden because it never becomes 
10 StA IV, 216.
11 Ibid.
12 Th is faulty etymology, which was generally accepted in Hölderlin’s time, is the 
core of his metaphysics. Unfortunately, the association of judgment with separation 
is altogether lost in the translation.
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visible as unity but rather as the distinction of the parts. Once the 
arche-separation has occurred and consciousness has originated, com-
plete and enduring reunifi cation is impossible. For the conscious mind 
there is no way back into undiff erentiated Being because that would 
imply the mind’s overcoming of its very nature. We can experience 
fl ashes of our origin, but total reunion is impossible for the intellect. 
In a letter to Schiller Hölderlin writes,
I seek to show that . . . the unifi cation of subject and object in an Abso-
lute – be it I or whatever one wants to call it – is esthetically possible, 
in intellectual intuition, theoretically however, only by means of infi nite 
approach.13
Being is inaccessible to refl ection, but we can somehow intuit it. Th e 
possible immanence of Being in the esthetical experience and Hölder-
lin’s views on intellectual intuition will be discussed in 4.3.3. and 5.3. 
respectively.
Th us in Hölderlin’s view, consciousness, refl ection, knowledge, and 
the mind belong to a dimension that is necessarily characterized by 
separation and opposition. It is the dimension that he calls judgment. 
Th erefore, Hölderlin is convinced that the thought of an absolute I as 
posed by Fichte contradicts itself. Th e Absolute ground of conscious-
ness is undiff erentiated, free of all internal separation or opposition. 
It has no division in subject and object and therefore no (self-)con-
sciousness. Hence, it cannot be referred to as an I. Th erefore, a diff er-
ent sort of unitary ground preceding all (self-)consciousness has to be 
thought. Th is undivided unitary ground of judgment Hölderlin calls 
Being. Since knowledge belongs to the dimension of judgments, of 
Being no scientifi c knowledge in the strict sense is possible. A science 
of the unitary ground is impossible for Hölderlin even though all con-
sciousness and all knowledge depend upon Being.
Hence, the fi rst dilemma of Hölderlin’s metaphysics is that con-
sciousness is important for my existence, but consciousness separates 
me from Being, the source of my being. But there is another dilemma. 
Before the arche-separation, there is no consciousness. Th ere is 
no me, and there is (for me) no unitary ground. Not only my indi-
vidual consciousness, and therefore my individual life, depends on 
the arche-separation, consciousness in general cannot come into exis-
tence without it. Without the arche-separation there might as well be 
13 StA VI, 181.
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nothing. Th is implies that Being depends upon the arche-separation 
to be discernable, to be distinguishable from Nothing-ness, to be at 
all. And this is the second dilemma: the Absolute needs to internally 
divide to come to life, to be, but in this process it literally ‘falls apart.’ It 
breaks down as a unity. Being in its full unitary purity and perfection 
is Nothing. Being has to harm its own essence to be anything at all, to 
be. In order to be (for us), in order to realize itself, Being has to stop 
being Being, pure unconscious unity. Th e question now is whether it 
disappears altogether in this process of arche-separation, or whether 
it is still discernable in conscious life.
Does consciousness destroy Being, replace it? Is there an absolute 
divide between primordial purity and conscious life on earth? Are there 
still remnants on earth and echoes in our individual consciousness of 
this original One-ness? And if so, how does Being appear, become 
present in the earthly dimension of judgment? Th ese questions domi-
nate Hölderlin’s work and life. Not only his metaphysics but also his 
entire life is characterized by an urge to express and experience this 
sense of unity that underlies all earthly fragmentation. At the same 
time, it is overshadowed by what he sees as the inevitable burdens of 
the isolation of individual conscious life. As we will see in the remain-
der of this chapter, Hölderlin believes that Being remains present in 
the life of conscious beings at least as the urge towards reunifi cation. 
We seek its primordial unity in love and in close friendships. We also 
catch occasional glimpses of Being in nature. Another manifestation 
of Being is beauty: beauty in general but especially the beauty of works 
of art. But before discussing these topics, let us fi rst study Hölderlin’s 
views on self-conscious I-hood.
4.2. Self-Consciousness
Th ere is a very specifi c case of consciousness, “the most fi tting example 
of judgment,” as Hölderlin puts it; namely “I am I” [Ich bin Ich]. Con-
sciousness is the result of the arche-separation of Being and in this 
consciousness self-consciousness is included.
‘I am I’ is the most fi tting example for this concept of arche-separation as 
theoretical separation, for in the practical arche-separation [the I] opposes 
the not-I, not itself.14
14 StA VI, 155; StA IV, 216.
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He views self-consciousness as a type of judgment. In this very specifi c 
case of judgment, a separation takes place as well: the I opposes itself 
to itself, while at the same time being aware of the identity of oppos-
ing agent and opposed. It is clear that Hölderlin follows the refl ection 
model of self-consciousness, which was generally accepted in his time. 
Th is separation “I am I” has a theoretical and a practical implication, 
he maintains. In the theoretical sense, this arche-separation results in 
the division between the I as subject and the I as object: hence self-
consciousness. Aware of the problems associated with the duality of 
the I in the refl ection theory, Hölderlin agrees that it takes an under-
lying unity for the I to recognize this identity of the subject-I and the 
object-I. Th e unity of Being is the necessary ground of self-conscious-
ness as “the most fi tting example of judgment.” A second implication 
of this example of arche-separation is a practical one. In the practical 
sense this separation signifi es a division between an I and a not-I. Th e 
self-conscious I distinguishes itself from the world that surrounds it. 
Hence, the arche-separation implies a loss of unity, of harmony. At the 
same time, this split produces another unity, a self-aware being that 
can oppose itself to the rest, to all that is not-I. (Self-)consciousness, 
which literally tears us apart, is also indispensable for our human way 
of being.
Since self-consciousness is the result of a separation, the I can never 
be fully restored to an original absolute unity. Hölderlin continues,
If I say: I am I, the subject (I) and the object (I) are not united in such a 
way that no separation could be performed without violating the essence 
of what is to be separated. On the contrary, the I is only possible by 
means of this separation of the I from the I.15
Self-consciousness is a case of identity for Hölderlin. It implies unity, 
but this unity is only partial “for in another respect it [the I] is opposed 
to itself.” Th is opposition proves that self-consciousness is not in itself 
the ground but must originate from another, underlying unity. Th is 
unity, “this Being, must not be confused with identity” since the prin-
ciple of identity is derived from self-consciousness and does not apply 
to Being.16 Th e Absolute is consciousness-less Being for Hölderlin. Here 
we see how Hölderlin is well aware of the problems associated with 
the refl ection model of self-consciousness. According to Hölderlin, 
15 StA IV, 216f.
16 Ibid.
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a distinction can be made at the occurrence of arche-separation 
between two types of separation: a theoretical separation (“I am I”) 
that results in self-consciousness and a practical separation (“I am 
not the other(s)”) from which consciousness in general arises. If the 
ground is the same in both instances, namely unitary Being, then no 
explanation is given for my ability to distinguish between two types of 
“subdivision” (myself and others).
As mentioned earlier, if knowledge is only possible as the result of 
a judgment that requires the separation of the whole into parts, then 
no knowledge is possible of what precedes the arche-separation. Th e 
arche-separation has resulted in consciousness, and hence it has given 
us conscious life, as we know it. At the same time, it has alienated us 
from the unitary source of all that is, and we suff er in our individual 
solitude and long for reunifi cation. With Being as its ground, self-con-
sciousness becomes an enigma that is beyond the solutions available to 
refl ection. Th e primordial unity, Being, I am unable to think. It is com-
pletely transcendental for me: it is “nothing (for me).”17 Nevertheless, 
my entire existence depends on it. In his novel Hyperion, Hölderlin 
points out another and more far-reaching consequence: the arche-
separation has burdened us with mortality. “When the beautiful world 
started for us, when we became conscious, then we became fi nite.”18 
Th e price we pay for consciousness is high: we have become mortals. 
Being is absolute, infi nite, unitary, and perfect; conscious beings are 
limited, mortal, solitary, and forever striving to return to the perfect 
unity of eternal Being. At the same time, we fear total reunifi cation 
since we would have to pay the price of loss of consciousness, the 
death of our individuality.
In this last quote, we have made a switch from Hölderlin as a philoso-
pher to the poet and novelist. As has been mentioned, Hölderlin is a 
serious participant in philosophical circles of his time. He knows the 
discussions, he criticizes prevalent theories, is able to point out their 
17 See “insofern bin ich (für mich) nichts” (StA VI, 155).
18 “Also da, als die schöne Welt für uns anfi eng, da wir zum Bewusstsein kamen, 
da wurden wir endlich” (StA III, 192). So far I have not appended the German text in 
the footnotes. I feel that the English version is adequate for conveying the meaning 
of the author’s philosophy. However, where Hölderlin’s novel and poems are con-
cerned, the richness of the German original cannot be fully captured in the transla-
tion. Th erefore, in case of his non-philosophical works, I will provide the German 
orginal in the footnotes. 
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contradictions and failures. Nevertheless, he is only a passer-by in the 
world of the philosophers. His true homeland is poetry. It means that 
we will have to adapt and translate. Some of the subtleties will be lost 
in the process. Th is cannot be avoided, but there remains much to be 
learned in this strange country. We will fi rst look more closely at the 
daily consequences of life in the arche-separation. Does conscious life 
as we know it inevitably and irreparably estrange us from our unitary 
ground? As we will see, the answer is not a simple Yes or No. Being in 
its primordial oneness cannot be grasped, but it presents itself in the 
world nonetheless. We are able to hear its echoes.
4.3. Worldly Echoes of Being
In the foreword of the penultimate version of Hyperion, Hölderlin 
writes,
Th e holy unity, Being in the unique sense of the word, is lost for us and 
we had to lose it, if we were to strive, long for it. We tear ourselves loose 
from the peaceful Hen kai Pan of the world, in order to re-establish it 
through ourselves. We are live in discord with nature; and what once, as 
one can believe, was One, opposes itself now, and dominion and slavery 
alternate on both sides. Oft en it appears to us as if the world were all 
and we were nothing, but oft en also as if we were all and the world were 
nothing. Also Hyperion was torn between these two extremes.
To end this eternal confl ict between our selves and the world, to bring 
back the peace of all peace that is higher than all reason, to unite us with 
nature into one eternal whole, that is the goal of all our striving. We may 
agree on that or not.
But neither our knowledge nor our actions ever reach at any time 
during our existence the point where all confl ict stops and where all 
is One; the defi nite line unites with the indefi nite one only in infi nite 
approach.
And we wouldn’t divine such an eternal peace, this Being in the 
unique sense of the word, we wouldn’t strive to unite nature with us, 
we wouldn’t think and we wouldn’t act, there wouldn’t be anything (for 
us), we wouldn’t be anything (for us) when this eternal union, Being, 
in the unique sense of the word, were not available. It is available – as 
Beauty; awaiting us is, to speak with Hyperion, a new kingdom where 
Beauty is queen.19
19 StA III, 236f.
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Th is fragment is a striking illustration of the complexity of our rela-
tionship to our primordial ground and the multitude of terms that 
Hölderlin uses to refer to it: holy unity, Being, the peaceful Hen kai 
Pan of the world, what once was One, the peace of all peace that is 
higher than all reason, eternal peace, eternal union, and Beauty. Some 
terms – such as what once was One and eternal peace – express loss, 
absence, and transcendence; but others – such as available and Hen kai 
Pan of the world – suggest its earthly presence. On the one hand, this 
primordial unity of Being is “lost for us.” Th e eternal and the mortal 
can only approach, not unite: “the defi nite line only unites with the 
indefi nite one in infi nite approach.”20 On the other hand, it is available 
[vorhanden], in German this literally means before our hands. It seems 
within reach. It shows itself. We would not long for it, if it were not 
in some way “available,” even if human hands cannot grasp it and if it 
is “higher than all reason.”
Th is situation of, let us say, absent presence has a purpose: we have 
to “re-establish [holy unity] through our selves.” Th is results in a pro-
cess of confl icts and opposition between ourselves and nature. Th ere 
is confusion of what has priority; the whole or the individual. We 
wonder what dominates: nature or we. We seem to strive for a unity 
that seems impossible to attain in this life but lies ahead of us as “the 
new kingdom where Beauty is queen.” Apparently, we know of a state 
of reunifi cation, of ultimate peace that is our future homeland. Th ese 
few lines are a beautiful illustration of the core and the fullness of 
Hölderlin’s work. Unity is “before our hands,” but the defi nite and the 
indefi nite can only approach, not merge. We strive for unifi cation, but 
we cannot make up our minds about its true importance. Is unity All 
and are we nothing or, are we All and is pre-conscious unity a mere 
nothing? Th en again, how could we ever long for something that is not 
there and does not make its presence felt?
For Hölderlin, unitary Being still echoes in conscious life that results 
from the arche-separation. It is most obvious in three categories of 
daily life: in young children and even adults of a certain authenticity; 
in nature; in beauty. Th ey will be discussed in that order.
20 See StA VI, 181.
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4.3.1. Being and the Innocent
Clearly, even though the arche-separation gives us consciousness and 
hence life as we know it, it simultaneously alienates us from the uni-
tary source of all that is. Hölderlin assumes that people have a certain 
awareness of the unifi ed ground of our earthly, individualized existence 
that is diffi  cult to pinpoint or to express in words, but that is very per-
sistent nonetheless. A verb that he oft en uses in a more poetic setting 
to express this awareness is ahnden, to surmise, to divine. Apparently, 
not all sense of unity has been lost in the arche-separation.
[Th e] One-ness with all that lives, that cannot be felt by more limited 
characters, that can only be surmised in its highest aspirations, but that 
can be recognized by the spirit and that arises from the impossibility of 
an absolute separation and individualized isolation [Vereinzelung] and 
that is most easily expressed by saying that the real separation, and all 
truly materially transient with it, . . . is only a state of the primordially 
united.21
Absolute separation and individualized isolation are impossible, 
Hölderlin asserts. Th e separation that we experience in our earthly 
existence is real, but it is not our ultimate reality. It is “only a state 
of the primordially united.” Being is not radically lost as the result 
of the arche-separation, and we are able to feel this unity, however 
briefl y, during our lifetime. But human sensibility for unity varies. It 
takes a certain degree of openness for this One-ness; “more limited 
characters” are unable to feel it. “It only appears lively in the hearts of 
the authentic, the ones who think for themselves, the inventors.”22 So, 
who are these authentic?
To a certain degree, the young belong to this category. Th ose in 
whom consciousness has not yet fully developed can experience unity 
quite easily, in Hölderlin’s view. Small children seem to have a natural 
openness for the original One-ness.
Yes, divine is the being of the child, so long as it has not been dipped in 
the chameleon colors of men . . . In the child is peace; it has not yet come 
to be at odds with itself.23
21 StA IV, 267f.
22 “er kommt nur in den Gemüthern der Originale, der Selbstdenker, der Erfi nder 
lebendig zum Vorschein” (StA VI, 328).
23 “Ja! ein göttlich Wesen ist das Kind, solang es nicht in die Chamäleonsfarbe der 
Menschen getaucht ist . . . . In ihm ist Frieden; es ist noch mit sich selber nicht zerfal-
len” (StA III, 10).
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Th e child has not yet been torn apart by the high degree of diff eren-
tiation, opposition, and solitude of adult life. It is still living in the 
peace of divine unity. “It is immortal, for it has not heard of death.”24 
Th is sense of unity diminishes as, with increasing knowledge, explicit 
consciousness develops in the maturing child. Th is realization makes 
Hyperion exclaim,
O! had I never gone to your schools! Th e knowledge which I pursued 
down its tunnels and galleries, from which, in my youthful folly, I 
expected confi rmation of all my pure joy – that knowledge has corrupted 
everything for me.25
Knowledge does not confi rm the One-ness of youth, it does not give 
insight into our origin, and it does not bring the peace that we hope 
for. On the contrary, as people grow into adulthood and become more 
refl ective, more educated, more explicitly conscious, their sense of 
unity becomes corrupted.
Th ere seems to be no simple way back to the unitary pre-conscious-
ness of youth. In one of Hölderlin’s poems, Menon cries out in despair, 
“Once how diff erent it was! O youth, will no prayer bring you back, 
then, /Never again? And no path ever again bring me back?”26 Our 
youthful openness for unity, our innocence will not return in response 
to our pleas. We cannot actively retrace our steps into pre-conscious-
ness unity. In times of despair, we may long to rid ourselves of the 
painful confl icts and the loneliness that seem to result from the arche-
separation. However, of the peace of pre-conscious Being adults no 
longer have a true conception.
Peace of childhood! Heavenly peace! How oft en do I pause before you 
in loving contemplation, and try to conceive of you! But our concepts 
are only of what has degenerated and been repaired; of childhood, of 
innocence we have no concepts.27
24 “Es ist unsterblich, denn es weiss vom Tode nichts” (StA III, 10).
25 “Ach! Wär’ ich nie in eure Schule gegangen. Die Wissenschaft , der ich in den 
Schacht hinunter folgte, von der ich, jugendlich thöricht, die Bestätigung meiner rei-
nen Freude erwartete, die hat mir alles verdorben” (StA III, 9).
26 In: Menons Klagen um Diotima. “Sonst mir anders bekannt! O Jugend, und brin-
gen Gebete / Dich nicht wieder, dich nie? führet kein Pfad mich zurük?” (StA II, 77).
27 “Ruhe der Kindheit! Himmlische Ruhe! Wie oft  steh’ ich stille vor dir in lieben-
der Betrachtung, und möchte dich denken! Aber wir haben ja nur Begriff e von dem, 
was einmal schlecht gewesen und wieder gut gemacht ist; von Kindheit, Unschuld 
haben wir keine Begriff e” (StA III, 10).
 hölderlin: the i and its ground 203
In concepts, we join separate elements. We ‘con-ceive’; we literally 
‘grasp together.’ However, a concept is only our attempt at joining 
what has fallen apart; it is not original unity. Of pre-conscious peace, 
no concept is possible.
Th erefore, I agree with Pankow when he asserts that Being in the 
sense that Hölderlin views it, does not correspond to the Platonic pre-
existing ideas.
According to the idealized Greek model, the returning to (and of ) the 
same is always possible, at least in principle, since the very memory that 
leads back to the true transcendental home of man is ultimately guided 
by the unchangeable character of timeless ideas. . . . Whereas Platonic 
anamnesis imagines a return to the preexisting idea itself, Hyperion 
experiences returning as a displacement of the very place to which he 
intends to come back.28
Th ere is no return to the vaguely “remembered lands” of our child-
hood, our pre-conscious life of unity and peace. “If I were on my 
native island, in the gardens of my youth, . . . ah! even then, even then 
I should be a stranger on earth, and no god would join me to the past 
again.”29 Aft er we have ventured into the consciousness of adulthood, 
we can never fully return to the purity of the homeland.
Each of us seem to go through his or her own, private arche-
separation. Even though we might conclude that eternal One-ness is 
lost forever with the onset of consciousness, this is something that 
Hölderlin cannot and will not accept. Even adults are able to experi-
ence a primordial state of harmony. At times even those who, like 
most adults, seem to be completely caught up in the oppositions of 
daily life have a sudden encounter with something that saves them 
from earthly doom. In the next fragment Hölderlin calls it faith.
O you who live in this age with me! Seek not counsel of your doctors 
nor of your priests when your hearts wither away! You have lost all faith 
in anything great; you are doomed, then, doomed to perish, unless that 
faith returns, like a comet from unknown skies.30
28 Pankow 1999, 148. 
29 “wär’ ich auch auf meiner heimatlichen Insel, in den Gärten meiner Jugend . . ., 
ach! Dennoch, dennoch, wär’ ich auf der Erd’ ein Fremdling und kein Gott knüpft  ans 
Vergangne mich mehr” (StA III, 150).
30 “O ihr Genossen meiner Zeit! Fragt eure Ärzte nicht und nicht die Priester, wenn 
ihr innerlich vergeht! Ihr habt den Glauben an alles Grosse verloren; so must, so must 
ihr hin, wenn dieser Glaube nicht wiederkehrt, wie ein Komet aus fremden Himmeln” 
(StA III, 42).
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Apparently, even when we are totally lost in the struggles of the here 
and now, when we are so totally absorbed in the fragmentation and 
the “me against the rest” of daily life that our “hearts wither away,” we 
can be hit by “a comet from unknown skies,” a sudden fl ash of insight 
that gives us back our faith in “something great,” the possibility of 
peace and harmony.
In some people a certain more permanent innocence, “gold long 
submerged,” is able to re-establish itself even.31 Th ey seem to have a 
familiarity with the One-ness of all that is.
It is eternally true, it is visible everywhere: the more innocent, the more 
beautiful a soul is, the more familiarly will it live with those other happy 
beings to which men deny souls.32
Th ese “beautiful souls” recognize the “familiarity,” the connection 
between all the separate beings of the world. For them, all that is, 
even plants and animals that are traditionally considered soulless, are 
included in this unity. Hölderlin’s beloved Diotima from the novel 
Hyperion and several poems is an example of such a beautiful soul. She 
seems to be modeled on Susette Gontard, the love of Hölderlin’s life 
and the wife of his employer, whom we will meet again later.
Hence, primordial peace and harmony can be experienced by the 
more innocent or authentic of the human race, and this shows in their 
peaceful and familiar way of interacting with all that surrounds them. 
Th ey still partially live in the harmonious unity of the homeland. But 
Being is not only refl ected in this particular group of human beings. In 
4.3.3. we will see that all real artists, poets in particular, must somehow 
have a sense of primordial Unity in order to be creative. Th e Beauty 
that the piece of art expresses is also the “living presence” of perfect 
unity that can be seen among us. Nevertheless, the confl icts, and the 
oppositions are real, and daily adult life is marked by the results of the 
arche-separation: individuality and refl ection, the pain of loneliness 
and mortality, and longing for reunifi cation. Th e truth of our everyday 
life is that we are mostly cut off  from the peace of the unifi cation that 
we long for.
31 “das begrabene Gold” (StA II, 77).
32 “Es ist doch ewig gewiss und zeigt sich überall; je unschuldiger, schöner eine 
Seele, desto vertrauter mit den andern glüklichen Leben, die man seelenlos nennt” 
(StA III, 56).
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In the next fragment from Hyperion, we once again see how momen-
tary our encounters with pure unitary Being are during our lifetime. 
Mere refl ection, explicit consciousness, is enough to chase it away and 
leave us isolated and lost.
An instant of refl ection hurls me down. I refl ect, and I fi nd myself as I 
was before – alone, with all the grief of mortality, and my heart’s refuge, 
the world in its eternal oneness, is gone; Nature closes her arms, and I 
stand like an alien before her and do not understand her.33
Here another term is introduced: Nature. Hölderlin oft en uses Nature 
as a synonym of Being. Th us, he can say “All wandering streams of 
human activity run into the ocean of Nature, just as they sprang from 
it.”34 Let us now concentrate on this conception of Nature as the image 
of unitary Being.
4.3.2. Being and Nature
Th e word nature [Natur] can have several diff erent meanings in 
Hölderlin’s work. He speaks of a person’s nature, meaning her char-
acter, personality. Sometimes nature is the whole of fl ora and fauna 
that surrounds us in the world and to which we belong as well. Th ese 
are common uses of the word in both the English and the German 
language, but Hölderlin oft en goes further in his concept of nature as 
the all-encompassing totality of which the natural world with its trees, 
birds, summer rains, and landscapes is only a manifestation. On the 
one hand, nature is our natural habitat; well-known and “intimate.” 
On the other hand, in its beauty and mystery it resembles “alien pow-
ers” that transcend us, as Hölderlin describes it in his poem Friedens-
feier [Celebration of Peace].35 With that particular connotation, nature 
becomes the All of Nature.36 It is the All of Nature that has preserved 
33 “ein Moment des Besinnens wirft  mich herab. Ich denke nach und fi nd mich, 
wie ich zuvor war, allein, mit allen Schmerzen der Sterblichkeit, und meines Herzens 
Asyl, die ewigeinige Welt, ist hin; die Natur verschliesst die Arme, und ich stehe, wie 
ein Fremdling, vor ihr, und verstehe sie nicht” (StA III, 9).
34 “alle die irrenden Ströme der menschlichen Tätigkeit in den Ocean der Natur 
laufen, so wie sie von ihm ausgehen” (StA VI, 329).
35 For the German original, Friedensfeier, see Appendix C. See also 4.7. 
36 As has been mentioned before, the German language capitalizes all nouns and 
thus cannot make the distinction between nature in the regular sense of the word and 
all-encompassing Nature. Since the distinction is possible in English, I will capitalize 
Nature whenever the latter is meant.
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the primordial One-ness where the restless mind of the romantic fi nds 
peace.
To be one with all that lives, to return in blessed self-forgetfulness into 
the All of Nature – this is the pinnacle of thought and joys, this the 
sacred mountain peak, the place of eternal rest.37
In the unifi cation with the All of Nature, we can forget ourselves for 
a while.
Oft en, lost in the wide blue, I look up into the ether and down into the 
sacred sea, and I feel as if a kindred spirit were opening its arms to me, 
as if the pain of solitude were dissolved in the life of the Divinity.38
In the encounter with Nature the loneliness that is the inevitable con-
sequence of life in the arche-separation is temporarily dissolved; the 
burden of our earthly individuality is lightened for a while.
Nature is not just a reminder of the original unitary peace of Being 
for Hölderlin; Nature is “the changeless, the quiet.”39 Th e conception of 
Nature as unchangeable and divine Being that comforts us in our soli-
tude and gives us temporary reprieve from the unrest that is inevitable 
in our earthly condition is prominent in the early stages of Hölder-
lin’s novel Hyperion. For Hyperion Diotima is the personifi cation of 
Nature; she is eternal Being. Th ere is a huge contrast between his own 
restless existence and the imperturbable and unchangeable peace of 
Diotima’s nature: “I [with] a mind full of wild contradictions” and 
“she . . . in changeless beauty, eff ortless, in smiling perfection.”40 During 
their love aff air, the two spheres of her primordial unitary peace and 
his own discordant earthliness merge, but this off ers only temporary 
reprieve.41 Hyperion starts to realize that the peace and quiet perfec-
tion of Being that he strives to attain is not a lasting earthly reality.
37 “Eines zu seyn mit Allem, was lebt, in seeliger Selbstvergessenheit wiederzukeh-
ren in’s All der Natur, das ist der Gipfel der Gedanken und Freuden, das ist die heilige 
Bergeshöhe, der Ort der ewigen Ruhe” (StA III, 9).
38 “Verloren in’s weite Blau, blik’ ich oft  hinauf an den Aether und hinein in’s 
heilige Meer, und mir ist, als öff net’ ein verwandter Geist mir die Arme, als löste der 
Schmerz der Einsamkeit sich auf in’s Leben der Gottheit” (StA III, 8f.).
39 “d[ie] wandellose[n], stille[n]” (StA III, 8).
40 “Ich [mit] ein Gemüth voll wilder Widersprüche . . . ; sie aber . . . in wandelloser 
Schönheit, mühelos, in lächelnder Vollendung” (StA III, 58).
41 Th e desire to return to the unitary source of all beings drives us towards intimacy 
with other (human) beings. Ultimately, this is just a surrogate for the all-unity that is 
our destination, as we will see in 4.5.
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However, he gains another and more important insight. When 
Diotima dies, Hyperion discovers that separation might not be radi-
cally opposed to unifi cation. Separation and changeability are essential 
to Nature, to primordial Being itself. Nature is not just the “change-
less”; “all transformations of pure Nature are part of her Beauty too.”42 
Being is not a static unity. Within Nature/Being are the dynamics of 
change, of life.
Must not all things suff er? And the more excellent, the more deeply! 
Does not sacred Nature suff er? O my Divinity! Th at you could mourn as 
you are blissful – that was long beyond my understanding. But the bliss 
that does not suff er is sleep, and without death there is no life. Should 
you be eternally like a child, and sleep like that which is nothing?43
Nature/Being would be asleep, unconscious, “like that which is noth-
ing,” without the changeability of life. Being fi nds itself in a state of “suf-
fering” and “mourning” typical for earthly life of separation “because 
it has to go outside itself.”44 Being cannot remain a static unity
because the parts of the One cannot remain in the same close or more 
distant relationship in order that everything meets everything, and 
everything attains its entire right, its entire measure of life.45
Th e “parts of the One” have to diff erentiate in order for individual-
ity to develop, and for this, the dynamics of change are needed. Th e 
“parts,” (human) beings have to experience the fullness of life through 
confl icts, refl ection, and momentaneous states of reunifi cation. Th ey 
are entitled to it.
Th ere is another reason for the transformations of life. Hölderlin 
continues,
[It is] eternal law, that the Whole that is full of content in its One-
ness does not feel itself with the defi nitiveness and liveliness, not in the 
42 “alle Verwandlungen der reinen Natur auch mit zu ihrer Schöne gehören” (StA 
III, 103).
43 “Muss nicht alles leiden? Und je trefl icher es ist, je tiefer! Leidet nicht die heilige 
Natur? O meine Gottheit! Dass du trauern könntest, wie du seelig bist, das konnt’ 
ich lange nicht fassen. Aber die Wonne, die nicht leidet, ist Schlaf, und ohne Tod ist 
kein Leben. Solltest du ewig seyn, wie ein Kind und schlummern, dem Nichts gleich?” 
(StA III, 150).
44 “weil es aus sich herausgehen müsse” (StA IV, 268).
45 “weil die Th eile des Einigen nicht immer in derselben näheren und entfernteren 
Beziehung bleiben dürfen, damit alles allem begegene, und jeden ihr ganzes Recht, ihr 
ganzes Maas von Leben werde” (StA IV, 268).
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sensorial unity in which its parts that are also a unity, only more loosely 
connected, feel themselves.46
Th erefore, primordial One-ness needs to separate within itself in order 
to feel life, to be conscious. Perhaps it is perfect in its spiritual One-
ness, but it might as well be dead. It can only feel alive within another, 
more material unity that is more loosely connected, but a unity none-
theless. In the metric version of Hyperion, Hölderlin writes, while 
employing the term pure Spirit to denote Being,
Th e non-suff ering, pure Spirit does not occupy
Itself with matter, but is also
Not conscious of any object nor of itself,
For it no world exists, since outside of it
Th ere is nothing.47
Hölderlin considers the arche-separation a matter of life and death for 
Being. It has to diff erentiate, to divide to “feel itself.” Th e price that 
is paid is that Being becomes a more loosely connected, a less perfect 
unity. Th us, the price is also opposition, confl ict, suff ering, and mor-
tality. Nonetheless, without conscious beings to think and experience 
its primordial unity, Being might as well be “Nothing.”48 Th at is the 
gain; that is why arche-separation occurs. I will let Hölderlin express 
this for him so crucial thought once again, this time by way of a frag-
ment from his poem Der Rhein [Th e Rhine].
. . . and if there be
One thing the celestials need
It is heroes and men
And mortals generally. For since
Th e serenest beings feel nothing at all,
Th ere must come, if to speak
Th us is permitted, another who feels
On their behalf, him
Th ey use and need . . .49
46 “ewiges Gesez, dass das gehaltreiche Ganze in seiner Einigkeit nicht mit der 
Bestimmtheit und Lebhaft igkeit sich fühlt, nicht in dieser sinnlichen Einheit, in wel-
cher seine Th eile, die auch ein Ganzes, nur leichter verbunden sind, sich fühlen” (StA 
IV, 268).
47 “Der leidensfreie reine Geist befasst / Sich mit dem Stoff e nicht, ist aber auch / 
Sich keines Dings und seiner nicht bewusst, / Für ihn ist keine Welt, denn ausser ihm / 
Ist nichts” (StA III, 195).
48 StA VI, 155. See 4.1.
49 “. . . und bedürfen / Die Himmlischen eines Dings, / So sinds Heroën und Men-
schen / Und Sterbliche sonst. Denn weil / Die Seeligsten nichts fühlen von selbst, / 
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Being needs mortal beings to “feel on [its] behalf.” Since it is a neces-
sity for Being to feel and to become conscious, humans should not 
turn their backs on the contradictions of earthly life in order to fi nd 
peace prematurely. Th ey are “needed” for an “eternal law” by which 
Being goes “outside itself ” in order “to feel itself ” with the “liveliness” 
that only mortal, conscious beings can provide. Being needs people in 
order to feel, to be alive. “It is human destination to replicate, hasten, 
individualize, mix, separate, bind the life of Nature.”50
People should not turn away from discordant, conscious life but 
fi nd peace in the acceptance of the oppositions instead. Without our 
earthly experiences, not only Being would be dead but we would lead 
incomplete lives ourselves. “Our soul, when it puts off  mortal experi-
ences and lives only in blessed quietness – is it not like a leafl ess tree? 
Like a head without hair?”51 As Hyperion develops into more mature 
adulthood he can say, “Since then much has changed in my eyes, and 
now I have peace enough in me to remain quiet with any look into 
human existence.”52 Hölderlin’s Hyperion fi nds out that the contradic-
tory tendencies in life are not just proof of human malfunctioning; it 
is the very structure of life.53 Human activity is indispensable for the 
unfolding of the unitary ground in all that is. “Th e drive towards arts 
and education with all its variations and diversity [are] actually a ser-
vice rendered to Nature by people.”54
We will now turn to the specifi c “service rendered to Nature” by the 
artist. It is the poet in particular who Hölderlin considers the special 
Muss wohl, wenn solches zu sagen / Erlaubt ist, in der Götter Nahmen / Th eilnemend 
fühlen ein Andrer, / Den brauchen sie” (StA II, 145).
50 “Menschenbestimmung, . . . das Leben der Natur zu vervielfältigen, zu beschleuni-
gen, zu sondern, zu mischen, zu trennen, zu binden” (StA VI, 328).
51 “Unsrer Seele, wenn sie die sterblichen Erfahrungen ablegt und allein nur lebt in 
heiliger Ruhe, ist sie nicht, wie ein unbelaubter Baum? Wie ein Haupt ohne Loken?” 
(StA III, 103).
52 “Seitdem ist manches anders in meinem Auge geworden, und ich habe nun so 
viel Frieden in mir, um ruhig zu bleiben, bei jedem Blik ins menschliche Leben” (StA 
III, 103).
53 Th ere is a distinct parallel between Schelling’s Freiheitschrift  and Hölderlin’s 
views on the striving of Being to obtain life. Schelling speaks of an Urgrund, which is 
also Ungrund, that longs to come to the light of understanding. Hyperion is written 
between 1792 and 1795 and published in 1797 (Volume I) and 1799 (Volume II), 
whereas the Freiheitschrift  is from 1809.
54 “der Kunst- und Bildungstrieb mit allen seinen Modifi kationen und Abarten 
[sind] ein eigentlicher Dienst, den die Menschen der Natur erweisen” (StA VI, 329).
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mouthpiece of Being. Let us take a closer look at the enormous burden 
that rests on the shoulders of the poet.
4.3.3. Being, Beauty, and the Poet
Nature is an expression of Being that is present without requiring any 
human activity. All we need is a degree of openness, as we have seen. 
“Blessed Nature had remained unchanged in her beauty . . . with our 
mortal powers we strive to cultivate the Beautiful yet it grows light-
heartedly beside us.”55 Nature is the Beautiful that “grows light-heart-
edly beside us.” It is there without any eff ort on our part. Apparently, 
there is another real presence of Being that depends on human eff ort 
and cooperation. Th is presence is what the artistic soul seeks.
I have seen it once, the one thing that my soul sought, and the perfection 
that we put somewhere far away above the stars, that we put off  until 
the end of time – I have felt it in its living presence . . . . the name of that 
which is One and All? Its name is Beauty.56
Beauty, or the Beautiful, is another term that Hölderlin frequently uses 
for Being. Th e perfection of our ground, Being, “that which is One and 
All,” is not so far away as we tend to think, this fragment suggests. It is 
not “above the stars” or unavailable “until the end of time”; “its living 
presence” can be felt here and now. Being is alive among us as Beauty. 
It is the “Beautiful” that artists “cultivate” in their works of art. Art is 
the joint product of the human artist and divine Being. Creating art 
is not just a matter of divine inspiration; it is the “work of gods and 
men.” Works of art arise from both human and divine activity. Art is 
“the fi rst child of human, of divine Beauty.”57 It takes an eff ort on the 
part of the artist to contribute the human share of this child. But also 
the divine parent contributes as a result of
55 “. . . die seelige Natur war wandellos in ihrer Schöne geblieben . . . . wir ringen mit 
sterblichen Kräft en Schönes zu baun, und es wächst doch sorglos neben uns auf!” 
(StA III, 126f.).
56 “Ich hab’ es Einmal gesehn, das Einzige, das meine Seele suchte, und die Vollen-
dung, die wir über die Sterne hinauf entfernen, die wir hinausschieben bis an’s Ende 
der Zeit, die hab’ ich gegenwärtig gefühlt . . . . den Nahmen dess, das Eins ist und Alles? 
Sein Nahme ist Schönheit” (StA III, 52f.).
57 “der Götter und Menschen Werk” (StA II, 119). I will elaborate on the meaning 
of the terms God, the gods, and their relationship to Being in 4.7. and 4.8. “Das erste 
Kind der menschlichen, der göttlichen Schönheit ist die Kunst” (StA III, 79).
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the necessary confl ict between the most original postulate of the Spirit 
which aims at communality and unifi ed simultaneity of all parts, and the 
other postulate which commands the Spirit to move beyond itself and to 
reproduce itself, within itself and others.58
In the context of his poetology, Hölderlin oft en uses the term Spirit 
(poetic, absolute, or pure Spirit) for Being. Being wants to unify all its 
parts and gather all beings inside of it, but at the same time it needs to 
move beyond itself and reproduce itself in order to be everywhere and 
in everything.59 For this movement of Being beyond itself the eff orts of 
the artist are essential, and among the arts poetry is the highest of all. 
It is the “teacher of humanity,” and “poetry alone will survive all other 
sciences and arts.”60 Th erefore, the poet should never think lightly of 
his task. In the poem Dichterberuf [Poet’s Vocation] Hölderlin writes 
that the poet’s work is not that of a regular person who “labors and 
earns his living . . . for a diff erent task is in question here, Entrusted to 
the poet’s care and service! Th e Highest it is to whom we are dedi-
cated.”61 Th e poet is a priest-like fi gure in Hölderlin’s conception, a 
“divine man.”62
Th e creation of this mixed breed is of utmost importance for both 
parents. In Hölderlin’s words, “In art the divine man rejuvenates and 
repeats himself. He wants to feel himself; therefore, he sets his Beauty 
over against himself. Th us did man give himself his gods.”63 Th e true 
artist can become conscious of himself (“feel himself ”) by separating 
from and opposing himself to the One-ness of his ground (Being/
Beauty). From this process, two things result. Th e fi rst of the artist’s 
activities is to capture a certain degree or fragment of divine presence 
58 “ein notwendiger Widerstreit . . . zwischen der ursprünglichsten Forderung des 
Geistes, die auf Gemeinschaft  und einiges Zugleichsein aller Teile geht, und zwischen 
der anderen Forderung, welche ihm gebietet, aus sich herauszugehen, und in einem 
schönen Fort schritt und Wechsel sich in sich selbst und in anderen zu reproduzieren” 
(StA IV, 241).
59 Th is reminds us of the centripetal and the centrifugal forces in Schelling’s Urgrund. 
Again, Hölderlin’s text precedes Schelling’s by approximately a decade. 
60 “Lehrerin der Menschheit”; “die Dichtkunst allein wird alle übrigen Wissenschaf-
ten und Künste überleben” (StA IV, 298).
61 “sich / Wehret und nährt! Denn es gilt ein anders, // Zu Sorg’ und Dienst den 
Dichtenden anvertraut! / Der Höchste, der ists, dem wir geeignet sind” (StA II, 46).
62 Th is lack of modesty, uncharacteristic for Hölderlin, will be discussed in the next 
chapter.
63 “In ihr verjüngt und wiederholt der göttliche Mensch sich selbst. Er will sich 
selber fühlen, darum stellt er seine Schönheit gegenüber sich. So gab der Mensch sich 
seine Götter” (StA III, 79).
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in his work and thereby realize something of Being for himself and for 
others – “man gives himself his gods”. Th e artistic work is a reminder 
or (partial) realization of Being in and for the world. But it is more 
than that.
Th e artistic endeavor has another eff ect. Hölderlin continues, “For 
in the beginning man and his gods were one, when, unknown to itself, 
eternal Beauty was.”64 Th e work of art constitutes a step in the self-
realization of Being at the same time. It helps the primordial One-ness 
to become conscious of itself because before the arche-separation – “in 
the beginning [when] man and his gods were one” –, “Beauty was” 
but it was “unknown to itself.” Once again we see that Being has the 
drive to realize itself, to become known to itself. Not just to please us 
or to remind us where we come from. It is not enough for Being to 
just be because Being without consciousness might as well not be, be 
Nothing. In order for Being to become known, not only to conscious 
beings, but also to itself, “it needs to [move beyond itself]. And since 
the poetic Spirit cannot know the world in itself nor of itself, an exter-
nal object is necessary.”65 By externalizing itself in works of art, Being 
gains (self-)consciousness. Th e perfect One-ness of Being loses some of 
its ontological quality and unitary purity when becoming “tangible.”66 
However, this loss seems to be the price to be paid for emergence in 
the world and thus for self-awareness, for life even.
Several of Hölderlin’s poems deal with his views on the artistic 
endeavor. Two of these will be discussed in the next chapter on intel-
lectual intuition (5.3.2. and 5.3.3.). Th ey are illustrative of his high 
expectations and the immense task that he takes upon himself. Hölder-
lin’s decision to turn his back on philosophy was not the easy way out, 
as will become clear in the same chapter. In 5.3.1. it will be explained 
why philosophy can never be more than second best, in Hölderlin’s 
view. How a more mature Hölderlin will come to recognize this con-
ception of poetry as hubris will be discussed in 5.3.4. By then, the 
brilliant young man has said goodbye to the career as a minister that 
64 “Denn im Anfang war der Mensch und seine Götter Eins, da, sich selber unbe-
kannt, die ewige Schönheit war” (StA III, 79).
65 “und doch muss er es. . . . Da [der poetischen Geist] aber [seine Individualität, 
sein Ich] nicht durch sich selbst und an sich selbst erkennen kann, so ist ein äusseres 
Objekt notwendig” (StA IV, 252).
66 “aus sich heraus zu gehen um ‚fühlbar‘ zu werden” (StA IV, 241).
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his mother had planned for him. Nonetheless, in 1801 he writes to his 
brother, “Religion occupies me above all.”67 It is, indeed, a religious 
urge that pushes him onwards. Let us see how the thirty-one year old 
who prefers poetry to serve the Divine relates to religion.
4.4. Religion
Hölderlin has fi nished his theological studies several years earlier. 
Repeated justifi cations in his letters are evidence that he is under con-
siderable pressure to take on the life of the Lutheran parson that is 
pressed upon him by the Württemberg Consistorium and especially by 
his own mother.68 David Constantine gives two reasons for Hölderlin’s 
refusal: his vocation as a poet and the unorthodoxy of his religiosity.
A country parson could have lived in the way Hölderlin professed to 
fi nd admirable . . . For his poetry’s sake he could not agree. His poetry 
was not of a kind to be pursued as a sideline to anything else; nor could 
the religion it professed possibly be squared with the dogma of orthodox 
Christianity.69
Th e fi rst reason conforms to Hölderlin’s own words; the second is 
more speculative. It is no easy task to shed light on Hölderlin’s views 
on Christendom since he never writes anything even vaguely resem-
bling a systematic theology. Little prose on the subject can be found in 
his letters, and there is a philosophical fragment that deals with reli-
gion. It is Beissner, the editor of the Stuttgarter Ausgabe, however, who 
names it Über die Religion [About Religion], not Hölderlin himself.70 
His views on religion are expressed mainly in his poetry. It would be 
impossible to force these mostly artistic expressions into a system, and 
67 “Die Religion beschäft igt mich vorzüglich” (StA VI, 420).
68 See, for example, the letter of 30–1–97 to his mother. Apparently, he answers to 
her request to respond to a job off er that consists of both taking over the work and 
the daughter of a retiring parson, which is not unusual in those days. He rejects his 
mother’s plan arguing that the life of a husband is beautiful but that he is too restless 
to settle down, that there is too much left  to do, that his present situation is better fi t 
for his inner being, and that he prefers his role of teacher to that of preacher. A few 
days later on 4–2–97, in a letter to his brother, he adds the argument that a job off er 
is no basis for a life-long bond with someone he might not have noticed otherwise. See 
StA VI, 232–235. See also the letter of 20–11–96 to his mother, StA VI, 224–226.
69 Constantine 1979, 74.
70 See StA IV, 275–281.
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it may even be contrary to Hölderlin’s views. Th erefore, I will only 
sketch some outlines.
If it is religion that occupies him above all, why indeed does Hölder-
lin refuse to practice the theological profession? Why is he desperate 
to fl ee his Württemberg homeland to be rid of “our lords in Stuttgart” 
whom he does not trust to “leave him in peace?”71 Is this about the 
lifestyle of the parson, is he afraid that the job will consume too much 
of his energy? Or is it really fear that the unorthodoxy of his religios-
ity will get him in trouble, as Constantine suggests? Hölderlin does 
not explicitly mention any such fear, but he does feel a personal need 
to search for the unitary ground of all that is far beyond the domain 
of the village parson and even beyond the theology and philosophy 
of his education. Already as a young student Hölderlin writes to his 
mother,
I studied that part of world-wisdom which deals with proofs of reason 
for the existence of God . . . I suspected that those proofs of reason for 
the existence of God and also for immortality were so imperfect that 
they could be overthrown entirely or at least in their main parts by acute 
opponents.72
Hölderlin is not particularly interested in dogma and rational proof 
of God’s existence. For him religion is about the experience of the liv-
ing presence of our unitary ground. Religion arises from the “belief of 
the heart which has been given such an unambiguous longing for the 
eternal, for God,” and this type of religiosity has very little to do with 
“proofs of reason.”73 Kant has undermined his belief in rational meta-
physics. It is an intuition for One-ness, which still lives in all of us, that 
drives him towards religion. “Art and religion, and philosophy . . . are 
fl owers and fruits of the tree, not soil and root.” Th ey are the “eff ects” 
and not the “cause.”74 It is this root that Hölderlin is aft er.
71 “Denn ich zweifl e ob mich unsere Herren in Stutgard werden in Ruhe lassen” 
(StA VI, 187).
72 “Ich studirte denjenigen Th eil der Weltweisheit, der von den Beweisen der Ver-
nunft  für das Dasein Gottes . . . Ich ahnete nemlich bald, dass jene Beweise der Ver-
nunft  fürs Dasein Gottes, und auch für Unsterblichkeit, so unvollkommen wären, 
dass sie von scharfen Gegnern ganz oder wenigstens nach ihren Haupttheilen würden 
umgestoßen werden können” (StA VI, 63f.).
73 “Glaube meines Herzens, dem so unwidersprechlich das Verlangen nach Ewi-
gem, nach Gott gegeben ist” (StA VI, 64).
74 “. . . Kunst und Religion, und Philosophie . . . sind Blüthen und Früchte des Baums, 
nicht Boden und Wurzel. Ihr nehmt die Wirkungen für die Ursache” (StA II, 77).
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“Th e fi rst child of human, of divine Beauty is art,” Hyperion pro-
nounces, as we have seen in 4.3.3. He continues,
Beauty’s second daughter is religion. Religion is love of Beauty. Th e wise 
man loves Beauty herself, eternal, all-embracing Beauty; the people love 
her children, the gods, who appear to them in multifarious forms.75
Other than in art, Beauty can be found in religion. Hölderlin appar-
ently goes along with the dictum of the Early German romantics. But 
for him this is not beauty in the sense of the esthetics of religious 
rituals, paraphernalia, or architecture; Beauty is the epiphany of eter-
nal unitary Being. Th e “gods in multifarious forms” are the fruits and 
the fl owers of this primordial One-ness of Being that common people 
love, but the “wise” love “eternal, all-embracing Beauty” herself. Th us 
religion can mean “love of the gods,” the worship of the children of 
divine Beauty in all their diff erent shapes and colors. Th ese are the 
personifi ed divine powers of positive religions that Hölderlin consid-
ers partial and historically determined revelations of Being. However, 
a minority can see beyond these fi xed and temporary forms. Th ey are 
“the wise” who love Being, the eternal unitary ground of all that is.
Th is view echoes the fundamental meaning of the word “religion” 
in the sense of the Latin religare; reconnecting what once was One. It 
is this divine unitary ground that Hölderlin seeks to fathom. All his 
endeavors, other than perhaps his work as a private tutor, which is 
meant to sustain him fi nancially, are about the human (re-)connection 
with a realm that at once transcends and permeates our daily exis-
tence. Both his poetry and his philosophy are embedded in his life’s 
attempt to (re-)fi nd our unitary origin in human bonds, in nature, 
in beauty. Even his poetological texts are an analysis of the necessary 
techniques, methods, and talents of the poet to bring about a mutual 
approach of God and world, to reconnect the One and the All. Hence, 
it is religion in the sense of the desire to reconnect and as the refl ection 
on the (im-)possibility of reconnection in or beyond our lifetime, that 
“occupies [him] above all.”
Whether Constantine is right with respect to the unorthodoxy of 
Hölderlin’s view has not become clear yet. Before continuing with this 
75 “Der Schönheit zweite Tochter ist Religion. Religion ist Liebe der Schönheit. Der 
Weise liebt sie selbst, die Unendliche, die Allumfassende; das Volk liebt ihre Kinder, 
die Götter, die in mannigfaltigen Gestalten ihm erscheinen” (StA III, 79).
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topic, however, it is now time to take a closer look at his deeply felt 
need for unity on earth, for Hen kai Pan here and now. It is closely 
related to his own sense of being torn between the here and the beyond, 
between mortal selfh ood and eternal peace, between individuality and 
unity. Th is ambivalence in the human, his own, way of being is what 
he seeks to understand and level out in all three of his major occupa-
tions: poetry, philosophy, and religion.
4.5. Life’s Conflicting Tendencies
As consciousness develops, the relation to our unitary ground becomes 
more and more distant, but it does not disappear altogether in Hölder-
lin’s view, as we have seen. Even though it is beyond our explicit con-
sciousness, we still have an awareness, catch an occasional glimpse, 
of this primordial unity in the experience of true Beauty and Nature. 
However, this experience of unity is only momentaneous and therefore 
remains unstable; “a person falls out of it and strives aft er it again – 
rattled from then on, because only now he really feels his torn apart 
existence,” Büttner asserts.76 Th e experience of One-ness seeks to sta-
bilize itself into a permanent awareness, but it does not and cannot 
last and thus stays limited to moments of ecstasy. Th e total union we 
long for is impossible in this life, Hölderlin believes. It would result 
in a state of unconsciousness, and unconscious existence is like death 
because “insofar as I have no consciousness I am (for myself ) noth-
ing.”77 Since we fear this loss of our individuality, we strive to safe-
guard the I against unconsciousness. Th us, we are caught in a life-long 
struggle between the drive for unity and the urge to preserve our indi-
vidual I-hood. As Hölderlin words this contradiction in Hyperion:
Now we feel the limits of our being
And the inhibited power impatiently resists
Its chains, and the spirit yearns
For the unspoiled Ether.
Th en again there is something else in us, that
Likes to keep the chains, because were
Th e divine in us not by any kind of resistance
Limited – we wouldn’t feel ourselves or others.
76 Büttner 2003, 230.
77 See 4.2. 
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Not to feel oneself, however, is death,
Not knowing anything, and being destroyed
Is one and the same for us.78
Hence, we recognize in ourselves and in the world as a whole two 
contradictory tendencies. “Th ere is a fi ght in the world about what 
is more; the whole or the individual,” “the most alive Eternal or the 
transient.”79
On the one hand, we have a longing for unifi cation. We detest the 
isolation that seems the inevitable companion of our individuality, and 
we long for unconsciousness. “It sometimes seems better to me to sleep 
than to be utterly without companions as we are.”80 We want to unite 
with everything and everyone in order to retrieve the original intimacy 
of Being. “To be one with all – this is the life divine, this is man’s 
heaven.”81 Since we realize that total union with all that surrounds 
us is impossible to achieve in our lifetime, we tend to concentrate on 
our immediate circle of kindred spirits. “Th e ideal is what Nature was. 
By this, by this ideal, this rejuvenated divinity, the few recognize one 
another and are one, for one thing is in them.”82 We try to neutral-
ize the feelings of isolation that the arche-separation forces upon us 
by forging intimate bonds with those who recognize this longing for 
union in one another.
Where do we fi nd the One that gives us peace, peace? . . . [I sought it] in 
fraternizing with people. It seemed as if the poverty of our being would 
become riches, when a few poor became One heart, One inseparable life, 
as if the whole pain of our life consisted in the separation of that which 
belongs together.83
78 “Nun fülen wir die Schranken unsers Wesens / Und die gehemmte Kraft  sträubt 
ungeduldig / Sich gegen ihre Fesseln, und es sehnt der Geist / Zum ungetrübten 
Aether sich zurük. / Doch ist in uns auch wieder etwas, das / Die Fesseln gern behält, 
denn würd in uns / Das Göttliche von keinem Widerstande / Beschränkt – wir fühlten 
uns und andre nicht. / Sich aber nicht zu fühlen, ist der Tod, / Von nichts zu wissen, 
und vernichtet seyn / Ist Eins für uns . . . ” (StA III, 195).
79 “Es ist nur ein Streit in der Welt, was nemlich mehr sei, das Ganze oder das 
Einzelne” (StA VI, 419); “das Lebendigstewige, oder das Zeitliche” (StA VI, 418).
80 “Indessen dünket mir öft ers / Besser zu schlafen, wie so ohne Genossen zu seyn / 
So zu harren” (StA II, 94).
81 “Eines zu seyn mit Allem, das ist Leben der Gottheit, das ist der Himmel des 
Menschen” (StA III, 9).
82 “Ideal ist, was Natur war. Daran, an diesem Ideale, dieser verjüngten Gottheit, 
erkennen die Wenigen sich und Eins sind sie, denn es ist Eines in ihnen” (StA III, 63f.).
83 “wo fi nden wir das Eine, das uns Ruhe giebt, Ruhe? . . . [Ich suchte es] in Verbrü-
derung mit Menschen. Es war mir, als sollte die Armuth unsers Wesens Reichtum 
218 chapter four
On the other hand, we are afraid to lose our individual I-hood, our 
life. We have a sense of self-preservation that drives us away from 
the eternally peaceful but deadly unity of Being. Th is drive tends to 
make us more “bestial than divine.”84 We have the tendency to vio-
lently destroy the need, “to disavow all receptiveness, and to tear up 
the beautiful bond that keeps us united with other spirits, to make the 
world around us into a wasteland.”85 We live in the inevitable dishar-
mony of the drive towards infi nite unity and the urge for the preserva-
tion of I-hood.
Th e goal of conscious life is to fi nd a compromise and a sense of 
peace in which neither of these confl icting tendencies is suppressed or 
prohibited. For Hölderlin, Manfred Frank claims, life is
the contradiction of the real activity towards the infi nite and the ideal 
activity that drives one back on oneself. If the Absolute presented itself 
under the scheme of an infi nite striving, it would remain unconscious. If it 
presented itself limitedly, it would contradict its own meaning . . . . Th ere-
fore it presents itself as inhibited striving.86
In Hölderlin’s language that is more poetical, real activity [reelle Tätig-
keit] is called longing or yearning [Sehnsucht], and ideal activity [ideelle 
Tätigkeit] is faithfulness [Treue]. Th ese two will always and inevita-
bly be in opposition. “And always there is a yearning that seeks the 
unbound. But much must be retained. And faithfulness is needed.”87 
In the course of our life, we are pulled back and forth between yearn-
ing and faithfulness. And it does not take much to get us off  track: 
“Our spirit glides out of its path so easily that oft en we’d better avoid 
even the rustling of a leaf, in order not to disturb its quiet aff airs.”88
If it were not for divine help, we would rush head-on into our own 
destruction. We receive assistance to counter “the eternal tendency, 
werden, wenn nur ein Paar solcher Armen Ein Herz, Ein unzertrennbares Leben wür-
den, als bestände der ganze Schmerz unsers Daseyns nur in der Trennung von dem, 
was zusammengehörte” (StA III, 164).
84 “Mer thierisch, als göttlich” (StA III, 188).
85 “gewaltsam jedes Bedürfnis zerstören, jede Empfänglichkeit verläugnen, und so 
das schöne Vereinigungsband, das uns mit andern Geistern zusammenhält, zerreis-
sen” (StA III, 190).
86 Frank 1993, 460.
87 “. . . Und immer / Ins Ungebundene gehet eine Sehnsucht. Vieles aber ist / Zu 
behalten. Und Noth die Treue” (StA II, 197).
88 “Unser Geist gleitet so leicht aus seiner Bahn; müssen wir doch oft  dem Säuseln 
eines Blatts entgehen, um ihn nicht zu stören in seinem stillen Geschäft e!” (StA III, 165).
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to reverse the striving from this world to the other into a striving from 
another world to this one.”89 Or as Hölderlin notes elsewhere, “Th e 
Heavenly who are devoted to mortals make their hasty return more 
diffi  cult.”90 In Hyperion he writes,
What is it for which man so immeasurably longs? . . . what is eternity 
doing in his breast? . . . Man wants more than he is capable of ! . . . this is 
it, and nothing else, which creates our fair dreams of immortality and all 
the enticing, all the colossal phantoms that ravish men a thousand times 
over; this it is which creates his Elysium and his gods for man, that the 
line of his life does not run straight, that he does not speed to his goal 
like an arrow, that a power outside of him stops him in his fl ight.91
Th e human being is unable to speed to this goal of ultimate unity “like 
an arrow” because “a power outside of him stops him in his fl ight.” He 
is prevented from running from individual life towards the longed for 
unconscious unity of Being, and therefore towards death, by a divine 
“power outside of him.” Nonetheless, this “immeasurable” longing for 
eternity continues to reside “in his breast” since he cannot prevent 
these dreams of immortality and he “creates his gods.”
Hölderlin’s novel Hyperion is about this confl ict in all its complex-
ity and the attempts to bring it to a conclusion. Th e main character’s 
name, Hyperion, refers to the Sun-god and is interpreted in mytho-
logical handbooks of Hölderlin’s time as “going beyond, transcend-
ing.”92 Hyperion longs to transcend, to go beyond his earthly self with 
all its bonds and limitations; he “was born to be homeless and without 
a resting place.”93 Hyperion’s true being longs for unitary Being, but 
as a mortal human person he wants to safeguard his individuality, his 
life, as well. Th erefore, he seeks unity in earthly intimacy instead. He 
89 “sein Karakter ist, der ewigen Tendenz entgegen, das Streben aus dieser Welt in 
die andre zu kehren zu einem streben aus einer andern Welt in diese” (StA V, 268).
90 “Die Himmlischen, den Sterblichen hold, / Erschweren ihnen die eilende 
Rü[h]kkehr” (StA II, 490).
91 “Was ist’s denn, dass der Mensch so viel will? . . . was soll denn die Unendlichkeit 
in seiner Brust? . . . Mehr will er, als er kann! . . . das eben macht die schönen Träume 
von Unsterblichkeit und all’ die holden und die kolossalischen Phantome, die den 
Menschen tausendfach entzüken, das schafft   dem Menschen sein Elysium und seine 
Götter, dass seines Lebens Linie nicht gerad ausgeht, dass er nicht hinfährt, wie ein 
Pfeil, und eine fremde Macht dem Fliehenden in den Weg sich wirft ” (StA III, 41).
92 See Binder 1961/62, 137.
93 “dazu geboren heimathlos und ohne Ruhestätte zu seyn” (StA III, 120).
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tries to satisfy his longing for transcendence by losing himself in close 
friendships.
Hyperion meets Alabanda. Th eir friendship is based on a mutual 
denunciation of the times in which they are living and an ardent hope 
for a new era. But it turns out that they are radically opposed in their 
ideas of how it is to be realized. Alabanda thinks his destiny and power 
are his own. He considers himself the source of his own being and 
denies any type of need and limitation. He is ultimately free to choose 
whether to engage in earthly or transcendent bonds or not. Th e inevi-
table human confl ict between faithfulness and longing, between indi-
viduality and the need for unifi cation are alien to him. In Alabanda’s 
own words,
I feel a life in me which no god created and no mortal begot. I believe 
that our existence is from ourselves and that it is only of our own free 
pleasure that we are so intimately connected with all that is . . . because I 
feel that I am free in the highest sense, that I have no beginning, there-
fore I believe that I shall have no end, that I am indestructible.94
Th at is “why [he has] never thought anything but lightly of death.”95
For Alabanda there is no complicated relationship between him-
self and the Absolute; he has made his I absolute. We cannot help 
being reminded of Fichte here. Not only Alabanda’s philosophy also 
his personality points in that direction. Alabanda is all activity. He 
is self-positing incarnate, one could say. He is a born revolutionary. 
If life’s conditions do not suit you, you set things straight with your 
own two hands, even if this results in warfare. He fi nds true life in the 
activity itself. Th is point of view is tempting for Hyperion, but ulti-
mately it cannot satisfy. It does not correspond with the complexity 
of Hyperion’s nature and philosophy. Th e friendship inevitably comes 
to an end. He bitterly mourns his loss. Again he feels isolated in his 
I-hood and loses his sense of unity. “Never now did I say to the fl ower, 
‘You are my sister!’ and to the springs, ‘We are of one race.’ ”96
94 “Ich fühl’ in mir ein Leben, das kein Gott geschaff en, und kein Sterblicher 
gezeugt. Ich glaube, dass wir durch uns selber sind und nur aus freier Lust so innig 
mit dem All verbunden . . . weil ich frei im höchsten Sinne, weil ich anfangslos mich 
fühle, darum glaub’ ich, dass ich endlos dass ich unzerstörbar bin” (StA III, 141).
95 “Warum [er nie] den Tod geachtet” (Ibid.).
96 “Nun sprach ich nimmer zu der Blume, du bist meine Schwester! Und zu den 
Quellen, wir sind Eines Geschlechts!” (StA III, 42). 
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In the course of the novel, Hyperion meets the love of his life: 
Diotima, she who worships the gods or who is worshipped by the 
gods.97 Hyperion describes her as “free from needs” and “divinely con-
tent.”98 Neediness [Bedürft igkeit] is Hölderlin’s typical characterization 
of mortal existence. Hence, Diotima is the personifi cation of eternal, 
divine Being. As “the sister of Nature” she is “divinely calm,” the 
“peace of Beauty, divine peace.” Everything is “blessed and beautifi ed 
by her presence.”99 Th e love aff air of Diotima and Hyperion appears to 
be perfectly fulfi lling at fi rst. Th eirs is a seemingly perfect unity. “We 
were but one fl ower, and our souls lived in each other, like the fl ower 
when it loves and hides its tender joys in its closed cup.”100
It does not and it cannot last, however, and the problem is exactly 
in the “closed cup.” It is All-Unity, the unifi cation of all, that Hyper-
ion yearns for.101 An exclusive love aff air, even with the incarnation 
of Being itself, is not enough. “O! How oft en did I believe to fi nd the 
Unnameable that should become mine, mine, by risking to lose myself 
in the beloved.”102 Losing oneself in the beloved, “submitting, eclipsing 
yourself for love, . . . becoming like [the beloved],” is not the solution.103 
Hyperion cannot fi nd peace in a unity with only one human being, 
and Diotima realizes,
what you mourn for in all your sorrow . . . It is a better age that you seek, 
a more beautiful world. It was that world alone that you embraced in 
your friends, with them you were that world.104
 97 See Binder 1961/62, 152. Diotima is also the name of the priestess who alleg-
edly educated Plato on his eros-theory in Symposion, which Hölderlin has studied 
extensively.
 98 “bedürfnisslos”; “göttlichgenügsam” (StA III, 58).
 99 “göttlich ruhig”; “Friede der Schönheit”; göttlicher Friede” (StA III, 51); “es war 
alles geheiliget, verschönert durch ihre Gegenwart” (StA III, 53).
100 “Wir waren Eine Blume nur, und unsre Seelen lebten in einander, wie die 
Blume, wenn sie liebt, und ihre zarten Freuden im verschlossenen Kelche verbirgt” 
(StA III, 61).
101 Hölderlin’s views on the relationship between primordial Being and All-Unity 
will be discussed in detail in 4.7.2.
102 “Ach! Wie oft  glaubt’ ich das Unnennbare zu fi nden, das mein, mein werden 
sollte, dafür, dass ich es wagte, mich selbst an das Geliebte zu verlieren!” (StA III, 164).
103 “und du gabst dich hin, verdüstertest dich aus Liebe . . . und wardst mir gleich” 
(StA III, 132).
104 “woran du darbest, was dir einzig fehlt . . . Es ist eine bessere Zeit, die suchst du, 
eine schönere Welt. Nur diese Welt umarmtest du in deinen Freunden, du warst mit 
ihnen diese Welt” (StA III, 60f.).
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Even the human love of our life will only temporarily quiet the drive 
towards the perfection of All-Unity, it cannot nullify the loneliness 
and the longing. “Th e beautiful joys of our love . . . made me forget that 
you were essentially inconsolable.”105 Earthly love can intimately con-
nect you with another human being, but this is only a surrogate for 
All-Unity. As Diotima writes, “I soon understood; I could not be all 
to you.”106
Hyperion is lured back to Alabanda. He leaves Diotima and goes to 
war in another attempt to obtain All-Unity that is doomed from the 
beginning; namely by killing all those who oppose it! Th is undertak-
ing, which nearly costs him his life, ends in chaos and destruction 
instead of peace and harmony. During Hyperion’s absence Diotima 
dies. Upon his return, Hyperion is inconsolable at fi rst. However, as 
time passes and he matures, he becomes resigned to the irreconcilable 
opposites in human nature. He realizes that the confl icts in life are 
necessarily part of a process of ripening. We are involved in a dance 
with Being, an alternation of approaching and withdrawing, that is 
sometimes joyful and sometimes sorrowful. However, it would be 
self-destructive to force a reunifi cation with our ground prematurely. 
We have to respect our individuality, “that a man shall be something 
in himself.”107 Not because individuality has priority over unity, but 
because in this rhythm of I-hood and togetherness mortal existence 
reaches its full beauty. It is not until the end of time that there will be 
a harmonious simultaneity of individuality and unity. Th at is when 
Being will have developed into All-Unity, as we will see in 4.7.2.
To be human is to live with the opposing drives of unifi cation and 
individualization. Denying either one of these opposing tendencies 
leads to the death of our humanity.
How could we deny the drive to infi nitely advance, to purify ourselves, 
to ennoble, to free ourselves? Th at would be bestial. But neither should 
we proudly exempt ourselves from the drive to be limited, to receive. 
Th en it would not be human, and we would kill ourselves. Th e discord 
of the drives, that no one can live without, love unifi es.108
105 “Die schönen Freuden unserer Liebe . . . machten mich vergessen, dass du im 
Grunde trostlos warst” (StA III, 129).
106 “Ich wusste es bald; ich konnte dir nicht Alles seyn. Konnt’ ich die Bande der 
Sterblichkeit dir lösen? Konnt’ ich die Flamme der Brust dir stillen . . . ?” (StA III, 129).
107 “dass einer / Etwas für sich ist” (StA II, 158).
108 “. . . Wie sollten wir den Trieb, / Unendlich fortzuschreiten, uns zu läutern, / 
Uns zu veredlen, zu befrein, verleugnen? / Das wäre tierisch. Doch wir sollten auch / 
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Th us, antagonism becomes the practice of everyday life of the indi-
vidual, but also of the history of humankind. Th e contrary drives are 
united in love, temporarily. Love is what enables us to transcend our 
I-hood from time to time. It drives us towards a unity in which an I 
does not need to give up its individuality. Nonetheless, even if we can 
relieve the isolation of our I-hood in loving intimacy, all one-on-one 
solutions are provisional at our point in history. However, it has not 
always been this way, and it will not be. As time progresses, humanity 
is evolving towards (a new) unity. On this development we will now 
concentrate.
4.6. Being and History
Before the arche-separation there is pure primordial One-ness; Being is 
totally One, undivided but unconscious, as we have seen. As a result, it 
cannot be distinguished from nothingness. With the arche-separation 
not only consciousness sets in, but also time and mortality. History 
begins.
We encounter two models of history in Hölderlin’s work. In his 
earlier work he conceives of history as cyclical, but around the turn 
of the century he gradually shift s towards a linear model. In the cycli-
cal model the pure nothingness of primordial Being moves towards a 
real, earthly presence as time progresses. It reaches a stage where its 
availability and its transcendence are balanced, but this phase cannot 
be stabilized. Being becomes more and more tangible at the detriment 
of its transcendence up to the point where it can only fall back into 
the chaos of nothingness. From here, the cycle starts all over again. 
According to Hölderlin, Antiquity is structured according to the cycli-
cal model and its corresponding laws of revolution.
Th e linear model, on the other hand, conceives of history without 
integrating the necessity of revolutions and chaos that are characteris-
tic for the cyclical model. Hölderlin develops this linear model in the 
three hymns Friedensfeier, Der Einzige, and Patmos.109 According to 
Des Triebs, beschränkt zu werden, zu empfangen, / Nicht stolz uns überheben. Denn 
es wäre / Nicht menschlich, und wir töteten uns selbst. / Den Widerstreit der Triebe, 
deren keiner / Entbehrlich ist, vereiniget die Liebe” (StA III, 195).
109 Th e German original of Friedensfeier can be found in Appendix C and the Eng-
lish prose translation in 4.7. For Der Einzige see StA II, 153–164 and for Patmos StA 
II, 165–187.
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the concept of these poems, Being will become more and more imma-
nent. Since he oft en names the presence and the activity of Being in 
history as Spirit, Hölderlin views history as a process of gradual spiri-
tualization until the Spirit will be revealed universally at the end of 
time. We will focus on this model.
It takes a long process of historical ripening for humankind to be 
able to cope with the Divine, is Hölderlin’s conviction. Th e problem 
is that human needs tend towards the visible, the tangible; things that 
can be experienced by the senses. Th is is also how Hölderlin explains 
his own fascination with the Greek gods. “What is it that binds me 
to the ancient, blessed shores, so that I love them still more than my 
fatherland?” he wonders in the poem Der Einzige [Th e Only One]. He 
goes on to answer his own question: it is “there where, the stones 
tell, Apollo walked in the guise of a king, and Zeus condescended to 
innocent youths and in holy fashion begot sons and daughters.”110 In 
“blessed Greece,” the gods were very visible.111 Th ey literally walked the 
earth, they interacted with humans even to the point of procreation, 
and their tangible presence was a constant and reassuring reminder of 
the Divine. It was a time when all rejoiced in the collective worship 
of the Divine:
from tongue to tongue it fl ew on a thousandfold, and not one endured 
life alone; shared out, such wealth delights and, bartered with strangers, 
it swells into exultation . . . as far as it can travel.112
Th is was the Golden Age.
He is aware of a theological dilemma, however. On the one hand, 
human dependence upon visibility and tangibility makes us seek the 
Divine in what can be perceived, hence is objectifi ed. Th is makes it 
diffi  cult for people to free themselves from the fi xed images of posi-
tive religion. On the other hand, true religiosity calls for a spiritual-
ity that transcends all fi xations in images since the objectifi cation of 
Being is an impossibility. Th e worship of individual gods cannot be the 
110 “Was ist er, das / An die alten seeligen Küsten / Mich fesselt, dass ich mehr noch / 
Sie liebe, als mein Vaterland? / . . . wo, wie Steine sagen Apollo gieng / in Königsgestalt, / 
und zu unschuldigen Jünglingen sich / Herablies Zeus und Söhn in heiliger Art / Und 
Töchter zeugte” (StA II, 153).
111 “Seeliges Griechenland” (StA II, 91).
112 “so riefs und fl og von Zunge zu Zunge / Tausendfach, es ertrug keiner das Leben 
allein; / Ausgetheilet erfreut solch Gut und getauschet, mit Fremden, / Wirds ein Jubel,
. . . so weit es gehet” (StA II, 92).
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ultimate stage of religiosity. Th erefore, the withdrawal of the gods is 
an inevitable step in the spiritual evolution of humankind. Th e Greek 
day had to and has ended. “But, my friend, we have come too late. 
True, the gods are living, but above our heads, up there in a diff erent 
world.”113 At our point in history, the divine has become transcen-
dent, “up there in a diff erent world.” And, his longing notwithstand-
ing, Hölderlin thinks we should be faithful to the present situation 
instead of retreating in a glorious past.
Not them, the blessed, who once appeared, the images of gods in the 
ancient land, I may no more invoke . . . and backwards my soul shall not 
fl ee to you that are past, too dear to me.114
Th ere is no way back; we should not try to reverse history.
In our times, the Divine seems to have retreated; we experience it as 
alien and remote. Words like “distant,” “from afar,” “distantly thun-
dering,” and “far off  ” abound in Hölderlin’s descriptions.115 We live 
in an interim age characterized by separateness and disunity: “it is 
terrible how here and there unendingly God disperses the living.”116 
Ours is an era of emptiness in which “tokens and words are very oft en 
still missing among us.” “Too long, too long now the honor of the 
Heavenly has been invisible.”117 We live in the nighttime of history in 
which the divine light has faded: “now evening has come.”118 In the 
poem Brod und Wein [Bread and Wine] Hölderlin describes how he 
goes to blessed Greece, “the house of all the Heavenly,” only to fi nd it 
abandoned. Its nature is still as splendid as he expected: “Festive hall! 
Th e fl oor is ocean! Its tables are mountains.” But it seems no longer 
in use for the “single purpose it was built for,” namely the communal 
worship of the Divine. Th e Divine has left  the world, ancient Greece 
is gone.
113 “Aber Freund! wir kommen zu spät. Zwar leben die Götter, / Aber über dem 
Haupt droben in anderer Welt” (StA II, 93).
114 “Nicht sie, die Seeligen, die erschienen sind, / Die Götterbilder in dem alten 
Lande, / Sie darf ich ja nicht rufen mehr, . . . / Und rükwärts soll die Seele mir nicht 
fl iehn / Zu euch, Vergangene! Die zu lieb mir sind” (StA II, 149).
115 See, for example, the poems Th e Archipelago, Patmos, Mnemosyne (Sta II, 103ff .; 
165ff .; 193ff .).
116 “. . . furchtbar ist, wie da und dort / Unendlich hin zerstreut das Lebende Gott” 
(StA II, 168).
117 “es fehlt sehr oft  noch unter uns Menschen an Zeichen und Worten” (StA VI, 
420); “Zu lang, zu lang schon ist / Die Ehre der Himmlischen unsichtbar” (StA II, 171).
118 “da nun / Es Abend worden” (StA II, 167).
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Where the temples, and where the vessels, where, fi lled with nectar, 
fi t to please gods, is song? Where, oh where do they shine, then, the 
far-striking oracles? Delphi slumbers, and where does the great destiny 
sound?119
Th e Divine has disappeared and so have the places and the means of 
worship. Left  behind is the depressing emptiness of the “festive hall” 
aft er the party is over and the guests have gone home.120 At this time 
in history when obscurity reigns, people can no longer believe in the 
peace and harmony that is their future homeland.
Th en you prove it to me, and tell me, so that to others I can repeat it, for 
there are others too who do not believe it, that joy aft er all outlasts both 
worry and anger, and a golden day daily still shines in the end.121
During this time of doubt and confusion the Divine is ungraspable, 
and a person no longer knows how to interpret his rare encounters 
with it. He “can hardly say” what it is “that approach[es] him with 
gift s,” and he “scarcely knows to what use he should put his assets, 
bustles, squanders it, and almost regarded as holy, things profane.”122
Th is fumbling “the Heavenly tolerate as far as they can” because 
in the end the emptiness is all for the best.123 “Much do the Heavenly 
spare us” since we do not yet have the strength and attitude necessary 
to survive divine encounters.124 Only a long process of maturation will 
prevent us from being killed by divine encounters. “For sparing, at 
all times sure of the measure, for a moment only does a god touch 
119 “Seeliges Griechenland! du Haus der Himmlischen alle, / Also ist wahr, was einst 
wir in der Jugend gehört? / Festlicher Saal! der Boden ist Meer! und Tische die Berge, / 
Wahrlich zu einzigem Brauche vor Alters gebaut!”; “wo? die Tempel, und wo die 
Gefäße, / Wo mit Nectar gefüllt, Göttern zu Lust der Gesang? / Wo, wo leuchten sie 
denn, die fernhintreff enden Sprüche? / Delphi schlummert und wo tönet das große 
Geschik?” (StA II, 91).
120 In 4.7. we will see how this description is almost the exact opposite of the open-
ing stanza of Th e Celebration of Peace where Hölderlin uses similar images to picture 
the setting of the eschaton. 
121 “So bezeugest du mir’s, und sagst mir’s, dass ich es andern / Wiedersage, denn 
auch Andere glauben es nicht / Dass unsterblicher doch, denn Sorg’ und Zürnen, die 
Freude / Und ein goldener Tag täglich am Ende noch ist” (StA II, 78).
122 “kaum weiß zu sagen”; “die mit den Gaaben ihm nahn”; “und kaum weiß er zu 
brauchen das Gut, / Schafft  , verschwendet und fast ward ihm Unheiliges heilig” (StA 
II, 92).
123 “Möglichst dulden die Himmlischen diß” (StA II, 92).
124 “so sehr schonen die Himmlischen uns” (StA II, 93).
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the dwellings of men.”125 An intermediate period of darkness serves to 
strengthen the individual and prepare her for the new era. “Confusion 
helps . . . and need and night make us strong, until heroes enough have 
grown in the iron cradle, and hearts, as before, resemble the heav-
enly in strength.”126 So far “we lack those strong enough for supreme 
joy.”127 We have to “grow used to joy, to day, and to the sight of these 
now manifest.”128 But in the end even “travails” will be recognized as 
“the spice of life” and will become “pleasing” instead of fearsome and 
repulsive, because they are recognized as “designed from above.”129
Th is whole process of strengthening enough individuals to make 
them ready for the state of perfection is paralleled by a historical 
movement of the purifi cation of religions.
It is the sower’s throw when he picks up
Th e wheat with his shovel
And throws it, towards the open, swinging it over the thrashing fl oor.
Th e husks fall at his feet, but
Th e grain reaches its end,
And there is no harm if some of it is lost . . .
For . . .
Not all things at once does the Highest will.130
In this gradual process, the marginal aspects of the various religious 
forms, the “husks,” will get separated from the essential, the “grain.” 
Th at some of the fi xed forms of religiosity will be lost is an acceptable, 
125 “Denn schonend rürht des Masses allzeit kundig / Nur einen Augenblick die 
Wohnungen der Menschen / Ein Gott an,” (BrA IX, 232). Since the poem Friedens-
feier, which is quoted here, had not yet been discovered when the second volume of 
the Stuttgarter Edition of 1951 that I use was published, I have been quoting and will 
continue to do so from Volume IX of the so-called Bremer Ausgabe (BrA IX), a chron-
ological edition of Hölderlin’s work, edited by D.E. Sattler. See the bibliography.
126 “Aber das Irrsaal / Hilft , . . . und stark machet die Noth und die Nacht, / Biß daß 
Helden genug in der ehernen Wiege gewachsen, / Herzen an Kraft , wie sonst, ähnlich 
den Himmlischen sind” (StA II, 93).
127 “noch fehlen die Starken zu höchsten / Freuden” (StA II, 94).
128 “gewohnt werden die Menschen des Glüks / Und des Tags” (StA II, 92).
129 “Wohl sind die Würze des Lebens, / Von oben bereitet und auch / Hinausge-
führet, die Mühen” (BrA IX, 235). Since this poem, Friedensfeier, was discovered aft er 
the version of the Stuttgarter Ausgabe that I use had been printed, I will be quoting 
from the ninth Volume of the so-called Bremer Ausgabe. See Hölderlin 2004 in the 
bibliography. See also 4.7.
130 “es ist der Wurf des Säemanns, wenn er fast / Mit der Schaufel den Waizen, / 
Und wirft , dem Klaren zu, ihn schwingend über die Tenne. / Ihm fällt die Schaale vor 
den Füssen, aber / Ans Ende kommet das Korn, / Und nicht ein Übel ists, wenn eini-
ges / Verloren gehet . . . / Denn . . . / Nicht alles will der Höchste zumal” (StA II,169f.).
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even necessary, step in the process of increasing spiritualization. We 
must let go of the familiar religious handholds even if the present 
seems empty and the future unsure. One of the reasons Hölderlin 
gives for the fact that even though the Divine is “near,” it is “diffi  cult 
to grasp” is that the historical separations of the Divine make it hard 
to detect the underlying unity. “All around the summits of time are 
heaped, and the most loved live near, growing faint on most separate 
mountains.”131 Th is isolation “on most separate mountains” threatens 
to exhaust the Heavenly; it “makes them grow faint.” It is only while 
history still lasts that we tend to be confused and think that we have 
to choose between the diff erent religions, “as if you Heavenly yourself 
excitedly cried that if I serve one, I must lack the other.”132 Th is is not 
true, but only from the end perspective of the completed whole will 
we be able to understand the role of each and every religious form in 
history. Th e Spirit will not only reconcile people with each other and 
with God, but also integrate all historical (partial) revelations of the 
divine. Th e end of time, which Hölderlin calls the Friedensfeier, the 
celebration of peace, will be discussed in 4.7.
Some other points about Hölderlin’s view on history must be made 
before. Th e fi rst one is that the experience of divine absence tempts 
the modern individual to think that history is of human making. How-
ever, in his novel Hyperion Hölderlin shows this to be a misconcep-
tion: Hyperion’s autonomous attempts to bring about peace and unity 
fail frightfully, as we have seen. Th e French Revolution is no more 
than a decade old when Hölderlin concludes that forcing a histori-
cal process before the time is ripe only creates havoc and destruction. 
History is not the domain of humankind “for they do not rule, but the 
fate of the Immortals rules, and their work moves of itself.”133 History 
is not human achievement but neither is it the work of an external 
god. History is explicatio dei, the living unfolding of unitary, divine 
Being. Human impatience will not be able to speed up this process. 
Even if “to us it seems long” that the divine “averted his face from 
131 “Nah ist / Und schwer zu fassen der Gott. . . . Drum, da gehäuft  sind rings / Die 
Gipfel der Zeit, und die Liebsten / Nah wohnen, ermattend auf / Getrenntesten Ber-
gen” (StA II, 165).
132 “Als eifertet, ihr Himmlischen, selbst / Dass, dien’ ich einem, mir / Das andere 
fehlet” (StA II, 154).
133 “Denn sie nicht walten, es waltet aber / Unsterblicher Schicksaal und es wandelt 
ihr Werk / Von selbst” (StA II, 170).
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humankind,” all people can do is wait for the process “to ripen” and 
not engage in “fearful activity” that is only an expression of fear and 
lack of hope.134 Th e “Heavenly . . . will return at the proper time.”135 Th is 
is the time when the readiness of the divine is met by suffi  cient human 
openness and strength.136
Th e second point that can be made about Hölderlin’s view on his-
tory concerns the role of the necessary mediation of divine contact.
Sparing, at all times sure of the measure, for a moment only does a 
god touch the dwellings of men . . . . For were not the giver sparing, long 
ago the blessings upon our hearths would have set fi re to both roof and 
fl oor.137
Th e average person cannot survive immediate contact with the Divine. 
It takes mediators to fi lter, to dim the Divine light. Th is theme we will 
encounter again in 5.3. where we discuss Hölderlin’s view of the role 
of the poet, namely to “grasp the Father’s ray” and “wrap the heavenly 
gift  in song.” Th e Divine has to stay in gradual contact with the earth 
“as though by a ladder.”138 “Always something or someone stands 
between people and him. And by degrees the Heavenly descends,” says 
an elaboration to the fi rst version of Der Einzige.139
All through history, the Divine has been mediated by certain 
fi gures that Jochen Schmidt calls soter-fi gures. Th ere are three demi-
gods whom Hölderlin considers so closely related that he calls them 
134 “als vor einiger Zeit, uns dünket sie lange, . . . Als der Vater gewandt sein Ange-
sicht von der Menschen” (StA II, 94); “Bis das es reift ”; “furchtsamgeschäfft  iges” (BrA 
IX, 236).
135 Die Himmlische “kehren in richtiger Zeit” (StA II, 94).
136 Jochen Schmidt sees a diff erence here between Hölderlin’s view and the biblical 
perspective. Th e proper time, “the kingdom of God,” he asserts, takes place in the 
Bible independent from the human state of existence. “Not so in Hölderlin’s work. 
While scripture demands metanoia, an inner change, because the kingdom of God is 
near, he demands it in order that the kingdom of God can . . . reveal itself ” (Schmidt 
1968, 145). I agree that for Hölderlin God and people are interdependent, but I do 
not agree that this is contrary to the biblical meaning of the kingdom of God. See, for 
example, Helmut Merklein (1978), Die Gottesherrschaft  als Handlungsprinzip. Unter-
suchung zur Ethik Jesu, Echter: Würzburg.
137 “Denn schonend rührt des Masses allzeit kundig / Nur einen Augenblick die 
Wohnungen der Menschen / Ein Gott an . . . Auch wär’ uns, sparte der Gebende nicht / 
Schon längst vom Segen des Herds / Uns Gipfel und Boden entzündet” (BrA IX, 232).
138 “Des Vaters Stral, ihn selbst, mit eigner Hand / Zu fassen und dem Volk ins Lied / 
Gehüllt die himmlische Gaabe zu reichen”; “als an einer Leiter” (StA II, 159).
139 “Immer stehet irgend / [Ein] Eins zwischen Menschen und ihm. / Und treppen-
weise steiget / Der Himmlische nieder” (StA II, 645). 
230 chapter four
a “cloverleaf ”: Heracles, Dionysius, and Christ.140 Th ey share the fol-
lowing characteristics:
1. Th ey are the son of a human mother and a father-god (Heracles is 
the son of Alcmene and Zeus, who slept with her in the disguise of 
her husband; Dionysius is the son of Zeus and the princess Semele; 
and Christ is the son of God and the Virgin Mary). Because of this 
dual heritage, they can mediate between heaven and earth. Th ey 
are greatly devoted to the earth and its inhabitants, but at the same 
time suff er from their earthly imprisonment and have to fi ght the 
tendency to escape towards heaven.
2. Th ey survive great dangers during childhood. Hera, the wife of Zeus 
who is sick and tired of his philandering, sends two snakes to murder 
the young Heracles, but he strangles them with his bare hands. Th e 
jealous Hera also provokes Semele, Dionysius’ mother, to demand 
to see Zeus in his divine form, and is struck by his lightning. Zeus 
subsequently rescues the fetus by sewing him into his own thigh. 
Christ survives Herod’s infanticide by divine intervention.
3. Th ey perform many miracles in adult life, in particular their descent 
in the Underworld and their victory over death.
4. Th eir deeds as adults testify of their devotion towards humans, 
especially as bringers of peace.
5. Th ey die a brutal and sacrifi cial death that is followed by miracu-
lous signs such as their ascension.
6. Th ey moderate the human drive towards the unbound, towards the 
unconscious unity of Being and thereby secure human existence. In 
the second version of Der Einzige, it is said that Dionysius “restrains 
the death-wish of peoples.” Soters make sure that people “will not 
follow the way of death and maintain the measure, that a man shall 
be something in himself ” since “God hates the unbound.”141
Th is theme of human frailty, the danger of immediate contact with the 
Divine, and the important role of mediators runs all through Hölder-
lin’s work.
140 “Ein Kleeblatt,” see StA II, 163.
141 “der / Die Todeslust der Völker aufh ält”; “dass sie / Nicht gehn den Weg des 
Todes und hüten das Maass, dass einer / Etwas für sich ist” (StA II, 158); “Ungebun-
denes aber / Hasset Gott” (StA II, 159). See Schmidt 1990, 119ff .
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Th e third and fi nal point that must be made about Hölderlin’s 
views on the course of history is that the threatening aspect of the 
nighttime of history becomes more emphatic in his work as his own 
mental breakdown approaches. Th e optimism of the earlier views is 
challenged, which becomes obvious in the frequent use of words like 
“furious” and “horrible.”142 Th e Divine seems more distant than ever, 
and “like fi re . . . deadly-loving are the voices of God.”143 Horst Rumpf 
remarks, “Until the end Hölderlin fi ghts an almost desperate struggle 
against the threatening dualism of his world that is falling apart.”144 I 
agree that the suff ering that is experienced as a result of the absence 
of divine light oft en seems to dominate the hope for and visions of 
a better era in Hölderlin’s later work. It is not an abstract, romantic 
longing for the Divine that drives Hölderlin; it is the real suff ering of 
a human being in the real darkness of an existential crisis. All he can 
do at those times is cling to words that have become empty and almost 
useless. Nevertheless, he never gives up on his eschatological hope. His 
very latest version of Patmos from mid 1803 starts with the words: 
“Full of goodness is, but no one by himself can grasp God.”145 From 
time to time, the loss of meaning and the doubts of the interim age of 
darkness seem overwhelming, but Hölderlin’s vision of hope does not 
change. Let us now turn to his eschatology.
4.7. The Eschaton and Celebration of Peace
Th e poem Friedensfeier [Celebration of Peace] constitutes Hölderlin’s 
vision of the eschaton. A prose translation is printed in full for the sake 
of clarity and the German original can be found in Appendix C.146 Th e 
poem is published in a period of harsh censorship laws, and Hölder-
lin is taking a risk. His worry that it might extend beyond orthodox 
Christian horizons is suggested by the introductory words that seem 
to echo Martin Luther.
142 “ergrimmt” (StA II, 177); “furchtbar” (StA II, 176).
143 “Wie Feuer . . . tödtlichliebend / Sind Gottes Stimmen” (StA II, 185).
144 Rumpf 1958, 92.
145 “Voll Güt’ ist; keiner aber fasset / Allein Gott” (StA II, 184).
146 See Hölderlin 2004, 231–236. Since this poem had not yet been discovered when 
the second volume of the Stuttgarter Edition of 1951 that I use was published, I have 
been quoting and will continue to do so from Volume IX of the so-called Bremer 
Ausgabe (BrA IX), a chronological edition of Hölderlin’s work, edited by D.E. Sattler. 
See the bibliography.
232 chapter four
All I ask is that the reader be kindly disposed towards this text. Th en 
it will certainly not be incomprehensible, far less objectionable. But if, 
nonetheless, some should consider such a language too unconventional, I 
must confess to them: I cannot help it. On a fi ne day almost every mode 
of song makes itself heard: and Nature, whence it originates, also takes it 
back again.
Th e author intends to off er the public an entire collection of similar 
pieces, and this one should be considered a kind of sample.
WITH heavenly, soft ly re-echoing, with calmly-murmuring music fi lled, 
and aired is the anciently-built, blessedly-familiar hall; about green car-
pets there waft s the fragrant cloud of joy and, widely-glistening, full of 
succulent fruit and gold-wreathed chalices, seemly-ordered, a splendid 
array, rising here and there above the leveled fl oor, the tables stand. For 
hither, from afar, at the evening hour, loving guests have repaired.
And with dawning eyes I think that I already, smiling with the grave 
daily task, see him in person, the prince of the feast-day. But though 
you like to disavow your foreign land, and, as though weary aft er the 
long heroic campaign, cast down your eyes, forgotten, lightly-shaded, 
and assume the shape of a friend, you All-known, yet such greatness 
almost forces knees to bend. Nothing I know before you, but one thing, 
you are no mortal power. A wise man may enlighten much for me; but 
where a God as well appears, a diff erent clarity reigns.
Yet not sprung up today, not unproclaimed he is; and one who did 
not shy away from either fl ood or fl ame, astonishes, now that all has 
grown silent, not without reason, now that dominion is visible nowhere 
among spirits or mortals. Th at is, only now they hear the work, though 
long it has been prepared, from morning until evening, for immeasur-
ably rumbles, subsiding in the depths, the Th underer’s echo, the mil-
lennial storm, to sleep, drowned out in peaceful tones. But you, grown 
dear to us, O days of innocence, you bring also today’s celebration, you 
beloved! And nocturnal all around the Spirit fl owers in this stillness; and 
I must advise you, even with hair silver-grey, O you friends!, to provide 
both garlands and banquet, now resembling eternal youths.
And many I would like to invite, but O you, the friendly-seriously 
devoted to people, there beneath the Syrian palm-tree, where the town 
lay near, by the well you liked to be; all around the cornfi eld rustled, 
quietly the coolness breathed from the shade of the blessed mountains, 
and your dear friends, the faithful cloud, cast their shadows about you 
also, so that the sacredly-bold, your ray would gently come through the 
wilderness to humans, O youth! But, O!, more darkly in the midst of the 
Word, dreadfully-determining, a deadly doom overshadowed you. Th us 
quickly fl eeting is all that is heavenly; but not in vain;
For sparing, at all times sure of the measure, for a moment only does 
a God touch people’s homes, unforeseen, and no one knows when. Even 
when subsequently the insolent passes over it, and to the holy place must 
come the savage from ends remote, and coarsely-touching exercises 
 hölderlin: the i and its ground 233
delusion, and thereby meets a fate; but gratitude, never does it follow 
upon the god-sent gift  at once; deeply-probing this can be grasped. And 
long ago, were not the giver to spare us the blessings upon our hearths, 
our roofs and fl oors would have gone up in fl ames.
Of the Divine we received much nonetheless. Th e fl ame was put in 
our hands, and shore and sea fl ood. Much more than in human fashion 
these, the alien powers, are familiar with us. And the stars teach you, 
which are in front of your eyes, though never you can be like them. Yet 
of the All-Living, from whom many joys and songs have sprung, one is 
the Son, he is calmly-powerful, and now we recognize him, now, that 
we know the Father, and to keep holidays, the Exalted, the Spirit of the 
World, has inclined towards people.
For long now he has been too great to be the Lord of Time, and wide 
his fi eld extended; yet when has it exhausted him? For once, however, a 
god may choose the mere daily task, like mortals, and share all fate. Th is 
is the law of fate, that all shall know of themselves, that, when silence 
returns, there may be a language too. But where the Spirit is active, we too 
will stir and dispute what might be best. Hence it seems best to me that 
now the Master completes his image, and is ready, and, himself glorifi ed 
by it, steps out of his workshop, the quiet God of Time, and the law of 
love alone, the gently-leveling, rules from here right up to heaven.
Much, from morning onwards, since we have been a discourse, hear-
ing from one another, humankind has learnt; but soon we shall be song. 
And that character of the age, which the great Spirit unfolds, as a sign 
lies before us that between him and others, that a covenant is between 
him and other powers. Not He alone, the Unconceived, the Eternal are 
all to be known by this, as likewise by the plants our Mother Earth and 
light and air are known. But ultimately, O you holy powers, our token of 
love for you, our testimony that still you are holy, is the feast-day.
Th e All-assembling, where the heavenly powers in miracles are not 
revealed, nor unseen in thunderstorms, but where in song hospitably 
gathered, present in choirs, a holy number, the blessed in every way are 
assembled, and also he, their most beloved, to whom they cling, is not 
missing; that is why I called you to the banquet that has been prepared, 
you, the unforgettable you, at the evening of time, you O youth, to the 
Prince of the feast-day; and our nation will not lie down to sleep, until 
all you who were promised, all you Immortals, to tell us about your 
Heaven, are here in our own house.
Lightly-waft ing breezes proclaim you already, you proclaims the 
smoking valley, and the ground still resounding with the thunderstorm, 
yet hope fl ushes the cheeks and in front of the door of their house sit 
mother and child and gaze upon peace, and few appear to be dying; for 
now a divining, sent by golden light, holds back their souls, a promise 
holds back the most elderly.
True, it is burdens, designed from above and carried through too, that 
are the spice of life. For now all things are pleasing, but most of all the 
ingenuous, for it is the long-sought, the golden fruit fallen in shattering 
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storms from the ancient stem, but then, the most loved goods, sheltered 
by holy fate itself, the shape of the Heavenly it is.
Like the lioness, you have lamented, O Mother, for you lost, Nature, 
your children. For them, All-too-loving one, your enemy stole from you 
when almost like your own sons you had nurtured him, and with satyrs 
would join the gods. So you built much and buried much, for you are 
hated by that which you, All-powerful one, you brought to light before 
its time. Now you know, now you leave off ; for willingly, until it matures, 
the fearfully-active rests unfeelingly below.
In the beginning of the poem Friedensfeier, Hölderlin pictures the 
feast that has been prepared for the celebration. Its setting is obviously 
worldly: the hall in which it takes place is “blessedly-familiar” with 
“green carpets” and tables “full of succulent fruit.”147 It is the landscape 
of Southern Germany where Hölderlin was born and raised. Th ere 
are the grassy valleys and the hills that resemble tables full of fruits 
(orchards and vineyards). Th e peace of Being has descended on earth 
with “heavenly music” and “stillness.” He sketches an idyllic image of 
the peace and harmony that will prevail.
In front of the door of their house sit mother and child and gaze upon 
peace, and few appear to be dying; for now a divining, sent by golden 
light, holds back their souls, a promise holds back the most elderly.148
At the end of time there will be peace and harmony, people will not 
be submitted to the hardships of temporality anymore. Mortality has 
been abolished: “even with hair silver-grey, [we are] now resembling 
eternal youths.”149
It is the poet who has organized the feast. He has provided “garlands 
and banquet,” and he has invited the guests.150 We will return to the 
grand role of the poet in 5.3. He is the I-fi gure who also is the fi rst to 
notice the arrival of the prince, the center of the feast. Aft er a day of 
serious work, “the prince of the feast-day” arrives smiling and ready to 
celebrate.151 It is “the evening of time” and daylight is fading.152 History 
147 “seliggewohnt”; “grüne Teppiche”; “gereift ester Früchte voll”; “Der himmlischen, 
still wiederklingenden, Der ruhigwandelnden Töne voll” (BrA IX, 231).
148 “Und vor der Türe des Hauses / Sitzt Mutter und Kind / Und schauet den Frie-
den / Und wenige scheinen zu sterben / Es hält ein Ahnen die Seele, / Vom goldnen 
Lichte gesendet, / Hält ein Versprechen die Ältesten auf ” (BrA IX, 235).
149 “und ware silbergrau“/ Die Locke, . . . Jetzt ewigen Jünglingen ähnlich” (BrA IX, 232).
150 “Kränze . . . Mahl” (ibid.).
151 “den Fürsten des Festes”; “Vom ernsten Tagwerk lächelnd” (BrA IX, 231).
152 “Abend der Zeit” (BrA IX, 234). 
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has come to an end and in the twilight the contours of objects fade and 
objectifi cation looses its dominance. At fi rst, the poet “thinks” he sees 
him, but the image is still very unclear, he sees with “with dawning 
eyes.” But soon a “diff erent clarity reigns.”153 It is the appearance of the 
prince that leads to this higher level of insight. It is no longer the twi-
light zone of intuition, as we will see in the next chapter, nor is it the 
light of mere rational knowledge; it is an all-encompassing clarity that 
contrasts with the explanations of wise, but mortal men. For “a wise 
man may enlighten much for me; but where a God as well appears, a 
diff erent clarity reigns.”154 Th e human way of being implies fragmen-
tary knowledge, whereas the true interpretation of self and of history 
as a whole will only be possible from the eschatological perspective.
In our times, we struggle with the contradiction between unity and 
individuality, but this will resolve at the celebration of peace. Th e indi-
viduality of all historical manifestations, both religious and otherwise, 
will be left  intact. Each individual person will be fully understood and 
understand herself and her own role in the unfolding of the divine, but 
at the same time peace and unity will reign. “Th is is the law of fate, 
that all shall know of themselves.”155 At the end of time, all things will 
not just dissolve into an amorphous mass and go back to the nothing-
ness of primordial Being; individuality and consciousness will some-
how both be preserved. In a reversal of St. John’s Gospel, Hölderlin 
says about Christ, “and now we recognize him, now, that we know 
the Father.”156
It is not that the signs have not been there all through history, but 
it takes a long process of ripening for humankind to be ready for 
this sort of perspective. “Not sprung up today, not unproclaimed he 
is.” Now that all has grown silent, and “dominion is visible nowhere 
among spirits or mortals. Th at is, only now they hear the work, though 
long it has been prepared.”157
153 “dämmernden Auges denk’ ich schon”; “Da ist doch andere Klarheit” (BrA IX, 231).
154 “Ein Weiser mag mir manches erhellen; wo aber / Ein Gott noch auch erscheint, / 
Da ist doch andere Klarheit” (BrA IX, 232).
155 “Schicksalgesetz ist dies, dass Alle sich erfahren” (BrA IX, 233).
156 “Und nun erkennen wir ihn, / Nun, da wir kennen den Vater” (ibid.). See John 
14,7. Th e role of the Father will be discussed in 4.7.2. 
157 “Von heute aber nicht, nicht unverkündet ist er; . . . da es stille worden / Da Herr-
schaft  nirgends ist zu sehn bei Geistern und Menschen / Das ist, sie hören das Werk, / 
Längst vorbereitend . . . jezt erst” (BrA IX, 232).
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In this state of peace where “all has grown silent” and “all around the 
Spirit fl owers in this stillness,” dominion, which implies separation 
and opposition, will be replaced by true unity. No one will be excluded 
from this peaceful togetherness.158
However, the peace at the end of time will not only reconcile indi-
viduals. In Hölderlin’s conception of the “all-assembling” celebration 
of peace, all successive historical partial revelations of Being will be 
present simultaneously in an all-encompassing harmony.159 All will be 
proven to be legitimate and valuable fragments of the whole, “the All-
Living, from whom many joys and songs have sprung.” Th e “divinely 
constructed palaces” of Asia, the “ancient blessed shores [where] 
Apollo walked,” “the gods,” the “brave sons of life,” and “Christ their 
brother.”160 Especially the Greek and the Christian religions are the 
focus of Hölderlin’s unifi cation, but also all other traditions will be 
integrated in a harmonious unity that ends all oppositions. Th e “heav-
enly powers” will be “in song hospitably gathered, present in choirs.”161 
All will be included in this peaceful unity at the end of time. It is a true 
All-Unity, “for nothing is common.”162 Th e use of the word “common” 
as the opposite of “sacred” or “holy” emphasizes once again that all 
will be included in the celebration of peace.
Th is interpretation of the all-inclusiveness of the eschaton is one 
of the ideas that Hölderlin fears will be judged “too unconventional,” 
as the introduction to the poem suggests. It refers to the doctrine of 
apokatastasis pantoon, the universal reconciliation at the end of time. 
Even though it is a view with points of reference in Scripture, this doc-
trine of Origines was considered a heresy. Origenes saw the beginning 
of St. John’s Gospel as proof for the ontological negation of evil.
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the 
Word was God. He was with God in the beginning. Th rough him all things 
were made; without him nothing was made that has been made.163
158 “da es stille worden”; “und es blüht / Rings abendlich der Geist in dieser Stille” 
(ibid.).
159 “Allversammelnde” (BrA IX, 234).
160 “Vom Alllebendigen aber, von dem / Viel Freuden sind und Gesänge” (BrA 
IX, 233); “göttlichgebauten Palläste” (StA II, 166); “die alten seeligen Küste . . . wo . . .
Apollo gieng” (StA II, 157); “die Götter”; “Söhne des Lebens”; “Christus . . . Bruder” 
(StA II, 158).
161 “Himmlische”; “bei Gesang gastfreundlich untereinander / In Chören gegen-
wärtig” (BrA IX, 234).
162 “Denn nichts ist gemein” (StA II, 170).
163 John 1,1–3. 1Cor 15,28, “God may be all in all,” echoes this view as well.
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If all things arise from the divine Logos, then ultimately nothing can 
be condemned. Th e doctrine continues to survive in Neo-Platonist 
circles, and in the 18th century, this theological tradition receives new 
emphasis. In this worldview, true evil does not exist; it is mere priva-
tio boni. Th at Hölderlin seems to support this view is also illustrated 
by the poem An die Madonna [To the Madonna] where he writes: “A 
mere nothing is evil.”164 In addition, Hölderlin writes to his brother, 
“Th us the largest and the smallest, the best and the worst of people 
arises from One root, and overall everything is good.”165 And to his 
sister, “Such is my conviction that in the end all is good, and sadness 
is just a road to true, holy joy.”166 Here we see a fundamental diff erence 
between Hölderlin and Schelling. Whereas Hölderlin tends to trivialize 
evil, Schelling takes it very seriously and attempts to explain human 
freedom to commit evil without having to give up on a single and 
good root for all that is.
Th e second idea in Hölderlin’s eschatology that might be held 
against him by the orthodoxy of his time is the inner-worldly setting 
of the eschaton. As was mentioned earlier, the fi rst stanza pictures a 
very worldly stage for the feast. But he goes a step further by writing 
that at the “all-assembling” feast “the heavenly powers in miracles are 
not revealed.”167 In the era of the Spirit, the Divine has been so distant, 
so very diff erent from the earthly, that it was experienced as a miracle 
whenever the Holy touched the earth. Th is will no longer be the case 
at the end of time, when the Divine has become fully immanent; when 
“all you Immortals, to tell us about your Heaven, are here in our own 
house.”168
164 “nichts ists, das Böse” (StA II, 213).
165 “So gehet das Grösste und Kleinste, das Beste und Schlimmste der Menschen aus 
Einer Wurzel hervor, und im Ganzen und Grossen ist alles gut” (StA VI, 328).
166 “Und so ists mein gewisser Glaube, dass am Ende alles gut ist, und alle Trauer 
nur der Weg zu wahrer heiliger Freude ist” (StA VI, 387). We can appreciate that this 
view does not leave much room for freedom. Hölderlin never seems to have struggled 
with this aspect of I-hood to the same extent that Schelling has. We will return to this 
subject in Chapter 7. 
167 “Der Allversammelnde, wo Himmlische nicht / Im Wunder off enbar” (BrA IX, 
234).
168 “All ihr Unsterblichen, uns / Von eurem Himmel zu sage, / Da seid in unserem 
Hause” (ibid.).
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Before we return to the “all-assembling” celebration of peace, we 
should spend some time on one of these “Immortals” that is unique 
in Hölderlin’s view: Jesus Christ.
4.7.1. Christ
It is not easy to distill a coherent picture of Christ from the totality 
of Hölderlin’s work. On the one hand, he is described as an ancient 
(demi)god. Schmidt has pointed out that the imagery that Hölder-
lin uses in the poem Brod und Wein [Bread and Wine] of 1800 fuses 
Dionysius and Christ into one and the same “wine god.” Although 
in combination with bread, which is the gift  of the goddess Demeter 
rather than Dionysius, it might be argued that the emphasis in the 
poem is on Christ rather than Dionysius.169 In the early Hölderlin, 
Christ is one of the gods. No “god” is singled out when the poem says 
that it is the heavenly choir, the community of the gods, that provides 
the gift s.
Th e heavenly choir left  a few gift s behind in which human, as before, we 
could take pleasure . . . Bread is the fruit of Earth, but blessed by the light, 
and from the thundering god comes the gladness of wine.170
Th e gift s are the products of heaven and earth and that is how they 
remind us of the Divine. “Th at is why through these we think of the 
Heavenly, who once were here and who will return at the proper 
time.”171 Th e Christ of Hölderlin’s early work is just the “brother” of 
Heracles and Dionysius with whom he forms one “cloverleaf.”172 He 
is faceless and interchangeable with the other (demi)gods. None of 
them is unique. “We may celebrate [the holidays] all and not count 
the gods; one always stands for all.”173 Hölderlin’s emphasis is on their 
unity, on Being as their common origin, and he seems uninterested in 
the descriptions of their individual diff erences.
169 StA II, 90–95. See Schmidt 1968, 160–167.
170 “der himmlische Chor einige Gaaben zurük, / Derer menschlich, wie sonst, wir 
uns zu freuen vermöchten, . . . Brod ist der Erde Frucht, doch ists vom Lichte geseegnet, / 
Und vom donnernden Gott kommet die Freude des Weins” (StA II, 94).
171 “Darum denken wir auch dabei der Himmlischen, die sonst / Da gewesen und 
die kehren in richtiger Zeit” (StA II, 94).
172 See 4.6. 
173 “sie alle feiern und nicht / Die Götter zählen, Einer ist immer für alle” (StA II, 
132).
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On the other hand, this image of “just another” Greek god does 
not seem to satisfy him in the course of time. Hölderlin becomes 
more interested in the actual historical fi gure of Jesus, in the details 
of his life, in his death, and in the consequences of both throughout 
the following ages of darkness. Th e timeless “god” of his early work, 
the “quiet genius . . . who proclaimed the end of day and withdrew,” 
becomes a little more situated in the words “there beneath the Syrian 
palm-tree, where the town lay near, by the well.”174 And only a few 
years later a geographically located, historical person emerges: “Far 
from the Jordan and Nazareth and far from the lake, in Kafarnaum, 
where they looked for him and Galilee the skies, and from Cana.”175
Around the age of thirty, during his last sane years, Hölderlin tries 
to reconcile his devotion for the gods of Antiquity and his intuition 
that they all arise from the same divine unitary Being with the fi lius 
unigenitus of the creed.176 In Friedensfeier it says, “Yet of the All-Living 
from whom many joys and songs have sprung, one is a Son.”177 Refer-
ring to the poem Der Einzige, Jean-Francois Courtine writes,
Th e central question of the hymn and Hölderlin’s christology in general 
could . . . be formulated thus: How can Christ be der Einzige without, for 
174 “ein stiller Genius . . . welcher des Tags Ende verkündet’ und schwand” in Bread 
and Wine that was fi nished in 1800 (StA II, 94); “Dort unter syrischer Palme, / Wo 
nahe lag die Stadt, am Brunnen” in a preliminary draft  for Friedensfeier from 1801 
(StA II, 134).
175 “Vom Jordan fern und Nazareth / Und fern vom See, an Caparnaum, wo sie ihn / 
Gesucht und Galiläa die Lüft e, und von Cana” in the last version of Patmos from 1803 
(StA II, 185).
176 Th is search never results in an unambiguous image of Jesus Christ. Hence, 
according to Constantine, Hölderlin fails in his project. “ ‘Der Einzige’ and ‘Patmos’ in 
their several versions are the evidence of his fi nal failure to clarify his own relationship 
with Christ” (Constantine 1979, 113). I do not agree that failure describes Hölderlin’s 
eff orts. He seeks to integrate the ancient with the modern, mythology with philosophy, 
his intuitions about our unitary ground with the reality of confl ict and isolation of this 
world. He is convinced that the whole picture will not be revealed until the end of time 
when the Father Himself appears and enough heroes have gained the strength that 
is needed to survive the fullness of divine presence. Only then, the role of each indi-
vidual and each (demi)god will become known. In the meantime, our understanding 
is necessarily imperfect. Th erefore, Hölderlin tries to gain insight for himself and for 
his readers by approaching the fi gure of Christ from diff erent angles and the perspec-
tive shift s as time goes by. Th e fragmentation that results is not Hölderlin’s failure so 
much as the human failure to shed light on what is ultimately beyond understanding. 
Trying to put all these fragments into one coherent system would neither do justice to 
the complexity of the problematic nor to the depth of Hölderlin’s thinking.
177 “Vom Alllebendigen aber, von dem / Viel Freuden sind und Gesänge, / Ist einer 
ein Sohn” (BrA IX, 233).
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all that, pronouncing some exclusion of the other demigods? How are 
we to conceive such a nonexclusive unicity?178
Let us attempt to sketch some outlines of Hölderlin’s thoughts on 
Christ, as they surface in and around the time of Friedensfeier based 
on four major diff erences between him and the antique gods.
Around 1802–1803, Christ is no longer simply a god, in Hölderlin’s 
view. He is not just one of the many sons of the Father; he is also “the 
jewel of your house,” “the best” of the Father, “the most loving,” and the 
one “whom most the [blessed] love.”179 He “completed and, comfort-
ing, ended the divine festivity.”180 When he appears at the celebration 
of peace, he brings the other “immortals” along. Hölderlin experi-
ments with Christ as the last one in a long line of (demi)gods. “And 
yet, you ancient gods and all you brave sons of the gods, there is one 
other I seek whom I love among you, . . . the last one of your kind.”181 
But also this perspective no longer exhausts Christ’s true being for 
Hölderlin. He does not simply come later than the others; he is diff er-
ent. He does not just happen to be the last god; he is the completion, 
the perfection of the diff erent historical revelations of the Divine. He 
is the ultimate god, the one to whom the other gods “cling.”182 “Christ 
is the end. He is of yet another nature.”183 Compared to the antique 
gods, Christ’s is “a diff erent fate. More marvelous. Richer to sing.”184 
He is diff erent and
A feeling of shame forbids
Me to compare with you
Th e worldly men. And indeed
I know that, He who begot you, your Father,
Th e same who . . .
For never He reigns alone . . .,
178 For Der Einzige see Sta II, 153–164; Courtine 1999, 131.
179 “sein Bestes” (StA II, 156); “Das Liebendste” (StA II, 132); “ihr Geliebtestes” (ibid.).
180 “vollendet’ und schloss tröstend das himmlische Fest” (StA II, 93).
181 “aber dennoch / Ihr alten Götter und all / Ihr tapfern Söhne der Götter / Noch 
Einen such ich, den / Ich liebe unter euch, / (. . .) den lezten eures Geschlechts” (StA 
II, 154).
182 “An dem sie hängen.” Hamburger translates “to whom they are devoted.” To 
cling is a more literal translation that I prefer, since it puts Christ in the center. When 
he appears the others “automatically” come along. See Hamburger 1961, 182.
183 “Christus aber ist / Das Ende. Wohl ist der noch andrer Natur” (StA II, 753).
184 “Anders ists ein Schiksaal. Wundervoller. / Reicher, zu singen” ( StA II, 181).
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Hölderlin says falteringly.185 Th e “worldly men,” whom Christ is not to 
be compared with, are the “brothers” of the preceding stanza: Heracles 
and Dionysius. Christ “is of yet another nature,” which seems to refer 
to the dogma about the two natures of Christ. He is not a (demi)god: 
he is fully God as well as fully human. “For once, however, a god may 
choose the mere daily task, like mortals, and share all fate,” he says in 
Friedensfeier with reference to the incarnation.186
Secondly, Christ’s presence (and absence) is of a diff erent nature. 
When the antique gods were worshipped, they literally “walked the 
earth.” Th ey mingled with mortals and thus were very visible. Th is is in 
stark contrast to the absence of the Divine in our times. Th e eff ective-
ness of the (demi)gods however, lasted only while they were around, 
whereas Christ works in history still, even aft er his disappearance. 
“Christ lives yet.”187 Christ’s death marks the end of the antique era of 
the clearly visible forms of the gods and starts a new era. His activity 
is no longer directly in his deeds, but he is present in the gift s of bread 
and wine and “mediated in holy scriptures”; not in the concrete visible 
presence but in “a trace of a word.”188 Th e Divine is in “the writings of 
the bard or the African.”189
Th irdly, Christ works in silence: “Silent is his sign.”190 Christ’s activ-
ity is not like the fi ght of a Greek warrior. He does not use violence and 
does not fi ght the limitations of the human condition with force. He is 
not of “the great era,” of “fi re,” of “the din of war, and the story of the 
heroes.”191 Th e glamour of the Divine of which the Greek gods were 
an expression and their (over)activity, their heroism, and their urge 
to outdo the enemy, has been banished in the fi gure of Jesus Christ. 
He is “calmly-foreknowing” and “calmly-powerful.”192 He attempts 
185 “Es hindert aber ein Schaam / Mich dir zu vergleichen / Die weltlichen Männer. 
Und freilich weiss / Ich, der dich zeugte, dein Vater, / Derselbe der, . . . . / Denn nim-
mer herrscht er allein . . .” (StA II, 155).
186 “Einmal mag aber ein Gott auch Tagewerk erwählen, / Gleich Sterblichen und 
teilen alles Schicksal” (BrA IX, 233).
187 “Denn noch lebt Christus” (StA II, 171).
188 “Mittelbar / In heiliger Schrift en”; “eine Spur eines Wortes” (StA II, 163).
189 “die Schrift  / Des Barden oder Afrikaners” (StA II, 159). Th e bard is the poet and 
the African refers to Saint Augustine. 
190 “Still ist sein Zeichen” (StA II, 171).
191 “Das Geschik der grossen Zeit”; “Feuer”; “Kriegsgetön, und Geschichte der Hel-
den” (StA II, 158f.).
192 “ruhigahnend” (StA II, 167); “ruhigmächtig” (BrA IX, 233).
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“to silence the raging of the world.”193 On another occasion, Hölderlin 
speaks of raging when describing the fury of rivers at being hemmed in 
by mountains.194 One who rages refuses to resign himself to the human 
condition in general and the personal destination that the Divine has set 
out for him in particular. Christ does not counter this raging with force. 
His actions are gentle and mild, “with drops he quenched the sighing of 
the light” in contrast to “thirsty wild beasts in those days.”195
Fourthly and fi nally, with Christ the Divine has become disclosed 
for common people, for the “many timid eyes [that] are waiting to see 
the light,” and not just for the (demi)gods.196 He is of “the penitent and 
the wandering of pilgrims and the peoples,” of the “unillustrious.”197 
“For now more to men does night belong. Not to youths.”198 Christ is 
the “benignly, gravely disposed to men” as Michael Hamburger trans-
lates, or more literally the “friendly-seriously devoted to men.”199 He 
is the one who “pronounced ultimate love.”200 Without this love, the 
urge to escape into the unbound, the wish to die would become too 
powerful to resist, as we have seen in 4.5. Christ is the very picture of 
faithfulness; he stays even when “to stay in innocent truth is suff er-
ing.”201 In that respect, he is an example for all people who suff er the 
inevitable contradictions and loneliness of life. In the darkness of his-
tory we have to fi ght the urge to return to the safety of eternal Being, 
to escape the doubts and the suff ering of the wilderness, the emptiness 
and danger of an apparently God-less life. Christ is our “Master and 
Lord,” our “Teacher” on how to resist the “boundless temptation.”202
Th is “youth” died a violent death. Again, we see Hölderlin’s struggle 
with the idea of an inevitable step in a divine scheme on the one hand, 
193 “zu schwaigen . . . das Zürnen der Welt” (StA II, 175).
194 See Preliminary draft s for Friedensfeier (StA II, 131).
195 “mit Tropfen / Stillt er das Seufzen des Licht, das dürstigem Wild / War ähnlich 
in den Tagen” (StA II, 181).
196 “Es warten aber / Der scheuen Augen viele / Zu schauen das Licht” (StA II, 170).
197 “Büssenden, und / Der Pilgrime Wandern und der Völker”; “Ruhmloser” (StA 
II, 159).
198 “Denn Männern mehr / Gehöret das Licht. Nicht Jünglingen” (StA II, 159). 
Eternal youth is a term that Hölderlin frequently uses for the gods.
199 “freundlichernst den Menschen zu gethan” (BrA IX, 232).
200 “die lezte Liebe” (StA II, 167).
201 “Jener aber bleibet” (StA II, 745); “zu bleiben in unschuldiger / Wahrheit ein 
Leiden ist” (StA II, 745).
202 “Meister und Herr”; “Lehrer”; “Versuchungen sind nemlich / Gränzlos” (StA 
II, 158–160).
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and, especially in his later poetry, with the reality of the gruesome 
death of a real man on the other. Whereas the words “dreadfully-
determining, a deadly doom overshadowed” him are still immediately 
followed by the observation that it is “not in vain” in Friedensfeier, 
the horror of the death becomes obvious in his later work.203 Th en 
Golgotha is referred to as the “hill of rage,” and Christ dies because of 
“statutes . . . in anger whetted.”204 Th e laws of people have been sharp-
ened beyond the point where they serve the purpose of protecting life 
on earth. Laws are to guard the human, to prevent people from fl eeing 
into the unbound, the deadly. But laws that are sharpened by anger 
“like dragons’ teeth they cut and kill the living.”205 Laws that should 
protect life on earth have come to “fetter” it. Laws that are meant to 
serve as “bonds of love” have become “ropes.”206
Nevertheless, even if not everywhere in Hölderlin’s poetry the death 
of Christ is calm and peaceful according to divine design, its inevita-
bility in the course of history predominates. Th ere are two reasons 
for his unavoidable death. First, as the “son of the Highest” Christ is 
“the bearer of lightning.”207 Lightning stands for the brief but powerful 
connection of heaven and earth. Since it carries the danger of burning 
what it strikes from “roof to fl oor,” it can last only for a brief moment 
in order to protect people from too much (divine) exposure.208 In Frie-
densfeier the disciples are called the “dear friends” of Christ who “cast 
their shadow about” him, so that the “sacredly-bold” ray would come 
gently “through wilderness” to people.” Christ is “the beam through 
wilderness” that needs the “faithful cloud of dear friends” as mediators 
to prevent his light from searing people and make sure that it “gently 
would come to men.”209 To protect us from too much divine exposure 
his life could not last long.
Th e second reason that his death is inevitable is that his individual 
presence has to be destroyed to set a process of spiritualization in 
203 “umschattete . . . Furchtbarentscheidend ein tödlich Verhängnis . . . aber umsonst 
nicht” (StA II, 177). 
204 “Zornhügel” (StA II, 177); “Sazungen . . . wenn im Zorn sie schärft ” (StA II, 212).
205 “Wie Drachenzähne, schneiden sie / und tödten das Leben” (StA II, 212).
206 “fesseln”; “Strike” (StA II, 144f.).
207 “Sohn[e] des Höchsten”; “der Gewittertragende” (StA II, 167).
208 “Uns Gipfel und Boden entzündet” (BrA IX, 232).
209 “Und die lieben Freunde, das treue Gewölk, / Umschatteten dich auch, damit 
der heiligkühne / Durch Wildniß mild dein Stral zu Menschen kam, O Jüngling!” 
(BrA IX, 232).
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motion: “He sent them the Spirit.”210 With the death of Christ, visible 
divine presence has disappeared from the earth, and a new and dif-
fi cult era has started. Th e death of Christ signifi es the transition from 
the secure tangibility of the Divine in the gods, to the volatility of the 
pneumatic.211 Th is is diffi  cult for human beings.
Upon the god-sent gift  for years at fi rst there follow suff ering and confu-
sion, so that more mildly in the subsequent period the loft y beam shall 
shine through holy wilderness.212
Hölderlin describes how the disciples “mourn” since “fame is extin-
guished, the delight of the eyes.”213 Th e disciples “mourned since now 
evening had come.”214 Th ey clung to the memories for “they did not 
wish to part from the face of the Lord and their homeland.”215 As 
Hölderlin ironically phrases it in the poem To the Virgin Mary: they 
wanted to “endlessly sit on their mother’s lap.” Th ey want the reassur-
ing presence of the divine back in their midst, Christ’s immediate pres-
ence, to “remain at the beginning.”216 Th is, however, would be contrary 
to the unfolding of Being in history. Th e unconscious unitary ground 
has to develop into a harmonious unity of conscious individuals. “But 
much is to be avoided. Too much of love, where there is idolatry, is 
dangerous, . . . Th erefore he sent them the Spirit.”217
With the death of Christ, visible divine presence has disappeared 
from the earth and the Spirit has become active because only the 
destruction of his individuality could bring about the universality and 
the freedom of the divine Spirit. At that point in time, history changed 
into a steady process of spiritualization. A long and hard process of 
strengthening common people into heroes will set in, “Driven in, as 
fi re into iron, was this.” In the nighttime of history, many will grow 
210 “[Drum] sandt’ er ihnen / Den Geist” (StA II, 168).
211 See John 19,30: He bowed his head and gave up his Spirit. Th is gospel was of 
major importance for Hölderlin and his fellow Stift ler. 
212 “Auf göttliche Gaabe aber jahrlang / Die Mühe erst und das Irrsaal, / Dass milder 
auf die folgende Zeit / Der hohe Stral / Durch heilige Wildniss scheine” (StA II, 131).
213 “trauern”; “erloschen ist der Ruhm die Augenlust” (StA II, 180).
214 “trauerten sie, da nun / Es Abend worden” (StA II, 167).
215 “lassen wollten sie nicht / Vom Angesichte des Herrn / Und der Heimath” (StA 
II, 168).
216 “Der Mutter ewig sizen / Im Schoose” (StA II, 214); “bleibet im Anfang” (StA 
II, 181).
217 “Zu meiden aber ist viel. Zu viel aber / Der Liebe, wo Anbetung ist, / Ist 
gefahrreich, . . . Drum sandt er ihnen / Den Geist” (StA II, 182f.).
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stronger and the result will be that the Divine will be available to the 
“unillustrious.”218 Th anks to the Spirit, all people can come in touch 
with the Divine. However, the lack of clearly defi ned “gods” initially 
only leads to a period of confl icts and misunderstandings. “Where the 
Spirit is active, we too will stir and dispute what might be best.”219 
But as time progresses and humankind matures, our interactions will 
move from confl ict and “dispute” to a more reasonable exchange, “dis-
course,” and eventually to harmony, “song.”220 In the end “the law of 
love alone, the gently-leveling, rules from here right up to heaven.”221
For Hölderlin the life and the death of Christ is a turning-point in 
history. He is the last and the ultimate in a long line of gods who 
walked the earth, and with this theory, he has strayed from the solus 
Christus of the theology of the Stift . Nonetheless, he is the Only One, 
as the tile of the poem says.222 Th is is not a contradiction for Hölderlin. 
Christ was one of the many gods, but he was the only one who started 
a new divine process of spiritualization. Th e times have changed, and 
we have to remain faithful to our present situation. Clinging to idols, 
focusing solely on one divine manifestation is not the right attitude 
in our times. In Patmos, Hölderlin prays for “pinions, most faithful 
in mind to cross over and to return.”223 He wants to understand the 
underlying unity of all divine manifestations. Th e fact that they are 
historically separated makes them grow faint. “All around the summits 
of time are heaped, and the most loved live near, growing faint on 
most separate mountains.”224 Th is isolation “on most separate moun-
tains” threatens to exhaust the Heavenly. Even though at our point 
in history the Divine is “near” but “diffi  cult to grasp,” Hölderlin no 
longer desires to retreat in the golden age of divine light. When he is 
218 “Eingetrieben war, / Wie Feuer im Eisen, das” (StA II, 168); “Ruhmloser” (StA 
II, 159).
219 “Wo aber wirkt der Geist, sind wir auch mit, und streiten, / Was wohl das Beste 
sei” (BrA IX, 233f.).
220 “Streit”; “Gespräch”; “Gesang” (ibid.).
221 “nur der Liebe Gesetz, / Das schönausgleichende gilt von hier an bis zum Him-
mel” (ibid.).
222 Der Einzige, StA II, 153–164.
223 “O Fittige gib uns, treuesten Sinns / Hinüberzugehn und wiederzukehren” (StA 
II, 165).
224 “Nah ist / Und schwer zu fassen der Gott . . . . Drum, da gehäuft  sind rings / 
Die Gipfel der Zeit, und die Liebsten / Nah wohnen, ermattend auf / Getrenntesten 
Bergen” (StA II, 165).
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fl own to Greece, he faithfully returns.225 But he realizes that also too 
exclusive a love for Christ is a mistake since it risks excluding the other 
partial revelations of the same Divine, “if I serve one, I must lack the 
other.”226 Th e uniqueness of Christ lies in his role as Conciliator. He 
reconciles all. He gathers the “Heavenly” around and into himself.
Exactly through the work of Christ, we are ready to look beyond the 
fragmentation of positive religions. “For behold, it is the evening of 
time and no longer alone the Father sits enthroned above. Others yet 
are with him.”227 It is Christ who has set this process of reconciliation 
in motion. Th e already quoted, “Th ere beneath the Syrian palm-tree, 
where the town lay near, by the well” from the Friedensfeier, is an 
allusion to the scene at the well of Sychar, according to Saint John’s 
gospel. Here Jesus encounters a woman from Samaria and declares,
Believe me, woman, a time is coming when you will worship the Father 
neither on this mountain nor in Jerusalem . . . . a time is coming and has 
now come when the true worshipers will worship the Father in Spirit 
and truth, for they are the kind of worshipers the Father seeks. God is 
Spirit, and his worshipers must worship in Spirit and in truth.228
Hölderlin interprets this as an argument against a positive fi xation of 
religion. He broadens the concept of reconciliation of the world with 
the Christian God to all-reconciliation. All mortals, all gods, all reli-
gions are to be included. Th is makes Hölderlin’s Christ the Son par 
excellence of his Father. Hence when Christ is invited to the celebra-
tion of peace as its most important guest, all those who cling to him in 
devotion, heavenly as well as earthly, come along. He is the reconciler 
who reunites in the One the All that has become dispersed in time.
Let us now return to Friedensfeier and fi nd out who the Father of Jesus 
is, “He who begot you” and who “never He reigns alone.”229
225 “Nah ist / Und schwer zu fassen der Gott” (StA II, 165).
226 “Von Trauern meine Seele / Als eifertet, ihr Himmlischen, selbst / Dass, dien’ 
ich einem, mir / Das andere fehlte” (StA II, 154).
227 “Denn siehe es ist der Abend der Zeit . . . Und der Vater thront nun nimmer oben 
allein. / Und andere sind noch bei ihm” (StA II, 137).
228 John 4: 21–24.
229 “der dich zeugte, dein Vater, / . . . Denn nimmer herrscht er allein” (StA II, 155).
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4.7.2. Th e Father, Being, and All-Unity
In Friedensfeier Hölderlin never clearly defi nes the central fi gure, the 
host of the celebration. Who is the prince of the feast-day? Suppos-
edly, he is “all-known.” He is “greatness” and “a god,” and he surely is 
“no mortal power.”230 At one point in the poem, Hölderlin calls him 
“the Father . . . the Exalted, the Spirit of the World” who now “inclined 
towards people.”231 In order to gain more clarity about this fi gure, we 
need to turn to other poems in which the term “Father” appears more 
frequently. On other occasions, the Father is characterized as “faithful 
and friendly” and “the god of gods.”232 In the poem An den Aether 
[To the Ether], Hölderlin calls him “Father Ether” who feeds the new-
born with “holy breath.”233 He is “the creative one” who “permeates 
all ducts of life.” He is the “Father of hope.”234 He has been active all 
through history; he is “the Great Father . . . who up there in the heights 
refreshes wandering Time.”235 Apparently, the latter has not been an 
easy feat. He arrives at the celebration “smiling,” but he also looks “as 
though weary aft er the long heroic campaign.”236 At the end of time, 
he “cast[s] down [his] eyes, . . . and assume[s] the shape of a friend.”237 
However, the poet is not fooled by this modesty; his greatness “almost 
forces knees to bend.”238
Th e Father is Being, the source of all that is. Th e Father is the uni-
tary ground of whom we do not get a clear picture until the end of 
time. He has been revealed in brief fl ashes only to individual persons 
and fragmentarily through history. Nevertheless, as totality, as unifi ca-
tion of the all, he could never be identifi ed with any of these modes 
of activity or appearances that have varied with cultural and historical 
settings. When he appears at the celebration of peace, the eschaton, 
all historical and partial revelations will integrate around the Father. 
Only then will we have full clarity about his unifying work in history 
230 “Allbekannter”; “das Hohe”; “ein Gott”; “Sterbliches bist du nicht” (BrA IX, 232).
231 “de[r] Vater . . ., / Der hohe, der Geist / Der Welt [der] sich zu Menschen geneigt 
hat” (BrA IX, 233).
232 “true und freundlich” (StA I, 204) [CvW]; “der Götter Gott” (StA II, 132).
233 “heilige[n] Othem (StA I, 204). 
234 “der Schöpferische” (StA II, 97); “Vater der Hoff nung” (StA II, 59).
235 “[der] grosse[n] Vater . . . welcher die wandernde Zeit / Droben in Höhen 
erfrischt” (StA II, 98).
236 “als vom langer Heldenzuge müd” (BrA IX, 231).
237 “Dein Auge senkst, . . . / Und Freundesgestalt annimmst” (BrA IX, 232).
238 “doch beugt fast die Knie das Hohe” (ibid.).
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all along. He diff erentiated himself in history. However, only at the 
end of time we will not only understand all these temporary manifes-
tations but also their completed unity. Hence, when Hölderlin speaks 
of the “Fatherland,” I do not think that he refers to Germany, as Hitler 
would have his soldiers believe when he provided them with copies of 
Hölderlin’s poems.239 In fact, the exact opposite is meant. Hölderlin’s 
Fatherland has nothing to do with nationalism; the land of the Father 
is the domain of All-Unity at the end of time. Let us look at this term 
more closely.
Being, pure original unity, that is absolutely One “in such a manner 
that no separation can be performed without violating the essence of 
what is to be separated,” as it says in Urtheil und Seyn, divides in the 
arche-separation.240 Time and conscious life emerge. With Being as 
its source, all of this life is touched by the Divine. “Into all the veins 
of life, rejoicing them all at once, may the Heavenly divide.”241 Th is 
arche-separation has dramatic consequences; it not only results in 
consciousness, time, diversity, and history, but also in mortality. All 
this occurs so that we will “re-establish [unity] through ourselves,” 
says the foreword to Hyperion. Because Being has gone “outside itself,” 
has diff erentiated, it has enabled its “parts” to experience the fullness 
of life. But that is not all. Because of its presence in history, because 
of the development of consciousness through time, primordial Being 
itself will also change. Before the arche-separation it is unconscious 
and hence indistinguishable from “nothingness,” but through the life 
and the consciousness of individual persons all through history eternal 
Being will be transfi gured. In the course of history, Being gradually 
comes to full self-consciousness.
Friedensfeier gives an impression of the completion of this process 
at the end of time. Th e “work that was heard” all through history now 
becomes “the completed image.”242 We will fi nally reach the stage that 
we have always longed for.
239 See Fioretos 1999.
240 See 4.1. 
241 “in die Adern alle des Lebens, Alle freuend zugleich, teile das Himmlische sich!” 
(StA II, 99).
242 “sie hören das Werk, / Längst vorbereitend, von Morgen nach Abend, jezt erst”; 
“Wenn nun vollendet sein Bild und fertig ist der Meister” (BrA IX, 232).
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Th e Heavenly . . . appear in person, and people grow used to joy, to Day, 
and to the sight of these now revealed, the countenances of those who 
were called the One and All, already long ago, who deeply had fi lled the 
taciturn heart with free self-content, and were the fi rst and only to satisfy 
every longing.243
Here we encounter the One and All again, the Hen kai Pan that was 
already mentioned briefl y as one of the terms with which Hölderlin 
refers to eternal Being.244 At this point, however, we are ready to make 
a distinction between Being and the One and All. Before the arche-
separation Being is One. Nothing or no one is to be distinguished in 
this unity. At the end of time, Being will have become a unity again, 
but a diff erent kind of unity. It is no longer unconscious Oneness that 
cannot be distinguished from nothingness. Th is new unity is not an 
amorphous whole in which historical events and all individuals dis-
solve. On the contrary, all are assembled and all are reconciled in it. 
Th is harmonious whole throws light on the true value and role of each 
particular individual whom “now we recognize him, now, that we know 
the Father.”245 Th e individual only now fully understands her place in 
the world and obtains full self-consciousness. I-hood is perfected. Being 
that is just Oneness becomes a unity that is One and All simultaneously 
because all individual I’s and events have become united without losing 
their individuality, their singularity. Th e completion of the world and 
the self-realization of Being are parallel movements. Being will gain full 
consciousness, and the individual and history will obtain a totally new 
“clarity.” In the course of history, Being becomes All-Unity, a unity 
in which also individuality comes to fullness. Ultimately, Being and 
consciousness become reconciled; Being reaches full self-consciousness 
in beings, and conscious beings peacefully unite: “the defi nite and the 
indefi nite lines have approached” and . . . touch. Th is is Hölderlin’s con-
cept of Hen kai Pan, of a One that grounds all.
243 “die Himmlischen . . . / Kommen sie selbst und gewohnt werden die Menschen 
des Glüks / Und des Tags und zu schaun die Off enbaren, das Antliz / Derer, wel-
che, schon längst Eines und Alles genannt, / Tief die verschwiegene Brust mit freier 
Genüge gefüllet, / Und zuerst und allein alles Verlangen beglükt” (StA II, 92).
244 See 4.3. 
245 “Und nun erkennen wir ihn, / Nun, da wir kennen den Vater” (BrA IX, 233). 
See also John 14: 7.
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4.8. From Here Onwards
“German idealism can be viewed as the various attempts . . . to overcome 
dualism,” it was said in 2.7. In that respect Hölderlin’s metaphysics is 
indeed idealistic. In his view, all that is originates from one, unitary 
ground. However, to him this Absolute is not an I as Fichte (and the 
early Schelling) maintain. It cannot be, Hölderlin argues, because an 
I is already internally divided in order to be aware of its I-ness, to 
be (self-)conscious. Hence, he calls this primordial unity Being. Since 
Hölderlin departs from the refl ection theory of self-consciousness, as 
do most of his contemporaries, he seems forced to decide between an 
absolute I or an absolute It; between idealism and dogmatism, or build 
a system that integrates both. However, he circumvents the dilemma 
of his time: the ground is not a subject and it is not an object either. 
Being is not an it; Being is nothingness. Th is nothingness has the urge 
to be, but in order to really be, to be real, it has to “go outside itself ” 
and destroy its perfect unity. Hence, life emerges from Nothingness, 
conscious I’s emerge from unconscious Being.
Even though his philosophy also ventures “beyond the Kantian 
limits,” Hölderlin never supports the idealistic foundationalism of his 
fellow Stift ler Schelling. In the latter’s eyes, Hölderlin’s metaphysics 
fails because he is never able to develop an adequate philosophical 
concept of the connection between the fi nite and the Infi nite, of the 
All emerging from the One. Th is is exactly Hölderlin’s independence 
vis-à-vis his generation. He simply refuses to take this step because he 
maintains that Being as pure unity is by defi nition beyond theoretical 
consciousness. He never claims knowledge about what lies past the 
Kantian limits, and he never searches for a Grundsatz. Nonetheless, he 
does claim intuitions of the presence of the unitary ground in nature, 
in beauty, in love. Father Ether breathes in all that is, but breath cannot 
be grasped, much less does it explain the One from which it emerges. 
Understanding our unitary ground will have to wait until the end of 
time when consciousness and unity are no longer mutually exclusive. 
Hölderlin does not fall in the trap of philosophical hubris that charac-
terizes German idealism.
His is only a short-lived poetical hubris, his romantic inheritance, as 
we will see in the next chapter. Hölderlin’s romanticism is also obvi-
ous in his emphasis on feelings, on love, on intuition, and in his glori-
fi cation of the antique golden era. But his philosophy forms a rejection 
of the solipsism that has captured the great thinkers of his era, idealists 
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and romanticists alike. His life’s quest is not so much ‘Who am I?’ but 
rather ‘Why can’t we live in peace?’ Th e road towards a ‘mature’ unity 
is necessarily long and arduous, he decides. Consciousness is indis-
pensable for life, but it comes at a high price. Our entire life is caught 
up in the contradiction of longing for and attempting to unite with all 
living beings on the one hand, and fear of giving up our individual-
ity and independence, on the other. He knows that these opposing 
drives are both real but cannot be resolved. Human life is literally torn 
between the lonely drive to preserve one’s I-hood and exaggeration of 
earthly relationships in order to experience unitary bliss here and now: 
“One, one friend in whom our soul can recover itself [because] the 
participation in All does not satisfy.”246 As long as we experience the 
Oneness of Being as fallen apart in the All of the realm of judgments, 
it is hard to endure our individuality and be content with an intuition 
of a new sort of unity, All-Unity, that will grow in time.
Th e duality of daily life as Hölderlin experiences it has a lot in com-
mon with the Grundverhältnis as we have encountered in Henrich’s 
theory of self-consciousness.247 A human being is both a self-conscious 
subject that enjoys and wants to preserve its uniqueness in opposition 
to the rest of the world and a person within this world. Th is duality 
arises out of one unknowable ground, also for Henrich, as we will see 
in Chapter 6. Nevertheless, there are considerable diff erences. Accord-
ing to Henrich, we are torn between uniqueness (subjecthood) and 
self-relativization (personhood). Our sense of infi nity is connected 
with being a subject over and above the things of the world, our con-
tingency with being a person in the world. In both cases, we are iso-
lated from other I’s. As subject we are opposed to all, as person we are 
afraid of losing ourselves in the masses. Henrich’s I never experiences 
a natural basis for connection. He poses a singular, ultimate ground 
for all, but this ground is beyond the human grasp. For Hölderlin, 
this unitary ground is still experienced as a yearning for togetherness. 
I-hood is a source of loneliness, but we never lose our sense of unity 
completely. We can catch glimpses of it in nature, in beauty, and in 
love. How Hölderlin thinks we can even have an inner experience of 
pure unity will be discussed in the next chapter.
246 “Wo einem doch die Teilnahme an Allem nicht genügt, wo man Eines will, 
Einen Freund, indem sich unsere Seel wiederfi nde” (StA VI, 92).
247 Henrich’s philosophy is greatly indebted to Hölderlin’s thinking. Henrich’s own 
theory of the ground of consciousness will be discussed in Chapter 6.
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Now let us return to Hölderlin’s metaphysics on which a consensus 
has never been reached among experts. He has been called a panthe-
ist, but also a true Christian and even a polytheist who places Christ 
among the Greek gods.248 To start with the latter: Hölderlin mentions 
“the gods” in plural frequently and they are a very real presence for 
him. However, it would be very superfi cial to see this as evidence of 
polytheistic inclinations. Th e gods, in the sense of divine individuals, 
are gone. Th ey belonged to a diff erent and long lost (golden) era. In 
our times of absence, “a god” is an expression Hölderlin also uses for 
the human experience of a transcendent power, something beyond 
purely human capacities. Whenever a connection between people 
succeeds, in friendships or in love, there is a god [Gott] or a deity 
[Gottheit]. Th is is how he can also write to his brother about the deity 
between them.249 Th ere seems no need to take polytheism as a serious 
characterization of Hölderlin’s metaphysics. We should, however, take 
a closer look at the other two terms: pantheism and Christianity. Let 
us start with the latter.
While some see strong connections with the pietism of his upbring-
ing, many recognize in the use of biblical passages at least the echoes of 
a Lutheran education.250 Xavier Tilliette goes even further. He claims 
Hölderlin to be a true Christian poet who merely strays in his youth 
but returns to Christianity “with timidity and ardency” aft er a detour 
in the world of Greek mythology. Th is return, however, is “smothered” 
because “Beissner [the editor of the Stuttgarter Ausgabe, CvW] . . . and 
his disciples practice a sort of intellectual terrorism concerning the 
Christianity of Hölderlin.”251 Before continuing this dangerous under-
taking of labeling Hölderlin’s metaphysics, it might be wise to keep 
this controversy among experts in mind. Even Schelling warns us that 
“in any case it seems questionable whether much is gained by resur-
recting such general labels . . . they seem to be much too clumsy.”252
Hölderlin has at times provoked passionate controversy, and like 
most creative thinkers, he is not easy to categorize. As a graduate of 
the Stift , he is obviously well-schooled in what constitutes (Lutheran) 
Christian thinking. His poetry in particular gives the impression that 
248 For the latter, see Bennholdt-Th omson and Guzzoni 2003, 307. 
249 “der Gottheit, die zwischen mir und Dir ist” (StA VI, 293).
250 See, for example, Schäfer 1991 and Binder 1961/62.
251 Tilliette 1986, 106.
252 SW 7, 344. Schelling is not referring to Hölderlin.
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he seeks to reconcile – an activity that he views as uniquely Christian –
what he fi nds valuable in his Christian education with a more intui-
tive sense of and an existential need for unity. Binder remarks that 
Hölderlin is not satisfi ed by the two extremes of the Christian think-
ing of his time. On the one hand, he rejects a theology that assumes 
a “positive revelation, whereby the revelator is the only active party.” 
Th e one whom the revelation is given to is not even allowed “to 
stir [sich regen] in order to receive it since this would imply that he 
had added something of his own.” Th is type of theology he calls an 
“Unding,” literally a non-thing, a piece of junk, because it is a theology 
without a recipient. To receive, or to understand, automatically implies 
an alteration of the understood. On the other hand, Hölderlin rejects a 
Vernunft religion, a system that calls its highest idea or ultimate value 
‘God.’ Whereas revelation theology abolishes the recipient, Vernunft -
theology does away with the giver.253 I agree. Th e former does not do 
justice to Hölderlin’s conviction that people are needed to realize the 
development of Being into All-Unity, to give Being consciousness. Th e 
latter is the kind of absolute idealism that he rejects as philosophically 
untenable. Furthermore, the hubris does not square with his personal-
ity and his religiosity. Romano Guardini rightly asserts,
Th e interiority that he was aft er was not a subjective sphere, but the 
unfathomable depth [Tiefenbereich] of real being . . . . Th is man was con-
fronted with a Christianity that had lost its religious character – or had 
slipped loose from world and history into an otherworldly [abseitig] 
pietism.254
Th is brings us to another Christian tradition, one that Hölderlin is 
raised in: Württemberg pietism. Let us briefl y look at some parallels 
between this specifi c type of Christianity and Hölderlin’s thinking. 
Pietism has an ambivalent attitude towards institutionalization. Since 
the Church represents the fi xed dogmas, rites, sacraments, images, 
etc., it cannot always be reconciled with what is considered true 
inner spirituality. Th is makes for a theological dilemma. We can only 
seek the Divine in what can be perceived and is thus fi xed to a large 
degree, but religiosity calls for a spirituality that transcends all fi xation 
in images. Th e only exception is Scripture, which is considered both 
fi xed, “the solid letter” [ feste Buchstabe], and spiritual. In his poem 
253 See Binder 1961/62, 2f.
254 Guardini 1955, 197.
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Patmos, Hölderlin refers to this warning against self-willed manipula-
tion of biblical texts, a message that is considered most explicit in the 
book of Revelation.255 Th e name Patmos refers to the isle where Saint 
John allegedly wrote the book of Revelation aft er either being exiled or 
having fl ed during the reign of Emperor Domitianus (81–96). Accord-
ing to the legend, this was the same person as the evangelist and the 
apostle. Th erefore, Patmos is for pietists, who favor both the book of 
Revelation and the Gospel of Saint John, the paragon of inspired inter-
action with the Bible because of its spiritual content. Th e pneumatic 
emphasis is especially deduced from the fourth chapter where Jesus 
meets the woman from Samaria at the well of Sychar. Furthermore, 
the poverty of Patmos complies with pietistic ideals. Pietism is a cult 
of silence, which is considered the state of inner fulfi llment. In those 
days, pietists are oft en referred to as the silent [die Stillen im Lande].256 
Th e landscape that is a wasteland devoid of outward glamour is con-
sidered a token of its inwardness.
Hölderlin’s thinking is said to be infl uenced by the pietistic spiritu-
ality of Friedrich Christoph Ötinger (1702–1782). Th e main motive of 
the latter’s work concerns the ingenuousness of the primordial golden 
era and a returning golden era of peace in which all gods and all mor-
tals will be united. Ingenuousness is synonym for a pure kind of wis-
dom that is opposed to the rationality of Enlightenment, and that is 
reminiscent of the biblical “blessed are the poor in spirit.” Hölderlin 
speaks of the “ingenuousness” of the disciples.257 Th e process that will 
lead to the golden fullness at the end of time is viewed as inherent in 
nature, and this unfolding of nature, this ripening, takes place accord-
ing to divine will. History is also considered the planned self-realization 
of God, not the result of human planning, in Ötinger’s view. Both 
history and the Bible are only understandable from the end perspec-
tive. Moreover, the concept of the celebration of peace at the end of 
time is anchored in the chiliasm especially prominent in Württemberg 
pietism. It is an eschatological concept of an actual golden era at the 
end of time which is to take place on earth instead of in an otherworldly 
255 See StA II, 172. See Revelation 22: 18f. “I warn everyone who hears the words 
of the prophecy of this book: If anyone adds anything to them, God will add to him 
the plagues described in this book. And if anyone takes words away from this book 
of prophecy, God will take away from him his share in the tree of life and in the holy 
city, which are described in this book.”
256 See Schmidt 1968, 130ff .
257 “Einfalt / Der Jüngers” (StA II, 167).
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setting. In addition, “Prince of peace,” that reminds us of the prince 
of Hölderlin’s Friedensfeier is a traditional chiliastic term. Th ere are 
indeed clear pietistic themes in Hölderlin’s thinking.258
How about the third characterization: was Hölderlin a pantheist? He 
has been labeled as such based on (early) passages in his work as the 
following: “Does our Spirit not encounter a kindred Spirit in every-
thing that exists?” Th e Spirit is “the Archetype of all Unity.”259 Spirit 
of the World is considered a pantheistic key term. Th is Great Spirit, 
the divine but immanent Logos, is the forming principle that is active 
in history. Th e Stoics saw this Logos as the pantheistic God.260 Hölder-
lin supposedly transposes this stoic-pantheistic concept into history. 
However, just reading the beginning verses of the Gospel of Saint John 
will make it clear that this concept is not alien to Christian thinking 
either. In addition, Hölderlin clearly says,
Th e blessed Unity, Being in the unique sense of the word is lost for 
us. And we had to lose it if we were to strive, to fi ght for it. We tear 
ourselves away from the peaceful Hen kai Pan of the world in order to 
reconstruct it through ourselves . . . But neither our knowledge, nor our 
actions ever reach in any period of our existence, the point where all 
opposition ends and where all is one; the defi nite line unites with the 
indefi nite only in infi nite approach.261
Th is might not be acceptable to all Christian thinkers, but it is defi -
nitely not straightforward romantic pantheism either.
Paul de Man has shown that Hölderlin makes it clear in the poem 
Der Rhein that “pantheism is only the fi rst stage in the history of the 
Western mind.”262 Th e Rhine starts out in the direction of pantheistic 
Greece, its “royal soul drove it, with impatience, towards Asia,” but 
258 For a more detailed study on this subject, see Schäfer 1991. 
259 “Begegnet nicht in allem, was da ist, unsrem Geiste ein freundlicher verwand-
ter Geist?” and “Das hohe Urbild aller Einigkeit” (StA III, 201). See Also Binder 
(1961/62).
260 See Görner 2003, 94.
261 “Die seelige Einigkeit, das Seyn, im einzigen Sinne des Worts, ist für uns verlo-
ren und wir mussten es verlieren, wenn wir es erstreben, erringen sollten. Wir reissen 
uns los vom friedlichen Hen kai Pan der Welt, um es herzustellen, durch uns Selbst 
(. . .) Aber weder unser Wissen noch unser Handeln gelangt in irgend einer Periode 
des Daseyns dahin, wo aller Widerstreit aufh ört, wo Alles Eins ist; die bestimmte 
Linie vereiniget sich mit der unbestimmten nur in unendlicher Annäherung” (StA 
III, 236).
262 De Man 1993, 135.
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turns away from it and continues towards the West. Aft er a period 
of “raging” at being “hemmed in by holy Alps,” it “meanders qui-
etly through German lands, content.”263 Nowhere in the poem does 
Hölderlin refer to its ending in the sea.
As the sea symbol indicates, pantheistic unity, for the romantic mind, is 
the fi nal consummation of all individual destinies, the end point of the 
quest. In the Rhine poem, however, the sea is not even mentioned, and 
the last glimpse we are given of the river is as it fl ows through the cities 
and by the towers of civilized Europe.264
Hölderlin’s conviction that we fi nd our ground in a primordial unity 
that has been lost to our refl ection but for which we keep a certain 
intuition, is not a pantheistic one. “He does not identify nature with 
God, but experiences special occasions, situations, and relationships 
as divine,” as Rudiger Safranski puts it.265 According to Charles Harts-
horne and William Reese, pantheism is the paradox “that the unchang-
ing and wholly necessary contains whatever is real in change and the 
contingent,” and every pantheist has to “seek in some way to soft en the 
diffi  culty.”266 Th e world emerges from a single unitary ground; Being. 
However, from the moment Being separates internally, it changes. Th e 
One is still in the All as a sense of unity, as a longing and an intuition 
for peace, harmony, and beauty. But the Oneness tends to drown in 
the All of everyday life. Th e Divine is in the world, but the world is 
not divine. God is in us, but human being is not divine being. God 
is the appeal for and the momentum towards a unity in which each 
individual plays his or her unique role. As long as we are in the world, 
we have no more than vague notions of this living unity. It is not until 
the end of time that God and world will be united. However, when 
that happens God will have been changed by this world.
It might be a daring theology, especially two centuries ago, but that 
does not necessarily make it a heresy. If Hölderlin is to be convicted of 
heterodox, or rather unbiblical, tendencies, it is not his search among 
the Greek gods that is at fault. What might be unchristian in his theol-
ogy is something that he shares with many Christians in the past and 
263 See “ungeduldig ihn /Nach Asia trieb die königliche Seele. (. . .) Wenn unent-
haltsam, aber gehemmt /Von heilgen Alpen, ihm/In der Tiefe, wie jener, zürnen die 
Ströme. (. . .) Stillwandelnd sich im deutschen Lande /Begnüget” (StA II, 143f.).
264 De Man 1993, 135.
265 Safranski 2007, 167.
266 Hartshorne and Reese 2000, 165.
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even today, some of whom have even reached sainthood. Hölderlin’s 
main unchristian characteristic might be the tendency to fl ee from the 
here and now. Th is does not turn him into a heretic, but it makes him 
a certain type of Christian: the dualistic kind, which is exactly what he 
strives to overcome in his metaphysics.
With all the diff erent labels that Hölderlin’s thinking has received, 
mysticism has never been one of them, as far as I know. Th is is sur-
prising since his true, perhaps even desperately true, religious urge 
has mystical tendencies. Is it perhaps the loss of a sense of reality, 
his “madness,” that makes the experts reluctant to call him a mystic? 
Hölderlin’s God (and gods) comes too close for comfort, and both the 
divine presence and the absence are more than he can bear. Darkness 
is familiar to him. Is it the dark night of the mystic or the black hole 
of a depressed man at the verge of a nervous breakdown? In any case, 
Hölderlin struggles with the dangers and the temptations of intimacy 
with the divine. Th e lure of the Great Beyond, of leaving the world 
behind, has tempted Hölderlin all of his life. In a letter he writes,
At other times, I could jubilate about a new truth, an important outlook 
on what is above us and around us; now I fear that I might end like the 
old Tantalus who received more from the gods than he could take.267
He defi nitely does not agree with Schelling that “the idea of an infi nite 
being was accompanied by a notion of infi nite boredom,” and that 
such a notion makes him “uneasy and sick.” And the “(blasphemous) 
exclamation: I should not want to gain eternal bliss for anything in 
the world,” seems contrary to his strongest desires.268 According to 
Alan White,
Schelling’s remarks suggest that the crucial diff erence between philoso-
phy and mysticism is visible in the philosopher’s rejection of what the 
mystic most ardently desires.
Both philosopher and mystic demand the Absolute. For the mystic it 
is the end in the sense of total bliss. For the philosopher it is the start-
ing point for an account of consciousness and world.269 White makes 
267 “Sonst konnt’ ich jauchzen über eine neue Wahrheit, eine bessere Ansicht dess, 
das über uns und um uns ist, jezt fürcht’ ich, dass es mir nicht geh’ am Ende, wie dem 
alten Tantalus, dem mehr von Göttern ward, als er verdauen konnte” (StA VI, 427).
268 Schelling SW 1, 326. Schelling makes this assertion with reference to Lessing.
269 White 1983, 36f.
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a mistake, of course, in not realizing that the mystical experience and 
philosophical interest need not be opposed. Th e experience may actu-
ally be an incentive to philosophize. Total bliss makes a person espe-
cially eager to look for its source, if only in order to fi nd out how to 
make it last!
In this chapter, we have established that Hölderlin’s metaphysics is 
not fully rational. Th e same is true for Schelling’s, contrary to his own 
assertions. More than two centuries ago, at the height of speculative 
reasoning, there is the insight that the ratio has its limits. In the next 
chapter we will see how philosophy seeks a way out of the straight-
jacket of the rational by way of the concept of intellectual intuition.
CHAPTER FIVE
INTELLECTUAL INTUITION AND METAPHYSICS
Th e term intellectual intuition is the translation of the German intellek-
tuelle or intellektuale Anschauung. Interestingly, Kant consistently uses 
the term intellektuelle Anschauung, and so does Fichte. Th e younger 
generation (Schelling, Hölderlin, and Novalis a.o.) use intellektuale 
Anschauung. Th e reason is unclear. Frank wonders whether “this is 
a type of agreement on the part of the young Jena thinkers to sepa-
rate themselves from Kant and Fichte.”1 Kant introduces the term in 
modern philosophy in connection with freedom. In Refl exion 4336 he 
writes, “Th e reality of freedom cannot be concluded from experience. 
However, we only have an understanding of it through our intellectual 
intuition . . . our activity.”2 In addition, he hints at its possible connec-
tion with I-hood. If the I knows of its existence, this has to be caused 
by an intuition, which is the only possible proof of existence. At the 
same time, such an intuition cannot be sensory. Th e consequence: a 
paradoxical intellectual intuition that cannot be squared with his strict 
dualism. Nonetheless, even though his texts suggest a latent ‘Yes’ from 
time to time, the outspoken ‘No’ to a human faculty of intellectual 
intuition dominates. For Kant, only God, the intellectus archetypus, 
possesses intellectual intuition in the sense that his young admirers 
insist on transferring to the I. Intuitus originarius is divine understand-
ing of the essence of all things-in-themselves, the noumena, instead 
of the way they appear, the phenomena, which form the limitation 
of human knowledge. It is a creative knowledge, a vision that makes 
what it sees; a capacity that is obviously way beyond the human. Let 
us fi rst look at the general controversy around the term and its brief 
popularity in idealistic and romantic circles before we move on to its 
two main philosophical defenders Fichte and Schelling, and the poet 
who practices what the others only preach: Hölderlin.
1 Frank 2004, 89. 
2 See also KpV A242–255.
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In an essay called Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton 
in der Philosophie [About a Recent Proud and Distinguished Tone in 
Philosophy], Kant berates the latest form of a tradition of philosophy-
by-inspiration that claims a type of insight that cannot be passed on to 
others, called intellectual intuition.3 Th ose who claim to practice this 
type of philosophy consider it “distinguished” to listen to and enjoy 
the “oracle in themselves,” whereas the more modest philosopher has 
to work hard for philosophical insights. Who, indeed, can refute a 
philosophy that appeals to a feeling [Gefühl] that leads to the heart 
of the matter, without the cleverness [Vernünft elei] of concepts, Kant 
wonders sarcastically. Such presumed supernatural means of knowing, 
such “mystical inspiration,” is “the death of all philosophy.”4 Intuiting 
the veiled goddess [Kant refers to the veiled Isis] is pointless. What 
we all kneel for is the majestic moral law in ourselves. We hear its 
voice, and we understand its imperative. But while we hear it, we are 
unsure whether we are its source or Another whose Being is unknown 
to us but who still speaks through us. We had better not speculate 
though; this only leads to Schwärmerei. It does not change our duty 
to raise the moral law in ourselves into clear concepts according to 
logical doctrine.5
As has also been the case with the I, Kant claims to be satisfi ed 
with erecting a building on unknown foundations, and once again, 
his followers protest. Kantian disapproval notwithstanding, the term 
blossoms. Somehow, the void between the form and the matter of 
knowledge has to be bridged. In order to make real knowledge of the 
world possible, there has to be a connection between the subject and 
the object, between me and the things that I encounter in the world, 
according to the young generations of philosophers. Somewhere, 
sometime before I start diff erentiating between me and the rest of the 
world in my own consciousness, there must be a unity. Th is unity, 
which is prior to and beyond all diff erence that I discern, must still 
be accessible to me because I was fully one with it before I came to 
be (conscious) and because I still participate in it. Somehow. What 
Xavier Tilliette calls un nouveau philosophème is born in the intel-
lectual environment of the Stift  at the time of Hegel, Hölderlin, and 
3 Kant 1928, 387–406. 
4 Ibid., 398.
5 See Kant 1928, 405. For the veiled Isis, see also 2.5. 
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Schelling. It is the latter, indeed, who is its most daring and outspoken 
proponent.6 “Without intellectual intuition no philosophy,” he states. 
Hegel agrees, “Without transcendental intuition one cannot philoso-
phize.” All hopes for metaphysics aft er Kant rest on “a wonderful and 
secret faculty”: intellectual intuition.7
Because it fi lls an epistemological void, intellectual intuition is 
enthusiastically received.8 Carl Leonhard Reinhold is the fi rst to very 
carefully approach the Kantian divide between the form (the catego-
ries of understanding) and the matter (sensory perception) of knowl-
edge. Knowledge need not always be a conjunction of intuitions and 
the categories of understanding, he asserts. Knowledge is sometimes 
provided by pure intuitions, pure concepts, and pure ideas; hence by 
just one of the two Kantian roots. He posits a form of super-sensory 
intuition with the Unconditioned, the Absolute, as object.9 It is Fichte 
who subsequently applies the term to the realm of the (absolute) I. He 
claims that the absolute subject, the I, “is not given by means of an 
empirical intuition, but by an intellectual intuition, and the absolute 
object, the Not-I, is opposed to it.”10 Th e I distinguishes itself from 
everything else because of the fact that I realize it by an intellectual 
intuition, by the ‘I am’ that is our most immediate certainty. He and 
Kant are not in disagreement, Fichte believes. Th ey both view the I 
as a spontaneous act. When he (Fichte) calls it intellectual intuition, 
he does not mean it in the Kantian sense of a (Platonic) intuiting of 
the ideas, or the Absolute, which would make his Wissenschaft slehre 
absurd.
Th e die is cast; intellectual intuition has become linked to the 
human I. Nonetheless, there is little agreement about its exact mean-
ing. According to Fichte, “it is the immediate consciousness, that I 
act, and what I enact.”11 With reference to Fichte, Hegel calls intel-
lectual intuition “pure thinking of itself, pure self-consciousness, 
I=I, I am; the Absolute is subject-object, and the I is this identity of 
 6 See Tilliette 1995.
 7 Schelling SW 5, 255; Hegel 1977, 110; Schelling SW 4, 362. 
 8 By Schlegel, Schiller, and others. See Tilliette 1995, 112f. 
 9 See Reinhold (1794), Beiträge zur Berichtigung bisheriger Missverständnisse der 
Philosophen Band VI, Erörterung, 399f. 
10 GA I, 2, 48. Th e reference is to the type, volume, and page of J.G. Fichte – Gesam t-
ausgabe of the Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaft en. Mostly I am using the 
translations of D. Breazeale, see Fichte 1994.
11 GA I, 4, 217.
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subject and object.”12 To Schelling, intellectual intuition is an intuition 
of what cannot become object, of what, like freedom, cannot appear 
in consciousness. He then combines Fichte’s absolute I with Spinoza’s 
Substance and thereby transfers the term that is fi rst graft ed onto the 
absolute I to an Absolute that resembles the mythical Hen kai Pan. It is 
this use that becomes popular, especially in literature. What starts out 
as a capacity that Kant attributes solely to God becomes the human 
faculty of intuiting the unity of all that is.
Th e term is enthusiastically received, but it lasts no more than a 
decade or two. By then, it has become a mere slogan. Any experience 
of awe, any feeling of losing oneself in the vastness of nature or in 
the beauty of a work of art, or any intense feeling of connection with 
others will soon be called an intellectual intuition. Th e meaning diff ers 
considerably from on individual author to another, but that does not 
seem to bother them. Intellectual intuition becomes trendy. In litera-
ture, it becomes closely associated with dying. Being placed outside 
the I, in the All, means losing oneself, losing (individual) life. Th is 
can be experienced as a nightmare or as a blissful state of slumber in 
which the meaning of life becomes suddenly clear. Philosophers are 
intrigued, but aft er Fichte and Schelling have left  it philosophically 
unfi nished, the fear to be branded a mystic or a Schwärmer, forces 
most to remain vague or limit the meaning of the term. Th e literary 
use of the term gradually makes intellectual intuition lean more and 
more towards the esthetic. Th e work of art is viewed as the receptacle 
of the Infi nite. Art is the synthesis of nature and freedom brought 
about by the joint eff ort of the Divine and the artist. Hölderlin chooses 
to leave philosophy and concentrate on poetry precisely because art 
can go where philosophy is at a loss. He will only sporadically use the 
term intellectual intuition as such. He will (in line with his philoso-
phy) no longer theorize about it but practice it as a poet instead. Even 
so, he will start to recognize its limitations and the hubris of the poet 
and the philosopher alike who think they can grasp the Divine.
Before we turn to our young heroes of the preceding chapters, we 
will fi rst study the views of Fichte on intellectual intuition. Th is has 
two reasons: First, in transferring a divine faculty to the I, Fichte 
nonetheless thinks himself to be true to the spirit, if not the letter, 
12 Hegel 1977, 119, slightly adapted. 
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of Kantian philosophy. Secondly, he is infl uential in the development 
of both Schelling and Hölderlin. His proclaimed ‘Kantian’ use of the 
term constitutes their justifi cation of taking intellectual intuition to 
be a capacity of human beings, despite Kant’s protests. For the short 
period of time that forms the focus of this study, intellectual intuition 
becomes the favorite route from the I to the Absolute. Let us see how 
this happens.
5.1. Fichte
In the Prefatory Note to the First Introduction of the Wissenschaft slehre 
Fichte writes, “My system is nothing other than the Kantian . . . but is in 
method quite independent of the Kantian presentation.” Both his and 
Kant’s system are true transcendental idealism, Fichte maintains. Th e 
main diff erence is not the content, but the form. Part of the problem 
with Kant’s work is that it is notoriously diffi  cult to interpret. Aft er 
all, “Kant himself, in the modest admission that he was not specially 
conscious of a gift  for clarity, attaches no great value to the letter of his 
doctrine.”13 Th erefore, Fichte feels “obliged to read [it] by the spirit, if 
reading by the letter gets us no further.” Since Kant’s philosophy has 
generally been completely misunderstood, he has “decided to dedicate 
[his] life” to the independent presentation of Kant’s great discovery.14 
Th at Kant vehemently disagrees with the avowed similarity of the two 
systems has been brought to Fichte’s attention by the time he writes 
the Second Introduction. Th is does not seem to disturb him too much, 
since “the question then is whether [Kant] was speaking of the Wissen-
schaft slehre genuinely perused and understood,” or rather of the mis-
interpretations of others.15 Aft er all, “the inventor of a system is one 
thing, and his commentators and disciples are another.”16 Th e tone 
is set! Fichte’s philosophy is a clarifi cation of Kant’s transcendental 
idealism. Period.
13 GA I, 4, 231. Fichte refers to the Preface of the Critique of Pure Reason, B xliv. 
14 Ibid., 183. Fichte does not miss an opportunity to literally quote the more obscure 
passages in Kant’s work and explain in his own words what it really is that Kant wants 
to say.
15 Ibid., 222 – note.
16 Ibid., 238. Th e stupidity of the average colleague is something that Fichte cannot 
emphasize enough.
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5.1.1. Intellectual Intuition in Line with Kant
In this context, it is all the more surprising that Fichte would claim 
a central role for intellectual intuition, the “primordial act” of the I.17 
Aft er all, he is fully aware of the fact that “there is nothing [Kant] is 
more decidedly – one might almost say, disdainfully – against, than 
the claim to possess a faculty of intellectual intuition.”18 Th is disagree-
ment is no more than a misunderstanding of the true meaning of his 
use of intellectual intuition, Fichte maintains. Intellectual intuition is 
the capacity of the I to be aware of its own activity, and every person 
who ascribes an activity to himself appeals to this intuition. Without it 
I would be unconscious of my own actions. I would not know what I 
am doing and that it is me doing what is being done. “Intellectual intu-
ition is the immediate consciousness that I act and of what I enact.”19 
Hence, Fichte’s intellectual intuition is not directed at the being of 
dead objects, the things-in-themselves, which is a faculty that Kant 
rightly rejects for humans, but at the activity of living consciousness 
that is the expression of freedom, the fact of reason. Ergo, Kant simply 
cannot disagree.
In order to become acquainted with this act, Fichte advises, “Th ink 
of yourself; construct the concept of yourself and take note of how 
you do this.”20 In this process, intelligence reverts into itself and makes 
itself its own object. By thinking itself, the I comes into being. Fichte 
is, of course, aware of the circularity of this type of reasoning. How can 
the I revert into itself, if it is not already there? Th erefore he tells his 
students to distinguish between the I and the philosopher. Th e I origi-
nally comes to exist for itself through this act, and it is the only way 
it comes into being at all. It is not preceded by anything or any act in 
general. Th e philosopher, on the other hand, has already run through 
this whole process, conceived of it, and for him the I is there before-
hand. Hence, it is only a matter of the philosopher making himself 
understood that makes the procedure seem circular.21 Th is primary act 
of self-reversion, Fichte assures us, is intellectual intuition.
17 Ibid., 216. 
18 Ibid., 224. 
19 Ibid., 217.
20 Ibid., 213. 
21 Ibid., 213f. 
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What ‘acting’ is is something that can only be intuited; such knowl-
edge cannot be developed from concepts nor can it be communicated 
thereby . . . In order to understand the true nature of acting, one has to 
turn to intuition.22
Intellectual intuition is neither consciousness nor self-consciousness; 
it is the condition of the possibility of all consciousness.
Th is intellectual intuition never occurs in isolation, and that makes 
it easy to miss. It is only one element of the three that constitute the 
representation [Vorstellung], but it is a vital one. Sensory intuition and 
conceptualization are the other elements.
In Kant’s opinion . . . and my own, three elements are required for a 
complete representation:
[1] Th ere is that whereby the representation obtains a relation to an 
object and thus becomes a representation of something. We all agree 
in calling this ‘sensory intuition.’
[2] Th ere is that whereby the representation is related to a subject, and 
thus becomes my presentation. Th is according to Kant . . . should not 
be called ‘intuition.’ I, however, call it by this name, for it bears the 
same relationship to a complete representation that sensory intu-
ition does.
[3] Lastly, there is that whereby the fi rst two elements are united and 
thus become a representation. Here again, we agree in designating 
this a ‘concept.’23
Each representation needs to be related to an object and to a subject 
in order to be someone’s representation of something. Sensory intu-
ition connects it to the object and intellectual intuition to the subject. 
In Fichte’s view, this implies that sensory and intellectual intuition 
are inseparable. Th ere can be no sensory intuition without intellectual 
intuition and vice versa. How else would I know that my representa-
tions are mine? How could I connect all the loose representations, if 
I remain purely passive, the inert stage on which presentations suc-
ceed one another, instead of the active principle that brings them 
forth? It takes “an intuition of sheer activity – not an activity that 
has been brought to a halt, but one that continues; not a being, but 
something living.”24 However, even when intuition is and remains 
22 Ibid., 215. 
23 Ibid., 227. 
24 Ibid., 218. 
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the basis of the concept, “a mere intuition yields no consciousness.”25 
Th e sphere of consciousness is not complete until both forms of intu-
ition (sensory and intellectual) are ‘grasped’ by means of concepts, or 
comprehended.26
Th e philosopher discovers intellectual intuition only by resolving 
the whole into its constituent parts. It is not something that can be 
pointed out all by itself, much less can it be proven. Fichte is convinced 
that Kant will not disagree that there must be something that relates 
the representation to the subject; it is only the term that he rejects. 
In Kant’s system there is also a concept of the pure I that conditions 
all consciousness, exactly as it is presented in the Wissenschaft slehre.27 
What he himself calls intellectual intuition is mentioned in Kant’s phi-
losophy “perhaps, under the name ‘pure apperception.’ ”28
Now we can see how Fichte can, indeed, consider himself to be a 
real Kantian. He approves of the two roots of knowledge, but he is 
convinced that he has found the principle that connects them. Intellec-
tual intuition bridges the Kantian divide, and thereby it also manages 
to connect the separate Kantian doctrines: practical reason and theo-
retical reason. Th is is something Kant himself never achieved simply 
because, according to Fichte,
he nowhere dealt with the foundation of all philosophy, but treated in 
the Kritik der reinen Vernunft  only its theoretical part, in which the cat-
egorical imperative could make no appearance; and in the Kritik der 
praktischen Vernunft , only of its practical side, in which . . . questions 
about the type of consciousness involved could not arise.
Th ere is no real diff erence between his system and Kant’s. It is all a 
matter of terminology and an (excusable) oversight on Kant’s part: he 
merely forgets to ask himself what sort of consciousness the categori-
cal imperative is. Fichte is more than happy to do this for him. Th is 
consciousness is “undoubtedly immediate, but not sensory; hence it is 
precisely what I call intellectual intuition.”29 He affi  rms the similarity 
by stating it in more Kantian terms. It is this “pure I” that provides 
25 Ibid., 245. 
26 Fichte uses begriff en werden. Th is translates to “being understood” or “compre-
hended” in English. In the German language the related noun, Begriff , means “con-
cept.” Being comprehended is being grasped by means of a concept. 
27 Ibid., 228f. 
28 Ibid., 225. 
29 Ibid. 
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the conditions for all consciousness. “Th us, just as in the Wissenschaft s-
lehre, so for Kant as well: the possibility of all consciousness is condi-
tioned by the possibility of the I, or of pure self-consciousness.”30
Intellectual intuition is “an intuition of sheer activity” for Fichte, it 
was said. By relating both freedom and intellectual intuition to activ-
ity, he cleverly combines the two Kantian realms. By giving a more 
dynamic role to this I that enables all knowledge, it merges with the 
subject of morality.
Th e concept of acting, which becomes possible only by means of this 
intellectual intuition of the self-active I, is the sole concept that unites 
the two worlds that exist for us: the sensible world and the intelligible 
world.31
Both freedom and intellectual intuition are based on the fact that “I 
am simply active.” If “I am given to myself, by myself, as something 
that is to be active in a certain fashion [morality] . . . I necessarily see 
myself as self-active [intellectual intuition].”32 Th e I is free to act: the 
free act of reverting into itself is called intellectual intuition and the 
freedom to act morally is the categorical imperative.
Fichte must have caused Kant a lot of aggravation. It is hard to 
imagine Kant in a rage, but we can almost hear him grit his teeth when 
transcendental idealism is defi ned as,
the mode of thinking in which speculation and the ethical law are most 
intimately united. I ought to begin my thinking with the thought of the 
pure I, and I ought to think of this pure I as absolutely self-active – not 
as determined by things, but rather as determining them.33
How aggravating it must be to see one’s thoughts taken one step too 
far time and again! Th is intuition, this claim to ‘know’ aff airs that are 
beyond knowing, is exactly the type of speculation that Kant rejects. 
And it will get worse, as we will see in 5.2. Schelling will go even fur-
ther when claiming that intellectual intuition gives access not only to 
the I, but to an absolute I that can hardly be distinguished from God! 
Th is is not just Schwärmerei: it is Schwärmerei that claims to be Kan-
tian in spirit! But let us limit ourselves to the lesser insults of Fichte 




33 Ibid., 219f. 
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5.1.2. Idealism versus Dogmatism
To Fichte it is clear that this intellectual intuition exists. But since 
idealism “is nothing more than speculation,” demanding proof of it 
is far more extraordinary than someone born blind demanding that 
we explain colors to him.34 How, then, can the philosopher ensure the 
objectivity of this purely subjective act of the individual, empirical per-
son? It cannot be demonstrated by means of concepts that this power 
of intuition exists, nor explained from concepts what it may be. It is 
beyond proof because it is the condition of the possibility of concep-
tual thinking, hence of the ability to prove. Everyone must discover it 
immediately in himself, or else he will never make its acquaintance. 
But if sensory intuition is not denied, then why reject intellectual 
intuition? It is strange, Fichte asserts, that philosophers do not realize 
that “everything that can be said against the claim that an intellectual 
intuition exists applies equally against the claim that sensory intuition 
exists.”35
Ultimately, this demand for objectivity is based on the strange and 
faulty assumption that the I is something over and above its own 
thought of itself. “God knows what!” Fichte exclaims theatrically.36 
“For the idealist nothing is positive but freedom, and, for him, being 
is nothing but a mere negation of freedom.”37 Th e I is nothing other 
than the free, self-reverting act, and vice versa. Th is act is obviously 
objective by its very nature. Aft er all, that I exist for myself is a fact, 
and I can only come to exist for myself through this particular, free 
act called intellectual intuition. In all other acts something wholly dif-
ferent comes about for me. In these other acts thinker and thought are 
opposed, and the thinker’s activity is directed at something distinct 
from himself. In the self-reverting act, however, thinker and thought 
are the same. By thinking this self-reverting act, it becomes objective 
for the philosopher,
that is to say, something that – insofar as he thinks of it – hovers before 
him as something that limits the freedom (i.e., the indeterminacy) 
of his thinking. Th is is the true and original meaning of the term 
‘objectivity.’38
34 Ibid., 211 – note. 
35 Ibid., 218. 
36 Ibid., 215. 
37 Ibid., 252.
38 Ibid., 246. 
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Whenever I think, I think something determinate and thereby restrict 
my freedom by confi ning it to something specifi c in a multiplicity of 
objects. Th e I also possesses this sort of objectivity since it can also be 
an object of my thinking.
Fichte acknowledges that this might not be the type of objectivity 
that satisfi es all of his readers. Th erefore, he is willing to explore what 
might be a crucial diff erence between his system and Kant’s.
According to Kant, all consciousness is merely conditioned by self-
consciousness; i.e., the contents of consciousness can still be grounded 
by or have their foundation in something or other outside of self-
consciousness.
For the Wissenschaft slehre on the other hand,
all consciousness is determined by self-consciousness, i.e., everything 
that occurs within consciousness has its foundation in the conditions 
that make self-consciousness possible – that is to say, is given and is 
produced thereby and possesses no foundation whatsoever outside self-
consciousness.39
Hence, for Kant pure self-consciousness conditions consciousness, 
whereas for Fichte this same faculty, now called intellectual intuition, 
determines consciousness. For Kant the I does not provide the content 
of its representations, whereas for Fichte it does. Hence, for Fichte the 
issue is whether there is really something outside the I. Th e problem 
lies in the postulation of the thing-in-itself that is supposed to operate 
upon the I.40
Fichte agrees with the Kantians that it defi nitely feels as if there is 
something not-I ‘out there.’ Our nature forces us to claim, “just as 
truly as I exist and live at all, there also exists something outside of me, 
something that does not owe its existence to me.”41 In order to explain 
this feeling, dogmatists think a real ground, an object that they call a 
thing-in-itself, “that is, something that is not a product of thinking.”42 
Dogmatists start with being, and this is something that the idealist 
totally disagrees with. “Idealism is not in the least acquainted with any 
sort of being, considered as something that subsists for itself.”43 If one 
39 Ibid., 229f. 
40 Ibid., 236f. 
41 Ibid., 211 – note.
42 Ibid., 244. 
43 Ibid., 261 – note. 
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were to ascribe this type of being to the I, the I would cease to be an I 
at all; it would become a thing, and the very concept of the I would be 
destroyed.44 How could anything exist for a thing, and how is a thing 
to exist for itself? Th e I is not a thing; it is an activity. Being is not the 
original concept, but merely derived through opposition to activity.
Th erefore, Fichte refuses to believe that Kant would expressly 
declare “to employ his own terminology, that sensations have to be 
accounted for within philosophy by appealing to a transcendental object 
that exists in itself outside of us.”45 Th us, Fichte disqualifi es the Kantian 
thing-in-itself as a left -over from dogmatism! But since Kant cannot 
possibly be accused of dogmatism, he must have been misunderstood 
by his interpreters.46 To the question whether there is assumed to be 
no “contact or aff ection” whatever accounting for cognition, Fichte 
answers, “All of our cognition does indeed begin with an aff ection; 
but not with aff ection by an object.” It is “by means of this act of your 
own thinking” that you ascribe to yourself receptivity or sensibility. 
“Th is is Kant’s view of the matter, and it is also the position of the 
Wissenschaft slehre.”47 Hence, in Fichte’s idealism there are no things-
in-themselves. How could things-in-themselves in a world beyond our 
thinking aff ect our thinking? Th ere are both conscious and uncon-
scious products of the I. Since the I is unable to recognize its uncon-
scious products as I, it takes them for alien, for not-I.
Nonetheless, Fichte agrees with the dogmatists that this feeling of 
the separate reality of the not-I is very persistent. Th e philosopher, 
however, “can separate what is conjoined in experience through the 
freedom of thought,” namely the thing and intelligence. If he leaves 
out the former, he retains intelligence-in-itself, and the representations 
are its products. Th is procedure is called idealism. If he leaves out the 
latter, he retains a thing-in-itself that causes the representations. Th is 
procedure is called dogmatism.48 In other words, dogmatism begins 
with necessity, and idealism begins with freedom; hence, they fi nd 
themselves in two completely diff erent worlds.49 Idealism has a dis-
tinct advantage over dogmatism, Fichte believes. Th e dogmatist cannot 
44 Ibid., 248.
45 Ibid., 239. 
46 Th e main problem of the average Kant-interpreter is that he uses passages from 
Kant’s text without understanding the whole, according to Fichte. 
47 Ibid., 241. 
48 Ibid., 188.
49 Ibid., 261 – note.
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make the connection between being and representation, whereas the 
idealist can: the I’s representing is its being. Even so, neither system 
can refute the other. Whether it is the thing-in-itself or the freedom of 
the I, ultimately both systems cannot prove their own starting-point. 
Th erefore, the decision depends upon the interests and the inclination 
of the philosopher, Fichte assures us.
However, let us not be fooled by this apparent truce between dog-
matism and idealism. In Fichte’s opinion, there are two types of phi-
losophers: those who have not risen to full realization of their freedom 
and those who have. Th e former are dogmatists. Th eir self-image is 
“thrown at them by objects” that act as a mirror.50 It is the outer world 
that has made them into who they are. Without it also their own selves 
would be lost. Idealists, in contrast, are independent of all that appears 
outside of them. Th ey do not need these things as a crutch because 
they have an immediate belief in themselves. Th ey are free. Th ey know 
that the “‘I’ and ‘self-reverting acting’ are completely identical con-
cepts.”51 Th e I is its own positing of itself and nothing other than that. 
Th e I is only ideal being; it is only for itself.
If everything (and everybody) that the I encounters in the world is 
its own product, this I of Fichte is blown well out of (human) propor-
tion. He is aware of the confusion between the I that is the object of 
idealistic philosophy, the “I-in-itself ” (not to be confused with a thing-
in-itself ), and the empirical individual that can say “I.” Th e former is 
I-hood in general, subjectivity, “the non-object.” It originates “through 
an absolute thesis” and is beyond all experience. Th e latter is living in 
two worlds:
I cannot be for me, without being something, and this I am only in the 
sensible world; but neither can I be for me, without being me, and this 
I am only in the intelligible world that opens itself for me by means of 
intellectual intuition.52
When someone calls out to me in the dark, “Who is it?” and I reply, 
“It is me,” I obviously refer to myself as a particular one of all pos-
sible rational beings, Fichte explains. Th is individual, this I that is 
determined and opposed to all other I’s, arises through a synthesis of 
an object with selfh ood. “In brief, I-hood and individuality are very 
50 Ibid., 194. 
51 Ibid., 216. 
52 Ibid., 190. 
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diff erent concepts, and the element of composition in the latter is very 
plain to see.”53
Th is duality in our daily, empirical I is something we are trying to 
overcome. Th ere is this perfectly rational being that exists in everyone. 
It is this ideal, the being that has ceased to be an individual and is pure 
rationality, that we strive for.
Reason is the only thing-in-itself, and individuality merely accidental, 
. . . merely a special way of giving expression to reason, and one which 
must increasingly merge into the general form thereof.54
Th e I lives towards a state in which it is no longer an individual because 
it has merged with pure reason. With the intellectual intuition of what 
it means to be an I, to be free to act, comes the awareness of the true 
freedom to be not just one particular way but all possible ways to 
give expression to reason: to be reason itself. To merge with reason 
is only to be postulated as the supreme goal of the striving of the I. It 
is never to be actualized, we are merely to approximate ourselves to 
this idea ad infi nitum. Th is is the background to the assertion: Th at 
which stands opposed to my action is the sensible world. Th at which 
is to come about through my action is the intelligible world.55 As long 
as the I is a creature of the world, it will be both free and unfree. It 
will be bound to the sensible world of necessity (its own unconscious 
products), but it will strive to throw off  these limitations in order to 
fully merge with the intelligible world of pure freedom (its conscious 
product).
Fichte struggles to cross the Kantian divide. Intellectual intuition is to 
connect Kant’s separate worlds of the noumena and the phenomena. 
Th e I strives to become absolute I by throwing off  all that is unfree and 
unconscious. Fichte never goes so far as to claim that (even momen-
tary) access to the Absolute is possible for the actual human being 
here and now.56 It is Schelling who relates intellectual intuition to the 
Absolute in no uncertain terms. Th e absolute I, as absolute aspect of 
53 Ibid., 256. 
54 Ibid., 257f. 
55 See ibid., 220. 
56 Th ere is an ongoing debate about the early Fichte (as in the text discussed here) 
versus the late Fichte. Th e latter does seem to claim access to an absolute ground for 
which he uses terms like life [Leben] and pure life [lauter Leben]. See Anweisung zum 
seligen Leben, GA I, 9.
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the empirical I of Fichte that makes it able to say “I am,” becomes the 
absolute I of Schelling as an I that thinks “I am it, the Absolute!” Let 
us see how this shift  takes place.
5.2. Schelling
Like all of Schelling’s metaphysical solutions, intellectual intuition 
has gone through several stages. It is a persistent theme in his texts 
for a little over a decade and disappears around the time of the Frei-
heitschrift . Especially for the young Schelling the infl uence of Fichte 
with respect to his view on intellectual intuition is considerable. Th e 
historical relationship between their use of the term is a complicated 
one. It is Fichte who fi rst employs it in 1792 in the Recension des Aene-
sidemus [Aenesidemus Review], but he does not mention it at all in the 
1794 Wissenschaft slehre.57 It is not until he adds the First Introduction 
in 1797 that he reintroduces the term polemically and in detail, as we 
have seen in the previous section. By then, Schelling has published his 
Vom Ich. Since this work is taken to be an interpretation of Fichte’s 
less accessible theory at the time, it is Schelling’s use that dominates 
the term for several years. We will fi rst look at the similarities and 
the diff erences between both philosophers before unfolding Schelling’s 
concept in more detail.
5.2.1. From Fichte’s Absolute I to Spinoza’s Substance
Both Fichte and the young Schelling realize that the concept of the 
I implies that the I has to think itself in order to be. In Schelling’s 
words: “It is not at all thinkable except insofar as it thinks itself, that 
is, insofar as it is.”58 Both agree that the starting-point of all knowl-
edge may not be objectifi ed; it can never be an object of conceptual 
knowledge. Th is would place it beyond the philosopher’s domain. 
According to the young Schelling, it is Reinhold who fi rst brings “the 
intrinsic problem of philosophy . . . into the clearest focus.”59 His failure 
to present “imagination” [Vorstellungsvermögen], hence a faculty of 
consciousness, as the fi rst principle of philosophy leads philosophers 
57 See GA I, 2, 31–67.
58 SW 1, 168.
59 SW 1, 175.
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to search for a principle prior to consciousness: the (absolute) I for 
which another type of “knowing” has to be found. Th e I cannot be 
given by a concept. Only concepts of objects are possible. “Th erefore 
the I can be determined only in an intuition [Anschauung] . . . [not] in 
an intuition of sense [but] in an intellectual intuition.”60 Intellectual 
intuition reveals the I, and reversely the I can be determined in an 
intellectual intuition only.
Since the I is I only because it can never become an object, it cannot 
occur in a sensory intuition, but only . . . in an intellectual intuition. 
Where there is an object there is sensory intuition, and vice versa. Where 
there is no object, that is, in the absolute I, there is no sensory intuition, 
therefore either no intuition at all or else intellectual intuition.61
Sensory intuition reveals the object. In the case of the (absolute) I there 
can be no object, hence no sensory intuition is possible. Th e absolute 
I, or the absoluteness of the I, can only be revealed by an intellectual 
intuition. So far Fichte and Schelling seem in agreement.
It is when Schelling elaborates on this absolute I that we begin to 
see important diff erences. For Fichte intellectual intuition reveals the 
“I am.” Intellectual intuition is not a source of knowledge of the Abso-
lute: the only “object” of unmediated knowledge is what we might call 
the absoluteness of I-hood. He himself believes that his use of intel-
lectual intuition comes close to self-consciousness or Kant’s transcen-
dental unit of apperception. “Everyone is immediately certain of his 
self; for he can intuit only it.”62 For Schelling, however, the absolute I 
is “the One Unconditionable, . . . the absolute all-comprehending real-
ity,”63 and in his descriptions of this One Unconditionable we hear 
Spinoza’s infl uence. It is “absolute causality,” “all [of its] attributes 
must be infi nite,” it is “indivisible,” and “the only true Substance.”64
Because of these Spinozistically sounding characteristics, the abso-
lute I becomes more like an absolute It, the unity of all that is. Hence, 
intellectual intuition becomes the immediate experience of absolute 
unity à la Spinoza. “No sense perception, no concept reaches [the] One 
Substance whose infi nitude is present only to intellectual intuition.”65 
60 SW 1, 181.
61 Ibid.
62 GA II, 3, 28. 
63 SW 1, 176. 
64 SW 1, 167; 192; 192; 193. 
65 SW 1, 171.
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Th is Absolute (I) is also “absolute power” and “absolute reality outside 
of all time.”66 Th e result is a tendency in the early work of Schelling 
that will become more apparent in the years to come. For Fichte the 
absolute I is the absolute aspect of the I, that urges the empirical, fi nite 
I to strive for the Infi nite. But Schelling does not speak of an ideal that 
we strive for ad infi nitum; he speaks of intellectual intuition as a capa-
bility of free human beings here and now. Th ereby he unmistakably 
moves away from his teacher. Repeatedly, we will see how Schelling’s 
I itself becomes absolute, infi nite, omnipotent. Th is “I am” no longer 
merely strives for absoluteness but merges with the Absolute here and 
now, as it appears.
Something similar seems to happen when, in line with Fichte, 
Schelling links the I with the only gateway to transcendence that Kant 
has left  open for people: freedom. “Th e essence of the I is freedom,” 
Schelling asserts, and Fichte would not disagree. But Schelling’s descrip-
tion of freedom again reminds us of a Spinozistic type of Substance. 
“Freedom is only through itself, and it encompasses the Non-fi nite.” 
Subsequently he connects it with the immense I of the overly self-con-
fi dent adolescent: “For the I, its freedom is neither more nor less than 
unconditional positing of reality in itself through its own absolute self-
power [Selbstmacht].”67 By connecting freedom that “encompasses the 
Non-fi nite” with the self-positing of the I, he creates a mixture of Kant, 
Fichte, and Spinoza colored with his own personality. Consequently, 
the absolute I evolves towards Spinozistic Substance and intellectual 
intuition towards an intuition of the Absolute instead of the absolute-
ness of the I. Th e I becomes all that is and Intellectual intuition as the 
awareness “I am!” becomes more like “I am it; the Absolute!”
Th is latter realization outdoes all morality. Hoping for mere good-
will as a basis for progress for humanity is futile. Humanity has to 
become aware of the fact that its very essence is absolute unity. “Give 
man the awareness of what he is, and he will soon learn to be what 
he ought to be. Give him the theoretical self-respect and the practical 
will soon follow,” the young Schelling writes. Once we have realized 
that the principle of unity has been “the regulating basis of the history 
of mankind” from the beginning, we will learn to act according to a 
66 SW 1, 195; 206. 
67 SW 1, 179. 
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moral goal of unity.68 “What is moral law for the fi nite I . . ., is natural 
law for the non-fi nite I, that is, it is given simultaneously with and 
in its mere being.”69 Morality will come naturally, so to say. In the 
free act of intellectual intuition, people are able to get in touch with 
their roots, their destination, and their absolute power simultaneously, 
and thus they overcome earthly limitations and shortcomings. Kant’s 
sense of moral duty has been transformed into an absolute I that, like 
Spinoza’s Deus, rules from the natural laws of its own Infi nity.
Both Fichte and Schelling search for an unconditionally certain 
foundation for philosophy. For Fichte this is a foundation for knowl-
edge. “Our task is to discover the primordial, absolutely unconditioned 
fi rst principle of all human knowledge,” he asserts.70 Th is foundation 
must be found in an activity that brings forth an I that is capable of 
knowledge: intellectual intuition. Schelling, on the other hand, wants 
to fi nd the foundation of all being. Intellectual intuition off ers it to us, 
but we are too “dim” to notice.
Since your perception ties you to objects, and since your intellectual 
intuition is dimmed and your existence is determined for you by time, 
even that to which you owe your existence, that in which you live and 
act, think, and know, becomes in the end . . . only an object of faith – 
something which seems diff erent from yourself . . . [and] never fi nd as 
real in yourself.71
Intellectual intuition shows us “that to which we owe our existence” 
and in which we “live and act, think, and know.” If only our faculty 
of intuiting the Absolute had not dimmed so much, we would directly 
experience what now appears as an object of faith to many.
Very early in his career, Schelling’s concept of intellectual intuition 
becomes the human means of access to the Absolute thanks to a Spi-
nozistic twist to Fichte’s absolute I. He claims,
[Spinoza] recognized that originally something had to be the basis for all 
existence, a pure immutable archbeing [Ursein], a basis for everything 
that comes about and passes away, something that had to exist by itself, 
in which and through which everything in existence had to attain the 
unity of experience.
68 SW 1, 157f. 
69 SW 1, 198.
70 GA I, 2, 255.
71 SW 1, 216. 
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Spinoza just never realized “that this unconditional, immutable arch-
form [Urform] could be found only in the I.”72 As a result, he tried to 
prove its lying in the not-I; and he failed. But what he in fact did was 
elevate the not-I to the I. Schelling is convinced that his own meta-
physics proves that “Spinoza’s error was not in the idea of the Uncon-
ditioned but in the fact that Spinoza posited it outside the I [in order 
to fi nd] the way to philosophy as a science.”73 Schelling is sure that he 
has incorporated Spinoza’s dogmatism in Fichte’s idealism. And like 
Fichte, he claims that he does not betray Kant but merely completes 
his work. Kant was the fi rst to “establish the absolute I as the ultimate 
substratum of all being and of all identity (though he established it 
nowhere directly but at least everywhere indirectly).”74 Kant’s tran-
scendental unity of apperception simply begs for the postulation of 
an absolute I, in Schelling’s opinion. What his eff orts at building one 
grand system have resulted in is a very dangerous mix! It is not only 
an attempt to grasp and control the unitary ground of all that is; it can 
easily result in an I that swallows all that is.
Aft er this comparison of Fichte’s and Schelling’s views on intellec-
tual intuition, it has become clear that the diff erences are about to 
cause a head-on collision between the mentor and his favorite student. 
We will now concentrate on Schelling’s development of the concept.
5.2.2. Schwärmerei, Art, or Philosophy?
In the summer of 1795, the same year that Vom Ich is fi nished, Schelling, 
then twenty, writes the Philosophische Briefe über Dogmatismus und 
Kriticismus. Th e fi nal three letters (eight through ten) deal with the 
striving of the fi nite for the Infi nite. Here Schelling also speaks of intel-
lectual intuition as a possible human experience here and now. How-
ever, the tone is so entirely diff erent that one starts wondering whether 
the suggestion of the more dangerous aspects of intellectual intuition 
à la Schelling is a mistake. It has been asserted that Schelling’s views 
on intellectual intuition in the eighth letter have been written with, or 
at least under the infl uence of, Hölderlin.75 Th e following quote does 
indeed breathe a Hölderlin-like atmosphere.
72 SW 1, 194.
73 SW 1, 172f. 
74 SW 1, 232 – note.
75 See, for example, Tilliette 2004, 35–37 and Beiser 2002, 476–479.
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We all have a secret and wondrous capacity of withdrawing from tempo-
ral change into our innermost self. . . . Th ere, in the form of immutability, 
we intuit the eternal in us. Th is intuition is the innermost and in the 
strictest sense our own experience, upon which depends everything we 
know and believe of a supersensory world.76
Hence, we can all experience the eternal by withdrawing from the bus-
tle of daily life into an innermost self, Schelling asserts. Th is escape 
into a primordial pre-conscious unity is Hölderlin’s deepest desire, as 
we have seen in the previous chapter. Nonetheless, even if Schelling 
calls it “the silent surrender of myself in the arms of the Absolute” for 
a while, Schelling’s intellectual intuition has nothing in common with 
the tentative and dangerous encounter with unconscious Being that 
characterizes Hölderlin’s meaning of the term, as we will see in the 
next section.
For Schelling intellectual intuition is a means of access to the Abso-
lute or the Unconditioned. It gets us beyond the phenomena to a phil-
osophically necessary, unitary ground. And what we discover there 
is the identity between our innermost self and what Spinoza called 
the One Substance. It takes place “whenever I cease to be an object 
for myself” and when everything objective has vanished. Even though 
Schelling asserts that we all have this ability to intuit the eternal in 
our innermost self, this experience is not easily achieved. Intellectual 
intuition is produced by freedom alone, and those who are “overcome 
by the invading power of objects” have a hard time experiencing it.77 
Intellectual intuition and self-power always remain closely linked in 
his view. Whereas for Hölderlin it constitutes a loss of control, for 
Schelling it is hard work.78
His brief fl irt with romanticism notwithstanding, the young 
Schelling is still keen on Fichte’s consent and wants to make sure that 
nobody can accuse him of dogmatism, or mysticism and other forms 
of Schwärmerei. Intellectual intuition, whereby subject and object fully 
merge, can be interpreted in two ways, he asserts. Either the I is viewed 
as becoming identical with the Absolute or the Absolute with the I. 
76 SW 1, 318. 
77 SW 1, 318f. 
78 However, when Tilliette remarks that “for Schelling intellectual intuition is not a 
shock, that electrifi es the reader, nor a vision that delights him, but the conclusion of 
an eff ort of ascesis and purifi cation [Läuterung],” I think this might be too religious an 
interpretation, at least where the young Schelling is concerned (Tilliette 1995, 35).
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“In the latter case, intellectual intuition [is] intuition of the I; in the 
former, intuition of an absolute object.”79 All dogmatism is based on 
the latter objectifi cation of intellectual intuition; it takes
the intuition of oneself for the intuition of an object outside oneself, the 
intuition of the inner intellectual world for an intuition of a supersen-
sory world outside of oneself.80
Th e latter is what Spinoza did, in Schelling’s view. Since he chose to 
interpret it as an intuition of the absolute object, he was a dogmatist 
and thereby deceived himself, like many of his predecessors. Schelling, 
as a true idealist, avoids this fatal error.
Mysticism, in the sense of losing oneself in the Absolute, is also 
unconvincing to him. “We cannot get rid of ourselves.” Even when 
intuiting myself as merged in the Absolute, it is still myself that I intuit. 
Th inking myself as lost in the Absolute or God is still the thought of 
myself, even if now a lost self. A person cannot “conceive of himself 
as annihilated without thinking of himself, at the same time as exist-
ing.” To Schelling it is obvious that everyone, even the mystic, always 
thinks of himself. It is exactly this ineradicable quality of I-hood that 
causes our fear of death.
For I could not feel any fear of a collision with not-being, if I did not 
apprehend a survival of my I, so that my feelings would survive too . . . I’ll 
gladly not be, only I don’t want to feel my not-being.
Spinoza was able to bear the apparent annihilation of his I because he 
never thought of himself as lost in this absolute state; “he thought of 
his personality as expanded into it!”81 Schelling’s “I am it, the Abso-
lute” resurfaces.
Despite his conviction that the I of the real philosopher can 
make all objects disappear, Schelling realizes that intellectual intu-
ition cannot occur in regular consciousness. Consciousness needs an 
object, whereas intellectual intuition that “arises in us by means of 
an instantaneous unifi cation of two opposing principles” cannot have 
an object by defi nition.82 Th is implies that there can be no rationally 
compelling theory about the Absolute because intellectual intuition is 
79 SW 1, 319. 
80 SW 1, 312. 
81 SW 1, 320ff . 
82 SW 1, 285. 
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an experience where consciousness ceases. It is a “state of death” from 
which we “awaken through refl ection, that is, through a forced return 
to ourselves. But no return is thinkable without resistance, no refl ec-
tion without an object.”83
Here Schelling sees a distinct diff erence between sensory intuition 
and intellectual intuition. In a way, all intuition, even sensory intu-
ition, is an “abyss. Should I maintain it as intuition I would cease to be 
I.” In the case of sensory intuition however, this risk is limited because 
the object off ers resistance to which the I naturally takes a stand and 
returns to itself; it re-fl ects. With intellectual intuition “there is noth-
ing but infi nite expansion” in which the I might easily disappear into 
nothingness. “Should I maintain intellectual intuition I would cease to 
live; I would go ‘from time into eternity.’ ”84 Reversely,
with absolute freedom no consciousness of self is compatible. An activ-
ity without any object, an activity to which there is no resistance, never 
returns into itself. Only through a return to one’s self does consciousness 
arise. Only a restricted reality [Realität] is an actuality [Wirklichkeit] 
for us.85
Th e I needs restrictions. It needs to encounter objects, not-I’s, in order 
to feel its own existence, to be self-conscious. Th is, in turn, would lead 
to the Hölderlinean line of thinking. Th e Absolute cannot be an I for 
an I is opposed to a not-I. And if there is something outside the I (the 
not-I), the I cannot be the Absolute. Again, we see a more romantic 
infl uence, be it Hölderlin’s or from the Jena circle.
Th is is also the case in the System des transcendentalen Idealismus of 
1800 that aims to explain “how the ultimate ground of the harmony 
between subjective and objective becomes an object to the I itself.”86 
Th e whole of philosophy starts, and must start, from an
absolute principle [that] is also at the same time the absolutely identi-
cal. [Th is] cannot be grasped or communicated through description, or 
through concepts at all. It can only be intuited. Such an intuition is the 
organ of all philosophy.
83 SW 1, 325.
84 Ibid. 
85 SW 1, 324. 
86 SW 3, 610. 
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Th e philosopher’s task is to establish “beyond doubt that such an intu-
ition does not rest upon a purely subjective deception,” that it pos-
sesses objectivity that is universal and acknowledged by everybody.
Th is universally acknowledged and altogether incontestable objectivity 
of intellectual intuition is art itself because the esthetic intuition simply 
is the intellectual intuition become objective.87
Th us Schelling’s search for the objectivity of this intellectual intuition, 
his attempt to justify its use in philosophy, forces him to venture into 
new and alien territory: the world of art. He has seen his Romantic 
friends in Jena at work, and he has attended their discussions on the 
meaning of art. Th ey have contemplated famous works of art together 
and “symphilosophized” and “sympoetized” about this experience. 
Subsequently, Schelling does what he does every time he is impressed 
by a new way of thinking: he tries to integrate it into his system. He 
is now convinced that art can prove that intellectual intuition is real. 
“Th e esthetic intuition is objectifi ed intellectual intuition.”88 How so?
For Kant, the world we know is at least in part product of the know-
ing mind. For Fichte, it is the production of the I. If the I does not 
recognize the world as itself, it is because it is its unconscious product. 
Th e Wissenschaft slehre teaches that theory and praxis are two rela-
tions between the I and its unconscious product. In cognition, the I is 
fi nite and must passively accept its own unconscious, infi nite product 
as alien. In morality, the opposite holds true. Th ere the world is expe-
rienced as fi nite, forever transcended by the striving of the I, which 
is infi nite. In ideal Infi nity the world, as the material of the I’s duty, 
will lose its independence. But neither in theory nor in practice does 
the I here and now recognize itself in its own unconscious product. 
Th is situation of a divide between the conscious and the unconscious, 
which still has a Kantian feel, is solved in art, in Schelling’s opinion.
In art, the confl ict between the I’s conscious and unconscious prod-
ucts is experienced as an internal one. Th e artist has conscious aims 
and techniques, but in genuine art there is also an element of incom-
prehensibility, of unconsciousness.
Th e basic character of the world of art is . . . an unconscious infi nity . . . In 
addition to what he has placed into it on purpose, the artist seems to 
87 SW 3, 624. 
88 SW 3, 625.
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have represented in it by instinct an Infi nity which no fi nite understand-
ing can wholly explicate.89
In art, the conscious and the unconscious are no longer opposed. In 
the work of art, the artistic I recognizes itself in its unconscious prod-
uct, and the confl ict ends in total harmony and infi nite satisfaction. 
Th e unconscious and infi nite element, which is inevitably refl ected in 
the work of art, is called genius. Truth and Goodness are mere ideals 
that drive science and morality, whereas Beauty is the miracle of the 
real presence of the Infi nite in the fi nite. Only the esthetic experience 
can synthesize the subjective and the objective pole of the Absolute, 
“the absolutely identical,” here and now.
Th e artist begins his work with a conscious design, but because the 
Absolute subconsciously works through him, more is produced than 
he intended or predicted. “In genius . . . a contradiction is solved that 
is absolute, and insoluble elsewhere.”90 Th e artist’s work is the Abso-
lute creating through him. To the non-artist this process remains a 
miracle. Th e philosopher may understand why the work of the artistic 
genius is necessary, but he cannot understand how he does it. None-
theless, art is the organon of all philosophy.91 Philosophy only raises 
thought above fragmentation, but “art carries the whole man, as he is, 
to the knowledge of the Highest, and in this lies the eternal diff erence 
and miracle of art.”92 Th e intellectual intuition of the philosopher is 
the subjective intuiting of the Absolute. Th is intuition “can become 
objective only through a second intuition. Th is second intuition is the 
esthetic.”93 What makes the esthetic intuition superior in Schelling’s 
view is that it provides actual products in which the “infi nite dichot-
omy of opposed activities” is resolved.94 What the philosopher can 
only think together, the artist actually presents.
Again, we see a synthesis of diff erent lines of thinking that we have 
come to recognize as typical for Schelling. Creative genius is com-
bined with the absolute I. Genius is “for the esthetic what the I is 
for philosophy, namely the supreme, absolute reality that never itself 
89 SW 3, 619. 
90 SW 3, 624.
91 See SW 3, 627. 
92 SW 3, 360. 
93 SW 3, 624. 
94 SW 3, 625. 
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becomes objective but is the cause of everything that is so.”95 Whereas 
Fichte is content to conclude that intellectual intuition of this absolute 
reality cannot be proven objectively and that there might be some-
thing wrong with such a demand for objectivity, Schelling does not 
hesitate to declare that he has managed to provide just such a proof. 
Emphasizing this absolute reality as the One Source from which all 
that is has sprung and connecting this immediately with the artistic 
endeavor is more or less in line with Hölderlin’s thinking, were it not 
that Schelling identifi es this Absolute with “the absolutely identical.” 
Hölderlin claims that since the essence of judgment (Urteil-Urtheilung) 
is characterized by the “is” of identity, identity can never be the high-
est. Over and above it is Being. And this ineff able, ungraspable unity, 
which grounds me and is in me but not within my realm of control, is 
what we long for from day to day. Philosophy can speculate about “it,” 
but while speculating the philosophers makes it into an object while at 
the same time having to acknowledge that is not and cannot be objec-
tive. “Reason . . . judges, and it takes place in the dimension that has 
been opened up by arche-separation,” as Henrich puts it.96 Schelling 
seems to forget to distinguish between what we call ‘I’ in daily life 
and the absoluteness of our I-hood time and again. Fichte’s absolute 
aspect of the empirical I is turned into all there is. Th e I is absolutized. 
Intellectual intuition thus becomes “a knowing that is simultaneously 
a producing of its object . . . and in which producer and product are one 
and the same.”97 Th e I becomes its own Creator and the Source of all 
that is. Fichte has a similar tendency but shies away from absolutizing 
the I as such. Th us we see Fichte’s “I am!” shift  to Schelling’s “I am it, 
the Absolute!” almost imperceptibly once again.
Even when Schelling writes that the artist is “governed” by a “power 
that separates him from all other people and compels him to say or 
depict things that he does not fully understand himself and whose 
meaning is infi nite,” he seems unaware of the importance of his own 
choice of words.98 Th e artist is “governed” by a sense of the Absolute. 
Th e artist realizes that in certain ways he is merely instrumental to this 
creative production. He cannot and does not try to master it, grasp it, 
95 SW 3, 619. See 5.3.4. for more about the genius tradition in romanticism.
96 Henrich 1992a, 82. 
97 SW 3, 369. 
98 SW 3, 617. 
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and control it. With this assertion, Schelling does indeed touch upon 
a crucial diff erence between Schelling, the philosopher, and the artist. 
Th e latter, and the theologian for that matter, opens her thinking for 
what she can no longer control in thinking and is in that sense “gov-
erned.” Instead of resolving it reasonably or otherwise, she lives it, or 
lives with it, in it. Th e artist is an I in touch with “the supreme, abso-
lute reality,” but the artist’s I, and every I in the world, is merely the 
opening to this reality. Th e I, as I, is not absolute and cannot control 
the Absolute. Judgment and participation denote diff erent perspec-
tives. Judgment and thinking make the I an outsider that controls; 
participation and intuiting imply its involvement. It is characteristic of 
Schelling’s thinking that even when writing about intellectual intuition, 
as, let’s say, the twilight zone of knowing, he does not allow anything 
other than clarity to reign. Intuition, however, does not take place in 
the bright daylight of philosophical refl ection. Intuition is not and can 
never serve as objective proof, but it can drive us nonetheless.
Around 1802, Schelling makes a fi nal attempt at justifi cation of intel-
lectual intuition as an objective instrument for the philosopher. He 
now defi nes intellectual intuition as “the capacity to see the universal 
in the particular, the Infi nite in the fi nite, and indeed to unite both in 
a living unity.”99 He tries an approach based on Kant’s view concern-
ing mathematics. According to Kant, proof in mathematics consists 
in constructing a concept a priori in intuition. Hence, Schelling fi nds 
proof in mathematics that the human mind has the capacity to per-
ceive the universal in the particular. By abstracting from all accidental 
features, the particular is viewed as a pure case of the universal. In 
geometry, we see how the rules for one particular form hold for all. 
Th e geometer deals with a universal that is the a priori form of sen-
sory intuition (space and time) whereas the philosopher deals with a 
universal that is the a priori form of intellectual intuition. Just like the 
geometer abstracts from the accidental properties of his particular fi g-
ure and considers its essential properties as pure instances of space in 
general, so the philosopher abstracts from all the contingent features 
of a particular object and sees it as a pure case of the Absolute.100
 99 SW 4, 362.
100 SW 5, 128–131.
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Kant only denies the existence of anything like a priori intuition 
for the philosopher because his concept of reason is far too narrow, 
in Schelling’s opinion. Kant reduces it to logic and makes it an exten-
sion of the concepts of understanding. What philosophy sorely needs 
is a new conception of reason. If it is the task of reason to fi nd the 
causes of an event, all it can ever hope to supply are the conditions 
for everything conditioned. Reason according to this conception will 
never be able to grasp the Unconditioned, the Absolute. Intellectual 
intuition is not explanation (i.e. showing how other objects act on 
something and cause it to act as it does), nor deduction (i.e. deriv-
ing something from higher principles), but contemplation, to consider 
something in itself, apart from its relations with other things. In intel-
lectual intuition, we can see an object as a representation of the entire 
universe. We intuit the identity of this particular with the universal. 
Th is intuition is not mediated by the senses because they grasp the 
object individually without recognizing it as part of a wider whole. 
Neither is it conceptual because to conceive an object is to subsume it 
under some universal and contrast it in some respects to other objects. 
Reason must be viewed as, say, the faculty of contemplation. Kant has 
indeed revealed the limitations of prevailing non-philosophies [Unphi-
losophien], Schelling agrees, but a new type should be possible, based 
on intellectual intuition. It should be in line with the Kantian Critique 
and systematically developed in order to test the truth of the original 
intuition.101
When also this attempt fails to convince his opponents, the term intel-
lectual intuition, at least as philosophema, dies quietly and Schelling 
turns to his philosophy of freedom.102 Let us nonetheless continue with 
the intuitive for as while and study Hölderlin’s philosophical and artis-
tic views on intellectual intuition.
101 SW 5, 5; 270.
102 It is fair to mention at least once that not much of the blown up I remains in the 
philosophy of the late Schelling. By then the philosophy of the intuiting I has become 
the philosophy of Revelation. Th e I is no longer (the way to) God. Th e philosopher 
cannot ascend to God. He can only fi nd God, if God descends. “God Himself must 
meet him with his aid and succor” (SW 10, 566).
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5.3. Hölderlin
Nature confounds the Pyrrhonian;
Reason confounds the dogmatic.
We have an incapacity to prove, in-
vincible for all dogmatism; we have
an idea of truth, invincible for all
Pyrrhonism.103
Th is short text Hölderlin writes to his friend Johann Caspar Camerer. 
On the one hand, “we have an idea of the truth” that no Pyrrhonism, 
no skepticism, can undermine. On the other hand, “we have an inca-
pacity to prove” all dogmatism notwithstanding. Hölderlin believes 
that we have a certain awareness of a primordial unity, Being in his 
terminology, that cannot be supported by reason because it precedes 
the dimension of reasoning: it is “invincible for all dogmatism.” No 
scientifi c knowledge will ever prove the ineradicable “idea” that we 
have of Being proper that precedes all consciousness and therefore 
all thoughts and acts. Th e indestructible certainty that we have of our 
unitary ground, of the “one-ness with all that lives” is the result of an 
intellectual intuition.104
As is the case with all of Hölderlin’s metaphysics, he has not theo-
rized much about intellectual intuition. Nonetheless, he seems to cat-
egorize this non-refl ective “idea of the truth” as a theoretical point of 
access at least at some point during his life. In a letter to Niethammer 
he writes,
I want to discover the principle which explains to me the divisions in 
which we think and exist, yet which is also capable of dispelling the 
confl ict between subject and object, between our self and the world, yes, 
also between reason and revelation, – theoretically, in intellectual intu-
ition [italics CvW].105
However, in a letter to Schiller he asserts that the philosophical demand 
that subject and object be unifi ed in an Absolute, “I or however one 
wants to name it,” is possible “esthetically, in the intellectual intuition, 
103 “La nature confond les Pyrrhoniens; / La raison confond les Dogmatistes. / Nous 
avons une impuissance à prouver, in- / vincible à tout le dogmatisme; nous avons / 
une idée de la verité, invincible à tout le / Pyrrhonisme” (in: Henrich 1992a, 74). 
104 “Einigkeit mit allem, was lebt” (StA IV, 267). 
105 StA VI, 203. Again, I will append the German original only when Hölderlin’s 
non-prose is concerned.
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but theoretically only through an infi nite approach.”106 Like Schelling, 
Hölderlin believes that intellectual intuition is indispensable to inspire 
the intellect to surpass itself, to turn mere refl ection into philosophical 
inspiration. He fi nds something lacking in cold rationalism as well. 
Refl ection, mere human reason, is only “dry bread,” whereas he who 
has experienced a fl ash of true insight into Being has been “secretly 
feasting at the table of the gods.” “Th e light of the divine [One diff er-
entiated in itself is] the ideal of the Beauty of striving reason.”107
Th ese quotes suggest that there is no clear demarcation between the 
experience of One-ness in theory and in poetry for Hölderlin. Some-
times he calls intellectual intuition esthetical rather than theoretical. 
Early in his career, he starts to view poetry as superior to philosophy, 
and in Th e Oldest System-Program of German Idealism it is explained 
why.108 Th e exact authorship of this text is contested, but it is agreed 
that it was written in the immediate circle(s) of our famous Stift ler. 
It has been preserved in Hegel’s handwriting, it comprises a theory 
of beauty that is supposedly mainly Hölderlin’s work, and it could be 
said that Schelling’s work constitutes the most complete elaboration of 
the program. Let us start there to get an idea of Hölderlin’s views on 
the relationship between poetry and philosophy and the crucial role of 
intellectual intuition.
5.3.1. Poetry and Philosophy
It is argued in this text that “reasonable” ideas will not appeal to 
“the populace” because the masses need an approach based on the 
senses instead of the abstractions of metaphysics. “Until we render 
the ideas esthetic . . . they will not be of any interest to the populace.”109 
Th erefore, philosophy needs to be made “sensuous” by esthetics and 
poetry “reasonable” by ideas. Only in a successful combination, “there 
prevails eternal unity among us. No longer the contemptuous look, 
no longer the blind trembling of the populace before its sages and 
106 StA VI, 181.
107 “Das trokne Brod, das menschliche Vernunft  wohlmeinend ihm reicht, ver-
schmähet er, weil er ingeheim am Göttertische schwelgt” (StA III, 81); “das göttliche 
divine ἑν δειαφερον εαυτῳ, das Ideal der Schönheit der strebenden Vernunft ” (StA 
III, 83).
108 See StA IV, 297–299.
109 StA IV, 299. 
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priests.”110 Reasonable poetry is preferable to the philosophy of sages 
and the institutionalized religion of priests because both keep people 
blind and trembling for those who claim access to the Divine. Poetry 
“at the service of ideas” is superior to any metaphysical theory because 
of its “sensuous” liveliness. Such poetry is the consummation of what 
is only begun in philosophy. Th rough a combination of fragmentary 
speech and the “personifi cation of abstract terms,” the poem can stim-
ulate the educated reader to complement the fragment into a “total 
impression,” Hölderlin writes elsewhere.111 Poetry can help us intuit 
the whole.
Since Being is an all-encompassing unity in which we all partici-
pate, we cannot oppose ourselves to it. It cannot be objectifi ed, and it 
remains in the realm of the unconscious. Being cannot be grasped by 
way of rational argumentation; it cannot be defi ned or presented by 
philosophy. It is through the non-discursive and intuitive expression 
of the poem that Being is articulated or realized, albeit only in fl ashes. 
Intellectual intuition cannot be permanent in people; it would kill them. 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, too long an encounter with 
pure divine unity implies loss of consciousness, death. Hence, these 
fl ashes of intellectual intuition are immediately followed by refl ection, 
a return to individual being. Th is antagonism between unity and (self-)
consciousness has been discussed extensively in 4.5.
Both poet and true philosopher rely upon the experience of 
One-ness that Hölderlin calls intellectual intuition. Without intel-
lectual intuition, both occupations can produce no more than mere 
handicraft : “How ineff ectual is the best-intentioned diligence of men 
compared with the power of pure inspiration!”112 True philosophy 
should be more than intellectual analysis, more than instrumental use 
of reason.
Th e entire business of intellect is makeshift . By its ability to sort out, it 
saves us from folly, from injustice; but to be safe from folly and injustice 
is, aft er all, not the highest level of human excellence . . . Mere intellect 
produces no philosophy, for philosophy is more than the limited percep-
110 StA IV, 298f. I will not elaborate on the term that the text uses for this fusion 
of poetry and philosophy: “new mythology.” Th is will start to play a large role in the 
late Schelling’s work. 
111 StA IV, 183.
112 “Wie unvermögend ist doch der gutwilligste Fleiss der Menschen gegen die All-
macht der ungetheilten Begeisterung” (StA III, 14).
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tion of what is . . . more than blind demand for ever greater progress in 
the combination and diff erentiation of some particular material.113
True philosophy is touched by the divine light of Being. Both poetry and 
true philosophy originate from the same source: divine Being. When 
one of Hyperion’s companions asks, “What has philosophy . . . what has 
the cold majesty of this discipline to do with poetry?”114 He answers, 
“Poetry . . . is the beginning and the end of philosophy . . . philosophy 
springs from the poetry of eternal, divine Being.”115 However, since 
philosophical theory (refl ection) belongs to the dimension of judg-
ment, it can never be adequate to express the primordial One-ness 
of Being. Even inspired philosophy cannot be compared to poetry, 
according to Hölderlin. Th at is why he considers the profession of the 
poet superior to that of the philosopher. Th e following quote expresses 
Hölderlin’s opinion on the subject quite eloquently. “Th ere is an asy-
lum where every poet who is stranded like me can fi nd a honorable 
refuge – philosophy. But I cannot leave my fi rst love, the hope of my 
youth.”116 May this be a comfort to those of us who are artistically not 
particularly gift ed!
Elsewhere he phrases the connection of poetry and philosophy dif-
ferently. Philosophy is more than a home for failed poets. It plays its 
own, specifi c role in the relationship with our unitary origin and its 
drive “to promote life, to hasten the infi nite process of perfection of 
Nature.” To show people which is the right course in life,
that they may take it with their eyes open and with joy and nobility, that 
is the business of philosophy, the fi ne arts, religion, which themselves 
113 “Des Verstandes ganzes Geschäft  ist Nothwerk. Vor dem Unsinn, vor dem 
Unrecht schützt er uns, indem er ordnet; aber sicher zu seyn vor Unsinn und vor 
Unrecht ist doch nicht die höchste Stuff e menschlicher Vortrefl ichkeit. . . . Aus blosem 
Verstande kommt keine Philosophie, denn Philosophie ist mehr, denn nur die 
beschränkte Erkenntniss des Vorhandnen . . . mehr, denn blinde Forderung eines nie 
zu endigen Fortschritts in Vereinigung und Unterscheidung eines möglichen Stoff s” 
(StA III, 83).
114 “Was hat die Philosophie . . ., was hat die kalte Erhabenheit dieser Wissenschaft  
mit Dichtung zu thun?” (StA IV, 81).
115 “Die Dichtung . . . ist der Anfang und das Ende dieser Wissenschaft  . . ., entspringt 
aus der Dichtung eines unendlichen göttlichen Seyns” (StA IV, 81).
116 “Es giebt zwar einen Hospital, wohin sich jeder auf meine Art verunglükte Poët 
mit Ehren fl üchten kann – die Philosophie. Aber ich kann von meiner ersten Liebe, 
von den Hofnungen meiner Jugend nicht lassen” (StA II, 289).
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arise from this drive. Philosophy makes aware of this drive, shows it 
its infi nite object in the ideal, and strengthens and purifi es it through 
this ideal. Th e fi ne arts present its infi nite object to this drive in a liv-
ing image in a presented higher world; and religion teaches it to divine 
and believe in this higher world right there, where he is seeking it and 
wants to create it, . . . like a hidden aptitude, like a spirit that wants to 
unfold.117
Philosophy, religion, and poetry all have a diff erent function. Philoso-
phy makes us conscious of our drive towards perfection and further 
defi nes it (“it opens our eyes”). Religion teaches us to intuit the pres-
ence of this ideal and believe in it (with “nobility”). However, only the 
fi ne arts are able to give us the “joy” of “a living image,” to realize a 
fragment of eternal Being. Th ere is a limit to what can be expressed 
rationally. Distinctions and specifi cations clarify and order our think-
ing, but it will never enable us to get in touch with the Divine.
Hölderlin is not prepared to content himself with clarifi cation and 
analysis, as is the philosopher’s task. His impatience with the imper-
fection of all that is said and his urge to realize perfection here and 
now are the ingredients for the tragedy that his attempts at philoso-
phy lead to. He realizes the shortcomings of his own philosophy and 
philosophy in general. Th is insight puts an end to his ambitions as 
a philosopher. But when he fl ees from Jena and a career in philoso-
phy, he does not try to escape from what he considers his task in life; 
the presentation of what cannot be presented [Darstel lung des Undar-
stellbaren]. He wants to reunite what has been separated. Nothing, no 
creature and no thought, can and should be left  out of this Unity. Art, 
especially poetry, seems to be the only instrument for expressing and 
presenting the underlying unity of all that is: Being. As we will see 
in 5.3.4., he soon comes to realize that also poetry is doomed to fail 
such a grand task. But let us fi rst look at Hölderlin’s thoughts on the 
production of the poem.
5.3.2. Grasping the Father’s Ray . . .
In the poem Wie wenn am Feiertage [As on a Holiday], Hölderlin 
describes the process of the conception of the poem. Artists cultivate 
Beauty, which is an expression of unitary Being, and works of art 
117 StA VI, 329.
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arise from the joint activity of the Divine and the human and both 
benefi t from it, we have learned in the preceding chapter. Artistic 
activity brings Being and people closer together; the defi nite and the 
indefi nite lines approach. Or as he writes elsewhere, Being becomes 
“more organic as a result of the molding cultivating human beings,” 
and people become more “general and infi nite.”118 In Wie wenn am 
Feiertage Hölderlin describes the poet’s task as “grasping the Father’s 
ray” and “wrapping it in song.” For clarity’s sake, we will start with a 
prose translation of the entire poem.119 Since translations cannot do 
justice to the virtuosity of Hölderlin’s poetry, the German text will be 
included in Appendix A.
As on a holiday, to see the fi eld, a countryman goes out, in the morning, 
when out of the hot night the cooling lightning has fallen for hours on 
end and far away the thunder still sounds, the river returns to its banks, 
and freshly the ground turns green, and with the joyful rain of heaven 
the grape-vine drips, and glistening in the quiet sunlight the trees of the 
orchard stand:
So in favorable weather they stand, they whom no master alone, whom 
wonderfully omnipresent teaches in a light embrace, mighty, divinely 
beautiful Nature. So when she seems to sleep at certain times of the year, 
in the heavens or among the plants or the peoples, the face of the poets 
also will mourn. Th ey seem to be alone, yet always they are foreknowing. 
For foreknowing she herself also rests.
But now day breaks! I awaited it and saw it come, and what I saw, it 
is holy, now be my word. For she, she herself, who is older than the ages 
and above the gods of Evening and Orient, Nature now has awoken with 
clash of arms. And high from the Ether down to the abyss according to 
rigid law, engendered out of holy Chaos, as once she was, rapture feels 
herself, the All-creative anew.
And as a fi re gleams in the eye of the man when he devises a noble 
conception, so anew by the signs, the deeds of the world now a fi re 
has been kindled in the souls of the poets. And what happened before, 
though scarcely felt, only now is revealed, and those who smilingly 
tended the fi elds for us, in the guise of laborers, have been recognized, 
the All-living, the powers of the gods.
Do you ask who they are? In song their spirit hovers, when it grows 
from the sun of day and the warm soil, and storms in the sky, and others, 
more prepared in the depths of time, and more meaningful, and more 
118 “die Natur organischer durch den bildenden cultivirenden Menschen” and the 
human being “aorgischer, allgemeiner, unendlicher geworden ist” (StA IV, 153).
119 StA II, 118–120. For Michael Hamburger’s poetic translation, see Hölderlin 
1990, 192–196.
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perceptible, drift  toward us between Heaven and earth and among the 
peoples. Th e thoughts of the communal Spirit are silently ending in the 
soul of the poet,
So that swift ly visited, familiar to infi nite powers for a long time, 
trembling with recollection, and set on fi re by the Holy Ray, the fruit 
conceived in love, the work of gods and men, the song, that it may bear 
witness to both, succeeds. Th us, as poets tell, for she desired to see the 
god in person, visible, his lightning hit Semele’s house and the divinely 
struck gave birth, to the fruit of the thunderstorm, to the holy Bacchus.
And hence the sons of the earth now drink heavenly fi re without 
danger. Yet it befi ts us, you poets!, to stand bare-headed beneath God’s 
thunderstorms, to grasp the Father’s ray, himself, with our own hands, 
and to off er the heavenly gift  to the people, wrapped in song. For only if 
we are pure in heart, like children, and guiltless our hands,
Th en the Father’s ray, the pure, will not scorch it. And, deeply shaken, 
sharing the suff erings of the stronger one, in the storms of the god, 
crashing down from above, as he nears, yet the heart will stand fast. But 
woe is me! When with [a self-infl icted wound my heart is bleeding, and 
peace is deeply lost to me, and freely modest self-contentment, and when 
unrest and lack drive me towards the abundance of the gods’ table, when 
all around me . . .]120 Woe is me!
And let me say at once . . . I was approached to look upon the Heav-
enly; they themselves cast me, the false priest, down far below the living, 
into the dark, that I may sing the song of warning for those eager to 
learn. Th ere . . .
Th e poem starts with a sketch of the countryside on a summer morning 
aft er a stifl ingly hot night with thunderstorms. Nature is green and fer-
tile, still dripping with the night rains. All is quiet still, but the moment 
of Nature’s awakening is near. In the second stanza, the poets’ pre-
dicament is described. Th ey are the students of Nature. In Hölderlin’s 
philosophical terminology, this means that they are directly in touch 
with unitary Being. Th e “wonderfully omnipresent,” who is “mighty” 
and “divinely beautiful,” “older than the ages,” and even “above the 
gods,” has been sleeping, unconscious. In our time of darkness, as we 
have seen in 4.6., the Divine seems far removed. Being and conscious-
ness are not on speaking terms, so to say.
120 I follow Hamburger in inserting the lines in brackets from an earlier prose draft  
(StAII, 2 669f.) to explain the abrupt change of tone and the inconclusiveness of the 
poem. See Hamburger 1961, 80.
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Poets in particular suff er because of this remoteness. Th ey “mourn” 
and feel “alone.” Nevertheless, they have not lost touched with Nature/
Being altogether: they are “foreknowing.” Hölderlin uses the German 
word ahnen or ahnden that is sometimes also translated with “divin-
ing.” Even when Nature “rests” and the Divine seems absent in sleep, 
the poets seem to have an awareness of unitary Being that precedes 
all knowing, all refl ection. Th is awareness is what Hölderlin describes 
as intellectual intuition in his philosophical texts. It is an intuition of 
the unitary ground, of the One-ness of all that is. Surprisingly, not 
only the poets are foreknowing, so is Nature herself. Poets seem to 
be connected with our unitary ground by this mutual “foreknowing.” 
Th ey communicate in this twilight zone between the nightly darkness 
of sleep and the daylight of consciousness. Because of their ability to 
allow the contours of their thinking to blur, Nature is starting to wake 
up. Being seems to be gaining consciousness, or at least have an aware-
ness of the possibility of doing so through the art of the poets.
In the third stanza “day breaks” and Nature stirs. Th e “All-creative” 
now has awoken from the “holy Chaos, as once she was,” and she 
“feels herself anew.” Th is is not full, explicit consciousness, but it takes 
a certain degree of consciousness to feel oneself. Th is feeling is closer 
to explicit consciousness than divining. Poet and Being approach. 
Being that was always there, but could only be foreknown and not 
experienced because all consciousness was lacking, is becoming more 
explicit in the poets’ (its own) consciousness. A “fi re has been kindled 
in the souls of the poets.” Th at which was “scarcely felt, only now 
is revealed.” Th e poets have labored on their fi elds, and fi nally their 
hard work is beginning to bear fruit. “Th e All-living, the powers of 
the gods,” the “thoughts of the communal Spirit . . . silently ending in 
the poet’s soul.” Th e seed of divine Being has been planted in the poet 
where it has been growing. Th e “fruit conceived in love” is about to be 
born. Th e poem is the product of the intimacy of the poets and Nature. 
Th e “song” that “bear[s] witness to both,” that is “the work of gods and 
men,” will succeed and bring Being into being.
Th is sounds almost like a romantic love story, but the sixth stanza 
warns us. Th e encounter with the Divine can only be “swift ” and “fl eet-
ing.” As can be learned from the old myth of the birth of Bacchus, too 
much contact, seeing “the god in person, visible” is like being struck 
by lightning. Intellectual intuition is dangerous business. It sets on 
fi re, and the “divinely struck” may give birth to holy off spring but not 
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survive the ordeal. Nonetheless, Hölderlin seems quite self-confi dent. 
History has taught the poets how to “grasp the Father’s ray,” and “the 
sons of earth now drink heavenly fi re without danger.” If the poet 
is “pure in heart,” he can “stand bare-headed” and remain upright 
“beneath God’s thunderstorms” that come “crashing down” when “the 
god nears.” Only the impure will be seared by this heavenly light.
Th e poet is depicted as hero and priest. He is the mediator of the 
Divine. Th anks to the poets’ eff orts, the “heavenly gift ” is off ered to 
“the people,” “wrapped in song.” But this sacramental conception of 
poetry, to which the word “signs” in the fourth stanza also refers, for-
bids complacency. Th e conception of the poem is not a magic trick of 
“grasping the Father’s ray” that the poet performs in order to nicely 
package Divine Being. “But woe is me!” Hölderlin hesitates. Abruptly 
the poem’s tone changes in the penultimate stanza. Hölderlin has been 
known to revise his poems frequently, sometimes over a period of sev-
eral years. Th e unfi nished sentence and the fragment of a preliminary 
prose draft  that has been inserted show Hölderlin’s discontent with 
this section. Th is conception of the role of the poet is apparently not as 
straightforward as it might seem and is rejected as false priesthood in 
the fi nal stanza. Before discussing Hölderlin’s realization of the hubris 
of this view, let us fi rst take a closer look at the next step in the produc-
tion of the poem. Th is is the process of naming [nennen].
5.3.3. . . . and Wrapping it in Song
Th e poet is to “off er the heavenly gift  to people” by “wrapping it in 
song.” What is essentially wordless has to be expressed in words. 
What is only intuited has to be named. Naming the nameless plays 
an important role in Hölderlin’s ideas about the responsibilities of the 
poet. Wolfgang Binder has made an extensive study of the name sym-
bolism in Hölderlin’s work.121 Th ree types of namelessness in connec-
tion with Being can be distinguished: the unnamable name of original 
Being, the neglected and renounced name of unitary Being, and the 
name of Being that is celebrated wordlessly.
121 See Binder 1961/62. I follow Binder’s categories, but my interpretation of and 
my reference to Hölderlin diff er considerably.
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Th e poem Natur und Kunst oder Saturn und Jupiter [Nature and Art 
or Saturn and Jupiter] will serve to illustrate the three diff erent types 
of namelessness.122 A prose translation of the entire poem is provided 
and the German original can be found in Appendix B.
You govern high up in the day and your law prevails.
You hold the scales of judgment, O Son of Saturn.
You hand out our lots and rest contented
In the fame of the immortal art of kingship.
Yet to the abyss, the singers know,
You have dismissed the Holy Father, your own.
And long now he has lain lamenting
Th ere where the wild ones before you justly remain.
Guiltless the god of the golden age:
Once eff ortless and greater than you, even though
He uttered no commandment, and
No mortal on earth ever named him.
So down with you! Or do not be ashamed to give thanks!
And if you want to stay, defer to the older one,
And grant him that above all others,
Gods and humans, the singer name him!
For see, as from clouds your lightning, thus comes
From him what you call yours! Th us to him bear witness
Your commands, and from Saturn’s
Peace every power has developed.
And once I have felt in my heart of hearts and
Do the things that you shaped grow dim,
And in its cradle to my delight
Changing Time has dozed off :
Th en I will know you, Kronion, then I will hear you,
Th e wise master who, like ourselves, a son
Of Time, gives laws to us and,
Uncovers what lies hidden in holy twilight.
Let us look at the three categories of namelessness as they appear in 
the poem:
1. Unknown
Th e fi rst type of namelessness is found in the characterization of Sat-
urn in the third stanza. As the title of the poem indicates, Saturn is 
122 StA II, 37f. 
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synonymous to Nature that, in turn, stands for unitary Being, as we 
have seen in 4.3.2. Before time existed, Saturn ruled “eff ortless[ly].” 
“He uttered no commandment,” but his peace ruled. Before the arche-
separation occurs, there is no separation, no opposition, and neither 
mortals nor confl icts exist. But there is no consciousness either. Th ere 
was only Saturn/Nature, “the god of the golden age.” Primordial, 
unconscious Being is still unknown, hence nameless: “no mortal on 
earth ever named him.”
2. Renounced
Th en comes Jupiter. Jupiter, a synonym for art here, is Saturn’s son 
and “son of Time,” Kronion. His laws prevail, but he (art) seems to 
deny his/its own origins: the “immortal kingship” of unitary Being. 
He “dismissed the Holy Father to the abyss” where he “long now has 
lain lamenting.” Th e arche-separation occurs, time and consciousness 
set in: the age of Jupiter. Saturn/Nature lies “guiltless[ly]” suff ering in 
the abyss, neglected and renounced; nameless. Hölderlin orders the 
younger god to put an end to this situation, to either leave or “defer 
to the older” god and “grant him that above all others . . . the singer 
name him.” Saturn should be given the honors that he is owed, aft er 
all from comes “what you call yours.” It is from Saturn’s peace that 
every power develops; Being is the source of all that is. Saturn is the 
father of Jupiter; art is a child of Being. Art has its own laws, its own 
ways of judging and ruling, and there is nothing wrong with that. 
But it tends to forget where it came from; it renounces its creative 
source, the origins of its powers of speech. Th ese laws should not 
replace what art is ultimately about: recognizing and naming the 
nameless “above all.”
Hölderlin recognizes the diffi  culties involved in naming. Elsewhere 
he warns for an all too easy and wrong type of naming. People have 
a way of labeling that gives them the illusion that attaching a name 
automatically implies knowledge of what has been named. But a fi xed, 
standard, thoughtless type of naming according to the rules and the 
conventions we have learned during childhood is counterproductive. 
It merely causes objectifi cation. It opposes the named to the namer 
and emphasizes separation. Th ereby it creates a distance that belies 
our intimate connection in a common, original ground. Th e wrong 
type of naming only serves to isolate us from each other and from 
the Divine. Even the gods themselves we have learned to objectify, 
thus causing alienation. How diff erent is the relationship of the young 
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child to the “friendly gods” as expressed in the poem Da ich ein Knabe 
war . . . [When I was a boy . . .].
How my soul loved you.
True, in those days I did not
Call you by name, and you
Never called me as men do, as if
Th ey knew one another, with names.123
Th e language “of men” tends to destroy the familiarity with Being. 
Th at is why the wise Empedocles advises his listeners to bravely forget 
the old names of the gods, learned from their fathers, and to lift  their 
eyes to divine Nature like newborns.124
To return to our original poem: Jupiter/art has taken over the world 
giving “laws” and “judgments” and enjoying the “fame” of “kingship.” 
Since it took the birth of Jupiter for naming to become possible at all, 
this is not a bad event as such. Jupiter is a “wise master” from whom 
there is much to be learned. However, his kingship should not exist 
at the cost of the “older one,” the unitary Being of Saturn. Art, the 
artist, should acknowledge the One, Being, as the other parent of its 
off spring, the work of art. Th e poet should give a voice to Being, name 
his intellectual intuition of absolute Oneness, and uncover what “lies 
hidden in holy twilight.” Th erefore a diff erent kind of namelessness is 
called for: the name that does not objectify but celebrates unity.
3. Celebrated
Th e fi nal type of namelessness results from a deep respect for the 
Divine. As Diotima expresses this in Hyperion,
the One, that we honor, we do not name; even though He is as intimate 
to us as we are to ourselves, we do not pronounce His name. No day 
celebrates Him; no temple is appropriate for Him; the harmony of our 
spirits and their endless growth alone celebrate Him.125
123 “Freundlichen Götter! / Dass ihr wüsstet, / Wie euch meine Seele geliebt! / Zwar 
damals rief ich noch nicht / Euch mit Namen, auch ihr / Nanntet mich nie, wie die 
Menschen sich nennen / Als kennten sie sich / doch kannt’ ich euch besser, / Als ich 
je die Menschen gekannt” (StA I, 266).
124 See StA IV, 65.
125 “Den Einen, dem wir huldigen, nennen wir nicht; ob er gleich us nah ist, wie 
wir selbst sind, wir sprechen ihn nicht aus. Ihn feiert kein Tag; kein Tempel ist ihm 
angemessen; der Einklang unserer Geister, und ihr unendlich Wachstum feiert ihn 
allein” (StA III, 224).
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Being, the One, in its purity can and should never become the object 
of our rituals. Any type of objectifi cation would rob it of its all-encom-
passing unity, “no day . . . no temple is appropriate.” Th e right type of 
namelessness is the only way to protect absolute One-ness. As par-
ticipants in this unity, we can only celebrate “the One” with our lives, 
by living in a “harmony of our spirits” and by an “endless growth” 
towards a state of being that will honor both our individuality and 
our unity.
Poets are aware of this (“the singers know”) and order Jupiter, “do 
not be ashamed to give thanks” and “defer to the older one” on whose 
“fame of the immortal art of kingship” he “contented[ly] rest[s].” Th ey 
demand that he “grant him [Saturn/Nature] that above all others, gods 
and humans, the singer name him” because “from him has come what 
you call yours,” namely the “commands” and “every power.” In this 
sacramental act of the nameless naming of eternal Being poets take on 
the role of “holy priests.”126 Hence Schmidt remarks,
When Hölderlin says I . . . this I is always a visionary and priestly elevated 
I, that stands out not as the result of its own wishes, but thanks to a holy 
offi  ce and as the organ of the Divine.127
Such priesthood takes a special state of mind in which “the things that 
you shaped grow dim, and . . . changing Time has dozed off .” Th en the 
poet can feel in his “hearts of hearts” the delight of “changing Time” 
that “has dozed off .” Th is refers to the semi-conscious awareness of 
intellectual intuition in which the contours of the objects fade (the 
“things that you shaped grow dim”) and the diff erence between the 
subject and the surrounding objects becomes less defi ned. When this 
happens, the poet will “hear” Jupiter’s laws and understand how he 
“uncovers that which lies hidden in holy twilight”: the eternal unity 
of Saturn.
Names distinguish and identify the diff erent aspects of life on earth. 
Th is is inevitable and even useful. However, a thoughtless, automatic 
type of naming makes the distinction absolute, objectifi es, isolates, and 
thus obscures the One Source from which all things arise and in which 
they participate: eternal Being. Th e two poems discussed have given us 
126 “heilige Priester” (StA II, 94). 
127 Schmidt 1968, 23.
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an idea of the relationship of poetry to Being and the role of the poet. 
Th e poet needs an (intellectual) intuition of the unitary origin and 
the ever existent intimate connection between all that is. Laws of art 
are worthless, if they renounce their ultimate source. Th e poet grasps 
the Father’s ray and wraps it in song. Th ere is an undeniable pre-
sumptuousness in this conception of poetry, which seems very unlike 
Hölderlin. Let us see how he seems to play with this romantic notion 
of artistic genius for a while only to unmask it as hubris.
5.3.4. Th e Hubris of the Poet
Works of art arise from the intimacy of the human and the divine, and 
in this process the role of the artist is of major importance, Hölderlin 
has asserted in the preceding. Th e immensity of this task is underlined 
in his theory on poetry. In the theoretical self-defi nition unfolded in 
Über die Verfahrungsweise des poëtischen Geistes [On the Operations 
of the Poetic Spirit] the role of the poet becomes frighteningly gran-
diose.128 In the fi rst sentence, extending over nearly three pages, he 
claims that the poet needs to be “in control of the Spirit.” He has to 
have “felt and appropriated, held fast and assured himself of the com-
munal soul that is common to everyone and proper to each.”129 To 
think that the artist can be “in control of the Spirit,” can manipulate 
Being so to say, sounds like a less than modest conception of the role 
of the poet.
Hölderlin has also been connected with the romantic notion of cre-
ative genius, a tradition primarily associated with Schelling. Lavater 
defi nes genius as follows: “Where there are eff ect, power, activity, 
thought, and sentiment that cannot be learned from people and that 
cannot be taught.” Th e genius is considered sovereign to all norms that 
are established and fi xed by tradition because in his geniality the poet 
is identical to God [Gottgleich].130 Th e genius transcends the earthly, 
as also the name Hyperion implies, and moves as a fettered stream 
“towards the immortal . . . where the arms of the Father absorb it.”131 
128 StA IV 241–265.
129 StA IV, 241.
130 Lavater 1949, 815. 
131 See the poem Der Gefesselte Strom [Th e Fettered Stream]; “wandelt hin zu 
Unsterblichen . . . wo ihn in die Arme der Vater aufnimmt” (StA II, 67).
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Th e genius tradition is a modern attempt to grant ultimate legitimacy 
and authority to the poet who views himself as “the natural organ of 
public justice.” Th is unrealistic self-image contrasts sharply with the 
social status and fi nancial dependency of the late 18th to early 19th 
century poet whose life is very insecure. Many young men aspiring to 
be poets are forced to accept a job as a private tutor [Hofmeister] to 
make ends meet.132
Th e two poems that have been discussed in this chapter defi nitely 
contain elements that could categorize Hölderlin’s self-defi nition as 
that of the romantic creative genius. He seems to have overestimated 
his own creative role from time to time, especially in his younger 
years. However, in his mature work (around the turn of the century) 
he seems to become well aware of the limitations of the poet, or of any 
human being for that matter, in the ability to “grasp” the Divine. Th e 
fi nal stanzas of Wie wenn am Feiertage [As on a Holiday], written in 
1799, could be interpreted as an indication of his hesitation to picture 
the poet as a direct mediator of the Divine. “Woe is me!” He shies 
away from the hubris of such a self-conception calling himself a “false 
priest.” In Wie wenn am Feiertage he asserts that Nature/Being is the 
poets’ only master, but in Natur und Kunst he explicitly calls Jupiter/
art a “wise master” who “gives laws” to the poets and thereby uncov-
ers “what lies hidden in holy twilight.” Apparently, a close connection 
with Being does not allow the poet to think himself above the law. 
Besides, in the last stanza of Wie wenn am Feiertage Hölderlin uses 
the passive tense: “I was approached to look upon the Heavenly.”133 
Th e initiative apparently lies with the Divine and not with the poet. 
When the Divine makes itself known to mortals, humility rather than 
genius seems to be called for. It takes one who is “pure in heart” to be 
able “to stand bare-headed” when “the god nears” otherwise he will be 
“scorched” by this heavenly light and cast “into the dark.”134
Moreover, in the poem Der Rhein of 1801 he seems to connect a 
type of ascetics with the poet’s, or maybe even the mystic’s, role that 
has nothing to do with the triumphal march of the genius. Since the 
Heavenly “feel nothing at all,”
132 See Kurz 2003, 68–70.
133 “Ich sei genaht, die Himmlischen zu schauen” (StA II, 120) [italics CvW].
134 See 5.3.2. 
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Th ere must come, if to speak
Th us is permitted, another who feels
On their behalf, him
Th ey use and need.
However, the Schwärmer who “should seek to be like them and not 
allow inequality” has to be prepared for the consequences of this 
desire. For
. . . their deposition
Is that he shall destroy
His own house, curse what he loves most
As his enemy, and under the rubble
Bury his father and his child.135
Too much equality with the unitary source of all that is could put peo-
ple in mortal danger and requires strict ascetism. Otherwise, they are 
struck by a fate similar to that of Empedocles of Hölderlin’s unfi nished 
tragedy.136 Empedocles calls himself a god and believes to be able to 
free himself from all earthly dependencies. He is punished for his lack 
of humility and ceases to be the mouthpiece of the gods. Hölderlin 
labels this attitude as the “hubris of the genius” who “chose foolhardy 
arrogance making a mock of heavenly fi res despising mortal paths to 
become the equal of gods on their own authority.”137
In Friedensfeier of 1802, which has been discussed in the previous 
chapter, Hölderlin displays yet another perspective on the work of the 
poet. He is viewed as the one who prepares the realization of Being 
that will be completed at the end of time. It is the poet who assists 
in the organization of the celebration of peace: he provides the “ban-
quet” and the “garlands” and sends the invitations for the eschaton. 
Th is does not imply that the poet is capable of realizing this celebra-
tion autonomously. Th e poet can “foreknow” or “divine” the state of 
135 Denn weil / Die Seeligsten nichts fühlen von selbst, / Muss wohl, wenn solches 
zu sagen / Erlaubt ist, in der Götter Nahmen / Th eilnemend fühlen ein Andrer, / Den 
brauchen sie; jedoch ihr Gericht / Ist, dass sein eigenes Haus / Zerbreche der und das 
Liebste / Wie den Feind schelt’ und sich Vater und Kind / Begrabe unter den Trüm-
mern, / Wenn einer, wie sie, seyn will und nicht / Ungleiches dulden, der Schwärmer” 
(StA II, 145).
136 Der Tod des Empedokles (StA IV, 3–168).
137 “Übermut des Genies” (StA IV, 446); See “Dann haben des eigenen Rechts/ 
Und gewiss des himmlischen Feuers/ Gespottet die Trotzigen, dann erst/ Die sterb-
lichen Pfade verachtend / Verwegenes erwählt/ Und den Göttern gleich zu werden 
getrachtet” (StA II, 145).
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all-reconciliation at the end of time and hence further human readi-
ness by prophesizing about its peace and harmony. He is the visionary 
whose task it is to explain “secret sign[s]” from heaven. Th e image that 
Hölderlin uses elsewhere of “the baton of song” fuses the role of the 
visionary whose most important attribute is the baton, with the task 
of the poet whose tool is the song.138 Hölderlin also presents a similar 
point of view in the poem Rousseau. Th e poet is one who can “see 
beyond his own time,” who understands the “hints, . . . the language 
of the gods,” who “reads the ultimate perfection in the fi rst sign” and 
“prophetically fl ies before his approaching gods.”139
Th e poet is the person with the talent to anticipate a new reality. He 
prepares people for a new era. “O wake, you poets, wake [the peoples] 
from slumber, those who are still asleep.” It is his song that “awakens 
the dead who are not yet made captive by coarseness.”140 He may even 
hope for this eff ect to last beyond his lifetime: “Th is is the holy goal of 
my desires, and my pursuit – Th is, that I awaken the germs now that 
will ripen in times to come.”141 But no more than that. Th e process of 
realization of a new era is not dictated by human planning and remains 
dependent upon the Divine. Even the poet can do no more that antici-
pate and await the fl ow of this gradual process of spiritualization until 
“it grows mature.”142 In the mean time, his task is to make sure that 
“the existing be well explained.”143 As Hölderlin matures, he learns to 
relativize the genius as the “fearfully active” I that is an expression of 
hubris and lack of hope. “For much can our kind accomplish, . . . but 
faced with powers divine, the strong will stand abashed.”144 Th e poet 
may only hope that “the Hallowed be my word.”145
138 “der Stab/ Des Gesanges” (StA II, 170).
139 “siehet über die eigne Zeit”; “Winke . . . die Sprache der Götter”; “kennt im ersten 
Zeichen Vollendetes schon”; “fl iegt . . . weissagend seinen kommenden Göttern voraus” 
(StA II, 12f.).
140 “O wekt, ihr Dichter! Wekt sie vom Schlummer auch, Die jezt noch schlafen” 
(StA I, 261); “Die Todten weket / Er auf, die noch gefangen nicht / Vom Rohen sind” 
(StA II, 170).
141 StA VI, 93.
142 “Bis dass es reift ” (BrA IX, 236). 
143 “Bestehendes gut gedeutet,” see StA II, 172.
144 “furchtsamgeschäft ig” (BrA IX, 236); “Denn vieles vermag (. . .) der Mensch (. . .) 
aber es steht / Vor Göttlichem der Starke niedergeschlagen” (StA II, 127).
145 “das Heilige sei mein Wort” (StA II, 118) [italics added].
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Hölderlin has not written an extensive theory about intellectual intu-
ition. Nonetheless, I am convinced that in his poetry he wants to “prac-
tice” precisely that. He does indeed try to grasp the Father’s ray and 
wrap it in song in order to off er it to people. Th ere is a certain amount 
of hubris in that conception. But whereas Schelling’s and Fichte’s meta-
physical point of departure is an I that takes on absolute proportions 
thanks to its ability of intellectual intuition, Hölderlin remains hesitant 
about “fearfully active” self-positing. Th e starting-point and the center 
of his philosophy is never the I but rather a longing for harmony and 
unity. It is the whole, the unity of all that is, which is to benefi t from 
his eff orts. He believes in its holiness and in its eternal progress. Ulti-
mately, intellectual intuition is not something for the happy few, the 
brilliant philosopher or the gift ed artist, but the destiny of all human 
beings. At the end of time, each and everyone will be able to intuit the 
Father and at the same time continue to be an individual I, but here 
and now intellectual intuition is not to be fi t into a system.
5.4. From Here Onwards
In the late 18th century, the term intellectual intuition is introduced 
in philosophy. It constitutes another attempt at bridging the Kantian 
divide. Kant’s principle of pure reason is self-consciousness; his prin-
ciple of practical reason is freedom. Th e German idealists claim that a 
philosophical principle can never be partial. Moreover, if praxis is to 
be reasonable, it must be the same reason as the one in theory. Th ere-
fore, there must be one principle for both theory and praxis. In less 
than two decades, the term intellectual intuition moves from a creative 
knowledge, which Kant attributes solely to God, to a human faculty of 
immediately experiencing the Absolute. Fichte is the fi rst to connect it 
to the human I, and his students Schelling and Hölderlin make it into 
an experience in which this human I encounters the Absolute. Th e 
young ones disagree on the nature of this encounter. Schelling is con-
vinced that it is the I that initiates and controls, whereas for Hölderlin 
the I is dependent upon the Divine for the encounter to take place. In 
any case, “production or revelation, intuition accesses the Absolute, 
Eternity . . . Th e obstacles of critical philosophy have been lift ed,” as Til-
liette puts it.146 Regardless of the exact name and the interpretation of 
146 Tilliette 1995, 59.
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the “object” of this experience – Absolute, Unconditioned, the abso-
lute I, or Being – the philosophers discussed in this chapter agree that 
intellectual intuition is the capacity to experience what lies beyond 
thinking, beyond regular consciousness. It becomes the term for the 
paradoxical “knowing the Unknowable.”
Th ere are three views on the possibility of intuitive knowledge in the 
philosophical tradition, according to Saskia Wendel:
1. “Th e fi rst school diff erentiates between intuitive and discursive 
knowledge, but classifi es both as thinking, therefore refl ection.” 
Aristotle with his distinction between dianoia and noesis is its best-
known representative. Dianoia is a discursive type of knowledge in 
the form of judgments, but noesis is more intuitive. It is an instan-
taneous and immediate grasping of something that is immune for 
errors. Both forms are intentional and classifi ed as refl ection.
2. A second school makes a distinction between intuition on the one 
hand and discursive or propositional knowledge on the other. It 
emphasizes its intelligibility, but points out its non-refl ectivity. 
Intuition is not interpreted as thinking “since refl ection is consid-
ered the equivalent of discursivity. Non-discursive thought does 
not exist, but non-discursive knowledge does. It is called intuition.” 
Th is intuition is understood as a kind of sensing that takes place in 
the intellect and is a prerequisite for discursive knowledge.
3. “A third school rejects the possibility of instantaneous and intuitive 
knowledge.”147
Kant is obviously an advocate of this last line of thinking. Th e three 
authors discussed in this chapter can best be classifi ed in the second 
category. According to their theories, refl ection necessarily takes place 
in the dimension where the subject experiences itself as opposed to 
the object, whereas intellectual intuition is an intuitive grasping of the 
unitary ground prior to all diff erentiation. Even though they do not 
view intellectual intuition as refl ection, it is still considered a major 
source of knowledge. It might even be the basis of true knowledge.
Th e development of the term from a divine ability to a human point 
of access to the Divine is an interesting one. Fichte sees it as the abil-
ity of the human I to come in touch with its own absoluteness, the 
absolute I. Th e I comes to know without a doubt that it is, and with 
147 See Wendel 2002, 28–30.
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the realization “I am” it breaks through to its subjectivity, its own 
absoluteness: the absolute I. In line with Fichte, also Schelling con-
nects intellectual intuition with the Absolute, which he still explicitly 
thinks of as the absolute I early in his career. However, he endows 
it with characteristics that evoke images of Spinoza’s Substance, his 
Deus. Even when Schelling criticizes a dogmatist objectifi cation of the 
Absolute – “Th e absolute I is . . . neither a phenomenon nor a thing-in-
itself, because it is no thing at all, but simply and purely I . . .”148 – it 
is more or less what he does to his conception of the absolute I. He 
knows that an I can never be a thing, but his absolute I is so much like 
Spinoza’s It that Fichte’s absoluteness of the I merges with a Spinozis-
tic Absolute. Since Schelling’s (and Fichte’s) absolute I also tends to 
get confused with the empirical I, it sometimes seems as if his I (the 
I called Schelling) becomes indistinguishable from the Absolute (the 
God of Spinoza). Intellectual intuition thus develops into the ability of 
the artistic or philosophical genius to grasp the Absolute, to enclose 
it in his mind, as it were. Th e genius not only encounters the Divine; 
he is divine.
Hölderlin is attracted to this approach for a while. But it is so thor-
oughly contrary to his personality, which seeks to connect and to 
harmonize instead of to master, that he shies away from the inher-
ent hubris. Th e Absolute is not a continuation of the I; an I can only 
“pray” to be approached by it and live to tell. Hölderlin’s intellectual 
intuition is more like the experience of the mystic who aft er a brief 
moment of ecstasy is cast into the dark night of purifi cation, instead of 
rejoicing in the power and enlightenment of the idealistic I. But as is 
the case for all darkness and suff ering, it is merely a stage of the great 
process of approach between Being and consciousness, between unity 
and individuality, Hölderlin believes. At the end of time, all human 
beings will intuit the Father and understand their own specifi c role in 
the historical process and Being will have gained full consciousness, 
but such an intuition is not to be put into a philosophical system. 
“Do you seriously believe the ideal of knowing could be presented at 
any point in time in any kind of system?” he writes as if addressing 
Schelling. “I rather believe that a human being needs for his know-
ing as for his acting an infi nite progress, unlimited time.”149 Intellec-
tual intuition is the poet’s or the mystic’s vision of the completion of 
148 SW 1, 177. 
149 StA IV, 213.
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human life and the idea of infi nite progress and indefi nite approach 
curbs human hubris.
Hölderlin has been called a revolutionary, a brain researcher, and a 
madman in diff erent studies.150 Never has any serious study been done 
on his possible mysticism, to my knowledge. Beiser merely mentions 
the term in connection with Hölderlin, but relates his philosophy to 
the Platonic powers of intuitive reason, not to any kind of Christian 
religiosity.151 Others have connected him with the pietistic tradition of 
his youth, as we have seen.152 Th is would be an interesting topic for 
further research, but it is beyond the scope of the present one. In any 
case, it should be realized that the fear of being ridiculed as a mys-
tic is enormous around 1800, as it is in contemporary philosophical 
and theological circles, and perhaps always has been. Both Kant and 
Fichte abhor it. Fichte calls it, “the production of an Unknown and 
Incomprehensible, by means of unrestrained imagination.” He seems 
to echo Kant when ridiculing “bold and adventurous thoughts [that] 
make their appearance in our minds without we ourselves being called 
on to think at all.” Sarcastically, he accuses his young students who 
believe that by these supernatural insights
study is changed into the most pleasant business in the world. And then, 
above all, the glorious results! – when scarcely released from school, or 
even while still there, to confront the most approved men in the land 
with brilliant thoughts.153
Hölderlin studies with Fichte in Jena but fl ees aft er several months, as 
we have seen. Th e reason is unclear. It has been said that his adora-
tion of Schiller feeds his own sense of inferiority and paralyzes his 
poetical eff orts. Does he perhaps (also) try to escape Fichte’s infl uence? 
Th e hyperactivity of the latter’s (philosophical) I is utterly contrary to 
Hölderlin’s Being, and its solipsism goes against Hölderlin’s openness 
150 See Bertaux 1980, Linke 2005, Weineck 2002, respectively. 
151 Th e Absolute “is identifi ed with the logos or telos, the archetype, idea, or form 
that governs all things. . . . To be sure, Hölderlin . . . [was] critical of the powers of a dis-
cursive reason; but, true to the Platonic tradition, [he] clung all the more fi rmly to the 
powers of an intuitive reason.” Hence, his use of the term intellectual intuition, “which 
[he] identifi ed with aesthetic feeling or perception.” He concludes that Hölderlin’s 
metaphysics “should not be seen in terms of the religious mysticism characteristic of 
the Protestant tradition” (Beiser 2002, 354f.). 
152 See 4.8.
153 GA I, 8, 283; 293f. 
 intellectual intuition and metaphysics 307
for all of creation. Hölderlin stops pursuing a career in philosophy 
because philosophical refl ection turns out to be contrary to his (reli-
gious) urge. Philosophy claims the utmost of explicit consciousness, 
of discursive reasoning. It attempts to think its object as sharply as 
possible: it analyzes, lays open, and pulls apart. Th ereby it objectifi es. 
Hölderlin not only sets out to think unity; he wants to live it. How-
ever, the philosopher cannot allow himself to merge with his object. 
Since thinking opposes unity, he soon turns away from an enterprise 
that can only fail in his eyes. Th ere must be ways from human being 
to Being, from the I-sayer to God, but Hölderlin doubts whether a 
philosophical system with intellectual intuition as its core will ever be 
it. His fellow Stift ler seems to prove him right.
Th e questions, the answers, and the aporias surrounding intellectual 
intuition form the core of the problematic of German idealism. What 
is this mysterious human ability? Is it an intuition of me as me, a 
pre-refl ective awareness that I am, that I act; is it self-consciousness? 
Is it an intuition of the Absolute, the Divine? Or is this one and the 
same thing, aft er all? Is my me-ness something absolute, divine even? 
Th e inexplicable and wonderful ability to say ‘I’ makes us into beings 
of transcendence. We transcend the physical, we transcend our own 
activities. We are always one step ahead of all we think and do, or 
rather above. We are always hovering above ourselves, it seems. We 
can apparently observe ourselves in the act of living, and then again in 
the act of observing. Ad infi nitum. Some believe that makes us divine; 
others believe that our very acts and thoughts prove the exact oppo-
site: we are not divine but lowly and sometimes evil earthlings. Or 
is earth not opposed to the Divine? And are we to realize heaven on 
earth by the very transcendence that we are? Th e advocates of intel-
lectual intuition somehow refuse to accept dualism as the ultimate. No 
absolute divide exists between heaven and earth, between the subject 
and the things of the world, between the I and the Absolute, between 
me and God. Th ey get into philosophical trouble, they sometimes get 
carried away by an unholy hubris, and they never manage to prove the 
philosophical soundness of their intuition of the Absolute. But they 
refuse to let God disappear into the Great (Kantian) Unknown. And, 
by God, how hard they try! Th e beauty of the theme of intellectual 
intuition is not the philosophical outcome as much as the desire of 
all metaphysics to connect God and earth while doing justice to the 
singularity of both.
308 chapter five
In the mid 18th century, Kant has erected a border fence and has 
forbidden all self-respecting philosophers to trespass. But his “sapere 
aude” at the same time whets the appetites of adventurers who feel 
challenged to fi nd out for themselves. Th is inevitably leads to illegal 
border crossings on a large scale. Th e young explorers get themselves 
into serious trouble in unknown territory. Fichte never quite dares to 
trespass and ends up straddling the Kantian fence, which makes for an 
awkward position. Schelling refuses to admit that he gets lost “on the 
other side” and keeps walking in circles. Hölderlin crosses the Kantian 
line, sees more than he can recount, and loses his mind. He cannot 
stay and he cannot leave and spends the rest of his life in the shadows 
of no-man’s-land.
We will now leave this era of attempts at connecting the I with 
the Absolute, at thinking “me and God” in precisely that order. What 
remains two centuries later is Kant’s strong argument why trespassing 
is an illegal pastime, Schelling’s and Fichte’s occasional glimpses of 
alien territory, and Hölderlin’s longing for his Homeland. Contempo-
rary philosophy mostly seems to have lost interest in this terra incog-
nita altogether. Metaphysics in general is considered too troublesome, 
vague, and speculative in the modern, negative sense of the word. Th e 
Kantian border fence has been resurrected (a risky term in philosophi-
cal circles), fortifi ed, and supplied with clear signs “no philosophers 
allowed.” What lies beyond is supposedly the land of the Church and 
its believers. Only theologians venture abroad occasionally thereby 
either trying their utmost to keep one foot on solid academic soil or 
gambling away their academic reputation. Nonetheless, I would like 
to make an idealistic, or rather romantic, plea for venturing beyond 
simply because people do not thrive when imprisoned by any kind 
of fence. Instead of claiming the land as ours, we could just visit and 
bring back stories of what we have seen and heard.
In the next chapter, we will look at two respected scholars, two think-
ers from the 20th century who are well acquainted with the inventor 
of the fence, the idealistic explorers, and their critics of later times. 
Dieter Henrich, the philosopher, we have met in the fi rst chapter and 
Karl Rahner, the theologian, will be introduced. Th e reason we need 
both is that the Kantian fence not only served to outlaw theology as 
a scientifi c discipline; it also put a huge divide between philosophy 
and theology as academic disciplines. When studying Henrich’s theory 
of the unitary ground, we will see how he has partially ignored the 
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Kantian warning. He maintains that there is indeed land on the other 
side. With this, he refutes Kant who says that we can neither confi rm 
nor deny its existence within theoretical limits. Henrich is certain that 
within the limits of philosophy we may indeed conclude that this for-
eign land exists. However, its landscape, its traditions, and its laws are 
a matter of belief. Karl Rahner comes to similar philosophical conclu-
sions. He also maintains that the other land exists. Th e reason that we 
know about it is that we hear someone calling out from the other side 
of the fence. As a Catholic theologian, he believes that we can turn to 
the Christian tradition to understand what is being said. Let us now 
step into 20th century metaphysics.
CHAPTER SIX
THE ABSOLUTE GROUND VERSUS GOD
Andrew Bowie writes about German idealism and its concept of the 
Absolute,
Th e Absolute need not be thought of as some strange mystical entity: it 
is initially just the necessary correlate of the relative status of anything 
that can be explained causally.1
We normally think of the world as a collection of individual things in 
a causal (or other) confi guration, but this conception becomes prob-
lematic when we try to think the world or the universe as a whole, as 
all there is. Th e causal confi guration is not capable of explaining its 
own existence since this would lead to an infi nite regress of causes. 
Everything that belongs to this confi guration is relative. Hence, it takes 
an Absolute as correlate. Th inking an Absolute, the Unconditioned 
[das Unbedingte], is the “natural” result of trying to understand the 
totality of the world or universe, including ourselves as knowing sub-
jects. For Bowie the Absolute appears to be no more than a logical 
counterpart of our natural ontology, a thought construction without 
reality or content.
Selbstbewusstsein und spekulatives Denken [Self-Consciousness and 
Speculative Th inking], one of Henrich’s metaphysical texts, ends with 
the sentence:
In a time that either expects theoretical redemption from progressive sci-
ence and increasingly subtle conceptual analysis, or seeks fi nal satisfac-
tion and appeasement in abstinence from theory, the Kantian imperative 
‘sapere aude!’ must include emphatically the imperative ‘speculari aude!’ –
Have the courage to think beyond your world in order to understand it 
and also yourself in it!2
Th is appeal to “think beyond your world” expresses an existential need 
to understand one’s own obscure existence in a world that is not self-
1 Bowie 1994, 4. 
2 Henrich 1982a, 181. For the English translation, see Henrich 1997a. 
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explanatory. Th is “beyond” seems more than the mere logical correlate 
to the relativeness of this world that Bowie refers to as Absolute. In 
addition, Henrich rejects the divide between contemporary alterna-
tives: scientifi c and theoretical thinking versus an attitude that fi nds 
its peace in irrationality, a life without theory, blind faith. Th en again, 
Henrich observes that it could be the case that philosophy is unable 
to give the answers itself so that its task would be no more than to 
untangle the thoughts, to test the possible grounds in order to under-
stand the situation of people who are faced with such questions in 
greater depth, but not to decide about them.3 Metaphysics has become 
a taboo in contemporary philosophy.
As a term fi rst applied to the works of Aristotle about a prima phi-
losophia, it is an old philosophical discipline. However, the Kantian 
insight that it is unable to provide reliable knowledge concerning God 
has had a huge impact on modern philosophy. Initially, a new genera-
tion of philosophers refuses to give in. Th is gives rise to the type of 
speculative thinking that links (self-)consciousness with an absolute, 
transcendent ground in German idealism. Exactly this combination 
of subjectivity and metaphysics is rejected several decades later. Self-
consciousness as a philosophical principle is viewed as a foundational-
ist project that is no longer considered viable. Ludwig Heyde writes,
From the second half of the nineteenth century onward philosophy 
teems with ‘farewell speeches.’ Th e most spectacular must be Nietzsche’s 
message of the death of God . . . Th ere is Marx’ announcement of the end 
of speculative thinking . . . With much pathos the members of the Wiener 
Kreis stand up for a radical positivism with their manifest Wissenschaft -
liche Weltauff assung . . . Th e fake questions of metaphysics and theology 
should be exposed once and for all.4
Philosophy and theology are pulled apart. Philosophy is the domain of 
reason and theology is concerned with the realm of faith. Metaphysics 
as the discipline where the two overlap seems to have lost its right to 
exist. In the second half of the 20th century, idealistic metaphysics is 
not only disqualifi ed as unscientifi c and irrelevant but unmasked as 
an expression of power-hunger that has turned out to be disastrous 
in history as well.
3 See Henrich 1999, 75.
4 Heyde 2000, 11f.
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Obviously, such metaphysics becomes an even more diffi  cult subject 
towards the end of the second millennium in which (neuro-)scientifi c 
research and its mostly naturalistic explanations are taken very seri-
ously. Th e rise of the natural sciences and the increased importance of 
technology have caused a major shift  in our self-understanding. Th e 
uncovering of our enormously complex brain has seduced many a phi-
losopher to seek the wonders of our self-conscious existence solely in 
grey matter. Th e I has been naturalized and can therefore no longer 
function as a gateway to God; there is nothing beyond physics. Th e 
God of (monotheistic) religion has become a matter of faith arising, 
as far as many naturalists are concerned, from ill-informed complex 
brain tissue in the fi nal stages of a predominantly Christian, cultural 
context.
In such a context, the two authors discussed in this chapter, Dieter 
Henrich (*1927) and Karl Rahner (1904–1984), start their careers. 
Nonetheless, both choose to make metaphysics the core of their pro-
fessional life. Both have learned from the mistakes and the achieve-
ments of the two centuries of philosophy that precede their own work. 
However, they take separate roads.
Henrich develops a philosophy of subjectivity that logically leads 
him to assume a unitary ground of all subjectivity, a ground that is 
beyond the physical. All through the 20th century criticism of a phi-
losophy of subjectivity, Henrich sticks to his conviction that the I is 
the point of access to what lies beyond physics even when all we can 
say is that it is and not what it is. Th at German idealism has led to 
disasters is not the consequence of this point of departure but of its 
attempts to control the Absolute by means of a supposedly fully trans-
parent and powerful I, the master of its own origins, in Henrich’s view. 
Actually, the exact opposite is true: the I is grounded in obscurity so 
totally beyond its own control that it gives rise to anxiety about its 
ability to preserve itself as well as gratitude for consciousness received 
(from where, from whom?).
Whereas the metaphysical is an absolute, unknowable, and I-less 
ground for Henrich, Karl Rahner develops a metaphysical anthropol-
ogy in which the ground of I-hood is God as holy mystery. He has 
been called “one of [the Church’s] most loyal sons” and “the dominant 
theological voice of the Roman Catholic Church in the twentieth cen-
tury” whose work expresses the spirit of aggiornamento of the Second 
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Vatican Council.5 Nevertheless, his creative affi  rmation of tradition in 
his early years is not altogether uncontested. His fi rst work Geist in 
Welt (1939) is a daring interpretation of Th omas Aquinas based on the 
(Kantian) work of Joseph Maréchal (1878–1944). It is to be his Ph.D. 
dissertation, but it is rejected by his supervisor Martin Honecker.6 
Th is never really discourages him. His concern for the questions and 
doubts of his contemporaries concerning the Christian faith challenge 
him to search for intellectually acceptable foundations. Rahner says of 
his own career,
I think that ultimately my theological work was really not motivated 
by scholarship and erudition as such, but by pastoral concerns . . . [Aside 
from my research into the history of dogma] I have always chosen, and 
in fact had to choose, tasks and themes that somehow dealt with . . . the 
questions of our day.7
He is never afraid to take the philosophical achievements and conclu-
sions of his era seriously and attempts to integrate them in his theol-
ogy. Th is automatically leads him towards a metaphysics that has the 
modern emphasis on subjectivity as its starting-point, just like Hen-
rich. And even if his work is less explicitly based on the successes and 
the failures of German idealism, he has a thorough knowledge of the 
philosophy of Kant and his young, rebellious followers.
Hence, two (predominantly) 20th century thinkers who both ven-
ture “beyond physics” and believe that human existence needs this 
meta to thrive are the subject of this chapter. Both have theories 
about human subjectivity and a unitary ground from which it arises 
that connect them with the type of thinking that originates in Ger-
man idealism. One, Henrich, searches his answers within the realm of 
philosophy; the other, Rahner, does not hesitate to connect his meta-
physical anthropology with theological concepts. Henrich appears to 
be trapped in a world of contradictions, like many of us who live and 
think in this still young 21st century. On the one hand, we seem afraid 
of being banned from the world of science, unmasked as mere believ-
ers. On the other hand, we feel the need to fi ll this scientifi c world with 
meaning that cannot be provided within the domain of these sciences. 
5 Krauss 1985, 1; Marmion and Hines 2005, 1. 
6 See Rahner Sämtliche Werke, Band 2 (1996) for the German original and Rahner 
1968 for the English version, Spirit in the World.
7 Rahner 1985, 22.
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Rahner is at home in his world of Christian thinking and faith but feels 
compelled to leave the comfort of what he fears will become an island 
of believers, “a self-enclosed Catholic ghetto,” instead of the universal-
ity that Catholicism should stand for.8
In that respect, both are illustrative of our modern problematic: we 
have to choose on which side of the Kantian fence we stand. Are we 
to choose philosophy and respect the Kantian limits or theology and 
accept that what we are talking about is beyond the scientifi c realm, a 
matter of faith only? We will fi rst follow the thoughts of the philoso-
pher who maintains that knowing about ourselves means that we have 
to acknowledge that not all is explained by the physical aspects of our 
existence. Subsequently, we will study the theologian who is much less 
hesitant to speak from a religious tradition but who also realizes that 
the naturalness of this type of thinking has disappeared in the course 
of the 20th century.
6.1. Henrich’s Metaphysics
All through his career, Henrich has defended his modifi cation of the 
monistic view of the Absolute as it was developed by the philoso-
phers of German idealism. Even if their ambition to develop an all-
encompassing theory may have failed, it gives openings that form the 
basis for Henrich’s speculative thinking. Th e type of metaphysics that 
he proposes endeavors to fi nd an interpretation of the world and of 
I-hood that gives us insights into the meaning of our lives, and it tries 
to phrase thoughts about the relationship between the contingent 
and the Absolute. Metaphysics was and still is the eff ort that seeks 
to fi nd an agreement between a totality that is relative to nothing, 
insofar absolute, and the human tendency towards self-explanation, in 
his view. He thinks we might need to stop using the term “metaphys-
ics” and speak of “ultimate thoughts” [letzte Gedanken] or “thoughts 
of closure” [Abschlussgedanken] instead. Th ese thoughts are “ultimate” 
because they provide an overall view of someone’s life. Th ey place 
a personal biography in a larger perspective and claim to say some-
thing about the truth of human existence. Th ey enable a person to 
bring her life to a “closure,” to prevent this life from evaporating into 
8 Ibid., 56f. 
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meaninglessness. Th is type of thought goes beyond everyday insights 
as well as scientifi c knowledge and in that sense point beyond (meta) 
the physical. Nonetheless, they need not be religious in the traditional 
sense.9
Henrich fully accepts Kant’s criticism of the rationalist metaphysical 
tradition. In his view, ultimate thoughts are regulative ideas in the Kan-
tian sense of postulates and projections of reason that have a practical 
rather than theoretical ultimate justifi cation.10 Contrary to the natural 
sciences, epistemic certainty cannot be achieved in the realm of tran-
scendental argumentation and “ideas” in the Kantian sense. Ever since 
Kant wrote his Critiques, philosophers have been aware of the fact that 
provable answers to questions concerning God and our own being do 
not exist, Henrich points out in an essay Warum Metaphysik? [Why 
Metaphysics?].11 However, in his ethics Kant himself argues that prov-
ability is not a suffi  cient criterion for reasonable conviction [vernünf-
tige Annehmbarkeit].12 In an attempt to develop a form of speculative 
philosophy that has contemporary validity and relevance, Henrich 
proposes a searching and explorative instead of founding approach.
All past excesses notwithstanding, Henrich refuses to see the his-
torical development of speculative thinking as proof of its impossibil-
ity. Th e challenge is to fi nd a type of speculative philosophy that is not 
branded by the overconfi dence of modernity but does not shy away 
from thoughts that can support and surround the type of metaphysical 
questions that all people inevitably encounter when confronted with 
pain, suff ering, and the perceived complexity of earthly existence. He 
thinks that it might be best to view the idealist program of foundation 
as a rather clumsy answer to the stimulus that makes people philoso-
phize: the need for orientation of conscious life by ultimate thoughts 
about a totality that supports (self-)conscious life.13 Henrich’s plea for 
speculative thinking is infl uenced by both Kantian philosophy and 
naturalism. He honors a strict divide between philosophy and theol-
ogy, but at the same time, he feels assaulted by the reductive, natu-
ralistic rejection of anything beyond the physical. He considers it the 
 9 See Henrich 1999, 195. 
10 Practical in this context is more than strictly moral as is the Kantian connotation. 
Even though moral implications are part of conscious life for Henrich, practical here 
has the more general meaning of being linked to the everyday experience of life. 
11 See Henrich 1999, 111.
12 See Henrich 1988.
13 See Henrich 1999, 95–97.
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duty of philosophers to provide people with a concept of conscious-
ness since such a concept is indispensable for consciousness to realize 
an existence in freedom.14
As Freundlieb puts it,
Henrich’s philosophy is an attempt to remind us that there may be more 
to reality than what most contemporary philosophy and the modern sci-
ences consider to be real.15
His concept of the Absolute opens perspectives for religious interpre-
tations, but he seems to refuse to draw such conclusions explicitly. 
From time to time, he expresses sympathy for Eastern religions with-
out ever truly elaborating. He claims that his philosophy is preferable 
to theology because it does not deny the legitimacy of both aspects of 
the Grundverhältnis whereas the major religions tend to absolutize just 
one.16 He calls Western religions “codex-religions” that can no longer 
convince because they contradict a modern conception of subjectivity. 
Monotheistic religions in general and Christianity in particular have 
arisen in defi ance of philosophy contrary to Buddhism, he asserts.17 
Nevertheless, in an essay called Eine philosophische Begründung für 
die Rede von Gott in der Moderne? Sechzehn Th esen [A Philosophical 
Motivation for God-Talk in Modernity? Sixteen Th eses] Henrich says, 
“Yes. As a philosopher I want to speak about God . . . God-talk of which 
I think that it can be motivated.”18
Let us now turn to Henrich’s metaphysical solution to the obscu-
rity of our existence in the thought of an absolute, a truly non-fi nite, 
ground from which the world enfolds but that is not separate from 
the world.
6.1.1. An Absolute and Obscure Ground
Even though it seems to be the starting-point for all our knowledge, 
the I is an enigma for itself, is the conclusion of Henrich’s theory of 
self-consciousness. Th e major reason for the precarious position we 
fi nd ourselves in is the incompatibility of the diff erent ontologies of 
14 See Henrich 1982b, 106.
15 Freundlieb 2003, viii.
16 For Grundverhältnis see 1.3.3. Henrich’s explanation for the variety of religions 
will be discussed in 6.1.3.1. 
17 Henrich 1999, 204.
18 Henrich 2005, 130.
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our existence. Conscious life unfolds within the inevitable tension 
of being aware of the uniqueness of our I-perspective and self-rela-
tivization. Kant has not succeeded in reconciling the dualism of our 
existence as both noumenon and phenomenon, or subject and person 
in Henrich’s terms. It is impossible to dispose of the subject-aspect 
because it is a prerequisite for knowledge of the world. Neither can we 
eliminate the person-aspect since it articulates the experience of being 
in the world. Our thinking about what we really know about ourselves 
leads us beyond ourselves towards a whole that surpasses us as well as 
enables our life, in Henrich’s view.19
Understanding subjectivity, its ground, and the whole to which 
it belongs asks for an extrapolating kind of thinking since these are 
concepts that go beyond the objectivities of the world of knowledge. 
Th is extrapolation goes in two directions: fi rst, the subject must go 
back beyond itself to its ground. Secondly, since the world appears 
as a whole opposed to a subject, a totality must be thought in which 
subjectivity is included. Hence, an extrapolation is necessary beyond 
the regular form of the world. Th ese two extrapolations should 
somehow be combined. Th e ground of subjectivity and the whole of 
subjects, the way in which subjects are individuals and the totality in 
which they co-exist, need to be integrated in one single thought con-
struction. Th is is necessarily a postulating kind of thinking since it 
cannot prove its truth. To think a ground that is capable of produc-
ing self-determining subjects surpasses regular knowledge. It can only 
demonstrate its consistency and acceptability as opposed to the alter-
natives, in Henrich’s view.20
Th e idea of a ground only seems to make sense within a monistic 
conception of the world, a world that is diff erentiated within itself, 
but whose diff erentiation is ultimately seen as part of a unitary whole. 
Henrich distinguishes three types of monism:
1. Methodological monism is the program to deduce at least the major 
characteristics of everything that can be known from one single 
basic principle [Grundsatz]. Carl Leonhard Reinhold (1757–1825), 
Fichte’s predecessor in Jena from 1788 to 1794, was the fi rst to pro-
pose this methodological approach. He took the structure of the 
19 See Henrich 2007, 26.
20 See Henrich 2007, 260. 
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representation [Vorstellung] to be the basic principle, as we have 
seen. Henrich also views Fichte’s absolute I as such a principle.
2. Metaphysical monism asserts that everything real can be under-
stood as a modifi cation of one single self-suffi  cient reality that is 
beyond human powers of cognition. Hölderlin and Henrich himself 
both belong to this category, the latter claims.
3. Ontological monism is the attempt to develop a speculative knowl-
edge that does more than just present a metaphysical monism in 
the way of the traditional via negativa: it develops concepts that 
have the status of “knowledge.” Hegel is a proponent of this type 
of monism, and this is also the early Schelling’s project.21
Hence, in Henrich’s metaphysical monism “everything real can be 
understood as a modifi cation of one single self-suffi  cient reality.” 
Somehow our point of departure in life, the certainty of the “I am,” is 
entwined with a total lack of clarity about who I really am and where 
the certainty that I am comes from. Henrich refers to the inability to 
understand the own self as the darkness or obscurity [Dunkelheit] of 
the human condition that is confi rmed and reinforced through all pos-
sible attempts at explication.22
Such a metaphysics of the obscurity surrounding human subjec-
tivity has consequences. First, it no longer implies the I’s self-power 
and self-presence. Hence, the more important theoretical arguments 
against subject philosophies disappear, in Henrich’s view. Secondly, 
from this incomprehension and lack of control of conscious life over its 
origins, its development, and its preservation the need for a self-inter-
pretation arises. Without such a self-description, a factual continuity 
of conscious life may be possible but none founded in understanding, 
Henrich argues. Despite confl icting ideas about uniqueness and self-
relativization that can exist in one and the same person, we experi-
ence the I as a unity and the discrepancies as something we need to 
overcome. Th erefore, a self-interpretation should have the capacity to 
surpass both poles of self-conscious life without ignoring or abandon-
ing this inherent tension.
Supposing an underlying unitary ground can fulfi ll these conditions. 
Such a ground of self-consciousness cannot be thought separate from 
21 See Henrich 2003, 127–139. 
22 See Henrich 1982a, 160–163. 
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the subject. It is an internal enabling of the subject’s self-activity, not a 
hidden cause that merely provokes the illusion of self-determination. It 
must somehow be of such kind that it can enable spontaneity instead. 
Th is ground is not an individual cause for each subject, and it is not an 
(absolute) I. It is rather the communal ground of all subjects, present 
in all, and opening the possibility of a being-with [Mitsein] that also 
enables this subjectivity to enhance itself. Th is ground should not be 
viewed as something that brings about I-hood at a certain point (in 
time), and subsequently gives rise to a self-generating act. It is rather 
a continuously enabling ground.23
At this point, the question may arise what this ground really is. 
What do we call it; how and especially why does it give rise to subjects? 
Henrich has consistently refused to go past the limits of philosophical 
reasoning in order to provide content for this ground but has strug-
gled within those limits. At times, for example in an earlier work that 
was discussed in the fi rst chapter, he seems to suggest that the ground 
of self-consciousness is consciousness, a fi eld or a dimension in which 
an I becomes active.24 Th is consciousness seems to be I-less and pre-
existent. “If one asks how such consciousness is to be understood, it 
is no longer ‘obvious’ that it belongs to an I, and hence is basically 
self-consciousness.”25 Th en again, he neutralizes this sort of claims by 
saying, “It is probably even necessary to assume that consciousness 
always makes its fi rst appearance in an egological orientation.”26
Whether self-consciousness is dependent upon a pre-existent 
dimension called consciousness or the two arise equi-primordially 
from another unknowable ground is not really the issue. In the course 
of his career, Henrich seems to become more fi rmly convinced that 
the basis of all our knowledge about ourselves and the world cannot be 
understood within the boundaries of this same knowledge. He agrees 
that Kant’s Critiques have closed off  the possibility of returning to the 
old metaphysics that claims knowledge about the precise nature of the 
Absolute. A ground of self-consciousness, no matter how we interpret 
it, can only be thought as a hypothesis that can never be turned into 
demonstrated knowledge.
23 See Henrich 1999, 20–23.




Th erefore, he suggests that we start from what he calls our primary 
rationality, our basic understanding of the world that guides con-
scious life since a type of “transcendence that does not arise from the 
extrapolation of worldly terms into absolutes can only be conceived 
in relation to what constitutes conscious life.”27 Philosophy does not 
open the road to an abstract wisdom separate from the world. How-
ever, a philosophy of subjectivity uncovers the problem that objective 
knowledge of the world and its valid rules of confi guration cannot 
solve the enigma of the ground of that subjectivity. Th erefore, the fact 
of our subjectivity urges us, who (also) belong to the physical world 
and its laws, to keep the dimension open of a type of thinking that 
goes beyond facts and intelligent explanations of the world toward a 
metaphysical.28 Th is “beyond” is obscurity, in Henrich’s view.
Henrich has always been aware of the monistic view of naturalism or 
materialism as a philosophical alternative. Both he and the naturalistic 
philosopher assume a single ground to all that is, but in the case of the 
latter, this ground is matter. Henrich repeatedly asserts that both types 
of explanation are just interpretations that cannot be proven. Nonethe-
less, he has a strong preference for a metaphysics of transcendence for 
philosophical reasons, but especially from an existential point of view. 
To start with the latter. Th e truth of metaphysics can only be found in 
key experiences of conscious life, such as: feeling supported, preserved, 
and confi rmed by an inner ground; hearing an appeal in the infi nite 
freedom of conscience; and experiencing a confi rmation of meaning 
in the encounter with other conscious life. Since his philosophy takes 
the ground of the world order to be present in every individual, it 
therefore endows every conscious life with absolute meaning, whereas 
naturalism leads to self-interpretations that rob life of ultimate mean-
ing, according to Henrich.
As for the philosophical arguments against naturalism, Henrich 
observes that debates over the past decennia have shown that philo-
sophical theories based in physical data are unable to design an anthro-
pology that can accommodate subjectivity. A coherent theory based 
on only the material aspect of life inevitably reduces the ontological 
multiplicity of human existence. An interpretation of the world that 
27 Henrich 1999, 37.
28 See Henrich 2007, 90.
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depends upon prior destruction of all that has to do with subjectivity 
can neither claim to be complete nor scientifi c. Self-consciousness as 
the familiarity that I have with my existence as mine, my me-ness, can-
not be explained from empirical facts and laws of nature. Subjectivity 
cannot be trapped in the laws of the natural sciences and elicits the 
postulation of a non-physical ground.
In addition, the natural sciences are unable to pass judgment on the 
origination of conscious life as we know it or on any kind of purpose 
in evolution. Upon close inspection even naturalistic theories oft en 
presuppose a principle that precedes matter and that explains the exis-
tence and laws of conscious life. In fact, Henrich argues, naturalism 
is a veiled attempt to implicitly come to a self-interpretation, thereby 
expressing the urge of the explicitly denied self-consciousness. Th e 
thought of a principle in nature that steers evolution into conscious 
life gives this life a perspective of a certain kind of salvation and direc-
tion. What these philosophies call “nature” has been enriched with 
concepts that are beyond the domain of the natural sciences since 
material nature as it presents itself to our senses can never be self-
explanatory. Th at it exists at all, and that laws are active under specifi c 
conditions can only be accepted as mere facts when it is impossible or 
illegitimate to think beyond what can be demonstrated by experience 
and theoretical analysis.29
Henrich’s metaphysical theory attempts to save the human being from 
being nothing more than a trick of nature. Th is brings us to an issue 
that is closely related and that naturalism seems unable to deal with: 
freedom. Its assumption still forms the backbone of Western societies 
even though it can hardly be supported by popular contemporary nat-
uralistic theories. Let us see how Henrich proposes to integrate free-
dom and subjectivity in a modern metaphysics of a unitary ground.
6.1.2. All-Unity and Freedom
In Henrich’s classifi cation, his is a metaphysical monism in which “one 
single self-suffi  cient reality that is beyond human powers of cognition” 
exists and “everything real can be understood as its modifi cation,” it 
was said. It is obvious that also in such a description of the Absolute, 
29 See Henrich 1999, 33f.
322 chapter six
plurality and individuality need to be protected from disappearing 
altogether for at least two reasons. First, it may be asserted that every-
thing in the world is grounded in unity, but it is obviously not as 
unity that we experience the world, as Henrich emphasizes repeatedly. 
Secondly, in our daily conscious life we do not experience ourselves as 
mere modifi cations of an underlying reality. We value our individual-
ity and our freedom to act. We may not be fully in control, but we do 
not experience ourselves as mere puppets that play a role in a script 
that is directed by an external preceding ground or merely the result 
of natural laws.
Th erefore, it seems necessary that an explicit distinction be made 
in the discussion between a unitary ground and our daily reality of 
free individuality. Both individual independence and the possibility 
of unity are characteristic for human conscious life. Hence, the being-
with [Mitsein] of subjects cannot be an unquestioned unity. Adult life 
is about the hope to recover a being-with in which the initial security 
of the unity of life is merged with the freedom of being an I, Henrich 
asserts.30 Th erefore, a term is needed that makes room for both unity 
and the experienced individuality and plurality in the world. All-Unity 
[All-Einheit] manages to combine both aspects of this dual perspec-
tive. It somehow integrates the subject and a unitary ground and the 
world form and the individual in our thinking. It thinks individuals 
in their independence within a whole in relation to which individual 
subjects are not originally independent.31
A modern philosophy of All-Unity, he argues, must include at least 
the following elements:
1. All of diff erentiated reality must be thought as ultimately belonging 
to one unity.
2. Th ere should be no unbridgeable divide between fi nite, individual-
ized life and its ground.
3. Individual beings are viewed as not ultimately isolated from each 
other.
4. Th e unitary ground is present in all that is, and as a result the fi nite 
tends towards infi nity and the Infi nite tends to express itself in fi nite 
beings.
30 Henrich 2007, 242f. 
31 See Henrich 2007, 265.
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Henrich warns us that the thinkers of German idealism have shown 
how easily the subject that arises from such a concept of All-Unity 
somehow ends up losing its contingency. Th e I should never be 
thought as an Absolute, I’s remain world-things. Neither should the 
individual I be viewed as striving to disappear in the infi nity of this 
ground because it is exactly this ground that enables it to be indepen-
dent. Th e radical dependence of the individual and its original inde-
pendence must be thought together.
In order to accomplish this, Henrich reasons as follows. If this 
all-unitary ground is that in which all diff erence exists, it must be 
self-diff erentiation. If the many are enclosed in the All-Unity, they 
basically possess the same form. It follows that the many must also 
possess this property of self-diff erentiation. Since the many clearly dif-
fer from the One, in which they are enclosed, in their fi niteness, their 
self-diff erentiation takes a diff erent form because in their self-diff er-
entiation they must establish and secure their diff erence with other 
individuals. Hence, the individuality of the fi nite is constituted by pro-
cesses of inner diff erentiation. Both poles of the Grundverhältnis, sub-
ject and person, follow this same form of continuously diff erentiating 
while remaining a unity: subjects in the unity of their self-conscious-
ness in respect to all that is given in the world and persons in their 
identity in being in the world. Th us, both subjectivity and personhood 
can arise from an original unity and develop into fi nite, independent 
individuality.32
Henrich’s theory of All-Unity is not just the solution to a philosoph-
ical riddle. If individuals gain the insight that they belong to an all-
encompassing whole this can have consequences for the way they lead 
their lives, he believes. In this, he follows Hölderlin who also calls the 
highest ground of all that is the ideal. In a letter to his brother, Hölder-
lin denies that Being should be seen as a basic principle [Grundsatz] 
of philosophy but rather as the lost unity that conscious life must aim 
to recover.33 Such a philosophy of All-Unity is an appeal to constitute 
peace and harmony in the here and now. Th at makes it more than 
a mere theory and might be an explanation for the long history of 
monistic philosophies that originate in Antiquity but receive renewed 
32 See Henrich 2007, 270.
33 See StA VI, 208.
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attention in the turbulent times of the French Revolution and Ger-
man idealism. All-Unity, All-Einheit, Hen kai Pan, is the testimony to 
a need of conscious life to understand itself and the world as based in 
an ultimate unity instead of in everlasting dualism and antagonism.
Henrich’s metaphysics is largely based on Hölderlin’s as has become 
clear in his major work Der Grund im Bewusstsein. Untersuchungen 
zu Hölderlins Denken (1794–1795) [Th e Ground of Consciousness. 
Studies of Hölderlin’s thinking (1794–1795)].34 Th e date in the title is 
of major importance here. Henrich’s research is based on the time 
span in which Hölderlin writes his only explicitly philosophical prose 
on general metaphysics: Judgment and Being and several letters to 
Hegel among others. Unfortunately, Henrich has not extended his 
research to the (poetical) work written in the fi ve to ten years follow-
ing Hölderlin’s stay in Jena. As was shown in Chapter 4, Hölderlin 
develops a view of All-Unity in the course of his poetry that is much 
more complete (and theologically oriented) than his Jena-work. In his 
later work, Hölderlin makes a clear distinction between three stages of 
reality: 1. the amorphous unity of the origin and ground of (self-)con-
sciousness, Being [Seyn], that cannot distinguish itself from Nothing 
because it is unconscious; 2. the world as we know it that is character-
ized by the isolation of individuals and the confl icting tendencies of 
longing for unity and fearing the loss of self that would result from 
true unity; 3. the situation at the end of history in which individuality 
and the inherently confl icting tendencies of consciousness will be har-
moniously combined with unity. Hölderlin is convinced that history 
will eventually lead to this harmonious state of All-Unity in which the 
unconscious ground merges with the consciousness of individuals. Of 
this ideal state, we can catch glimpses in the present. In Henrich’s phi-
losophy, (All-)unity is a mere postulate, a thought construction, noth-
ing to be experienced here and now. Th ereby he has overlooked the 
(eschatological) hope in Hölderlin’s thinking. We will return to this 
subject in the fi nal chapter. Right now, it is time to turn to a related 
concept that Henrich repeatedly mentions in his earlier work and has 
discussed somewhat more extensively recently: freedom.35
34 Henrich 1992a. 
35 In: Henrich 2007.
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Freedom is of major importance in this context. If a unitary ground 
is assumed that enables all that is and remains present in all beings, 
it needs to be explained how and in how far individuals can be the 
master of their own self-diff erentiation. Even when his most recent 
work is not a comprehensive study on this subject, Henrich discusses 
certain aspects of freedom that are interesting. First, he draws some 
parallels between subjectivity and freedom. He remarks that we can 
observe the symptoms of free actions but never the actual execution of 
freedom. Th erefore, if freedom is real, it can only be known “inside.” 
A free act cannot be understood objectively by defi nition. Were it to 
fi t in a certain system and to be explainable and predictable by laws, 
it would no longer be a free act. Both characteristics it has in com-
mon with subjectivity.36 Indeed, freedom is closely connected with the 
conscious achievements of subjectivity. Only persons who know of 
themselves can be free. Free choice implies that a conscious subject 
can think of alternatives and that the decision for one of these does 
not come about by external or internal coercion (the latter in the case 
of addiction, for example). Being able to say ‘I’ and to be free go hand 
in hand. Th is type of reasoning is in line with the German idealists’ 
attempts to connect the Kantian view of freedom with the noumenal 
aspect of being an I.
Secondly, Henrich remarks that human freedom is self-determi-
nation.37 Philosophical freedom focuses on the actions of people. It 
assumes the possibility to choose between diff erent goals and the abil-
ity to distance oneself from one’s own actions and thus avoid being the 
pawn of one’s impulses. It takes a certain refl ection about the appro-
priate means to reach a certain goal. Freedom is not a characteristic 
that realizes itself in each individual action. It rather takes form in 
a process that grounds a type of actions. Freedom is not about the 
decision to do this or that whenever I feel the impulse. It is rather a 
way to appropriate a specifi c way of acting and make this part of my 
perspective on life. It is about determining who I am.
Th is description of freedom links it closely to Henrich’s views of 
conscious life. Hence, he feels the need to defend it against the deter-
minism of naturalistic philosophies. It is in this context that his empha-
sis on the so-called consequence principle [Konsequenzprinzip] should 
36 Ibid., 283. 
37 Ibid., 330.
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be interpreted, in my opinion. Th e latter principle is concerned with 
weighing the pull of the diff erent motives involved in a decision. It 
maintains that all events are triggered as the result of preceding events. 
Th is principle constitutes the foundation of the natural sciences. When 
it is applied to human behavior, the consequence principle concedes 
that the actor is perhaps capable of acting otherwise but never in the 
exact same situation. Such a limited concept of freedom, however, does 
not square with the self-image of people, he rightly asserts. For Hen-
rich, this implies that if a sense of freedom is not declared obsolete, an 
explanation has to found in which both the consequence principle and 
freedom can be integrated. He adds that even though the consequence 
principle is the basis of scientifi c research, it cannot be proven as uni-
versally valid and might not be applicable to all dimensions of life.38
When Henrich asserts, that every conception of freedom always has 
the consequence principle to contend with, it is once again clear that 
his major opponents are the naturalists. Speculative thinking he con-
sistently calls postulatory: it cannot be proven, nor can it be solved in 
“an intuitive and quasi-theoretical certainty.”39 With the latter asser-
tion, he explicitly rejects the idealistic attempts at solving the problem 
of the unknowability of the unitary ground with a form of intuitive 
knowledge posited with the term intellectual intuition. All-Unity is 
not the knowable Absolute (I) of the young Schelling, for Henrich, nor 
is it the mystical experience of Oneness that Hölderlin longs for and 
seems to fi nd at brief moments. His thoughts on freedom can never 
become more than mere postulates that are unable to counterbalance 
the utter conviction of the deterministic truth of naturalism. Henrich’s 
professed monism notwithstanding, the young ones of the Tübinger 
Stift  have not succeeded in helping him across the Kantian fence even 
at the point where Kant himself thought to see an opening. As a phi-
losopher, Henrich dares to speculate in the most basic sense of the 
word of looking around meticulously, thoroughly, and with circum-
spection, but he refuses to name what he sees in the process. He insists 
that obscurity is the only justifi able description of the view. Th erefore, 
when he claims in Eine philosophische Begründung für die Rede von 
Gott in der Moderne? Sechzehn Th esen [A Philosophical Motivation for 
38 Ibid., 285–293.
39 Ibid., 264. 
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God-Talk in Modernity? Sixteen Th eses] that there are certain things 
that the philosopher can say about God, it might come as a surprise.40 
Let us take a closer look.
6.1.3. Th e Philosopher about Religion
What are the God and the religion that Henrich says he can talk about 
as a philosopher? A distinction needs to be made between the God of 
monotheistic religions and a metaphysical God fi rst, he asserts. Th e 
monotheistic God is personal, which means equipped with reason, 
will, and commitment to people. Within monotheism, this God is 
opposed to the world, and faith to reason, which would be unaccept-
able for the concept of the metaphysical God.41 In what he consid-
ers philosophically acceptable God-talk, the metaphysical God should 
explain: the unity of the world, its existence that cannot be explained 
through itself, and its confi guration that is subject to laws and that 
allows a high degree of diff erentiation and individual life. Henrich sees 
three ways to conceive of this metaphysical God:
1. As opposed to the fi nite world, as eternal Being itself versus fi nite 
beings who are unable to bring forth their own existence. Th is con-
cept of God leans towards the monotheistic God and does not have 
his preference. Elsewhere he writes that he does not fi nd a Creator 
who causes the genesis of subjectivity out of a creative act philo-
sophically convincing since it presupposes a subject with a type 
of consciousness that is fundamentally similar to ours and just as 
obscure concerning its origins.42
2. Th e metaphysical God can also be conceived as an infi nite Being 
that is beyond opposition and therefore Unknowable.
3. Th e third and fi nal way to view the metaphysical God is as Absolute, 
therefore inclusive of the world and eff ective in the life and think-
ing of people, instead of separated from and opposed to them.43
In this overview God, or the Divine, becomes progressively less per-
sonal. Th is last option is for Henrich the only valid way of thinking 
40 Henrich 2005.
41 See Henrich 2005, 132f.
42 See Henrich 1999, 64.
43 See Henrich 2005, 133. 
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beyond the fi nite world. Th e truth of thinking such an Absolute is not 
to be found in scientifi c proof. A fi rst step towards legitimate think-
ing about transcendence can be the experience of our conscious lives 
that seem so natural and obvious in a daily setting but that remain 
obscure for us in many ways. As point of departure, the positive 
key-experiences in this conscious life could serve, such as feelings of 
support and affi  rmation by an inner ground, the sense of the infi nite 
freedom of conscience, and meaningful encounters with other con-
scious lives. Th us, Henrich makes a plea for an ascertainment of the 
Divine through the positive experiences of life that stand fi rm against 
distress [Not] and not from basic experiences of guilt, suff ering, and 
fear of death. Th at Henrich’s philosophy yearns for a more optimistic 
approach is also clear from his remark that the Christian message (the 
Gospel speaks of Glad tidings, euangelion) in the antique world con-
cerned such positive experiences as love and gratitude.44
Since the essay provides no further clarifi cation of this obscure 
ground, we will turn to two other topics in Henrich’s philosophy of 
religion. We will study his interesting views on what he understands 
to be the most important roots of religion and his explanation for 
the variety of religions that we encounter in the world in 6.1.3.1. and 
6.1.3.2, respectively.
6.1.3.1. Explanation for the Variety of Religions
Religions arise from all kinds of feelings and experiences in a human 
life such as fear (of death), the experiences of failure that accom-
pany human activity, moments of ecstasy and transcendence, and 
hope, Henrich asserts. He recognizes all of these origins. Neverthe-
less, he believes that there is a set of three questions that is central to 
all religions and gives rise to multiple potential answers, according to 
Henrich: Who am I?; Where do I come from?; Where am I going? 
Th ese questions and the multitude of answers that have been given 
in the past, and still are, express the confusion and the enigmas sur-
rounding our own existence. Th ey arise from self-consciousness, pos-
sible answers are given within self-consciousness, and those answers 
have consequences for our view on self-consciousness. Th erefore, 
the most fundamental root of religion is the question ‘Who am I?’ 
Th e obscurity of our subjectivity makes us seek answers beyond our 
44 Ibid., 139. 
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everyday reality. Because whenever a person understands herself as 
“an individual thing ‘with’ subjective life,” this immediately provokes 
questions about the meaning of this subjectivity.45 Who is this being 
that can say ‘I’? Religions enable a type of behavior in which the rela-
tion of subjectivity with its unknowable ground can fi nd expression. 
Th erefore, Henrich calls religions “the major self-interpretations of 
self-consciousness.”46
Self-interpretations he defi nes as “cultivated and ultimate self-
descriptions of conscious life in the Grundverhältnis.”47 Th ese are not 
explanations of the value of the Grundverhältnis or of what causes it 
to arise. Th ey are merely the inevitable consequence of being aware 
of one’s own life in the Grundverhältnis. Hence every self-interpreta-
tion must be in line with our self-understanding as experienced in this 
Grundverhältnis. No distance should be felt between the experiences 
of (self-)conscious life and the self-interpretation; otherwise the con-
tinuation of that self-interpretation is threatened by alienation. Th is 
Grundverhältnis, however, is characterized by fundamental contradic-
tions, as we have seen in the fi rst chapter. “Th e immediately famil-
iar conscious life can be analyzed ontologically in various ways,” as 
Henrich puts it.48 Th is can automatically lead to a variety of interpre-
tations of life. Th erefore, self-interpretations are provisional, subject 
to misconception, and will not be able to cancel the disparity of the 
diff erent aspects of the Grundverhältnis. Th is can result in confl icting 
self-interpretations not only from one individual opposed to another 
but also in the course of the life of one and the same person.
Since it is hard to live peacefully in a situation of insurmountable 
contradiction, the need arises to concentrate on one of the two poles 
of the Grundverhältnis and subordinate the other. Religions tend to 
do this and thus enable people to neutralize the tensions within their 
self-understanding and soothe the turmoil of life to a certain degree. 
Furthermore, self-interpretations can be integrated in the original self-
perception and cause it to change or realize continuity in preceding 
variations of that self-perception. Religions are attempts to understand 
and change the human Grundverhältnis to the world. Henrich speaks 
of a basic sense of deliverance,





namely of being liberated to an unambiguous self-orientation, to a well-
determined place in an understood totality, and to the end of disqui-
etude that results from the confusion and the obscurity that dominates 
the natural world.49
However, the price that is paid is a measure of neglect of one of the 
poles of the Grundverhältnis.
Henrich argues that from the duality that characterizes the Grund-
verhältnis two major types of religion can be deduced:
1. When the subject-aspect is the center of orientation, it leads to the 
appeal to transcend life in the world and to retreat into the purity 
of consciousness, a sphere that precedes all individuality. Th is type 
of religion is monistic. It views the ultimate fulfi llment either in an 
absolute I or in a hyperindividual and undiff erentiated I-less reality. 
Th is can subsequently lead to two possibilities: on the one hand, 
a striving for pure consciousness [reine Bewusstheit] with denial 
of the I and the desire to give up consciousness altogether, on the 
other.
2. When the person-aspect is viewed as the ultimate orientation, 
this asks for a surrender of subjectivity. Th e idea of uniqueness 
is perceived as vanity, and believers are stimulated to resign to 
the existing world order. In these religions, the established world 
order is viewed as just, trustworthy, and thus willed and continu-
ously renewed by a Highest Person. Th is results in the pluralism of 
monotheistic religions.
Th e diff erent types correspond to “Eastern” and “Western” religions 
respectively.50
Every major self-interpretation has developed from and is expe-
rienced in the Grundverhältnis and seeks to neutralize its innate 
tensions by subordinating one of its aspects. Th us, it attempts to tran-
scend the Grundverhältnis even though the possibility of awareness of 
this other pole remains. Th is neglected aspect will always be a source 
of instability in every religion, Henrich claims. Religions will always be 
pressured to re-integrate that pole of the Grundverhältnis that they try 
49 Ibid., 116.
50 It is noteworthy that both major types coincide in their renunciation of center-
ing one’s life on fi nite I-hood, even if they approach self-denial from entirely diff erent 
angles.
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to transcend, thereby weakening the clarity of their symbols and pro-
voking a confusion of diverging explanations. Th erefore, it is doubtful 
whether religions in their ultimate aim to transcend the Grundverhält-
nis by extrapolation of one of its poles can ever succeed. Monotheism, 
which has tried to absolutize the person-aspect of the Grundverhält-
nis, has struggled with monistic infl uences that tend towards abso-
lutization of the subject-aspect. Hence, it is accompanied by a threat 
from something it describes as “mysticism.” Monistic religions, on the 
contrary, which emphasize the subject-aspect are threatened by the 
suspicion that personhood is the essential form of humanity and that 
individuality is the ultimate reality. If so, then giving up this individu-
ality will merely lead to self-loss and not to deliverance.51
Th erefore, the contradictory aspects of the Grundverhältnis inevi-
tably result in the possibility of diff erent cultures and religions. How-
ever, as attempts to transcend the Grundverhältnis they are all doomed 
to fail ultimately. Th e one-sidedness of their basis makes lasting, self-
centered, insular religious traditions impossible in history, if they are 
to carry any truth in them. Th e philosophy of religion should avoid 
treating this plurality of religions as mere fact or peculiarity. Neither 
should it explain the diff erences solely in terms of opposites since cul-
tures and religions do not develop in simple reaction to other cultures 
and religions. For a large part, they have developed independently. 
Moreover, it is outdated to view the diff erent religions as diff erent 
stages in the same process of maturation. Th ere is no such thing as 
linear progress from one religion to the next. It would be more fruit-
ful for philosophers of religion to focus on clarifying the origins of 
religions as self-interpretations of conscious life instead.
Hence Henrich asserts,
Th is leads to the conclusion that the major self-interpretations need 
philosophy . . . It alone opens the perspective, if such a perspective exists 
at all, to combine conscious life and individuality [Einzelnheit] not only 
in confusing thoughts and deep symbols but in a kind of understanding 
that can last.52
Only speculative philosophy is able to transcend the ideas that are 
unfolded within religions and develop a non-doctrinal type of thinking 
that starts from the Grundverhältnis, in his view. Such a philosophy 
51 See Henrich 1982a, 118.
52 Ibid., 119.
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can never be a scientifi c discipline because just as the Grundverhältnis 
springs from an unknowable source, it can only obtain its fullness in 
a type of closure that cannot be proven within the domain of regular 
knowledge. Starting-point should be conscious life, its need for self-
interpretations, and an approach that is an extrapolation of the way this 
conscious life is experienced. People want to lead their lives instead of 
viewing them as mere objective processes that happen to them. Th ey 
cannot give meaning to their lives in an atmosphere of fatalism or 
arbitrariness. Even if such self-interpretations can never be supported 
by “hard” evidence, they seek thoughts of closure [Abschlussgedanken] 
that help them think their lives as a coherent whole. In that respect 
metaphysics is of all times, according to Henrich.53
One element to be studied in Henrich’s philosophy of religion remains: 
gratitude. Th e obscurity of the ground of I-hood, our inability to con-
trol and preserve self-consciousness, elicits intense feelings of grati-
tude for the gift  of a life that can succeed. Let us see how Henrich can 
connect gratitude with an I-less ground of conscious life.
6.1.3.2. Gratitude as the Basis of Religious Praxis
Th e fundamental inability to explain our subjectivity leads to religion 
and the religious praxis centers around gratitude, in Henrich’s view. 
Th is results in two questions:
1. Is there a link between the obscurity of self-consciousness and the 
gratitude that people experience for their lives?
2. Is this gratitude the obsolete remainder of feelings provoked by the 
conception of the monotheistic all-mighty Creator-god, or is it still 
viable in the type of metaphysics that he promotes?
Th ese questions, which will be discussed here, are from an essay called 
Gedanken zur Dankbarkeit [Th oughts on Gratitude].54
In everyday interactions between people where gratitude is involved, 
there is a benefactor [Wohltäter] who opens herself to another con-
scious life, the receiver of the benevolence [Wohltat]. Th is makes grati-
tude fi rst and foremost a confi rmation of dependence. It presupposes 
53 Ibid., 121.
54 See Henrich 1999, 152–193.
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that both parties are aware of the moral need to enter into close bonds 
with others. Th is implies an awareness of the tension as well as the 
relation between the subject-aspect and the person-aspect of conscious 
life because both benefactor and receiver of the benevolence realize 
that they have to carry out their subjectivity in relationships with other 
subjects.55 Th is situation makes Henrich conclude that his insights into 
conscious life can be linked to his thoughts on gratitude.
In order to explore this possible link, Henrich takes a closer look 
at the phenomenon itself. A basic characteristic of gratitude is that it 
is not felt in the familiar immediacy of another person but rather in a 
movement of turning towards and focusing on a specifi c other from 
a distance. We feel gratitude towards a person who is experienced as 
another. Th e type of thanks that is directed at other persons or person-
like beings Henrich calls communal thankfulness [kommunaler Dank]. 
Feelings of gratitude need not always be directed at other people, 
however. Th ankfulness can go beyond the human interaction of give 
and take. People can also be thankful for things that did not fall to 
them because of the actions of other people, such as a turn for the 
better aft er times of distress, illness, and mortal danger. Such grati-
tude Henrich calls contemplative thankfulness [kontemplativer Dank]. 
It is a form of gratitude that “goes beyond the interactive play of give 
and take.”56 It has nothing to do with feelings of dependence; it is 
rather an expression of freedom. Even if it could be argued that also 
this type of thankfulness is oft en directed at a personal helper, alive 
or deceased, or a personal power, this need not always be the case, 
Henrich maintains.
He sees plenty of instances of gratitude that transcend the system 
of personal interaction. Of these, he gives several examples, such as 
the deep gratitude that we feel for a beloved, for example the gratitude 
of parents for a child or those situations in which our own life seems 
to succeed. Feelings of gratitude can even be detached from specifi c 
situations and people and become a more general attitude in life.57 
A life that is grateful has grown beyond the confl icts that determine 
its course and has reached an awareness of a totality in which it par-
ticipates. When we feel thankful for all that is good in the world, we 
experience a distance between ourselves and the world as a whole, turn 




towards this totality, and feel gratitude for our ability to participate 
in it. In this distancing from and turning back towards the world, the 
self-relation changes as well. I am no longer immediately present to 
myself as I was before, but I become aware of all the other subjects that 
are relative to the whole and thus connected. Such gratitude makes my 
self-centeredness subside.
Th is analysis of the social aspects of gratitude can be applied to the 
religious praxis. To start with communal gratitude: People need each 
other and acknowledge this by thanking others for their assistance. 
Likewise, they could view themselves as dependent on an almighty 
power for support and other services. In view of this power’s omnipo-
tence, the dependency is even larger. If thankfulness is understood as 
communal, then this power has to have characteristics of a person, or a 
person-like being: God. Moreover, if thanking is understood as a pre-
requisite for services rendered in the future, it would thus be obvious 
that prayers of thanks play a major role in religious rituals. However, 
this would be an explanation for the role of gratitude in the religious 
praxis that borders on calculation. But even if communal gratitude 
is not considered to be a purely self-serving act, the interpretation of 
gratitude as communal results in existential diffi  culties. Christian the-
ology has the tendency to demand thanks for all that is and happens 
since it all comes from God and belongs to his world which is the 
best possible world albeit corrupted by sin, Henrich remarks.58 Th is is 
not the type of gratitude that can be understood from a philosophy of 
conscious life because it would imply thanks for the suff ering and the 
distress of others as well as our own negative experiences, he claims. 
In those cases gratitude could only arise in view of the experienced 
strength to endure and not be directed at the immediate cause of the 
distress.
Even when Henrich considers basic feelings of thankfulness for the 
world and one’s own life one of the most powerful roots of the reli-
gious praxis, he thus rejects the Christian interpretation of gratitude. 
But if there is no longer room for the personal God of monotheism as 
the Giver of this life in a modern world, does this mean that gratitude 
for the gift  of one’s life has to disappear altogether? Henrich insists 
that being thankful for life is an important and very real experience 
58 Henrich refers to Bible verses that speak of this command to be thankful for all 
that is, such as Eph. 5: 4; 20 and 1 Th ess. 5: 18.
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of conscious life. At any point in a mature conscious life, we can turn 
around and look at its course, but especially towards the end, we tend 
to take stock of this life as a whole. We not only weigh the positive 
against the negative; we feel gratitude for what has made this life to 
our own, he asserts. With his concept of contemplative thankfulness 
that is not directed at a person or a person-like being, Henrich can 
hold on to feelings of gratitude for life without the recognition of a 
personal God. If self-consciousness is viewed as something that we 
are unable to bring about, to control, and to preserve by ourselves 
but that is not the gift  from a personal God, gratitude for this gift  
can be considered contemplative. Hence, he has disconnected feelings 
of gratitude concerning the gift  of life from a personal Giver. Th us, 
a modern worldview without a personal God can still include the 
basic experience of gratitude without contradicting itself. Once again, 
Henrich emphasizes that in the dimension of metaphysics decisive 
arguments cannot be provided. Th ese thoughts on gratitude cannot 
decide whether our thanks should be contemplative or directed at a 
personal God.
Let me end this fi rst part of the chapter with a short commentary of 
Henrich’s metaphysics. All of his arguments against naturalism are to 
the point, in my view. It does, indeed, not provide convincing ways 
to deal with the human sense of free I-hood. In addition, posing a 
material ground to all that is seems counterintuitive to the human 
experience of self-conscious life. However, claiming a unitary ground 
that precedes the dualism of life in the Grundverhältnis but insisting 
upon its absolute transcendence might make Henrich’s theory more 
vulnerable to naturalistic attacks. Aft er all, the human race is getting 
more and more adept at manipulating matter. Control of matter could 
provide a sense of security, a home for our still unanswered questions, 
and the hope that with the progression of scientifi c research, this home 
may be modeled for life-long, if not eternal, happiness. I agree with 
Henrich that scientifi c proof of either alternative is impossible, but I 
fi nd his metaphysical solution of mere obscurity as a ground unsatis-
factory. Obscurity cannot give meaning to life. It might rather serve 
to confi rm the naturalistic relativization of the unique worth of each 
I, which is exactly what Henrich tries to counteract.
It is interesting to note yet another parallel between Henrich’s meta-
physics and naturalism besides the monism. Both reject theology as a 
“doctrinal type of thinking” that refuses to integrate scientifi c results 
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in its anthropology. Th is is an assertion that is unjustifi ed, in my view. 
Many contemporary theologians, if not the majority, attempt to re-
interpret an age-old tradition in view of new insights in psychology, 
sociology, neurology, and virtually ever other scientifi c discipline. 
Moreover, in the realm beyond physics, no such distinction between 
theology and philosophy can be made, in my view. Th ere is no clear 
choice between the God of the Bible who is the object of blind faith 
and the God, or the Absolute, of unfaltering reason. Th e modern theo-
logian who ventures in the land beyond the Kantian fence, has the ten-
dency to call what she encounters there “God,” but not at the expense 
of leaving reason and the insights of the many scientifi c achievements 
of our time behind. If metaphysics is about an unknowable ground, 
why allow ourselves philosophical postulates but reject the theological 
equivalent as mere doctrine? Henrich’s analysis of the variety of reli-
gions based on the Grundverhältnis is interesting, but as a philosopher, 
he seems unwilling to do justice to theological attempts to link con-
scious life within a Christian setting with philosophical reasoning. He 
strives to provide something that is a notch up on the scientifi c ladder 
while at the same not claiming scientifi c foundations. It invites the 
question what this type of philosophy can provide that theology can-
not. Moreover, he promotes precisely the metaphysical type of think-
ing that lead German idealists to speak of God and religion. It makes 
for a strange mixture.
Finally, his views on gratitude as contemplative – hence not directed 
at a personal Giver of life – seem rather artifi cial. Even though I do 
agree that gratitude can be beyond the immediate give and take of 
daily life, this does not imply that gratitude can occur wholly separate 
from the context of personhood. I do not fi nd Henrich’s examples 
convincing. We cannot feel gratitude towards an obscure ground. If 
we thank for our lives, we do not thank its ground; we thank its Giver, 
One to whom we can relate. I cannot help thinking that Henrich wants 
to save certain religious experiences from his own philosophy. Maybe 
the problem rather lies with his insistence on a metaphysics of an 
obscure impersonal ground?
Th erefore, it might be interesting to turn our attention to the meta-
physics of a theologian who holds on to a personal God as the unitary 
ground of all that is.
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6.2. Rahner’s Metaphysics
Karl Rahner59 distinguishes a transcendental, a priori, theology and a 
descriptive, historical, a posteriori theology. We will focus on the for-
mer. It constitutes Rahner’s attempt to show that we are “naturally” 
open to transcendence, that the conditions for the possibility of religi-
osity are present in the human being. Rahner’s heartfelt involvement 
in the Christian tradition makes him sensitive to the loss of ground 
of its intellectual heritage in modern culture. He knows how hard it 
is for modern people to believe, even for those who are still closely 
involved with the Christian worldview. Th e average person who comes 
to theology today “does not feel secure in a faith which is taken for 
granted and is supported by a homogeneous religious milieu common 
to everyone.” He is convinced that the major problem is the contem-
porary theological discourse, which is of such a nature that we can 
no longer connect it with our modern self-understanding. It employs 
terms and concepts that are alien to the ones in which we express 
our experiences of transcendence in daily life. In addition, it claims 
certainties that we are no longer able or willing to accept in all serious-
ness. But if we fi nd the way in which our sense of the metaphysical is 
worded unworthy of belief through the fault of theology, we will think 
ourselves justifi ed, not illogically, in further doubting the reality of 
anything beyond the physical. Th erefore, it is important that theology 
explain Christian faith in a way that is consistent with modern life and 
that takes its doubts and its achievements into account.60
59 Karl Rahner is born on March 5, 1904 in Freiburg, Germany, as the fourth of 
seven children of the daughter of an innkeeper, and a teachers’ college professor. It 
is what Rahner calls “a normal, middle-class, Christian family” (Rahner 1985, 24). 
Aft er fi nishing high school in Freiburg, he follows his brother Hugo and enters the 
Jesuits in Feldkirch, Austria, on April 20, 1922. He studies in Pullach (near Munich) 
and in Valkenburg (Netherlands). His ordination takes place on July 26 in 1932. In 
1934, he is sent to Freiburg to study philosophy where he attends Martin Heidegger’s 
philosophy seminars. In 1939, he fi nishes what is supposed to be his dissertation, Geist 
in Welt, which is rejected by his supervisor Martin Honecker. During World War 
II, he mostly does pastoral work in Vienna and in a Bavarian country parish. Aft er 
fi ft een years of teaching at the University of Innsbruck, Rahner receives an appoint-
ment for the academic chair for Christian philosophy and the philosophy of religion 
in Munich in 1964, where he becomes the successor of Romano Guardini. In 1967, 
he is appointed professor of dogmatics and the history of dogma in Münster until his 
retirement in 1971. Karl Rahner dies in 1984.
60 SW 26, 12. Th e references are to the Karl Rahner Sämtliche Werke 1995–2000 
edited by K. Lehmann, J.B. Metz a.o. Volume 26 is the Grundkurs des Glaubens. Stu-
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Th is requires, Rahner agrees with Henrich, that subjectivity should 
be the philosophical point of departure. To Rahner modern times 
are about “the process of man’s understanding himself as subject,” as 
Th omas Sheehan puts it. A modern philosophy of religion ought to 
start with a refl ection upon the human being as the universal question 
that she is for herself.61 In addition, for determining the possibility 
of any type of knowledge, a study of the limits of the human way of
knowing is relevant. Every philosophical question about an object 
of knowledge implies the question of the knowing subject “because 
a priori the subject must carry with it the limits of the possibility of 
such knowledge.”62 A transcendental anthropology investigates the 
necessary conditions for the possibility of knowledge of the Divine on 
the part of the human subject. Th is does not mean that the content 
of faith can be deduced from the subject, but that the transcenden-
tal side of knowledge, the subject, must be taken seriously.63 Th is, of 
course, assumes a human capacity for metaphysics, which tries to put 
into concepts “what we have always already anticipated in our being 
and in our activity.”64 Metaphysics is not about the discovery of new 
knowledge, but about becoming aware of what one already knows, 
albeit unthematically.
Since “metaphysics is the question about the being of beings as 
such,” a metaphysical analysis of human nature is always at the same 
time a general ontology.65 A metaphysical anthropology speaks of the 
human being, of being in general, and of absolute being. Reversely, 
all general ontology is and necessarily remains metaphysical anthro-
pology. Whatever is said about being must be said; it must be com-
municated by human means. “Every ontology is ontology.”66 Rahner’s 
dien zum Begriff  des Christentums of 1976. See Rahner (1999) in the bibliography. Th e 
translation is based on the 2002 edition of Th e Crossroad Publishing Company. 
61 Sheehan 1987, 2. Th e German Mensch has until recently been translated in Eng-
lish as “man.” Since Mensch means human being and since Rahner included all human 
beings in God’s grace, he would no doubt agree that excluding the female half is a 
bad start for any theology. Th erefore, I will oft en modify the translations into gender 
neutral or more inclusive language, and in case that I use the original translation the 
reader is kindly requested to remember this footnote. 
62 Schr 9, 34. 
63 Schr 9, 29. 
64 SW 4, 52. Volume 4 of the Sämtliche Werke is Hörer des Wortes. See Rahner 
(1997) in the bibliography. Th e translation is based on the 1994 edition of Hearer of 
the Word translated by J. Donceel.
65 Ibid. 
66 Schr 9, 34. 
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general ontology says that pure being cannot contain anything that 
cannot be communicated, that is absolutely irrational. His anthropol-
ogy says that human beings possess an unlimited openness for being 
as such and that our nature does not a priori exclude any kind of dis-
closure of being. Th is forms a diff erence with Henrich’s philosophy. 
Rahner claims human openness for what lies beyond the physical and 
the domain of explicit knowledge. Even if he calls pure being, or God, 
a mystery, it is not entirely irrational; it is not obscurity.67
None of this, however, tempts him to take the idealistic route from 
the I to a knowable Absolute that also Henrich rejects. But, contrary to 
Henrich, Rahner’s turn to the subject does not imply a modern secular 
move away from the Christian tradition. It is Rahner’s conviction that 
God must be more than the Absolute of German Idealism, pure being 
of metaphysics, or obscurity. Th e God of Christianity is a personal and 
free God, as we will see in 6.2.3. Th is implies that people are unable to 
determine the relationship unilaterally since that would be in blatant 
contradiction with God’s freedom. If theological God-talk must be 
illuminated by referring back to the human being, this is not the same 
as deducing it therefrom, Rahner warns us. It is more than the mere 
objectivation of humanity’s subjective religious state.68 To Rahner both 
God and human being are essentially open to each other. If the human 
being is understood as
the being who is absolutely transcendent in respect of God, ‘anthropo-
centricity’ and ‘theocentricity’ in theology are not opposites but strictly 
one and the same thing, seen from two sides.69
Humanity and God are two sides of the same medal. It is impossible to 
speak theologically about God without at the same time saying some-
thing about human subjectivity, and vice versa.
67 A translator of Rahner’s work can either choose to translate Sein as Being (with a 
capital B) or as being. One of the publishers chooses the latter arguing that for Rahner 
being is not divine. As Andrew Tallon writes in the Editor’s Introduction to Hearer of 
the Word, “Rahner says God where he means God” (Rahner 1994, xi). I agree. Th ere-
fore even when translating Seyn to “Being,” with a capital B, in case of Hölderlin, I opt 
for “being” in the case of Rahner. Th e argument is that Hölderlin does indeed tend 
to divinize Being, whereas to Rahner it is a philosophical concept. Th omas Sheehan 
chooses to speak of beingness as the translation of the German Sein, but I fi nd this 
term too artifi cial.
68 SW 4, 44.
69 Schr 9, 28. 
340 chapter six
Moreover, since modern metaphysics is necessarily involved with 
people’s secular understanding of themselves, a plurality of additional 
disciplines has become relevant for theology, such as the social and 
the natural sciences. Th e latter in particular dominate in the present 
age. Even though Rahner does not see that as a problematic aspect of 
our times – he even calls it a legitimate process by which the world is 
allowed to become “worldly” willed by Christianity itself – , he is well 
aware of the infl uence of the sciences on contemporary religiosity. It 
is far from obvious how theology should cope with this situation, he 
admits.70 Besides our self-understanding, the development of the natu-
ral sciences and technology has undeniably aff ected our relationship 
with nature. Nature is no longer divinized. Its laws are becoming ours 
to manipulate. God is no longer the incomprehensible and omnipo-
tent ruler of the elements. As the natural sciences have progressed, we 
no longer experience ourselves as living in nature, left  to the mercy of 
the elements. On the contrary, we feel that we are to a large degree its 
creators. Th e Copernican Revolution from cosmocentrism to anthro-
pocentrism has not merely taken place in the theoretical sense; it is the 
practice of modern life, according to Rahner.71
Our creativeness with regard to nature, our mastery of the world, 
burdens us with an ever-greater responsibility. Th is has had an enor-
mous impact on our religiosity. Th e world has become “demytholo-
gized,” “hominized.” In general, it has become more Godless. However, 
the resulting situation of profanity that makes “the world Godless and 
God world-less” is not a reason to despair, Rahner asserts. It is just 
that the medium in which God is experienced has shift ed from the 
objective world to our subjectivity.
In earlier times it was the external world with its order and harmony 
that provided the initial start for a person’s experience of transcendence. 
Today it is his existence with its unfathomable depths.72
Th e human way of being recedes into mystery once again. Th e mystery 
no longer mainly approaches us from our natural surroundings, but 
“it now breaks out of [our] own being.” Once again, we experience 
70 Schr 13, 77.
71 Schr 6, 8f. 
72 Schr 11, 162. 
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ourselves as living in the land of the uncontrollable: “Th is modern 
Titan is a poor mortal in all his Promethean pride.”73
All this implies that our religious context has changed dramatically. 
Rahner believes that there will be no religious convictions and customs 
shared on a large scale in the (near) future. Hence, in order for us to 
have the courage to persevere in a relationship with an ever more inef-
fable God, we will have to rely on personal experience and decision. 
He is convinced that “the devout Christian of the future will either 
be a ‘mystic,’ one who has ‘experienced’ something, or he will cease 
to be anything at all.”74 Th is opinion, which is half a century old, still 
stands, in my view. Th e contemporary mystic experience or experience 
of God is thought of as an experience of transcendence that is more 
fundamental and more original than and provides the basis for the 
refl ection about God. As such, it is no longer considered the exclusive 
privilege of the mystic in the traditional sense of the word; it is ines-
capably present in everyone.
Hence, similar to Henrich’s philosophy, Rahner’s starts with the sub-
ject and is willing and convinced of the need to think beyond physics. 
Rahner also criticizes the hubris of German idealism with a metaphys-
ics of an Absolute to be mastered. Contrary to Henrich, Rahner calls it 
the personal and free God of Christianity and not the obscure ground 
of our subjectivity. For our knowledge of this God, we are ultimately 
dependent upon his willingness to disclose himself to us as well as a 
natural capacity for transcendence. Let us see how Rahner proposes to 
go beyond physics in what he calls an intellectually honest justifi cation 
of Christian faith.
6.2.1. Being and Beings
Human beings do not stop at asking questions about specifi c things in 
the world. It is in our very nature to go beyond the beings of the world 
and inquire about being as such, Rahner asserts. We have an urge to 
know what reality is all about in its unitary totality. Even if we do not 
really know being as such, at least we know of it. We can distinguish 
between being and beings and we can inquire about being, which 
would be impossible about something that is absolutely unknown to 
73 Schr 6, 13f. 
74 Schr 7, 15. 
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us in every respect. Exactly in asking the metaphysical question, we 
become aware of our essence. A human being “is insofar as he asks 
about being.”75 Nevertheless, the fact that we need to inquire about it 
shows that the question is not from the start and from every point of 
view made superfl uous by an answer.
If I, the questioner, ask about being . . . my question shows that I already 
know about being . . . Yet, as inquirer, I cannot be the being about which 
I inquire, since otherwise . . . I should be in unquestioning possession of 
the being I inquire about.76
Human beings are the beings that can inquire about being, but they 
also must inquire about being. We know about being but we do not 
know all about it, otherwise we could stop asking altogether. Let us 
try to fi nd out why Rahner’s metaphysical point of departure is that 
people are always already practicing metaphysics even when being is 
not fully transparent to us.77
6.2.1.1. Th e Openness for Being
In Rahner’s view, transcendence is not just one among many top-
ics that intrigue people; it forms the very core of human knowledge. 
Without our ability to transcend what is off ered to our sense organs, 
we would have no knowledge whatsoever. Our capacity for transcen-
dence becomes obvious fi rst of all by looking at all the diff erent things 
that we know about ourselves as human beings from the various view-
points available to us. All these empirical data result in a plurality of 
particular anthropologies that approach the human being from a defi -
nite standpoint such as psychology, genetics, neurosciences, etc. At 
the same time, these disciplines intend to say something about who 
we are as a whole. In these attempts to analyze and reconstruct our 
own being, we experience ourselves as the subject “of these multiple 
objectivities.” We transcend every possible element of this analysis and 
affi  rm ourselves “as more than the sum of such analyzable components 
of our reality.”78 We are over and above all the components, and we 
75 SW 2, 54. See bibliography. Volume 2 of the Sämtliche Werke is Geist in Welt. 
See bibliography Rahner (1996). Th e translation is based on the 1968 edition of Spirit 
in the World of W. Dych. 
76 SW 4, 72. Th is identifi cation of being and knowing will be explained in 6.2.1.3. 
77 SW 4, 54.
78 SW 26, 34.
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can consciously and freely relate to the totality. As a result, we realize 
that to be a human being means to be
someone who cannot be derived, who cannot be produced completely 
from other elements at his disposal . . . He experiences himself as some-
thing necessarily prior to and more original than this plurality.79
As a unitary subject we transcend all the diff erent aspects of our 
human (way of ) being. We are the subiectum of our multiple empiri-
cal objectivities.
But there is more. We not only transcend our own separate compo-
nents; we also transcend all the individual objects of our knowledge. 
Even though we exist within a world full of objects, we are able to 
detach ourselves from these objects in thought and in action. We “step 
out of ourselves” into the world and somehow manage to “return into 
ourselves” without losing ourselves in the world. We always recognize 
our I as separate from and opposed to all the things we encounter.
We pronounce judgments about the world . . . We are subjects as against 
objects . . . When we step out of ourselves in grasping the things, we also 
return so completely into ourselves as ‘subjects’ . . . that we subsist in 
ourselves as subjects, as separates, as opposed to the outside objects we 
know.80
Th e knowing self-subsistence that we exercise with every judgment 
belongs to the essential makeup of human beings.
Besides the transcendence of our own objectivities and the ability to 
distinguish the objects of our consciousness from ourselves as a (self-)
conscious subject, we possess a third form of transcendence. We are 
able to distinguish single, separate objects from the totality of the fi eld 
into which they are projected, because we are able to “reach beyond” 
them. We transcend the separate objects towards a distant, infi nite 
horizon.
Before we elaborate on this third form, it should be emphasized that 
Rahner considers this threefold capacity to transcend the result of the 
way our mind is constituted. It is “precisely what the intellect has to 
contribute to mere sensibility as such in the constitution of the human 
experience of the world.”81 With this statement, Rahner underlines 
79 SW 26, 36. 
80 SW 4, 84.
81 SW 2, 42.
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his recognition of the two Kantian roots of knowledge. Th ere is an 
object that is given to us (through sensibility), and there is the ability 
to objectify (which Rahner calls intellect). One is dependent upon the 
other. Without the former we would be unable to experience the world 
around us, but without the latter we would lose ourselves in that world. 
Given this Kantian point of departure with sensibility as indispensable 
for human knowledge, the familiar question returns once again: How 
can metaphysics be possible? We can apparently transcend the world 
of our senses and avoid getting lost inside of it. But is there something 
in human nature that opens up the possibility of “real” transcendence, 
of knowing (of ) more than the objects present to our senses? Rahner is 
convinced there is. In order to explain his third form of transcendence 
he takes the traditional route of investigating the peculiar nature of the 
judgment. Let us see where it leads.
Th e most general form of a judgment is: this is such or so (for exam-
ple, this pen is blue). In a judgment, we grasp a single object under a 
universal concept; we grasp the universal in the singular (the blueness 
in the pen). Rahner calls this “abstraction.”
‘Abstracting’ means ‘detaching’ [herauslösen]. When we abstract, we 
know that the quiddity [the whatness, Washeit] given in sense knowl-
edge may be detached from the individual thing in which it presents 
itself to us.82
(We know to detach blueness from this particular ballpoint pen. It 
could also be the blueness of another pen, my teacup, or your socks.) 
So what is it in our human way of being that enables us to understand 
that even if the quiddity only presents itself to us in a particular sense 
object, we know it is not restricted to it?
Rahner asserts that we know that the whatness in the individual 
object is limitless “only if the activity that grasps this individual sense 
object reaches out, prior to this grasping, beyond this individual 
object.”83 In every particular object we grasp, we have already reached 
beyond it. We can only perceive individual objects because they are 
profi led against a horizon. Without this horizon, all would be pre-
sented to our senses as one massive whole. Th anks to this horizon, 
we can perceive depth, so to say. Th e horizon enables the individual 
objects to stand out. Th is “reaching beyond” Rahner calls the Vorgriff . 
82 SW 4, 90.
83 SW 4, 92.
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It is an a priori power given with human nature. It is “an unthematic 
but inevitable knowing of the infi nity of reality” that opens up the 
horizon within which the single object can be grasped.84 Th is Vorgriff  
is the condition of the possibility of abstraction. Th anks to an inborn 
power to perceive a horizon, we are always already a step beyond each 
individual object of our knowledge.
Here we begin to understand where Rahner radically surpasses Kant. 
For fi nite knowledge to be possible at all, it takes an a priori capacity of 
the human mind to have an awareness, or an unthematic knowledge 
in Rahner’s words, of infi nity.
Th rough the Vorgriff , which is the condition for the possibility of objec-
tive knowledge and of our self-subsistence, we continually transcend 
everything toward pure being.85
In that it opens up an horizon against which individual objects can 
come to stand out, it also enables us to become subjects. Th e Vorgriff  
as an essential power of human nature enables both the subject and 
the object of every act of knowing.
Rahner thus claims, “Th e Vorgriff  toward being as such in its essen-
tial infi nity belongs to the basic makeup of human existence.”86 Some-
how, we are open to all of reality, all of being. We already have a 
provisional knowledge about being as such. As subjects, we are able 
to reach beyond all that we positively know about ourselves and about 
the things of the world. Being a knowing human being means being 
more than a mere world-thing lost in the multitude of objects. Th is 
more consists in an openness for being as such. As subjects we recog-
nize ourselves as “that particular being that is quodammodo omnia,” in 
a certain way all. In all we know, in all we do, we have already reached 
beyond the specifi c object of our knowledge and the particular act and 
affi  rmed the existence of absolute being. We are not “one particular 
subject among many others at the material level, but that inconceiv-
able being in which the sum total of reality as such achieves realization 
of itself.”87
Hence, metaphysical anthropology is concerned with being as such, 
and the only way to fully understand the human being would be to 
84 SW 26, 37f. 
85 SW 4, 92. 
86 SW 4, 98.
87 Schr 13, 122. 
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understand reality itself, to understand God. Reversely, Rahner can 
claim that every pre-refl exive, unthematic experience of self that is 
the very root of all cognition is enabled by the original and ultimate 
experience of God.88 Th is is a far-reaching conclusion. Metaphysical 
anthropology is thus at the same time a philosophical theology. To 
speak with Th omas Sheehan,
If man is intrinsically the movement beyond (meta) beings . . . to their 
[being] . . ., that is, if he is the concrete and worldly diff erentiation of 
beings and their [being], then the thematic discipline called metaphysics 
is not a fl ight to heaven but a worldly hermeneutics . . . which merely lays 
out – i.e. brings to light, appropriates, and articulates – the knowledge 
man already has.89
We will elaborate upon Rahner’s ideas about God in 6.2.3. It will then 
be shown that God is ultimately more than pure or absolute being. God 
is not Being or the Absolute of German Idealism. God “in spite of –
no, because of – his absoluteness is no impersonal ‘It.’ ”90 God is per-
sonal and free. For right now, let us return to the language of being.
All we do and all we know is based upon our capacity to tran-
scend specifi c beings toward pure being. Nevertheless, our openness 
towards being as such can easily be overlooked. Th e silent horizon 
against which all is profi led can be ignored in the face of the distract-
ing variety of the immediate phenomena that dominate the space of 
our conscious life. Furthermore, transcendence is always given only as 
the condition of the possibility of knowledge and not by itself alone. 
“One can never reach out to it directly. It gives itself only in so far as 
it directs us silently to something else, to something fi nite as the object 
of direct vision.”91
Th erefore, we should not understand the Vorgriff  as an inborn con-
cept of being as such or of Gods pure being itself. Th e Vorgriff  is not 
an act of knowledge in which pure being, or God, is the object. In 
this respect, Rahner remains a student of Kant. Human knowledge is 
originally receptive. Human knowledge demands, besides the Vorgriff  
toward being as such, also the representation of a fi nite object. “Th is 
means that we do not from the start, on account of our essence, possess 
88 See Schr 13, 125. 
89 Sheehan 1987, 158.
90 Schr 6, 188f.
91 Schr 6, 180. 
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any knowledge.” Our knowledge is dependent upon a foreign starting 
point. What being is becomes clear to our fi nite receptive knowledge 
only in the reception of a sense object that is comprehended as a stage 
on the way to being as such. It is through the appearance of the indi-
vidual object that an outlook upon being is off ered. And it is a syn-
thesis of the appearing object and of being as such that is opened up 
in the Vorgriff . We always comprehend being as the being of a being, 
whereby we both separate and connect being and the particular being. 
“Th us in both direct and refl ective metaphysical knowledge, being can 
be comprehended only in a phenomenon.” Th e whole of being as such 
cannot appear to us.92
For our knowledge, we have to depend upon our senses, Rahner 
agrees with Kant. Nevertheless, in the claim that we always have a 
rudimentary knowledge of being beyond the beings that appear to 
our senses thanks to the Vorgriff , Rahner radically surpasses Kan-
tian philosophy. “In the Vorgriff  the most general structure of being 
as such, i.e. everything which belongs to being as being, is co-known 
[mitgewusst] by us,” he claims.93 Even when all human knowledge is 
necessarily related to sense intuitions, metaphysics is possible. In every 
act of knowledge, we reach beyond the specifi c object presented to our 
senses. Without this Vorgriff  towards being as such, knowledge would 
be impossible. Having established that all our knowledge is enabled by 
an infi nite horizon, being, let us now see what it is that we (co-)know 
about being. In what sense is being open to human being?
6.2.1.2. Th e Openness of Being
It will be clear from the preceding that Rahner never thinks of pure 
being as one object among others. Pure being must not be confused 
with a being. Being is not an object, and we cannot experience “it” in 
itself. “It is itself present only as the whither [Woraufh in] of transcen-
dence itself, which is enough to eliminate all forms of ontologism.”94 
Pure being is not something to be grasped, but neither is it a reality 
that is distinct from all the beings of the world. Our capacity for tran-
scendence towards pure being always refers us back to the things of 
the world. Nonetheless, pure being is not the totality that arises aft er 
92 SW 4, 178. Our knowledge is receptive because we are material beings. Th is will 
be explained in 6.2.1.3.
93 SW 4, 224.
94 Schr 4, 52. 
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all that is has been added up. It is the unity against which multiplic-
ity stands out, it is the one ground from which all beings originate. 
“Th is totality, precisely as the ‘whither’ of the Vorgriff , cannot be the 
subsequent sum, but only the original unity of the possible objects.”95 
Rahner agrees with the thinkers of the preceding chapters that there is 
one unitary ground to all that is.96 Like Hölderlin, he calls it Sein, and 
this being opens up to us in all the individual beings of this world.
In line with Th omist metaphysics that asserts quidquid enim esse 
potest, intelligi potest [for whatever can be, can be known], for Rah-
ner being and knowing are related to each other because originally, in 
their ground, they are the same reality.97 “Basically knowledge is self-
presence [Beisichsein] of a being in its being.”98 Knowing is an activity 
by which the knower returns into herself, thus resulting in self-pres-
ence; knowing is coming-to-oneself. Th is self-possession implies two 
stages: an outward expansion and a taking-back. “A being possesses 
being to the extent that it possesses the possibility of such a reditio in 
seipsum [return into self ].”99 Knowing is the being-present-to-self of 
being, essentially the subjectivity of being itself.
Everything strives back toward itself, it wishes to come into itself, to take 
possession of itself, since it is what it wishes to be, namely being, to the 
extent that it takes possession of itself.100
Where self-presence is complete, knowledge too is complete.
Th is implies that there must be diff erent degrees of being depen-
dent upon the gradation of the return of a being into itself. Hence, the 
intensity of being is determined by the degree of ability to be present 
to self. Th e degree of being “of its very nature, self-presence, refl ec-
tion upon self, is diff erent with every diff erent being.” A thing, a dead 
object, utters itself to some extent; it is a possible object of knowledge. 
But it cannot reintegrate what was uttered. Th erefore, it remains hid-
den to itself and is only luminous for others.
 95 SW 2, 117. 
 96 In the course of this chapter, however, we will see that a seemingly similar point 
of departure notwithstanding, Rahner has no affi  nity with the German idealistic notion 
of Being or the Absolute. Ultimately, pure being is the God of Christianity for Rahner. 
What this means for his theology will be clarifi ed in 6.2.3. 
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Th e degree of self-presence . . . corresponds to the intensity of being . . .
And the other way round: the degree of intensity of being shows in the 
degree in which the being in question is able to return into itself, in 
which it is capable, by refl ecting upon itself, to be luminous for itself.
In human beings the utterance of our own essence in thought and in 
action returns for the fi rst time wholly to ourselves.101 Th rough our 
thinking and acting, we utter who we are, and this we can perceive 
and understand ourselves.
“Th e nature of being is to know and to be known in an original 
unity, in other words, self-presence, luminosity.”102 If being able to 
know and knowability are intrinsic to being itself, then an individual 
act of knowing can no longer be understood as a relationship between 
a subject and an object distinct from it. Knowing is understood as the 
subjectivity of being itself. Rahner realizes that with this interpretation 
of being he could be accused of having “strayed into the basic assertion 
of the philosophy of German idealism, as it fi nds its peak in Hegel: 
being and knowing are identical.” Nevertheless, he wants to emphasize 
that his own statement of the original unity of knowing and being “has 
nothing in common with any kind of pantheism or of idealism.”103 In 
reaction to German idealism he asserts, “True, being is knowing. But 
only to the extent that a being is or has being . . . Not every being is 
‘knowing’ or ‘true’ in the same sense and measure.”104 Only pure being 
is the absolute identity of being and knowing. Human “presence to” 
or “possession of ” being is not absolute but fi nite. Th at is why Rahner 
likes to call human beings fi nite spirits.
Before studying the reasons that Rahner refers to human beings as 
fi nite spirits, it should be remarked that his use of the term spirit does 
not imply any kind of ontological dualism. For Rahner people are not 
essentially spiritual beings who were punished to live a worldly life, 
found themselves in an alien environment by pure chance, or what-
ever world-unfriendly interpretation has been put forward in the past. 
He does not in any way mean to ignore or reject our physicality, our 
material presence in the world of time, space, and history. In Rahner’s 
101 SW 4, 74ff .
102 SW 4, 60.
103 SW 4, 72. 
104 SW 4, 78. 
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metaphysics, we truly live and are meant to live here and now. Every 
kind of rationalism, “as an attempt to lift  human existence above his-
tory, must be rejected as inhuman and therefore also as lacking due 
respect for the human spirit.”105 Hence, the human being is spirit, but 
spirit in a peculiar way. We are spirit endowed with senses and living 
in history. Let us see how this works out in Rahner’s metaphysical 
anthropology.
6.2.1.3. Human Being as Finite Spirit
Rahner maintains that the absolute openness for being as such belongs 
to our fundamental makeup, as we have seen. Th at is why he asserts 
that to be human is to be spirit. “Human nature is absolute openness 
for all being, or, to put it in one word, the human person is spirit.”106 
We continually transcend all the objects we encounter toward pure 
being. “From the start, in our dynamism toward being as such, we 
grasp single objects as moments of this unending movement of the 
spirit.”107 We have also seen that for Rahner
knowing is being-present-to-self [Beisichsein], the refl ectedness-upon-
self [Insichrefl ektiertheit] of being itself. Knowing will know something 
to the extent in which it is this something.108
With Aquinas, Rahner calls this complete return of the subject into 
itself the characteristic feature of spirit. “Spirit is the single person 
insofar as he becomes conscious of himself in an absolute presence 
to himself.”109 But even though we possess this openness for being, 
we are not absolutely open; we are not absolute being, and we do not 
experience ourselves as pure spirit. We are not the unquestioning and 
unquestioned infi nity of reality. Th is makes us fi nite spirits. “We live 
life while reaching ceaselessly for the absolute, in openness toward 
[pure being] . . . We are forever the infi nite openness of the fi nite for 
[pure being].”110
105 SW 4, 248. 
106 SW 4, 60 (Der Mensch ist Geist, SW 4, 102).
107 SW 4, 102. 
108 SW 2, 83. 
109 SW 26, 178. 
110 SW 4, 102. Rahner in fact uses “God” here, instead of pure being. In the case of 
this statement, the terms are more or less interchangeable; the diff erence between God 
and pure being will be discussed in 6.2.3. 
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If presence-to-self in knowledge and the intensity of being are 
the same, then one’s own intensity of being, one’s own subjectivity, 
should be the proper object of knowledge. No objective other could 
ever “intrude.” So the question is: How can sense knowledge of this 
other come about? How can Rahner combine our materiality with the 
Th omistic notion of knowledge as self-presence? How can he honor 
the two Kantian roots of knowledge in this context: a someone who 
contributes the thinking and a something that provides the content? 
Th e diff erence between the Th omistic metaphysics of knowledge and 
the Kantian is that the latter has a gap between the knowing subject 
and the object that needs to be bridged. In the former, there is no gap. 
Knower and knowable must have the same origin, otherwise it can-
not be comprehended how knower and knowable can become one in 
the act of knowing. To Th omas the ontological unity of knowing and 
object logically precedes the separation.111 Th en the question is how 
the known that is identical to the knower can come to stand over and 
against the knower as other. How does this come about? How can 
fi niteness and spirit go together?
Th e answer can be found in our materiality. We are essentially mate-
rial beings. Materiality is not something that is merely added to our 
true spiritual nature or something provisional. “It would be unchris-
tian to understand matter and spirit as merely existing alongside 
each other,” Rahner asserts.112 It is ultimately from the human being 
that we know that spirit and matter are related to each other. We are 
truly material beings, but we are also knowing beings. Since we are 
material beings, we are dependent upon our senses for knowledge. 
Hence, human knowledge is receptive: it needs input from things that 
are distinct from it, that stand outside it. Th e essential characteristic 
of sensation is not-being-with-self or being-with-another. “Sensibility 
means the givenness of being (which is being-present-to-self ) over to 
the other, to matter.”113 Th erefore, the return into oneself, the self-
refl ection that constitutes the essence of knowledge, is possible to us 
only when we step outside ourselves toward another reality distinct 
from us. “Human knowledge can be self-return [Rückkehr in sich] 
111 SW 2, 73f.
112 SW 26, 177. 
113 SW 2, 98. 
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always only by stepping out [Auskehr] into the world.”114 As a mate-
rial, sensible being, as a sentient knower, the human being is always 
situated at the midpoint between total abandonment [Verlorenheit] 
to the other and setting-self over against [Sichabsetzen] every other. 
Sensation loses itself in the other, and the intellect liberates the self by 
objectifying.
Hence in our original knowledge we are ontically [seinsmässig] 
present to the other. Being in us does not stand in itself alone, but is 
with “another.” Th is other cannot itself be being, but it must be the 
possibility of being. “Th erefore, to be human is to be an empty, unde-
termined possibility of being . . . Th at is what Th omist metaphysics calls 
matter.”115
Th e capacity of the one human knowledge to place the other, which 
is given in sensibility, away from itself and in question, to judge it, to 
objectify it and thereby make the knower a subject for the fi rst time, that 
is, one who is present to himself [bei sich selber] and not to the other 
[beim andern], one who knowingly exists in himself, this we call thought 
[Denken], intellect.116
Sensibility is what lures us out into the world, and thought is what 
brings us back into ourselves, enriched with world, so to speak. We 
only know by stepping out of ourselves into a world, an other that 
is distinct from us. All things only become understandable for us, 
are “conceived of,” when “resolved on the one hand into the laws of 
thought and on the other, into elementary data of the senses.”117 Since 
the structure of the knower as a being is the structure of the known 
(what we are determines what we can know), this implies that “the 
being of the receptive sense knower is the being of matter.”118 Human 
being is essentially material being and human knowing is always 
related to a something. Th is something Rahner calls “the empty yet 
necessary ‘whither’ [Woraufh in] of knowledge.” Th is “whither” that 
is at the same time the “whereat” [Woran] of the known is matter. 
“Knowledge, still wandering and seeking its goal, comes to rest in [an] 
object.”119 Or from an ontological point of view it can be said that we 
114 SW 4, 178. 
115 SW 4, 186. 
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always grasp being as the being of a being. We distinguish in every 
object of our knowledge between the whatness [Washeit] in a some-
thing, and this something [Etwas] in itself, between an essence and its 
bearer. Th is something is the “whereat” [Woran] of the whatness. Th e 
empty “whereat” of the being of an existent in which being is in such 
a way that it is not for itself, that it is not present-to-itself, is prime 
matter. Matter is “the empty, undetermined ‘whereat’ of an existing 
reality.”120
Moreover, matter can be the bearer of several possible whatnesses 
and is thus the cause of the “thisness” of a being. Reversely the same 
whatness can occur in diff erent objects. Hence, matter is the principle 
of individuation in the sense that it is the cause of the multiple indi-
viduation of the same quiddity.121 If matter is the principle of individu-
ation, this means that human being, which is essentially material, is 
being one among many. “Because we are essentially material beings, 
we may be repeated in our quiddity . . . there may exist many human 
beings.” To Henrich this meant the relativization of our uniqueness, 
as we have seen in 1.3.3., but to Rahner it implies that “we are actually 
human only in a humanity.” It takes humanity as a whole “to make 
manifest what is essentially given to each of us single persons deep 
down in our possibilities, but only as possibilities.”122
Human beings are fi nite spirits. We know of being as such only 
because and insofar as we know through the senses. “We penetrate 
into the world in order to reach being as such, which extends beyond 
the world.”123 We are the beings that as spirit are self-presence and 
as matter are presence-to-other (hence self-absence). We are mate-
rial spirits or spirited matter. “Matter is the condition which makes 
possible the objective other that the world and human being are to 
120 SW 4, 192ff . 
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themselves.”124 It is the condition for that otherness that alienates the 
human person from herself and precisely in doing so brings her to 
herself. “Our cognitive self-subsistence derives always and necessar-
ily from a stepping out into the world, from the grasping of some-
thing, distinct from us.”125 Matter is what makes us spirit. And it is of 
the intrinsic nature of matter to develop towards spirit. Th e human 
being is “the existent in whom the basic tendency of matter to discover 
itself in spirit through self-transcendence reaches its defi nitive break-
through.”126 Th anks to our make-up, we are both essentially material 
and essentially spiritual. We are open to pure being, even if we cannot 
achieve absolute knowledge. All knowledge of pure being is a posteriori 
in the sense that we only obtain it through the concepts and the things 
of the world. It is transcendental to the extent that the orientation 
towards pure being is a permanent existential of the human being.
So far, we have talked about being: the being of beings, human being, 
and pure being. To Rahner this pure being as the infi nite horizon of 
all beings is not something neutral, an it; it is the God of Christian-
ity.127 Pure being, the whither of our transcendence, the infi nite hori-
zon against which all the knowable objects are profi led is God. Rahner 
goes as far as to state: “All knowing beings . . . implicitly know God 
in everything they know.”128 In all we know God is co-known. But 
the knowledge is implicit and unthematic; we hear “something.” Our 
“speaking of God is the refl ection which points to this more original, 
unthematic and unrefl exive knowledge of God.”129 Let us now look at 
what Rahner thinks he can say about God explicitly.
6.2.2. God as Mystery
‘God’ is a diffi  cult word, Rahner admits. Like every other term, it is 
infl uenced by each individual’s private history and runs the risk of 
being misunderstood by others in other contexts. In addition, it has 
124 SW 26, 179. 
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127 Th is God as experienced and expressed falteringly in the Christian tradition has 
certain characteristics such as his free personhood. Th e terms and the various inter-
pretations given in his tradition are for Rahner, and for most modern theologians, the 
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been handed to us through a common history in which it has been 
so frequently used that it is colored by quasi-objectivity; ‘God’ has 
become all too familiar a name. Finally, all names defi ne, distinguish, 
and limit. Hence, the infi nite horizon itself cannot be given a name. It 
is essentially wordless because every word receives its meaning and its 
limits within the fi eld of other words. All this might tempt us to stop 
using the term ‘God’ altogether.130
However, there are several reasons to hold on to it. One is that we 
badly need a word that expresses our transcendence and its source. A 
word that “allows all the individual things we can name to disappear 
into the background.” A word that expresses “the totality that grounds 
them all.” A word that in its lack of contour refl ects what it refers to; 
namely “the ineff able one, the nameless one.” Rahner is convinced that 
we need such a word at least as a question in order for our humanity 
to survive. If it were to disappear from the face of the earth, humanity 
“would have forgotten the totality and its ground . . . would have for-
gotten that [it] had forgotten.” In short, we would have ceased being. 
Surprisingly, the word that has come to us in the history of language, 
that is given to us, and in which we are embedded, or caught even, 
continues to exist almost against all odds. Even those who would like 
to see it eradicated, and call themselves atheists, are helping the word 
to survive, Rahner asserts. And since the term ‘God’ really says noth-
ing about what it means – it “confronts us like a blank face” –, it might 
actually be a good name to use for a God who is a mystery.131
Th e philosophical conclusion that we do not and cannot know 
the infi nite horizon of our transcendence permeates Rahner’s image 
of God. We will never know God in the modern meaning of knowl-
edge since “God is not an object among others in the realm of man’s 
a posteriori knowledge but the fundamental ground and the absolute 
future of all reality.”132 Our notion of knowledge is based on a model 
in which an object is penetrated and mastered. It is a combination of
130 Th e similarity with Hölderlin’s view of the stages of naming cannot escape us 
here. Th e namelessness of original Being and the wrong type of naming that deludes 
us into thinking that we know what we are talking about. Perhaps it is this type of 
quasi-knowledge that provokes naturalism. 
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the Greek desire of absolute gnosis and the modern understanding of 
knowledge as a process that leads to the mastery of an object come 
together, whether the mastery in question is conceived in terms of Ger-
man idealism or of the natural sciences.133
If applied to God, we run the risk of turning ultimate knowledge 
of God “into a sublime gnosis in which once again a human being 
replaces God with self,” Rahner maintains.134
If, in contrast, knowledge of God is no longer understood in terms 
of “seeing through” something but as a possible openness to mystery 
itself,
the unlimited and transcendent nature of man . . . does not turn man 
into the event of the absolute spirit in the way envisaged by German 
idealism or similar philosophies; it directs him rather to the incompre-
hensible mystery, in relation to which the openness of transcendence is 
experienced.135
In such a conception of God I am no longer the dominant subject 
reaching for and attempting to grasp the Absolute, but the one “whose 
being is bestowed upon [me] by the mystery.”136 I realize that my 
capacity for transcendence is not something that I establish by my own 
power, and I do not control it. I am the subject whose origin and end 
remain hidden from me. Rahner states that we experience ourselves as 
grounded in an “abyss of ineff able mystery,” a mysteriousness that has 
epistemological grounds.137
In Rahner’s view, as we have seen, all conceptualization stems from 
our capacity for transcendence. Transcendence is the most basic and 
original in our knowledge. All the things that are familiar to us from 
everyday life and scientifi c knowledge are secondary and “defi cient 
modes of that original relationship” to transcendence. And whatever 
term we want to use for the unobjectivated experience of transcen-
dence; it is and ultimately remains a mystery. Th e main reason that 
mystery would be an appropriate designation is because it expresses 
that human knowledge always falls short essentially of its complete 
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fulfi llment, which is designated by the breadth of its Vorgriff .138 Th e 
range of the Vorgriff  may be absolute, but that does not imply that 
the Vorgriff  provides us with positive knowledge of the Absolute. As 
the condition of possibility for all naming, the Vorgriff  reaches out 
towards what is nameless. Th is is not another, better, reality next to or 
opposed to ours in the dualistic sense, but the horizon, the fulfi llment, 
of the one and only reality, ours. Pure being or God is the horizon 
against which all beings can become known. In order to positively 
know, we would need a concept of this infi nite horizon within which 
all positive knowledge necessarily takes place. But the horizon itself 
cannot be present within the horizon. Th e all-defi ning limit cannot 
be defi ned by a more ultimate limit yet. God, as the term of our tran-
scendence, is always present as that which disposes but is absolutely 
beyond disposal. For this reason, God is a mystery.
Th e original transcendence, the fundamental experience of God, 
is the condition for the possibility of all knowledge. In metaphysi-
cal refl ection, we only make explicit what we know implicitly in the 
depths of who we are.
A person knows explicitly what is meant by ‘God’ only insofar as he 
allows his transcendence beyond everything objectively identifi able to 
enter into his consciousness, accepts it, and objectifi es in refl ection what 
is already present in his transcendentality.139
However, we should never forget that this refl exive and thematic 
knowledge of God that is conceptualized objectively is not the pri-
mary and most basic and original knowledge, nor can it replace the 
latter. Since our original transcendence always directs our attention 
back towards specifi c objects, these are “the mediation of and the point 
of departure for our knowledge of God.”140 Th is makes our knowledge 
of God ultimately a posteriori insofar that it is always mediated by 
the concrete reality of the world such as concrete objects, language, 
history, etc. Th is makes for the complicated situation that the most 
fundamental, our infi nite horizon or God, can easily be overlooked. 
Th is again might evoke the suspicion that such a mysterious God is 
merely an idea, the creation of human thought. And indeed, giving 
theoretical proof for the existence of God is impossible since it would 
138 SW 2, 116f.
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imply the grounding of the ground of all theory. Nevertheless, Rahner 
is convinced that transcendence is borne by God, and God is not its 
creation.141
Th is unknowability of God is not merely a de facto hiddenness that 
could be remedied in time as each person’s natural end or by something 
like an intellectual intuition as assumed in German idealism, accord-
ing to Rahner. God as mystery is not the as yet unmastered realm of 
the intelligible, not something to be grasped in the end. Th is rejection 
of the claim to absolute knowledge of German idealism Rahner shares 
with Henrich. A major diff erence is, of course, that for Rahner this 
unknowable ground is not I-less but the free and personal God of 
Christianity. Hence, the unknowability is not a symptom of obscu-
rity but an expression of freedom and personhood. Moreover, with 
Hölderlin, Rahner asserts that the end of history will be “the absolute 
nearness to God.”142 We will get back to Rahner’s views on this near-
ness and intellectual intuition in 6.2.5. We should now try to fi nd out 
how this unknowable ground can be personal, free, and loving.
6.2.3. A Personal God of Freedom and Love
Christianity is not concerned with being or the Absolute; an “it” that 
can either be grasped in knowledge or a realm that can be proven to 
be beyond knowing. Precisely the aspect of hiddenness and mystery 
of pure being is Rahner’s point of departure for thinking a personal 
God. He argues that being, to the extent that it is being, is “not only 
present-to-self, but also hidden, present-only-to-self.”143 Despite its 
openness, pure being is inscrutable, and the reason for this lies in its 
freedom. “Pure being is free being, hence it is not from the start and 
necessarily manifested to the fi nite being.”144 Being can freely express 
itself or keep silent.
We do not stand before pure being, the fi nal horizon of our Vorgriff , 
as if it were a lifeless [unbeweglichen] ideal which, always at rest, must 
always be available to our grasp; we stand before it as before a subject of 
free self-disposition.145
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Pure being is a “subject of free self-disposition,” hence a personal God. 
We do not ascribe human features to pure being in a human need to 
anthropomorphize and then call it a personal God aft erwards. Rather 
in the self-disclosure, in this opening up of self [Sicheröff nen] itself, 
being appears as a personal God. It is characteristic of free persons 
that they manifest of themselves only what they wish to manifest. Free 
decisions are taken by personal beings, not by things, and free persons 
only open up at their own free decision.
Th e ground of our spiritual personhood, which in the transcendental 
structure of our spiritual self always discloses itself as the ground of our 
person and at the same time remains concealed, has thereby revealed 
itself as person.146
Pure being, the ground of (human) beings is personal.
Th is personal God can decide to reveal himself. If revelation is to 
be the self-manifestation of God to a fi nite human being, the possibil-
ity of revelation presupposes two things: First, a divine revelation “is 
possible only if we ourselves, the subjects to whom it is addressed, 
off er it an a priori horizon within which something like a revelation 
may occur.” Human nature must possess openness for this utterance 
of ultimate being, or in typical Rahner terms: we must “have an open 
ear for every word that may proceed from the mouth of the eternal.”147 
Since it belongs to our innermost nature to stand before God, no dis-
closure of pure being is excluded beforehand. Th e second condition for 
the possibility of revelation is the ultimate unity of being and knowing. 
Only if being and knowing fully correspond, if being is luminous, can 
it be communicated in words what pure being is. And, possibly in 
direct response to Schelling, Rahner adds,
Only if these depths are not a dark urge, an abysmal night, a blind will, 
but eternal light (even though inaccessible to us left  to our own devices) 
can the word be the bearer of . . . all reality.148
In Rahner’s opinion, pure being cannot contain anything that, because 
of its absolute “irrationality,” cannot be expressed in the word of a rev-
elation. Pure being as such is intelligible, and it can be expressed: “being 
is luminous, it is Logos, and it may be revealed in the word.”149
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Th ese two suppositions, however, might as well be interpreted as 
arguments against an actual revelation. If being is intrinsic lucidity 
and necessarily means self-presence and if human beings have an 
absolute openness for being, then being should already always be 
manifest. Th ere would be no need for revelation. Reaching complete 
knowledge of it would only be a matter of time, and if a revelation 
occurs, it is no more than provisional help that might speed up a pro-
cess. However, it would not provide us with any knowledge that could 
not be deduced from our a priori human nature. Revelation would 
be superfl uous “since divine light always already necessarily shines 
and illuminates every human person.”150 Th is is the idealistic position 
that Rahner rejects as non-Christian. Th e Christian God freely decides 
what to communicate and what to keep to himself. Whatever is known 
about this God is the result of this free self-disclosure. Th e Christian 
God is the free and personal God of revelation. Since free activity is 
always unpredictable in the sense that it does not fl ow from its ground 
in a way that can be deduced from the nature of this ground, revela-
tion is not simply a continuation of our “natural” knowledge of God. It 
is “the actual opening up of God’s hidden essence.”151 God may speak 
and may refrain from speaking. Only then can God’s actual speaking 
to us, be understood for what it is: the unpredictable act of God’s 
personal love.
Th is conclusion introduces a new aspect of transcendence: love. For 
Rahner our capacity for transcendence is not exclusively, or even pri-
marily, the condition of possibility for knowing objects, for subjectiv-
ity as self-presence, for freedom as presence-only-to-self, but also for 
being present to other subjects. “For a subject who is present to him-
self to affi  rm freely vis-à-vis another subject means ultimately to love.” 
Hence, there is more to transcendence that convinces Rahner that the 
infi nite horizon must be personal. Transcendence is not limited to the 
realm of knowledge, (self-)consciousness, or freedom: it is also evident 
in the ability to love. In understanding transcendence not merely as 
an epistemological term, we are no longer talking about pure being, as 
mystery, as the unknowable, obscure ground, as Henrich envisions it. 
We are talking about the personal God of Christianity. In this respect, 
Rahner speaks of this personal God as holy mystery.
150 SW 4, 110. 
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To whom would the name ‘holy’ belong more basically and more origi-
nally than to this infi nite term of love, which love in the presence of the 
incomprehensible and the ineff able necessarily becomes worship?152
A personal God is free and loving, and mystery is the very core of this 
God’s personhood. Rahner “sees freedom and love as more descriptive 
of a person as such than, for example, substance or consciousness,” I 
agree with Andrew Tallon.153 Th is puts personhood, subjectivity, self-
consciousness in a completely diff erent light. I am no longer the ‘I’ 
that extends into infi nity solely as the result of my capacity to think. 
I do not control this aspect of absoluteness that I intuit in my human 
way of being with my intellect. Th e point of connection is love. Th e 
Christian God is a free subject, not a substance or an Absolute that can 
be fathomed by human genius. Th is free God rather discloses himself 
in relationships of love. In Christianity each person is considered com-
pletely unique and of eternal value because of and in God’s personal 
love. Love is the luminous will willing the person [gelichtete Wille zur 
Person] in his or her irreducible uniqueness. And “because and insofar 
as God loves the fi nite, it shares in the luminosity of pure being.”154 
Let us now turn to this mystery of freedom and love in the human 
being.
6.2.4. Th e Mystery of Human Freedom and Love
As human beings, we necessarily affi  rm ourselves as being. Whether 
we like it or not, we simply cannot get around the bare fact that we are. 
Our being is not a matter of free decision on our part. In this neces-
sary affi  rmation, we become aware of our thrownness [Geworfenheit], 
of our contingency [Zufälligkeit]. Th is makes the human way of being 
ambivalent. On the one hand, the contingent is basically unintelligible 
because something is intelligible only when it can be grasped as nec-
essarily emerging from its ground. Our presence in the world cannot 
be explained in terms of necessity. On the other hand, every object of 
knowledge is already viewed under the general aspect of being as such, 
as we have seen in 6.2.1. Th is position within the horizon of pure being 
makes us intelligible. We are contingent and intelligible at the same 
time. Our self-affi  rmation is a necessity – we simply are. Our being is 
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given to us and our transcendence is not the result of our own eff orts. 
However, the way we deal with this givenness is an act of human free-
dom – we decide who we are. Only in free activity, something unique 
can happen that cannot be deduced from a previous ground or under-
stood from the application of some general (natural) law.
Rahner agrees with Henrich that freedom is not the power to do 
something provisional that can be revised whenever one feels like it, 
not the capacity to do whatever one pleases.
Freedom is not the power to constantly change one’s course of action, 
but rather the power to decide what is to be fi nal and defi nitive in one’s 
life, what cannot be superseded or replaced, the power to bring into 
being from one’s own resources what must be, and must not pass away, 
the summons to a decision that is irrevocable.155
A free act is essentially the fulfi llment of one’s own nature, a taking 
possession of oneself, a coming to oneself. It is the power to decide 
about oneself and to actualize oneself once and for all. Our free deci-
sions work back upon ourselves; they determine our being. “We do 
not simply perform good or bad actions: we ourselves become good 
or bad.”156 Ultimately, the free action is the agent itself. In real free-
dom, the subject ultimately “does not do something, but does itself.”157 
Hence, freedom is the capacity of a subject to achieve her fi nal and 
irrevocable self. “Although it exists in time and in history, freedom 
has a single, unique act, namely, the self-actualization of the single 
subject.” A free decision is ultimately always a decision about and a 
molding of oneself as a person. Th e free agent might be unpredict-
able for the one who is present to the performance of the act, but 
this unpredictability does not imply randomness. Since freedom is the 
fulfi llment of one’s own essence, the act is luminous for the free agent 
performing it. Th is freedom cannot be escaped from. We are working 
towards such a self in all we do and do not. Freedom is fi rst of all the 
subject’s responsibility for herself, her accountability.
Since God as the source and the goal of freedom is the incom-
prehensible mystery, this freedom is a mystery itself. Th at empirical 
psychology is unable to affi  rm the freedom of the human individual 
is perfectly consistent with its method, also Rahner remarks. It can 
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merely determine functional interconnections of individual facts and 
objectivities about who we are within the horizon of experience. Our 
responsibility and freedom, however, are not particular, empirical 
facts in human reality alongside all other data, and objectivation of 
the freedom in any act is impossible. Real transcendental freedom lies 
in the fact that we always experience ourselves as the subject that is 
given over to itself and that can never be turned into an object.
It is only through this that I know that I am free and responsible for 
myself, even when I have doubts about it, raise questions about it, and 
cannot discover it as an individual datum of my categorical experience 
in time and space.158
Th is radical mysteriousness of freedom continues into all our free acts. 
We cannot objectify our subjectivity, likewise we cannot rise above our 
freedom, i.e. transcend our own transcendence. “An absolutely certain, 
propositionally objectifi ed declaration about our exercise of freedom 
in a determined act located in space and time is basically impossible” 
with regard to ourselves and even more so to others.159 Th e experience 
of freedom in our free acts can never be fully objectifi ed. Moreover,
the moment we experience that we come radically from God, that 
we are dependent on him to the last fi ber of our being, then the real-
ization that we also have freedom vis-à-vis God is truly . . . not all that 
self-evident.160
Human freedom is a mystery.
Freedom only exists because there is unlimited transcendence, and 
in that sense freedom always has a theological character. It is only 
“because this horizon of absolute transcendentality that we call ‘God’ 
is the source and the term of our spiritual movement, we are subjects 
at all, and hence free,” Rahner asserts. Without this infi nite horizon we 
would be locked up within ourselves, without freedom and unaware 
of the fact. We are “built” to freely receive what a free God can reveal 
to us. We are essentially the beings who, in our innermost nature, 
can hear the word of God and “every philosophy of religion is basi-
cally nothing but an attempt to say where humanity should wait for 
the encounter with God.”161 However, this does not imply that we are 
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pre-programmed, unquestioned, and unquestioning listeners. Whether 
we are actually willing to listen is our own free choice. In Rahner’s 
understanding of freedom, God is not only the condition of its possi-
bility, its supporting horizon, but also one vis-à-vis whom we are free. 
Even though freedom is always exercised on concrete individuals or 
the individual things of experience, God is its proper object. As our 
knowledge is ultimately directed at pure being, likewise the horizon of 
transcendence is the condition for the possibility of our free subjec-
tivity. We encounter God, wherever we turn or whatever we do, as a 
question to our freedom. And all our acts are an unthematic “yes” or 
“no” to this God himself. In saying “no,” we would be affi  rming and 
denying our freedom simultaneously.162
Freedom, “as the capacity for the eternal,” Rahner considers an 
extremely high value, higher than the material security of physical 
existence as such.163 Th erefore, a fl ight from freedom into the enclo-
sure of a merely secure life is immoral, he asserts. Likewise, the attempt 
to make what is morally evil more or less completely impossible by 
coercion is ultimately a morally wrong attempt to eradicate the scope 
for freedom itself.164 None of this implies some sort of untouchability 
of all we do. Freedom might come “naturally” with subjectivity, the 
capacity for transcendence; the capacity for self-actualization is obvi-
ously not unlimited and infallible. Freedom might be “free self-realiza-
tion into fi nality. Yet in spite of its peculiarly creative character, it is a 
created freedom.”165 First, because it is borne by its absolute horizon, 
it does not make itself. Secondly, because people always exercise their 
original freedom within the world, it has to objectify itself in mat-
ter and thereby becomes alienated from itself. We have seen a similar 
movement in the case of our acts of knowledge. Th irdly and closely 
related, a person exercises her freedom in a common space of human 
existence and is unavoidably restricted by other human persons as a 
result. Human freedom is not totally unlimited. We should distinguish 
between absolute freedom, or “freedom in its origin,” and “freedom in 
its concrete incarnation in the world” as two moments that form “the 
single unity of freedom.”166
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We are free to listen for a word from a free and personal God. How-
ever, in Rahner’s metaphysics the act of “hearing” or understand-
ing this God, is not a purely intellectual undertaking. Knowledge is 
closely related to love. Any “positivism that places knowledge and love 
merely de facto beside one another in an unreconciled dualism must 
be excluded.”167 Th e way in which a person can understand her God is 
always also dependent upon her love. We do not acquire knowledge 
about God in an attitude of neutrality and then decide to love (or 
turn away from) this God aft erwards. Such a neutrality of “objective” 
knowledge is a dangerous abstraction of philosophers, he asserts. He 
even goes as far as to state that
[what is] co-affi  rmed [in metaphysical knowledge] can become the 
object of implicit knowledge only to the extent that this knowledge fi ts 
in the structure of the love for which one has opted in one’s concrete 
conduct . . . Only one who, in spirit, lives in temples and cloisters, can be 
a philosopher.168
Metaphysics necessarily implies spirituality, religious commitment, 
and love of God. Both knowledge and love are placed within one and 
the same horizon of mystery.
Mystery is not merely a way of saying that reason has not yet completed 
its victory. It is the goal where reason arrives when it attains its perfec-
tion by becoming love . . . [Love is] the perfection of knowledge itself.169
Th e free acts of a subject are luminous only for this subject itself. A free 
act can become luminous and understandable for another when the 
other co-performs [mitvollzieht] or co-enacts this act as free act; when 
the other loves it. By taking part [nachvollziehen] in the performance 
of this free act of another, it emerges, as it were, also from oneself 
and may be understood. Th is makes love the light of all knowledge. 
Only in identifying with or re-enacting God’s free action it becomes 
luminous for us.170
Th ere is another important, if only implicit, parallel between knowl-
edge and love in Rahner’s metaphysics. In his epistemological view 
of transcendence, the infi nite horizon of being points our attention 
towards specifi c beings. We know being in beings. In his view of tran-
scendence as love, love of God, as the transcendental opening out, 
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requires “an intramundane Th ou. Th e original relationship to God 
is . . . love of neighbor.”171 We love God in humans. Transcendence 
always directs us back towards the world. God is not available as 
such. Just as the infi nite horizon of our being is not to be grasped in 
knowledge, a personal God is not to be loved in isolation of the world. 
Th e theory of Christian mysticism “has always been tempted . . . to let 
everything in the mystic act disappear in the face of God.” But leaving 
creatures is only the fi rst stage in fi nding God, Rahner maintains. Th e 
next would be service towards creatures, as is recognized in the fi rst 
and second commandment: to love God and your neighbor as your-
self. But there is a third stage: “to fi nd the very creature itself, in its 
dependence and autonomy, in God.”172 Th is would be a point of view 
that does justice to both the unity of all that is and the freedom of the 
individual subject. “Love of God . . . is the ultimate reason for a love of 
man’s neighbor that can be unconditional and yet remain free.”173
Our capacity for transcendence is real, but it makes us neither uncon-
ditionally free, nor the Unconditioned itself. We are fi nite spirits who 
do not have absolute power or knowledge in Rahner’s opinion. Nev-
ertheless, we are free to keep an “open mind” for the eternal, spiritual 
aspects of our existence. Let us end the subject of freedom, love, and 
transcendence with Rahner’s own eloquent summary:
To be human is to be that being who stands in free love before the God 
of a possible revelation, to listen for God’s word or God’s silence to the 
extent that we open up in free love for this message of the word or of the 
silence of God. We hear this possible message of the free God when we 
have not, on account of a wrongly directed love, narrowed the absolute 
horizon of our openness for being as such, when we have not, in this 
way, made it impossible for the word of God to say what it might please 
God to say, to tell us under what guise God wishes to encounter us.174
We will not study Rahner’s theology in more detail. We will skip over 
explicitly theological terms like grace and creation, and we will not 
discuss Rahner’s Christology and his concept of Holy Trinity. Th ese 
constitute a major portion of his thinking. For our present purpose, 
it suffi  ces to have established his ideas about a real openness between 
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God and human being that permeates our capacity for knowledge, for 
freedom, and for love. Th ere is only one topic left  to discuss that is 
important regarding this openness between God and human being. 
Aft er having spent the entire fi ft h chapter on the idealistic concept of 
intellectual intuition, we will now study Rahner’s response.
6.2.5. Intellectual Intuition and Beatifi c Vision
In Rahner’s view, the ungraspability of God is not merely a de facto 
hiddenness that can be remedied in time as each person’s natural end, 
as we have seen. Th e mystery will never be eliminated, even if we come 
to meet God face to face in the beatifi c vision. “On the contrary, it 
is in the immediate present vision of God that the incomprehensible 
mystery of God is most forcibly evident.”175 Human openness for pure 
being is not some inborn capacity for divine knowledge. We do not, 
on account of our essence, possess any knowledge.176 Th ere is no such 
thing as intellectual intuition as assumed in German idealism, Rah-
ner agrees with Kant. Intellectual intuition is “that knowledge that is 
precisely what human knowledge is not.” “Th e essence of the human 
intellect is to be defi ned in light of its ‘conjugi passibili corpori’ [being 
united with receptive corporeality],” he quotes Aquinas.177 Human 
knowledge is receptive; “all our ideas derive from contact with the 
world of sense.” Th ere is no such thing as knowledge “in the spirit’s 
pure interiority.”178
We know of being as such only because and insofar as we know through 
the senses . . . We penetrate into the world in order to reach being as such, 
which extends beyond the world . . . Hence for us as fi nite and receptive 
spirits there exists a luminosity of being as such only in the luminosity 
of material realities . . . We go out toward God [Ausgang zu Gott] only by 
entering into the world [Eingang in die Welt].179
Transcendence opens up in the perception of fi nite objects as the hori-
zon against which they are profi led.
175 Schr 4, 61. 
176 SW 4, 178. 
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Nonetheless, Rahner seems to agree with Hölderlin in predicting 
an “absolute nearness to God” at the end of time.180 Furthermore, he 
speaks freely of what the tradition calls the visio beatifi ca, or the mysti-
cal experience. In his book Ignatius of Loyola, he has Ignatius say,
I had a direct encounter with God. Th is was the experience I longed to 
communicate to others . . . I truly encountered God, the living and true 
God . . . How it is at all possible to make such an experience comprehen-
sible using human concepts is for you theologians to speculate.181
And that is precisely what Rahner’s metaphysics attempts to do. He 
maintains, “Ignatius was really a mystic.”182 Apparently, he believes 
that at least some of us can come face to face with this unitary ground 
of all that is, this ungraspable horizon. So why reject intellectual 
intuition?
Th e important distinction between the intellectual intuition of German 
idealism and Rahner’s conception of the visio beatifi ca is the fact that 
the very substance of this vision is the incomprehensibility of God, in 
Rahner’s view. Th is vision means “grasping and being grasped by the 
mystery . . . its fi nal assertion, its eternal and total immediacy.”183 It is 
overwhelming nearness of the mystery called God; it does not provide 
absolute knowledge. God as mystery is not the yet unmastered realm 
of the intelligible, not something to be fathomed in the end. Th e free 
and personal God is and remains a holy mystery, beyond the grasp 
of the I that tends to confuse its infi nity with mastering all. Mystery 
excludes mastery.
Divine revelation is not the unveiling of something previously hidden, 
which through this illumination leads to an awareness similar to that 
found in ordinary knowledge of the world. Rather it means that the ‘deus 
absconditus’ becomes radically present as the abiding mystery.184
If the theoretical intellect is understood as the capacity for conceptual 
mastery and comprehension, then beatitude means that the theoreti-
cal intellect is set free to love the mystery, which lays total hold of us 
180 Schr 5, 15. 
181 Rahner 1979, 11f.
182 Schr 3, 280. 
183 Schr 4, 41. 
184 Schr 16, 238. 
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by its direct presence. Here we see how Rahner can speak of a uni-
tary ground, the possibility of total intimacy of human beings and this 
ground while rejecting the idealistic attempt at grasping this Oneness 
in our subjectivity. Every Absolute we hope to engulf in mystical fl ight 
is ultimately merely “the infi nity of dissatisfi ed fi niteness, but not the 
blessed infi nity of truly limitless fullness.”185 If the beatifi c vision does 
not provide knowledge of God but the absolute proximity of the mys-
tery, this is a radical experience of the ultimate incomprehensibility. 
At this point, Rahner’s metaphysics coincides with classical mystical 
theology. In the mystical experience all that we can ask for is faith to 
accept our limitedness and “the loving surrender to the enduring mys-
tery . . . from which come love and salvation.”186 Such “blind” trust that 
we are safe and loved, without which we would be unable to endure, 
takes thorough preparation in line with the ascetic life style of saints, 
according to Rahner.
We might summarize all this as a threefold diff erence between Rah-
ner’s ideas concerning the awareness of the One in all that is and the 
idealistic view of intellectual intuition:
1. Rahner’s God is personal and free, not a controllable Absolute 
at the mercy of the omnipotence of the human I. Th is God can 
freely manifest of himself whatever he wishes and whenever. Th ere 
is a basic error in modernistic philosophy of religion’s tendency 
to decide “from below.” We cannot establish a priori laws for the 
possibilities of what is to be revealed since revelation is of its very 
nature “the unique gratuitous activity of a free agent.”187
2. God is not to be grasped in the spiritual interior of a human being. 
Since a human person as a spirit is absolute openness for being, and 
since “to be human is to be spirit as a historical being [Der Mensch 
ist als geschichtliches Wesen Geist],” revelation necessarily takes 
place in history.188 Th e way to God is not through the absoluteness 
of the I, but through the world that opens out for the I capable of 
transcendence.
185 Schr 3, 43f.
186 Schr 16, 238.
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3. Th e type of perception that we are capable of with respect to the 
metaphysical is our hearing. “As long as we are not given the imme-
diate vision of God, we have to listen for a ‘word’ of God in the 
sense of a vicarious sign of what is not given in itself.”189 Hence not 
in the immediate presentation of God’s own self, but in a commu-
nication through a sign, a word. Even those who are blessed with 
the immediate vision do not come into the possession of absolute 
knowledge but into “immediate sight of the mystery itself.”190
Let us return to our image of the Kantian fence once again and try to 
understand the way Rahner would relate to it. Th e fi rst thing to note 
is that he does not really acknowledge a fence that blocks the view. 
Th ere is a horizon that we cannot see beyond, but this horizon reaches 
into infi nity. If we allow a fence in Rahner’s panorama for now, we 
could think of it as follows. In Rahner’s metaphysical anthropology, 
“the human person [is] the being who, in history, listens to a possible 
revelation of God.”191 Human beings are “hearer of the word.” Human 
beings arise from God and are oriented towards God. To be human is 
to be capable of transcendence. In Rahner’s view, this does not imply 
that we can climb over physical fences and conquer the metaphysical 
realm on the other side. We can have a transcendental understanding 
of God as the principle of all knowledge and reality, but
on account of the fi nite character of our knowledge, and despite the 
absolute, limitless range of our transcendence, God remains forever the 
unknown one, so far as the actual knowledge of the human spirit is 
concerned.192
We cannot form an adequate, objective concept of God. God cannot 
and will not be grasped and mastered in human knowledge. In order 
to hear anything at all, a word must be spoken. Even if we can draw 
the conclusion that it would be entirely useless to speak in a con-
text in which there are no listeners, the initiative ultimately lies with 
God. Rahner’s metaphysics is ultimately theology. And even if this 
God chooses to reveal himself, this does not result in regular worldly 
knowledge.
189 SW 4, 168.
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 the absolute ground versus god 371
As long as we imagine that analytical, coordinating, deductive, and mas-
terful reason is more and not less than experience of the divine incom-
prehensibility . . . we have understood nothing of the mystery and of the 
nature of grace and glory.193
We hear words of freedom and love “from the other side of the fence.” 
Th ese do not give us directions for a Beyond; they rather are the guide-
lines for responsible communication here and now.
6.3. From Here Onwards
Th e absolute ground versus God is the title of this chapter. Th e Abso-
lute is a term that comes to be the keyword of German idealism, as we 
have seen. It is the God of reason, a God within reach of the human 
intellect, but also a God of immanence and a God of freedom. A God 
in me. An immanent God has the immense advantage of divinizing life 
on earth and God as (all) in all is indeed a biblical line of thinking. If 
my I-hood has an aspect of infi nity, it has infi nite worth. However, the 
infi nity of the idealistic I is emphasized to the point where it thinks 
to be able to master God, claim its absoluteness as its own. Somehow, 
contingency as a reality of life and the element of a God who sur-
passes all that is (humanly possible) are lost. Nevertheless, both lines 
are indispensable in an analysis of the human way of being: there is 
transcendence in the way I am, but my I is always transcended by all 
that is, can be, and should be. Th is transcendence is not just a factual 
surplus over and above all that is; it constitutes an appeal to each and 
every I to transcend its egocentricity in order to realize peace, love, 
and unity. Even if they do not fi t nicely into a rational system, it seems 
wrong to let go of either aspect, both in the description of I-hood and 
in the concept of God.
Perhaps that constitutes an important diff erence between theol-
ogy and philosophy. Philosophy analyzes, it pulls apart, dissects, and 
attempts to provide a clear overview of all the elements of the sys-
tem. But where the human way of being is concerned systems fail. Not 
as far as partial descriptions go – these are improving all the time –
but somehow the complete picture escapes us. Th e young Rahner 
has been a student of Martin Heidegger from whom he says to have 
193 Schr 4, 56. 
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learned at least one thing: that everywhere and in everything “we can 
and must seek out that unutterable mystery which disposes over us, 
even though we can hardly name it with words.” He continues to point 
out the diff erence between the philosopher Heidegger and himself as a 
theologian. “Heidegger himself abstains from speech about this mys-
tery, speech which the theologian must utter.”194 Indeed theologians 
remain, or at least they should remain, faithful to the ineff able without 
resorting to the glorifi cation of irrationality. Th eologians cannot, and 
most no longer do, hide behind an inviolable faith. But neither can 
they, like Henrich as a philosopher, be satisfi ed with mere obscurity 
as the ground.
Th eologians “must utter,” even if it is no more than a stutter from 
time to time. Th is type of speech is not easily accepted in an academic 
setting. Th eology is no longer in the happy circumstance that God and 
its own position are sacrosanct. Th eology in the 21st century can no 
longer hide behind the solid walls of a tradition on unshakable philo-
sophical foundations. Philosophy has stopped being ancilla to theol-
ogy. Th e maid no longer needed her lord and master, her servitude had 
become an obstacle for her autonomy, and she threw him out. In the 
course of a few decades some two centuries ago, everything changes, 
and we are still in the process of getting used to it. Our thinking can 
no longer start with the Lord, and in the West, there are hardly any 
ancillae left . Ours is a culture where we all have to think for ourselves, 
lead our own lives. We only serve when we think it worthwhile, and 
we cannot do so without having to justify (also to ourselves) why we 
do. Th e I has become lord and master of life, or so we would like to 
believe. We know all too well that our control fails frequently; life 
tends to get out of hand. However, this is oft en considered a problem 
to be solved in time: . . . by us. Aft er all, the land of reason is still young 
and developing. Give the I time and it will fathom and master the laws 
of all that is. Th anks to the powers of (neuro-)science, medicine, and 
technology, it will become clear that there is no beyond, and the stut-
terers will be silenced forever.
In this chapter, we have encountered two thinkers who are fully aware 
of modern developments and have integrated them in their theories. 
Both are convinced that contemporary metaphysics has to start with 
194 See Sheehan 1987, xif. 
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the experience of self, that no philosophy can ignore the human sub-
ject. Both have come to the philosophical conclusion that it takes more 
than the physical to explain our ability to say ‘I,’ to know about our-
selves and to know that we know. Both take our capacity for transcen-
dence very seriously, but they have been warned by the mistakes of 
German idealism. Th e namelessness of the source and fi nal destination 
of transcendence should be emphasized and honored. “We have really 
understood this process of naming, only if we understand it as sim-
ply pointing to the silence of the transcendental experience,” Rahner 
writes.195 I believe Henrich would agree. Empirical I’s are not absolute, 
they do not control their own transcendence; it comes to them from a 
source that is way beyond their grasp.
Another similarity between both authors is that they are convinced 
that all that is arises from one single ground. However, that is at the 
same time where we encounter profound diff erences. Henrich main-
tains that a unitary ground has to be assumed philosophically to 
explain human subjectivity. Unity may be the ultimate ground of our 
(self-)consciousness in his metaphysics; it is defi nitely not the way we 
experience life in his worldview. Everyday life is not characterized by 
unity; it takes place in the duality of the Grundverhältnis of conscious 
life. His concept of the human way of being emphasizes separation, 
being-apart, instead of togetherness. A person is an isolated individual 
[Einzelne] who is supposedly connected with other individuals in an 
unknowable ground but does not really live in an atmosphere of unity. 
Unity is a philosophical assumption; obscurity is the true depth of 
conscious life in Henrich’s philosophy. Ultimate unity is the unreach-
able ground of an otherwise torn existence. Rahner, on the contrary, 
states that all our knowledge occurs within the unitary horizon of the 
Vorgriff  towards pure unitary being. We are embedded in unity and 
we have “an infi nitely profound yearning for unity.”196 Not to say that 
Rahner ignores the ambivalence of human existence, but in seeing 
unity as the horizon of all we know, do, and love, this unity is always 
present. We know because of this unitary horizon, we are free to act 
because of it, and we are able to love because of it. Th is horizon is 
God. “God alone remains the one true unity in the plurality that is 
195 SW 26, 64. 
196 Schr 6, 3.
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the human being.”197 Even when this God is a mystery, he is the holy 
mystery that loves and wills our existence.
Th is brings us to the other fundamental diff erence between Hen-
rich’s and Rahner’s view of the unitary ground. Both recognize that in 
the experience of transcendence we feel disquieted by its ineff ability, 
and we fi nd ourselves questioning. In becoming aware of the fact that 
we are not absolute as subjects, we understand ourselves as beings 
that receive being. However, for Rahner the Giver is a personal God 
with whom we may connect in a loving, personal relationship, whereas 
Henrich is keen on keeping everything metaphysical unpersonal, I-less. 
Even gratitude as the basis of the religious practice should be viewed as 
directed at something instead of someone, in his opinion. However, if 
the source of our being is obscurity, our being is ultimately character-
ized by uncertainty. If, in contrast, it is the result of a free decision, 
we can feel secure in the love of a personal God. Unfortunately, this is 
the point where the masters of suspicion, Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche, 
start whispering in our modern ear. Th e high level of abstraction of 
Henrich’s thinking and his care to avoid the concepts of Christianity 
give his thinking a measure of plausibility. When the familiar image 
of a fatherly, loving God who gives life appears, the philosopher gets 
uncomfortable. Is this projection not the proof of psychological imma-
turity, or historical indoctrination perhaps?
Th e fear of anthropomorphism, Nietzsche’s “human, all too 
human,” characterizes Henrich’s metaphysics, and modern thinking 
in general. A personal God is embarrassing to believe in. A personal 
God (over)rules. In German idealism, this God is set aside in favor of 
a philosophical Absolute that can be thought as the exponent of our 
subjectivity. But then we become confronted with a new kind of dicta-
torship; that of the absoluteness of reason. We become equipped with 
a scary I that results in a dangerous foundationalism destructive of any 
kind of otherness. It seems as if all human dreams of infi nity need to 
be put in perspective to prevent disasters. We should not substitute 
the Lord of Christianity with the lordship of our own I. We should 
save each other and ourselves from the type of rulers that destroy the 
multiplicity of life.
Th e I of German idealism is fascinated by its own infi nity, and 
thereby it lets itself be cut off  from the experiences of daily, very con-
197 Schr 7, 18.
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tingent, existence. In turning to the Absolute, idealists manage to for-
get about real life. Metaphysics should be aware of this danger and 
always direct the attention back to the world. Or in Rahner’s theologi-
cal language,
Precisely this conditioned reality is what is loved unconditionally 
by the Unconditioned that therefore has a validity that makes it more 
than something merely provisional – something that dissolves in the face 
of God.198
Th ose who intuit more than the physical should attempt to interpret 
what it means for life here and now.
Th e value of daily, conscious life in the world is something that also 
Henrich emphasizes time and again. However, if metaphysics has to 
start with the categories of daily life, as he maintains, then it cannot 
ignore emotions, love, passion, intuition, contradiction, and even irra-
tionality. As homage to the reality of life here and now, metaphysics 
should demand the freedom to allow other categories than rationality 
to play a role in its discourse. It should allow for a diff erent sort of 
rationality. Like Hölderlin, the poet, also the metaphysicist should not 
be put off  by the Kantian “no trespassing” sign while at the same time 
refusing to fall into the idealistic trap of absolute mastery of the meta-
physical. Metaphysics should be the art of thinking beyond physics. 
Th is is not a plea for irrationality. However, thinking a unitary ground 
takes more than reason in the too limited sense of the scientifi c word. 
It has been Rahner’s contribution to this chapter to point this out to 
us. By closely connecting love, freedom, and knowledge within the 
one horizon of our transcendence, he manages to develop a concept of 
All-Unity that exceeds Henrich’s, in my view. His theology voices the 
type of receptiveness and openness that we need to do metaphysics. 
Th e initiative lies with our stuttered transcendence, the (intellectual) 
intuition concerning unity, the hope to transcend egocentricity.
Let us underline this by going back to Hölderlin’s more poetical 
approach of the ground of consciousness. Perhaps the most remarkable 
contrast between Hölderlin and (the early) Schelling is in his motives 
for philosophizing. He is not out to unfold a theory, to build a system; 
he has the urge to express in an intelligent manner how life feels. As a 
result, passion is allowed to play a role in the theory itself. Hölderlin 
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does not want to cut the Gordian knot of philosophy as Schelling does; 
he wants to understand the complexity of his feelings concerning the 
human way of being. He not only refuses to stop at the Kantian lim-
its, as also his fellow student of the Stift  does, he chooses to shake off  
the yoke of philosophy altogether. His turn towards poetry is not a 
token of philosophical incompetence. In Grund im Bewusstsein Hen-
rich has shown conclusively that Hölderlin’s thinking is independent 
and well-respected in Jena, the center of German philosophy at the 
time.199 Neither is it a renunciation of thought altogether. Hölderlin 
merely understands the dangers of the route that his contemporaries 
are taking towards naming, pinning down, and thereby controlling the 
wondrous fact of our infi nite openness beyond the empirical person 
who says ‘I.’ He chooses poetry as a more effi  cient means of voic-
ing what philosophy cannot allow: human desires, even contradictory 
ones; passions, even when barely controlled; and intuitions, even when 
words fail to capture them. So does metaphysics at its best. And in this, 
it gives a more complete picture of what it means to be an I.
Hölderlin has been called the poet of philosophers, and he has 
intrigued many: Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Henrich, to name but a 
few. He has also fascinated theologians such as Guardini and Tillich. 
Is it not curious how philosophers and theologians alike adore those 
who dare to follow their heart – or should I say intuition? Th ose who 
will call out for God with the intelligence and the passion that are 
both inherent to the human way of being? A theoretical self-interpre-
tation of conscious life is indeed valuable, but philosophy should not 
be blind to the fact that the meaning of life is not so much in theory 
as in feelings. For Hölderlin things are not unreal simply because we 
cannot master them in thought. If we love the “peace of all peace that 
is higher than all reason,” if we long for it, it must be real somewhere, 
somehow.200 It is this longing that Henrich, as a philosopher, cannot 
allow fi ltering into his texts, if he wants the scientifi c recognition that 
his intellectual capacities deserve. Nevertheless, I believe that it ham-
pers his concept of the human way of being.
Our subjectivity in the sense of our experience of a self that is aware 
of its opposition to the rest of the world seems to be Henrich’s starting-
point. Being a person, being in the world, he sees as a relativization of 
199 See Henrich 1992a, 31–185.
200 StA III, 236.
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our uniqueness. All the I can do is make the best of its encounters with 
all the other I’s, so it appears. Being an I, being an individual on earth, 
implies isolation. Hölderlin, on the other hand, departs from a painful 
awareness of the loss of unity. Whereas Henrich speaks of individual 
I’s that search to explain their existence and look for meaning of this 
individual life, Hölderlin starts with the lost paradise of a pre-con-
scious togetherness and is focused on re-establishing unity on earth, 
the perfect unity of the end of time. Hölderlin would rather disappear 
as an individual but feels obliged to sit out his individuality in a sort 
of faithfulness to the divine need for thinking and feeling. Only the 
hope that this individuality is the inevitable road to a unity that is One 
and All, instead of One and Nothing, makes his life bearable. At the 
end of time, the contradictions of life will be resolved in a unity that 
is in no way harmed by individuality, in Hölderlin’s view. Henrich, 
as a philosopher, is not concerned with eschatology. He has focused 
on Hölderlin’s philosophical work in Jena in 1794–1795, whereas the 
latter’s eschatology only plays a role in his mature poetry. Neverthe-
less, if we should start with what Henrich calls our primary rational-
ity, our basic understanding of the world that guides conscious life, 
then we have to take feelings of hope seriously, even if they can only 
be uttered in verse that leads outside the philosophically safe arena of 
intellectuality.
Hölderlin survives in this world of lonely I-hood thanks to an intu-
ition of All-unity. He claims fl ashes of insight into the peace and har-
mony of this unity, whereas Henrich rejects an awareness of a state that 
is prior to or beyond the duality of the Grundverhältnis. Intellectual 
intuition is rejected as a source of “knowledge” concerning the unitary 
ground by Henrich, Rahner, and Hölderlin alike. Intellectual intuition 
is not thinking; not discursive knowledge, but a non-discursive sens-
ing, an awareness that is too volatile to put into concepts. Th e idealistic 
turn of an I swallowing the Absolute and thereby becoming absolute 
itself is rejected by all three authors. Nonetheless, both Hölderlin and 
Rahner allow for something like a mystical experience, brief moments 
of ecstasy in the literal sense of feeling placed outside the (empirical) 
I by fl ashes of insight into a totality of peace and harmony. Both do 
not allow “God to pale into an abstract postulate of the theoretical or 
practical reason.”201
201 Schr 3, 39f. 
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Perhaps metaphysics is by defi nition the land of art and theology. 
Not because the Kantian fence is an absolute limit for what we can 
know, but because living (and thinking) does not fi nd its limits in 
knowing. We should not allow the riches of human life to be reduced 
to what we can think. No metaphysics can ignore rationality; but it 
should not be limited by it either. To paraphrase Hölderlin: philoso-
phy is a tyrant whose force we should endure but never subject to 
by free choice.202 Th e same is true for the natural sciences. We can 
be measured, weighed, counted, analyzed in physical systems of 
measurement. Th e possibilities and the limitations of our thinking 
can be determined philosophically and (neuro-)scientifi cally to a cer-
tain degree. But next to and beyond all that, we feel love and pain 
and longing, we get deeply involved with the other I’s that we encoun-
ter, and we intuit a presence of divine unity in our lives that we may 
call God.
For Hölderlin religion is defi nitely not the answer to the question 
‘Who am I?’ as Henrich maintains it to be, but the desire to redis-
cover the purity and the harmony of the unitary source here on earth. 
Hölderlin’s search is for a unity that will do justice to his singular 
I-hood at the same time. To speak with Rahner: We are only human 
in humanity. Religion is not (only) about the question ‘Who am I?’; 
the question ‘How can we live together?’ occupies it instead. Not only 
in the sense of ethics. Religion is an antidote to solipsism. It is about 
reconnecting what has somehow become severed. It is not only an 
attempt to cross a divide between God and the human way of being, 
the ideal and bitter reality. It also searches to reconnect I’s who have 
individualized and absolutized to the point where they can only be 
at war. For Hölderlin and the religious person in general, a peaceful 
unity of infi nitely valuable individuals is what we live for and hope to 
live towards.
All-Unity is an attempt to think freedom and individual worth in a 
setting of a unitary, divine ground. I believe that Hölderlin’s philosoph-
ical insights concerning the interdependence of the I and its ground, 
the individual and a (divine) unity is an extremely valuable contribu-
tion to metaphysics that has been underestimated by many, including 
Henrich. We will elaborate on this in the next and fi nal chapter.
202 See StA VI, 202f.
CHAPTER SEVEN
GOD – BEYOND ME
Is there a chance of survival for a metaphysics in the 21st century that 
has I-hood as its point of departure? Th is question has been the focus 
of this research, and its ambiguous phrasing is deliberate. On the one 
hand, this research has concentrated on a specifi c type of metaphysics: 
that of Dieter Henrich and its German idealistic roots with I-hood as 
its explicit starting-point. On the other hand, this question refers to 
the present point in history, the fi rst decade of the 21st century, in 
which the I has become the collective point of departure. As a Western 
culture, we are interested in ourselves to the point of obsession. Life 
is about an I that is to develop, to shape and model itself according 
to the ideal of an assertive, healthy, accomplished, and independent 
individual. Th e self-suffi  ciency that is thus expected weighs heavily on 
the shoulders of the, oft en fragile, I. Human existence is about more 
than developing the I, but we seem to have forgotten. Hence, both 
the central role of the I in the type of metaphysics studied and the 
egocentrism stimulated in Western culture in our day and age are 
questioned. 
Th erefore, in an attempt to shed some light on the modern question 
‘Who am I?’ this study has started with Dieter Henrich’s philosophy 
of subjectivity. It has been determined that the question about I-hood 
cannot be fully answered unless we allow for an aspect of infi nity in 
our way of being. Th e I can be approached and studied from many 
diff erent angles, and each will provide (important) information about 
certain aspects of the human way of being. However, with Karl Rah-
ner it can be asserted that the I is the “subiectum of these multiple 
objectivities.”1 Even though the individual identifi es with these “objec-
tivities” to a certain extent, the I is more than its body, its brain, its 
psychology, its feelings, its activities, etc. Th e I is that ungraspable 
unity that knows of itself as surpassing all these qualities, and in this 
ability to be “beyond” them it discovers its infi nity.
1 See 6.2.1.1. 
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Th e aspect of infi nity in I-hood has led all of the authors involved in 
this research to the assumption of a unitary ground, one single source 
for all the I’s of the world. Th e I has become philosophically con-
nected to an Absolute that Henrich describes as obscurity. For the 
early Schelling it is absolute I, Urgrund, or Ungrund, but also God in 
the Freiheitschrift . Hölderlin calls it Being in his philosophy, but shift s 
to God, Father, and Father Ether in his poetry. Rahner likewise speaks 
of being in his metaphysics, but never denies that to him being is the 
Christian God. Hence the question about the connection between the 
I and this ego-less ground of Henrich and the Absolute (I) of the early 
Schelling can be phrased as ‘Who am I to God?’ in the metaphysics 
of Hölderlin and Rahner. All have attempted to approach the unitary 
ground of all that is through I-hood. Th e question has not only been 
whether these projects have succeeded, but also if they stand a chance 
of succeeding. Can the I as these authors have portrayed it fi nd a sense 
of infi nity and of the infi nite worth of its life without trivializing the 
contingency that is inherent to the human way of being? 
Th is leads to the title of this chapter: God – beyond me. Th ere is a 
double criticism in this title. Firstly, it criticizes the idealistic search for 
a ‘God’ to be found through a pure I to be uncovered in isolation of 
the rest of the world. Both German idealism as a philosophical school 
and Henrich as a contemporary elaboration have the tendency to look 
for pure self-consciousness in an I that is liberated from its entwine-
ment with other I’s. Once this I has been pinpointed, it can suppos-
edly start its search for absoluteness and for its connection with other 
I’s, Mitsein in Henrich’s terminology. Such an approach results in an 
I that has its private philosophical connection with a unitary ground 
that is by defi nition isolated, unrelated (i.e. absolute). In a metaphysics 
of this sort humankind can easily be understood as a mere innumer-
able and chaotic collection of I’s in which the individual threatens to 
drown. In fi erce competition with other I’s it is to prove its unique 
worth by absolutizing its achievements. Th e consequence is a lonely 
I-hood that may reach into infi nity as a philosophical conclusion and 
perhaps in its most private experience, but this I has lost all sense 
of being united with others in this one ground. It cannot fi nd a real 
ground for togetherness.
Th is is not only a depressing metaphysical conclusion for an I in 
the world, but it does not form a realistic refl ection of daily I-hood 
either. We do not become an I fi rst and subsequently start dealing 
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with the rest of the world, or Infi nity. Our I-hood develops in and 
never quite separates from the whole in which it comes to be. ‘Who 
am I?’ can never be answered apart from the question ‘Who are we?’ 
I am me because I am addressed as an individual; I am a hearer of 
words spoken to me (Rahner). Exactly this domain of relationality 
can and should form the basis for a concept of God. An I that can 
neither experience nor think a fundamental connection with other I’s 
and with their common ground will have a hard time giving meaning 
to its life.
It is Hölderlin’s metaphysics that attempts to circumvent such an 
isolated I as its point of departure; as such he forms a vivid criticism 
of this shortcoming of idealistic philosophies of subjectivity. Th e way 
to the infi nite ground of I-hood is not through an enlargement of the 
self-consciousness of the empirical I to absurd absolute proportions; 
it is through the I’s intuition of the unity from which it has arisen 
and its longing to restore this unity here and now. Such (re-)unifi ca-
tion, however, should not be established at the expense of its attained 
individuality. Hence, Hölderlin’s view of the connections between the 
I and its unitary ground is far more complicated, but also far more 
realistic. It recognizes and respects the singularity and the individual-
ity of all I’s, not just its own, and it emphasizes the human longing for 
intimacy and peaceful togetherness. 
Closely related is the second criticism in the title of this chapter. Th e 
idea of German idealism that the infi nite aspect of our I-hood would 
imply our ability to master Infi nity as such, to be able to grasp God or 
the Absolute in thought, has failed. God is beyond me in the sense that 
by means of the route of thinking, the I will never understand what 
God is all about. Th ere is no metaphysical knowledge; God is beyond 
the I’s refl ective powers. Th e metaphysics or the subject philosophies 
of the authors studied here, with the exception of Hölderlin (and Rah-
ner to a certain extent), are focused on the I that thinks. Th inking 
places the I, the subject, over and against its objects. It takes place in 
the realm of arche-separation in which a more original unity has been 
torn apart, in Hölderlin’s view. Th inking cannot bring the I the unity 
that it longs for, he maintains. Th e unitary ground of I-hood, of all I’s, 
is beyond the thinkable. Nonetheless, Hölderlin refuses to conclude 
that any sense of the original unity is therefore impossible. 
Rahner’s approach shares this tendency to put the unitary ground 
beyond the human grasp but not entirely beyond all possible experi-
ence. As the infi nite horizon of and the condition for thinking, being 
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is always there as the mystery to be known of, not to be mastered 
in knowledge. By allowing other categories than the strictly rational, 
such as (intellectual) intuition and love, to play a role, a metaphysics 
of unity that starts with the I might succeed. We are not just thinking 
subjects; the primary awareness of I-hood is characterized at least as 
much by the fact that the I feels, loves, and intuits. 
Th e failure to claim knowledge about anything beyond the physical 
has tempted many, such as naturalists, to declare metaphysics a left over 
from pre-scientifi c worldviews. Th ereby they display a hubris compa-
rable to German idealism: what is beyond me does not exist. What 
the human I cannot think, what does not fi t within the categories that 
we control, is not there. Who or what are they declaring non-existent, 
however? Th ey claim scientifi c grounds to reject transcendence. With 
disdain, they are declaring God dead. However, which God are they 
referring to exactly? Th e God of Christian dogma? But who is that? 
If the answer were as clear as naturalists maintain, theologians would 
have stopped disputing centuries ago. Spinoza’s remark still stands that 
many who say that they doubt the existence of God may depart from a 
fi ctitious idea that does not accord with the true nature of God.2 
Th e term ‘God’ may evoke a range of solidifi ed truths that have per-
haps become indigestible for modern Westerners. We might therefore 
need to let go of the term. However, why give in to misconceptions 
of those who have not taken the time to study the riches of the term 
in religious traditions? We will get back to this major issue of naming 
this ground in 7.5. 
Five questions have formed the focus of this project. Th ey were posed 
in the introduction, approached from the point of view of our diff erent 
authors, and will be picked up again in this chapter. What has been 
learned about I-hood will be discussed in 7.1.: Who am I? We will then 
move on to the I’s relation to its unitary ground: Who am I to God? 
(7.2.). Subsequently, the possibility of knowledge with respect to this 
ground will be discussed: Who is God to me? (7.3.). Th e issue of the 
possibility of the togetherness of I’s will be studied next with the assis-
tance of Hölderlin: Who are we? (7.4.). Finally, in 7.5., we will move 
on to a much-delayed question in this inquiry: Who is God? It is here 
2 See 2.2. 
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that the friction that has been ignored previously between the terms 
‘God’ and ‘unitary ground of I-hood’ will be discussed.
7.1. Who am I?
“At every moment, throughout our whole life, we are always thinking 
I, I, I, and never anything else but I,” Fichte writes in the 18th cen-
tury.3 Even if he is exaggerating, we can only agree that being an I is 
the ‘natural’ point of departure in modern life. Nonetheless, we do not 
know who this I is; not only as a philosophical enigma, also in daily, 
conscious life the I is confronted with seeming contradictions between 
its mind and body, thought and matter, infi nity and mortality, etc. 
What makes one a dualist and another a monist appears to be rather 
a matter of accepting or rejecting the experienced opposition between 
these diff erent aspects of life as ultimately diff erent realms. However, 
the experience of the ambivalence inherent to being a worldly, self-
conscious being seems beyond dispute. Most people have experienced 
the disturbing feeling of not knowing who or what they are from time 
to time, especially when confronted with (sometimes-unpleasant) sur-
prises about their actions. “I am not myself today” is a not uncommon 
excuse, and when handicapped, ill, or in pain for prolonged periods of 
time, many have the tendency to view their bodies as something that 
they are dragging along, a burden for their real I. Being an I is being 
a strange mixture of certainty and insecurity, control and surrender, 
thinking and feeling, proud self-suffi  cient I-hood and the desire to 
belong to a larger whole.  
A philosophy of I-hood that strives to be faithful to these types of 
experiences in life has to account for the contradictions that are inher-
ent to self-conscious beings. If a dualistic divide between mind and 
body is accepted, such a philosophy is safe from naturalism. In sug-
gesting that there is something totaliter aliter, something beyond mat-
ter and beyond science, the existence of a soul apart from the body, it 
thereby creates two separate realms: that of physics and reason versus 
that of religion and faith. However, either such metaphysics places itself 
outside the scientifi c community as a mere belief system, or it forces 
the philosopher to practice science during weekdays and religion on 
3 GA I, 4, 253.
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Sunday. It takes a certain amount of courage nowadays to admit that 
one is willing to take all scientifi c results concerning the human way 
of being into account without letting go of the intuition that not all 
is said if the aspect of infi nity in I-hood is left  unmentioned. In this 
research, it has been concluded that there is more to the I than what 
naturalists claim and (neuro)scientists study. But how can this “more” 
be thought without retreating into the safe but archaic term “soul” 
and still protecting the mystery, the aspect of infi nity, and the infi nite 
worth of each individual I that it stands for? Who am I?
7.1.1. Conscious of Being both in and “above” the World
Dieter Henrich gives a thorough description of self-consciousness 
as the pre-refl ective awareness of me as myself, a familiarity of the I 
with itself that cannot be learned or proven, that is not the result of 
reasoning but immediate, unmediated. He demonstrates conclusively 
that any form of refl ection in the description of this I-hood leads to 
circularities. Self-consciousness is in the realization ‘I am!’, not in the 
‘I think.’ Schelling’s, “My I . . . produces itself by its own thinking” is 
circular and cannot be an adequate description of the origination of 
self-consciousness.4 Henrich also provides a lucid explanation of the 
ambivalence of being a self-aware being in the world. I-hood is lived 
in the inevitable tension between being opposed to the world (subject) 
and being in the world (person). Experiences of the infi nity of I-hood 
and of its contingency are both inherent in the human way of being 
an I. Hence, Henrich’s two important contributions to a philosophical 
analysis of I-hood are that self-consciousness is pre-refl ective and that 
the contradiction that is inherent in the human way of being cannot 
and should not be ignored. 
However, there are several aspects to be criticized in Henrich’s phi-
losophy of I-hood. First, his concept of being a person. He views the 
person-aspect of I-hood as a relativization of the uniqueness of the 
subject-aspect. Hence, being in the world seems to decrease the infi -
nite aspect, the unique worth of the I. Th is is a rather undesirable 
result since it reminds us of the old dualism of the eternal soul in the 
unworthy body now rephrased as the Grundverhältnis of the infi nite 
subject and the person as contingent “world-thing.” Th e person-aspect 
4 SW 1, 167.
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of I-hood should rather open the possibility of relationality instead of 
sentencing the I to the isolation of being a world-thing drowning in a 
never-ending stream of other world-things. Being a person implies the 
capacity and the longing for communication and connection. Being a 
person is recognizing the infi nite worth of other I’s and of one’s own 
I-hood in the eyes of other I’s. Henrich has made a recent attempt at 
embedding the I in a community, in worldly togetherness [Mitsein], 
but it almost comes as an aft erthought in his long career.5 
In line with this lack of relationality in his view of personhood, the 
subject-side of being an I has problematic aspects in Henrich’s inter-
pretation as well. Subjecthood, the I’s aspect of infi nity that is coupled 
with its unique view, derives this unicity from its opposition to the 
rest of the world, to all that is and all who are not-I. Hence, also in the 
infi nity of subjectivity the I ends up isolated. Even in the introduction 
of the term Mitsein, Henrich remains in a hurry to emphasize that 
Mitsein is never the cause of subjectivity. In his view, self-conscious-
ness cannot arise merely as the result of being addressed as an individ-
ual. He may be right, but even if the awakening of (self-)consciousness 
is not under human control, healthy I-hood can only develop within 
a community of I’s. 
Hence, it can be concluded that interrelatedness, intersubjectivity as 
the togetherness of subjects, is underdeveloped in Henrich’s theory of 
I-hood.6 For Henrich the connection between I’s in a unitary ground 
is a postulate, beyond experience and proof. His use of proprioception 
(being in the body) as a possible basis for connections between I’s is 
rather vague. It is obviously not his area of expertise and feels like 
a half-hearted attempt to repair an obvious lacuna in his theory. He 
appears to be unaware of more promising indicators in contemporary 
neuroscientifi c research with regard to the fl exibility of the bound-
aries of what we experience as ‘I,’ such as hemineglect and mirror 
5 See 1.3.6. 
6 Because of this neglected relationality, Henrich’s subject philosophy seems an 
illustration of what Sallie McFague considers characteristic for Western male devel-
opment. It starts from a position of separation and works toward connection, whereas 
the female line “begins from a position of relationship and works towards indepen-
dence” (McFague 1988, 12). Especially motherhood does indeed help to interpret I-
hood as always and everywhere in intimate togetherness. We all start from a position 
of unconscious unity towards one of more or less independent I-hood without ever 
completing estranged from this unity. Th is I-hood needs other I’s to develop both the 
awareness of what sets us apart as what unites us. See also 7.5.2. 
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neurons. A tool in my hand can become part of me, and mirror neu-
rons allow me to ‘participate’ in someone else’s activities or perhaps 
even feelings.7 Even at the physical level the connection between I’s is 
of much greater importance and takes place at a much deeper level 
than Henrich’s philosophy has taken into account. My family, my 
friends, perhaps even those victims of war that I watch on the evening 
news become part of me, more than I care to realize and sometimes 
dare to realize. Th e human person, the embodied I, is not wholly sepa-
rate and limited, even in its physicality.
Since Henrich views personhood as Einzelheit, isolated individual-
ity, being a contingent “world-thing,” his view of personhood becomes 
automatically associated with embodiment, it was said. Th is makes his 
theory vulnerable for attacks from naturalistic angles, and naturalism 
is indeed, sometimes explicitly but always implicitly, Henrich’s major 
opponent. In the naturalist view, being an I means being a person, an 
integrated and complex piece of matter, indeed a “world-thing,” and 
its so-called subjectivity, let’s say ‘its inherent infi nity,’ is considered 
merely a left -over from archaic philosophies that will be naturalized 
and eliminated in the course of time. We will return to the vulnerabil-
ity of Henrich’s metaphysics with respect to naturalism in 7.2.  
Th e original insights of the two authors that we have studied from 
the era of German idealism in which Henrich’s metaphysics is founded 
have served to qualify this view of being an I. Th e very early Schelling, 
fi rst of all, seems to share Henrich’s view of empirical I-hood’s main 
occupation as self-preservation which means isolating itself from and 
opposing itself to all the not-I’s that it has to compete with.8 It seems, 
however, as if Schelling’s I never experiences this as a shortcoming. 
In the young Schelling’s metaphysics, the I’s interest is limited to its 
absoluteness, its infi nite self-power, and does not include its contin-
gency, or what Heidegger (and Rahner with him) will later call its 
“thrownness” [Geworfenheit]. Th e early Schelling’s I is not really in the 
world; it is ‘above’ it and in the process of becoming absolute I. Th is 
implies that it has to incorporate all that is in the absoluteness that it 
considers its own. Its main occupation appears to consist of engulf-
ing the other I’s, which are thus not respected, not even recognized, 
as real I’s. Th e young Schelling has what we would now call a large 
7 See the discussion in 1.1. 
8 See 3.2.
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ego, an I that is not to be relativized by anything or anyone. Hence, 
in that respect Henrich’s theory of more modest I-hood is defi nitely 
an improvement.
I heartily support Henrich’s attempts to bring the I ‘down to earth’ 
and to base a theory of I-hood on daily life’s experiences. Further-
more, I can agree with Henrich when he asserts, “Conscious life is 
at once shaped and unbalanced by the basic confl icting tendencies 
orienting it.”9 Nonetheless, I-hood is about balancing, not only about 
being resigned to contradictions in the human way of being that can 
neither be ignored nor resolved. Two opposites that do not meet but 
merely serve as each other’s counterbalance do not provide an inte-
grated picture of I-hood. Two children on a seesaw are not a unity, 
but counterweights. In contrast, I-hood presupposes a sense of unity 
that precedes all dualism. 
It is Hölderlin who provides a useful correction of idealistic views of 
I-hood. Henrich is right in noting that Hölderlin does not support the 
idealistic solution of self-absolutization. When Hyperion tries to take 
that approach by following Alabanda in his absolute I-hood, in the 
novel Hyperion, it turns out to be a nearly fatal mistake.10 Hölderlin 
tries to break away from the idealistic egocentricity, but he does not 
achieve this by relativizing the I’s unique individuality, and in that 
sense he also corrects Henrich’s view of I-hood. With Henrich, he rec-
ognizes the sharp contradiction within I-hood and he is aware of the 
modern fear of losing oneself. However, for Hölderlin the threat is not 
in all the other I’s per se. 
Whereas for Henrich the contradiction of I-hood is in the unicity 
of the subject’s infi nity versus the self-relativization of contingent per-
sonhood in the world, for Hölderlin it is self-conscious I-hood versus 
unconscious unity. Hence, Henrich’s confl icting drives are quite dif-
ferent from the ones that Hölderlin is struggling with. Th e ambiguity 
of Hölderlin’s view of I-hood is not in its infi nity versus its contin-
gency: it is in being torn between the desire to unite with all other I’s 
for whom he passionately longs and the I’s duty to remain an isolated 
individual. If the I gives in to its most basic desire to unite with specifi c 
I’s that it loves, this would constitute a premature unifi cation. It would 
be a return to a pre-conscious state indistinguishable from death. Th e 
 9 Henrich 1997b, 112.
10 See 4.5. 
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I is aware of its divine task to endure the loneliness of I-hood and 
fi ght the desire of premature union in order to realize a universal, 
living unity of individual I’s. Consequently, Hölderlin seeks a balance 
between unity and individuality here and now. In his metaphysics, he 
tries to think unifi cation in daily life, and Henrich appears to have 
missed this part of Hölderlin’s views on being an I.
In summary, Henrich’s metaphysics is clearly based upon (the pitfalls 
of) idealistic foundations in which the Absolute becomes closely asso-
ciated with I-hood. Th e problem with the philosophy of German ide-
alism is that it tries to think an I apart from, or perhaps beyond, its 
entanglement with other I’s or even its worldy reality as a whole. Th is 
does not work. Th e search for a pure I that fi rst has to fathom itself 
and starts to relate aft erwards is an unrealistic I. I believe that Henrich 
never really rose above this idealistic shortcoming. An I is born into 
a community; it becomes an I in and by relating to other I’s. An I 
arises out of unity and never fully detaches itself therefrom. Daily life 
consists in balancing between individuality and unity, between self-
centeredness and openness. Hölderlin understands this in the 18th 
century and, interestingly, this point of view is refl ected in the meta-
physics of Karl Rahner. Th e associated key term is love.
7.1.2. Loving
Th e novelist Moshin Hamid writes that 
[it is] not always possible to restore one’s boundaries aft er they have 
been blurred and made permeable by a relationship: try as we might, we 
cannot reconstitute ourselves as the autonomous beings we previously 
imagined ourselves to be. Something of us is outside, and something of 
the outside is now within us.11 
Th e character of Hamid’s novel is referring to romantic love. Th is 
openness for another to the point where it becomes diffi  cult to tell who 
is who from time to time is accepted as a not uncommon occurrence 
between lovers. Something similar, however, seems to be the case in 
human interactions in general as even neuroscientifi c research seems 
to suggest, as I have noted. It not only implies letting (something of) 
another I in, but also the I’s stepping out of itself, hence transcendence.
11 Hamid 2007, 174. 
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Love is the art of opening up for another and allowing boundaries 
between I’s to blur both ways. Let us summarize what can be and has 
been said about love with the help of the thinkers of this study. 
Henrich writes, 
Both love and selfh ood must be conceived together, freed from their 
opposition, which seems hopeless – and this by means of a thought that 
neither denies nor robs either of its genuine sense by reducing it to a 
moment of the other.12 
In Henrich’s philosophy, love and I-hood appear to be opposites, and 
the task of thinking them together seems a “hopeless” one. Th is is 
another demonstration of his view of I-hood as isolation. An I that 
opens up risks losing itself. Love is indeed hard to integrate in his 
metaphysics. 
Schelling also recognizes the tension between the two concepts. 
Love and selfh ood are opposed, but from this pair of opposites arises 
life, not a situation of seeming “hopelessness.” In Schelling’s solution, 
I-hood (being-in-self ) is viewed as the ground that is needed to pre-
vent the I from fl owing away in the other I’s it encounters. Selfh ood 
provides a mainstay from which the right type of togetherness, love, 
can fl ow. Th e paradox of love is that it unites what can exist in itself 
but cannot really be without the other. According to Schelling, love 
unites what is diff erent and independent.13 
Schelling’s solution points at the limitations of a metaphysics that 
allows only rational categories.14 As he puts it, “All life yearns to be 
raised from mute, ineff ective unity into an expressed, eff ective one.”15 
Remaining an I, an isolated self, is ineff ective unity. It is unity because all 
not-I’s are ignored. For a unity to be eff ective, it needs to be expressed, 
realized, as successful togetherness of I’s. Th is going-out-of-self is a 
yearning of life itself. Yearning, desire, longing are perhaps not safe 
philosophical categories, but they are indeed part of the experiences of 
conscious life, which also Henrich agrees should be the basis of a meta-
physics that is viable in this day and age. Yearning for an expressed, 
communicated, realized unity is what lures people out of their mute 
12 Henrich 1997b, 123.
13 See 3.4.3.
14 Th is issue will be returned to in 7.3. 
15 See 3.4.1. 
390 chapter seven
self-suffi  ciency. By the time Schelling can write this, he is well into 
the Freedom essay of 1809 and moving away from the strictly rational 
concepts and the “absolute I-hood” of his earlier  metaphysics. 
Once again, it is Hölderlin who manages to mediate between seem-
ing opposites. He is keenly aware of both the importance and the risk 
of love as it is commonly understood and fi nds expression in daily 
life. Love is an antidote for the curse of isolated I-hood. Love unites 
I’s and unifi cation is what Hölderlin longs for. In our daily reality of 
being literally torn between the drive to unite, or even merge, with 
others and to preserve self-conscious I-hood, love is the potential of 
a harmonious solution of what is unsolvable at our point in history. 
However, there is a risk involved in such love. Lovers indeed open up 
for each other in a profound way, but Hölderlin recognizes the exclu-
siveness of such a connection. Th e openness of the I should not be 
limited to a few selected I’s that ‘return the favor’ and thereby confi rm 
the I’s unique worth. When he writes, “All is lost, when Unity, holy 
universal Love is lost,” the key word is “universal.”16 Love must enable 
general unity, universal openness; not a one-on-one romantic union. 
Love is the principle that is to transcend the dichotomy of conscious 
I-hood and pre-conscious unity. Love is the image of the reality of 
All-Unity at the end of time, when “the law of love alone, the gently 
leveling, rules from here right up to Heaven.”17 In that respect, love is 
the I’s universal duty, and it is not allowed to hide behind a private 
surrogate.
Hence in a metaphysics that takes the I as its point of departure, 
there need not be all that much opposition between love and self-
hood as Henrich seems to believe. Only when the I’s I-hood is viewed 
as something that can only be lived in isolation of other I’s does it 
appear to be so. Being an I is good, but an I that is only directed at its 
own center is egocentric in the contemporary sense of the word. Only 
when this I opens up, fl ees its self-centeredness, there is love. From 
Schelling it can be learned that only this opening up leads to real life 
since selfh ood is only the ground of being, not real existence itself. 
Love is not indiff erence in the sense of unifying independent entities 
into an amorphous mass, nor is it mutual dependence as a condition 
for survival of isolated I-hood. Love is where the combination of unity 
16 StA VI, 419.
17 BrA IX, 233. See 4.7.
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and individuality succeeds. Love is where I-hood can exist within a 
unity without dissolving. Hölderlin adds to this view the notion that 
love’s universality is the lifelong task of the I. 
Rahner also recognizes the universality in the command to love your 
neighbor; not a selected few but those the I encounters everywhere in 
daily life. He makes the connection between love and subjectivity as 
two cases of the same capacity for transcendence of the I. Hence, the 
capacity for transcendence is not limited to the realm of consciousness 
but also of love. Love is transcendence towards another I, subjectivity 
is transcendence of the world of separate objects, both movements 
towards an infi nite horizon. In the beings of the world, we reach for 
pure being; in loving the neighbor, we love God. Reversely, both acts 
of transcendence direct us back towards the world. He describes an 
act of love as a subject who is present-to-self and chooses to go out to 
another I, to open up for another. Hence, love constitutes the balance 
between independent I-hood and togetherness. However, Rahner goes 
even further than viewing love as the I’s mere opening up. By loving 
one co-performs, takes part in, the acts of another. In love, we can shift  
perspective, so to say. In this sense, love is not only the ‘natural’ capac-
ity of transcendence that comes with I-hood; love is also an expression 
of the I’s freedom to transcend. An act of love is the I’s free decision 
to move outside itself. For Rahner love and freedom are closely con-
nected. Let us turn to the latter topic.
7.1.3. Free
Freedom is an illusion, naturalists tell us. We will stop talking about 
grounds once we fi nally understand all the causes of human behavior. 
Hence, the philosophy of freedom will be replaced by the physiology 
of decision-making.18 Th ere are no grounds for our acts and we do not 
make free decisions; we are merely caused to act this way or that by the 
laws of matter. Th ese types of philosophical conclusions, even when in 
no way confi rmed and agreed upon in the neuroscientifi c fi eld, man-
age to get the attention of the general public because they are so upset-
ting in the contradiction to our primary understanding of ourselves. 
We do not live our personal life nor has society been organized as if 
people simply do what they cannot help doing. Human freedom is 
18 See Chapter 1. 
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not absolute and unlimited, that much is obvious. Th ere is a degree of 
determinism, or unfreedom, in each of us. Nonetheless, if we look at 
the reality of life, some people make ‘not altogether free’ decisions that 
we qualify as wrong and others make ‘not altogether free’ decisions 
that we admire as heroic. I refuse to believe that we should organize 
our society with perfect indiff erence to both. 
It is with freedom as it is with being an I: it is lived in the tension 
of an aspect of infi nity and an aspect of being in the world, hence sub-
mitted to the laws of matter. It is the aspect of infi nity that makes that 
neither self-consciousness nor freedom can be observed; it can only 
be experienced by the I itself. Others can merely deduce free I-hood 
from its activity. Th erefore, being an I-sayer and being free are closely 
linked in that neither can be understood objectively by defi nition. If 
it fi ts in a system with laws, it is no longer free, and if it is objectifi -
able, it is no longer I-hood. Hence, naturalists reject both, as we have 
seen in the fi rst chapter. Nonetheless, both the sense of being an I and 
being free (to a certain extent) to actualize this I-hood are assumed in 
daily life.
Both Rahner and Henrich confi rm this link between freedom and 
I-hood. Only in free activity, something can happen that cannot be 
understood from a previous ground. Freedom is what allows the I to 
express its uniqueness and it constitutes its uniqueness at the same 
time. Henrich calls it self-determination and likewise Rahner sees free-
dom as the power to decide what is to be fi nal and defi nitive in one’s 
life.19 Both agree that freedom is not about doing whatever comes to 
mind, but about realizing one’s real being, real nature. In freedom, 
the subject does not do “something, but does itself.” Freedom is of the 
utmost importance for an I to realize itself. In this self-actualization, 
it decides if and how its ground is realized.
Th is illustrates the two sides of freedom. I-hood needs free activity 
in order to determine the unique way in which a personal life unfolds. 
Only in free activity, something unique can happen that cannot be 
deduced from this ground. Hence, in the unfolding of its free activity 
the I is free vis-à-vis its ground. Th erefore, the ground cannot deter-
mine the I’s free acts even when transcendence and freedom are not 
the result of the I’s own eff orts: it is given to it. Th at makes this unitary 
ground dependent upon the self-determination that it has given to 
19 See 6.1.2. and  6.2.3. respectively.
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these free I’s. In freedom the I and its ground appear most clearly in 
their interdependence. Even though the I’s freedom is exercised within 
the world, it is ultimately directed at this infi nite ground. 
In summary, the question  ‘Who am I?’ can be answered as follows: 
In my ability to say ‘I,’ I become aware of an aspect of infi nity in my 
I-hood. Somehow, I transcend my status of “world-thing” and become 
aware of both my capacity for unique individuality and for unity with 
others. In love, I am able to realize some of this togetherness here and 
now, and in my free activity I realize my unicity and become aware of 
the relationship of interdependence between me and the one ground 
of I-hood. Th erefore, before returning to the topic of freedom in 7.2., 
we have to turn our attention to this unitary ground of I-hood as it can 
be interpreted with the help of the authors of this study. 
7.2. Who am I to God?
Th e question of the relation of the I to its unitary ground, or phrased 
more theologically ‘Who am I to God?’ has been studied extensively in 
the course of this project.20 Even though the philosophies diff er con-
siderably, all authors maintain that the diversity of the I’s of the world 
arise from and remain within one unitary ground. Somehow, the 
human I never loses touch with this absolute ground. Th e immanence 
of this ground results in the self-absolutization of the idealistic I. It is 
an I that becomes so self-confi dent and grand in its own absoluteness 
that it ignores all otherness, and is no longer able to recognize and 
respect the infi nite worth of all other I’s. Th e not-I as my unconscious 
product, as Fichte states it, is undoubtedly a dangerous point of depar-
ture for the I’s interactions with its world.21 Th e aspect of infi nity of 
the I leads to the absolutization of the I’s power to control all that is, 
even to master its ground, as we have seen. 
Th e merits of Henrich’s attempts at facilitating a contemporary meta-
physics starting with the infi nite aspect of I-hood while avoiding the 
major pitfall of idealistic self-aggrandization, are considerable. How-
ever, he tries to counteract this dangerous development by positing the 
20 Th e undeniable friction between the metaphysical relation of the I to its ground 
and the theological relation of a human subject to God will be addressed in 7.5. 
21 See 5.1. 
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I’s total ignorance concerning its metaphysical roots, which results in 
the somewhat frantic question ‘Where do I come from?’ In Henrich’s 
metaphysics, precisely the infi nite ground that has to be assumed in 
combination with its absolute unknowability, hence unavailability, is 
to keep the I from the deadly hubris of German idealism. Th anks to 
the obscurity of its ground, the I is chastised into feelings of gratitude 
for its existence rather than dreams of absolute self-power. However, 
is that not a rather fragile protection against ‘I-hood getting out of 
hand’? Is this orphaned I, preoccupied with its identity and obsessed 
with self-preservation as a result of this insecurity concerning its 
ground, not the contemporary variety of Saint Augustine’s incurvatio 
in seipsum, an I that is literally ‘rolled up into itself ’ like a threatened 
hedgehog. Introverted, unable and unwilling to step out of the safe 
solitude of its I-hood in fear of being swallowed by other, more pow-
erful I’s, and thus disappearing altogether. Th e idealistic I may lack all 
modesty, but Henrich’s attempts to relativize its absoluteness leave the 
I literally in the dark, which also seems an unsatisfactory condition for 
a being that he claims fi t for speculari, circumspection. 
Th e inaccessibility of the I’s ground is problematic in yet another 
respect. When Henrich asserts that in his model of all-unity “indi-
vidual beings are viewed as not ultimately isolated from each other,” 
the question arises whether an unknowable, unitary ground that is 
merely a postulate can really be the basis of a satisfactory metaphys-
ics. What is the use of postulating that the I’s isolation is not ultimate, 
if unifi cation merely takes place in a ground that is not only beyond 
knowledge but also beyond any kind of experience? If the unity of 
the ground is really immanent, the I needs to be ‘in touch with it’ 
somehow. It needs to be refl ected and experienced in the reality of its 
everyday togetherness with other I’s. It is the daily reminder and real-
ity of ultimate togetherness that gives its life meaning. Henrich speaks 
of ultimate thoughts and thoughts of closure, but the I also longs for 
a sense of belonging here and now.
Another diffi  culty with Henrich’s metaphysical attempt to circum-
vent idealistic self-absolutization – a real danger for a metaphysics 
emphasizing the aspect of infi nity in I-hood – is that it brings his 
philosophy within the fi ring-range of naturalism. Aft er all, natural-
ists agree on the fact that there is one ground to all that is. Th ey even 
concede this ground to appear ‘infi nite’ in the sheer vastness of the 
real and possible beings arising from it. However, from the natural-
ist point of view, this ground is not obscurity but matter. Since the 
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human race is becoming ever more adept at manipulating matter, it 
could provide a home for our still unanswered questions and justify 
the hope that with progressive scientifi c research this home can be 
modeled for life-long, if not eternal, happiness. In this light, obscurity 
is a rather meager alternative. Is there really an existential advantage to 
positing an infi nite and obscure ground, which is once more a distant 
‘Great Beyond’ like the Monarch in high heaven that German idealists 
attempted to bring down to earth?22 
Perhaps there is one ‘tangible’ advantage that could make Hen-
rich’s metaphysics more attractive than naturalism to modern I’s: his 
attempt to save the individual’s uniqueness. Aft er all, he claims the I’s 
subjectivity and its inherent infi nity next to and of equal importance 
as its contingent personhood. In that case, it would be necessary for 
the human person (the I in the world) to be able to realize or ‘embody’ 
something of that uniqueness. In order to accomplish this, the concept 
of freedom is indispensable. Th e I’s real sense of freedom resists natu-
ralistic theories that maintain that as soon as all of the components of 
the machine have been pinpointed and its input unveiled, there will 
be no room left  for freedom either.23 Th e individual’s freedom, which 
still forms the backbone of Western societies even if popular, contem-
porary naturalistic theories can hardly support it, should therefore get 
more serious attention than Henrich’s metaphysics grants it with. 
Th us, we come back to the philosophical question concerning freedom 
once more. It is a major theme for the thinkers of the late 18th century 
who are enamored with the ideals of the French Revolution, at least 
for a while, as we have seen in Chapter 2. Freedom is also the one 
opening to the metaphysical aft er Kant has posited his strictly dualistic 
epistemology. However, freedom becomes a very complicated issue in 
a metaphysics of a unitary ground, as has been noted. How can this 
ground that enables and remains present in all beings allow for the 
freedom of these beings? 
Of the authors discussed, only Schelling makes a serious attempt at 
explaining the possibility of individual freedom in combination with 
a unitary ground. Th ere is one ground that can either keep to itself 
or fl ow out. Since the two contradictory forces, the centripetal one of 
selfh ood and the centrifugal one of love, are equiprimordial in this 
22 We will return to the concept of God in the late 18th century in 7.5.1.
23 See Swaab’s statement in Chapter 1. 
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ground, the decision to bring forth is an expression of the unitary 
ground’s freedom. Th e ground is free, is Schelling’s conclusion, and 
only from a free ground free beings can arise. Th ese forces, which are 
active in the ground, also work in the I. Th erefore, both the capacity 
for selfh ood and love, turning inward and fl owing out, belong to the 
basic makeup of these beings. People are (to a certain extent) free to 
choose when to turn inward and when to open up. Turning inward is 
not a bad thing; it is necessary even, otherwise the I would simply dis-
solve. Selfh ood is the ground of being, but too much focus on inward-
ness and self-preservation, hence egocentricity, is evil. Only when this 
selfh ood serves as a foothold for an I that fl ows out, loves, real being is 
realized. Th us from a unitary ground that has no evil in it at all, beings 
arise that are free to be evil or good. Th is is a brilliant solution for a 
metaphysics of a unitary ground giving rise to independent I’s. 
But there is more, in Schelling’s opinion. Th is freedom of beings is 
not merely the result of the free decision of this ground to create. It 
is also a necessity for this ground in order to unfold. If these beings 
open up, they contribute to the unfolding of the full potential of the 
ground; the Deus implicitus can develop into the Deus explicitus. In 
freedom, the I and its ground become mutually dependent. Th is is an 
extremely important conclusion for the I’s proud sense of self-worth. 
Even though German idealistic philosophies tend to allow its I to rise 
above all things earthly and Henrich’s attempts to bring it down to 
earth are justifi ed, this philosophical conclusion of the interdepen-
dence of the I and its ground should not be trivialized. Hölderlin also 
emphasizes the dependence of the ground on self-conscious beings in 
order to “feel itself.” Hölderlin speaks of the unitary ground that thus 
gains consciousness, Schelling of the ground that comes alive. Since 
also for Hölderlin consciousness means life – Being as unconscious 
unity is pure nothingness –, for both Schelling and Hölderlin the free, 
conscious activity of beings is literally a matter of life and death for 
this unitary ground. 
Nonetheless, there is a fundamental diff erence between Hölderlin 
and Schelling. Th e latter is very concerned with explaining how real 
evil can exist in a world that arises from a unitary ground that has no 
evil in it whatsoever. He takes the freedom of human beings very seri-
ously. Hölderlin, in contrast, tends to trivialize evil: “A mere nothing 
is evil.”24 Schelling would agree that in the end evil will be cast out as 
24 See 4.7.
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non-being, but that does not make it a “mere nothing” in our everyday 
existence, in his opinion. In line with this trivialization of evil, Hölder-
lin does not seem particularly interested in the subject of freedom. He 
is touched by the égalité and fraternité of the French Revolution rather 
than its liberté. In an early Hymn to Freedom (1793), in which the 
“Queen of Freedom” claims that the “world lives its holy life freely,” 
freedom is only “beckoning in the distance.”25 Ultimately it is “the law 
of fate, that each shall know of all the others,” it says in the Celebration 
of Peace.26 Hölderlin sees a divine plan unfolding in which there is not 
all that much room for humans to have a say and change its course by 
their own free activity. 
Schelling tends to exaggerate free and active I-hood. He writes, “Give 
man the awareness of what he is, and he will soon learn to be what he 
ought to be. Give him the theoretical self-respect and the practical will 
soon follow.”27 Whereas Schelling believes the I to be powerful enough 
to do the right thing once educated about the unitary ground of life, 
Hölderlin agrees that the principle of unity has been “the regulating 
basis of the history of mankind” from the beginning but he cannot 
or will not place the fate of this unity in the hands of human I’s.28 
Freedom as a theme never really appeals to Hölderlin, and perhaps 
he feels that “the fearfully active” I of his idealistic fellow students is 
in the need of an antidote.29 A small poem called Wurzel alles Übels 
[Th e Root of All Evil] says, “To be united, at one, is divine and good; 
wherefrom then comes the desire among people that only one person, 
one thing, only they?”30 Th is could be a reference to the idealistic self-
aggrandization that he renounces.
Hölderlin’s metaphysics does not really allow for an active role for 
the free I, hampered as it is by its eagerness to give up the burden of 
isolated I-hood. Hölderlin’s I appears too passive to do justice to the 
free activity that forms the I’s real contribution to the realization of 
divine unity. Th e I might not be as powerful as Schelling pictures it, 
but by leaning over to the other extreme of total passivity Hölderlin 
might miss the opportunity to think the I’s assistance of divine Being 
25 StA I, 157; 158; 161.
26 BrA IX, 234.
27 SW 1, 157. 
28 StA I, 158.
29 StA II, 118; See 5.3.4. 
30 “Einig zu seyn, ist göttlich und gut; woher ist die Sucht denn / Unter den Men-
schen, dass nur Einer und Eines nur sie?” (StA I, 305).
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in coming alive, which is exactly what he desperately longs for. His I 
does not manage to break away from its melancholic sense of loss and 
seize a measure of control over itself. Only in the few short years as 
a productive poet, he allows for a proud role for the I, only to shrink 
away from the dangers of the idealistic hubris. We do indeed “stir 
and dispute where the Spirit is active” in Hölderlin’s concept of the 
I, but ultimately the I is subjected to a divine plan that is unfolding.31 
Hence not a free subject that actively contributes, but a passive being 
subjected to infi nite powers and desires. Th is seems in contradiction 
with Hölderlin’s view of Being’s dependence on human beings to 
really be.
Th e situation of the dependence of the ground on the I is a heresy 
in the eyes of late 18th century theology. It would be blasphemous to 
suggest that the Lord could be dependent upon His subjects. How-
ever, the attempts of our Stift ler to contribute a real role to the I’s free 
actions in a divine plan seem logical, if human freedom is to be taken 
seriously. An almighty God no longer appeals to them, and such a 
God is going out of fashion in contemporary Western society as well. 
It is hard for humans to achieve a certain balance in free activity and 
passive receptiveness in life, as is illustrated so well by these two young 
thinkers. Nonetheless, both aspects of I-hood belong to the condition 
humaine. Is it all that farfetched to assume a degree of vulnerability 
in this ground that opened up and allowed the unfolding of its life, 
its realization, to depend upon free beings? And is there room for 
this type of question in a philosophical discourse? Th is topic will be 
returned to in the following sections. 
In summary, the question ‘Who am I to God?’, the question about the 
I’s participation in a unitary ground can be answered as follows: I am 
both embedded in and independent of the one ground of all beings. 
In my free activity, I can act in ways that are unique and cannot be 
explained from this ground. Th e freedom that I am endowed with as a 
consequence of my origins in a free ground create a situation of mutual 
dependence between me and this ground. I am grounded in a unity 
that allows me freedom to choose to either open up or remain self-
centered. My choice, however, aff ects the ground’s ability to unfold. 
To God I am a unique individual whose choices either assist or hinder 
31 BrA IX, 234.
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God’s universal life. It seems that with the latter statement the rational 
metaphysical discourse concerning the I’s ground is coming closer to 
God-talk. Th is brings us to the next major issue in this study. Th is is 
the question concerning the I’s ability to know or at least know of its 
metaphysical ground.
7.3. Who is God to Me?
With respect to the I’s ability to know, or know of, its ground and 
the appropriate metaphysical discourse, the thinkers of this study dis-
agree considerably.32 Let us start with the latter. Henrich and the early 
Schelling use rational categories to discuss the infi nite ground of the 
human way of being. Th e diffi  culties they encounter when remaining 
within the boundaries of philosophical refl ection form an illustration 
of the problems of a metaphysics that endeavors to be rational accord-
ing to scientifi c rules, the modern limits set by the (natural) sciences. 
In his Freedom essay, Schelling breaks with a narrowly rational dis-
course and comes to employ an entirely diff erent language with cat-
egories that are no longer strictly philosophical.33 Hölderlin switches 
to poetry in order to be able to express what the unity of this ground of 
I-hood is all about. Rahner takes the God of the Christian tradition as 
his point of reference and takes refuge in a theological discourse. Hen-
rich, however, stays within modern Kantian limits and can do none of 
these things. Consequently, his ground is rational with almost clinical 
precision, and all it can thus be is obscurity. No life, no feelings, no 
relationality, only obscure ‘it-ness’ can be allowed in a ground that is 
supposed to be acceptable for a metaphysics that rejects any kind of 
explicit religiosity.
Let it be clear that this is in no way implies my rejection of the 
strictly rational method of the sciences. Its accomplishments should 
not be underestimated. Th ere is no denying and no need to deny that 
human beings are (also) natural beings in the world. Th is we real-
ize more and more as the natural sciences progress. Much has been 
achieved in terms of the protection of human beings from natural 
32 Please note, once again, that there is considerable friction between the meta-
physical question concerning the I’s ability to know its ground and the theologically 
phrased Who am I to God? Th is issue will be thematized explicitly in 7.5. 
33 See 3.4.1. 
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disaster, pain, and disease. Human thinking, human I-hood, cannot 
and should not be separated from the human brain. We have a lot in 
common with those “beings to which men deny souls,” as Hölderlin 
remarks towards the end of the 18th century.34 Th e methods of science 
seem very successful in clarifying important aspects of the materiality 
of human self-conscious life.
Nonetheless, it cannot be a turn for the better if we unleash the laws 
of nature on our I-hood and simplify it in order to eliminate the sense 
of ambivalence that comes with the human way of being. We might 
no longer be interested in using the word “soul,” which perhaps served 
in the past to diminish the other, physical, aspect of I-hood. However, 
we should not deny the infi nite aspect of I-hood and thereby the infi -
nite worth of every human life. A metaphysics that degrades I’s to no 
more than complex matter might just result in the same disrespect 
for human life that we have displayed towards nature in general. As 
we have felt, and oft en still feel, justifi ed to exploit nature to death, 
humanity might perish at the mercy of those who deny “souls” even to 
themselves. Life is more than what is captured by the laws of nature. 
Th is assertion is something to defend, even if it makes for philosophi-
cal and existential complications. It is exactly this conviction and his 
tenacity in defending it in a philosophical setting that makes Henrich’s 
metaphysics invaluable. However, it tries to solve purely rationally, 
what can perhaps only be intuited, felt, experienced pre-refl ectively. 
Th e latter term is exactly the one Henrich uses for self-consciousness, 
but he does not extend this pre-refl ective certainty to the metaphysics 
of its ground. 
Th is inevitably brings us to a much-contested topic in the late 18th 
century circles of our authors. It concerns the question about what 
the I can really know about this infi nite ground of I-hood. Th e answer 
causes a fundamental split in metaphysics. It can be maintained that it 
is an object of faith, hence the domain of religion. Radically opposed 
are endeavors such as the absolute idealism of Schelling’s early years to 
obtain knowledge of the Absolute, to re-incorporate it in the domain 
of philosophy. In a Kantian context of knowledge as the categories 
of understanding in the mind of the subject combined with the raw 
material that the world of objects provides it with, Schelling never 
34 See 4.3.1. 
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succeeds, as we have seen in Chapter 3. Kant wins the debate, it could 
be said, an outcome still respected by philosophers, Henrich among 
them, more than two centuries later.
In contrast with Schelling, Hölderlin realizes almost from the begin-
ning that it is impossible to think the unitary ground. Th inking is Ur-
theilung, arche-separation, and the realm of the Urtheil only tears the 
realm of unitary Being apart. Unity does not arise from and is not 
experienced in our ability to think. Hence, the I cannot think its uni-
tary ground in Hölderlin’s view, but neither does he want to ban this 
ground to the realm of faith. Th is would put a distance between him 
and his divine roots that he fi nds unacceptable and not in line with his 
basic intuitions. Hölderlin’s I longs for togetherness, and this results 
in a metaphysics that seeks unity here and now. Intellectual intuition 
becomes the intermediate term between faith and knowledge that he 
desperately needs to explain these fl ashes of insight into the world as 
it is meant to be: a peaceful unity of independent I’s, All-Unity.
Intellectual intuition becomes the term to indicate that the I cannot 
know but can know of its ground. Th e heated debate that rages when 
Hölderlin and Schelling develop their views on intellectual intuition 
soon comes to a conclusion: there is no room for it in philosophy. 
Nonetheless, novelists, poets, and mystics continue to hold on to the 
possibility of an ‘experience’ of some kind of the all-unitary ground, 
and the term leads a life of its own in romantic literature and religi-
osity. It has even survived into the 21st century. Not as intellectual 
intuition as such, but as intuition, sixth sense, inspiration, being in 
touch with the primal source, mystical experience, etc. Th e number of 
terms is almost inexhaustible, and its meaning is oft en just as vague 
as intellectual intuition is towards the end of the 18th century. In all 
cases, it refers to a category that is beyond a strict rationality. Intuition 
is not thinking, refl ection. Intuition is not concerned with the opposi-
tion between the subject and its world, but with its unity.
Two centuries later, this problem still stands in metaphysics. Is the 
reference to revelation and faith the only possibility to get beyond the 
Kantian fence that sets the boundaries for the I’s knowledge? Hen-
rich respects Kant’s limits of the knowable by speaking of ultimate 
thoughts as regulative ideas. Th ese are thoughts of closure that sum-
marize a life, make it understandable within a totality that is presented 
to us. Henrich calls All-Unity a postulate and the consequence is that 
all he can say about this one, infi nite reality is that it is ultimate but 
shrouded in obscurity. Th us, he allows our most fundamental feelings 
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to be dictated by an artifi cial line that does not function as such in 
daily conscious life, which he claims to be the appropriate point of 
departure for a contemporary metaphysics. At one point in his career 
(around 1802), even Schelling concedes that the philosophical, the 
Kantian, concept of reason is far too narrow. Reason should be more 
than explanation in the sense of providing causes and deduction, i.e. 
deriving something from higher principles. It should also include con-
templation, considering something in itself and not just in relation 
to other things; hence, intellectual intuition or perhaps what is called 
holistic thinking nowadays. Th e enterprise of metaphysics might be 
doomed to fail, if we do not accept a faculty of intuition in whatever 
form. But if we do, what distinguishes it from mere fantasy? 
Even when Henrich shies away from pre-refl ectivity when it comes 
to a metaphysics of the I’s ground that is beyond knowledge, the solu-
tion might nonetheless be in the non-rational experiences of everyday 
conscious life. Let us test this criterion on our authors. In the Frei-
heitschrift , Schelling describes the urges in the Urgrund giving rise to 
creation. It might be characteristic of his foundationalism that he does 
this from the point of view of this Absolute. Th is might evoke a sense 
of deep recognition in those who can somehow go along with this 
sentiment. Nonetheless, in the reality of the here and now it implies 
taking an impossible viewpoint as the point of departure. We sim-
ply know nothing about possible urges in an Urgrund. Hölderlin’s 
approach is radically diff erent in that the I ‘discovers’ in the course of 
Hyperion that individual I-hood is needed in order to realize oneness, 
to make primordial unity come alive. It is not a metaphysical theory 
in the sense of claiming to know how creation must proceed; it is the 
experience of the I’s conscious life that gives insight in a metaphysics 
of its unitary ground. Th ese are crucial diff erences. Positing the one-
ness of reality is not a necessity for a metaphysical theory or its logical 
conclusion; it is what a living human being cannot help “divining,” to 
use Hölderlin’s poetic term, in the trials and tribulations of life.   
Like Henrich, also Rahner respects the Kantian dual roots of knowl-
edge and rejects the term intellectual intuition as precisely what human 
knowledge is not. He asserts that the problem is that in our times 
knowledge has become too much about mastery of an object by a sub-
ject. If applied to God, we risk turning knowing of God into grasping 
God, and “replacing God with I,” Rahner maintains. Human open-
ness for its unitary ground is not an inborn capacity for knowledge 
of God. All knowledge of pure being, God, is a posteriori in the sense 
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that we only obtain it by stepping out into the world of beings and 
transcendental to the extent that the orientation towards pure being 
is a permanent existential of the human being. Nonetheless, he asserts 
that we know of being and that the most general structure of being is 
co-known [mitgewusst] by us. 
Rahner’s rejection of the term intellectual intuition notwithstand-
ing, I do not believe that he would object to Hölderlin’s assertion that 
people can glimpse divine unity in poetry, nature, and relationships 
that succeed, as long as it does not result in the idealistic attempt 
of mastering the unitary ground and confi ning it within the bounds 
of human I-hood. In that respect, there is not very much disagree-
ment between both thinkers. Th e major diff erence between Rahner 
and Hölderlin might be that the very substance of the visio beatifi ca 
is mystery for Rahner; whereas for Hölderlin we will fully know each 
other, the all-encompassing divine unity, and ourselves once we come 
to meet “the Father” face to face at the Celebration of peace. 
Another diff erence, perhaps, is Rahner’s great concern for the free-
dom of God – God is free to reveal what we may know of Him. And 
this God reveals in the openness of history. Rahner’s refusal to make 
revelation into an inner experience is directly related to his fear that it 
will thus come within the grasp of the human I. He makes a plea for 
knowledge of God as openness to transcendence, hence to mystery. 
Mystery instead of mastery, and openness and wonder instead of the 
absoluteness of the I. However, also for Hölderlin true knowledge of 
the unitary ground, as opposed to an occasional fl ash of insight, is not 
within grasp of the individual human I. As it has been noted earlier, 
Hölderlin is not particularly preoccupied with protecting God’s free-
dom since he does not view the I as powerful enough to get a hold of 
and thus manipulate the Divine. History is Being unfolding according 
to the Father’s plan, and human knowledge of this divine process will 
not occur until the end of time. Nonetheless, Hölderlin seems over-
whelmed by occasional insights here and now into the divine unity 
that is the I’s ground. Even though Rahner does not admit to these 
openly, he has the founder of his order, Ignatius of Loyola, do this 
for him. In his Th eological Investigations, he seems to retreat into the 
safety of the accepted term “pilgrim knowledge” for regular human 
“knowledge” of God versus the visio of the saints.35 Perhaps thereby he 
35 See 6.2.5.
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once again creates a distance between God and world that Hölderlin’s 
mysticism seems to bridge occasionally and that Schelling strives to 
overcome in thought. He thus might make a mistake comparable to 
the idealists. In their case, the Absolute is available for the intellectual 
elite, for Rahner it is for the holy elite. It seems a diffi  cult task to bring 
God to every I without exception.
Nonetheless, also for Rahner the ground of I-hood is not an obscure 
Great Beyond cut off  from daily life. Love is the link. Metaphysics is 
not just about knowledge of the infi nity of life; it necessarily implies 
love of God. To be human is to be a being standing “in free love” 
before God. We can hear this God when we “open up in free love” and 
“when we have not, on account of a wrongly directed love, narrowed 
the absolute horizon of our openness for being as such.”36 He views 
love as the perfection of knowledge itself. Th e inborn transcendence 
that forms the basis for and the horizon of our capacity to know comes 
naturally, so to say, but the transcendence in love is the result of a 
free decision. It is from this point of view that Rahner calls love the 
perfection of knowledge. Love of God is the decision to open up for 
this horizon. Once again the short-comings of a metaphysics that uses 
only rational categories becomes clear; it has to stop at the Kantian 
fence and be resigned to the unknowability of the ground. Love as a 
real aspect of conscious life knows no such limits.
It is in Rahner’s metaphysics that another, unexpected, parallel 
between transcendence in knowledge and love is to be found. Our 
knowledge is possible because of the Vorgriff  towards the infi nity of 
being, it was said. Th e horizon of being cannot be known in itself, but 
it directs our capacity for transcendence back at beings in the world. In 
love, the I makes a parallel movement. If the I opens up in love of God, 
this transcendental opening out is also re-fl ected towards (human) 
beings. Transcendence towards God comes to be directed at the beings 
of the world, both in love and in knowledge. People do not fi nd God 
by leaving the world. God is not to be known, loved, and related to in 
isolation of the world. However, limiting the world to things that can 
be pointed at, be it objects or human beings, will not do justice to the 
infi nity of reality as a whole. 
36 See 6.2.4.
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In summary, the authors of this study are in agreement (with the 
exception of the early Schelling) that the question ‘Who is God to 
me?’ cannot be answered within the realm of human refl ection. We 
have no knowledge of the ground of I-hood. If we wish to prevent a 
huge divide between reason and faith, thinking and feeling, physics 
and meta-physics, non-refl ective but very real categories from daily 
conscious life such as love and intuition are called for. It might be 
such self-transcending, non-rational experiences of conscious life that 
form the opening for a metaphysics that can succeed into the 21st 
century. Th e art of living might best be refl ected in a metaphysics that 
is evocative and intuitive like art rather than rational like philosophy. 
Intellectual intuition, the mystical experience, or whichever term is 
affi  xed to the feeling that all is and all are somehow connected in a 
meaningful awe-inspiring way enabling the I to surpass itself, is not 
only for saints aft er prolonged periods of ascesis; it is an experience of 
the conscious life of many I’s.
7.4. Who are We?
It has already been established that idealistic subject philosophies as 
the type of thinking that starts with a separate, independent I will not 
come to a satisfactory concept of the I’s unitary ground. Th is lonely I 
that is I thanks to its opposition to the rest of the world is not a viable 
point of departure. Because of the concept of the I as isolated in its 
unique infi nity, the unifying function of the Absolute is lost. If abso-
luteness is to be found inside or through the I, it does indeed extend 
beyond its lonely earthly I-hood, but only to claim its absoluteness in 
solitude. Instead of realizing it is always already embedded in a larger 
whole, this I goes out and searches for other isolated, ‘absolute’ I’s. Of 
course, it has trouble fi nding these! 
Th e major achievement of Hölderlin’s metaphysics is that it provides 
a model of I-hood that does not view the human I as an independent 
entity capable of life in isolation of its surroundings and subsequently 
entering into relations. Being an I, a subject that is simultaneously in 
the world, implies seeking togetherness with other I’s and not just pre-
serving isolated I-hood. Being an I is striving for balance between unity 
and individuality. Self-consciousness is not only the ability to say ‘I,’ 
but also to be spoken to, to hear words from other I’s, to recognize their 
I-hood, and experience a fundamental connection. Intersubjectivity
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is not the cause of subjectivity, I agree with Henrich. However, our 
I-hood never fully detaches from the unity we emerge from and share 
with other I’s, and human subjects are lost without other I’s to share 
their subjectivity with. Th erefore, we need a model in which the I 
arises in an already given unity that allows this I to discover itself 
in the sense of its own role in the whole, its unique contribution, its 
infi nite worth. Hölderlin’s view of the unitary ground is a good point 
of departure for what might be an acceptable metaphysics for the 21st 
century, in my opinion. It has non-rational and rational elements in 
combination with a fundamental religiosity. Let us see if we can take 
Hölderlin’s insights one step further and into the 21st century. 
Hölderlin’s metaphysics ultimately tries to think the unity of the pri-
mordial ground in the here and now of fragmented and isolated I’s. Let 
us review briefl y: consciousness in the sense of a subject’s opposition 
to objects suppresses our sense of unity. In looking at other things, 
other people, from the isolation of I-hood we tend to lose our more 
primary sense of togetherness. Th e arche-separation has destroyed the 
perfection of Being, pure unity, and there is no way back. Our longing 
for unity can no longer be satisfi ed merely by a return to what once 
was since it would imply the loss of I-hood and no more than the gain 
of Nothing-ness. Th e I suff ers from its present state of solitude and 
strives for a new unity, a new harmony in which it not only co-exists 
with other I’s but fi nds completion in this togetherness. A unity of I’s 
that come to full bloom, or in Hölderlin’s unrivaled words that “each 
attain their entire right, their entire measure of life,” in peaceful co-
existence, not alongside but complementing each other.37 
Relationality and interdependence, to feel in the depths of our being 
that we are a unity in which our individuality is grounded, is the fi rst 
step away from the individualism that mars the philosophies of Ger-
man idealism and its prolongations into the 21st century towards a 
view of the unitary divinity of life here and now. Th e early Schelling is 
too preoccupied with the absoluteness of his I to be able to see the uni-
tary aspect of the ground refl ected in the world. Hölderlin emphasizes 
it repeatedly, but it has gone largely unnoticed in the general glorifi ca-
tion of the absoluteness of I-hood in the metaphysics of his era. Even 
though Dieter Henrich is the one to bring the value of Hölderlin’s 
37 See 4.3.2.
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metaphysics to the attention of contemporary philosophy, his blind 
spot for Hölderlin’s sense of unity and neglect of the (later) poems 
prevent him from doing full justice to the riches of Hölderlin’s meta-
physics of a new unity. Th is unity is not only the I’s ground; it is what 
the I longs for, its source of hope in all daily experiences of fragmen-
tation and isolation, and the contribution to its realization is the I’s 
major challenge in life.
When Hölderlin’s speaks of the “impossibility of an absolute sepa-
ration and individualized isolation [Vereinzelung],” he concedes that 
isolated I-hood is a reality of adulthood but not the ultimate reality. 
Consciousness may be unique to every single individual, but con-
sciousness can never reach into infi nity, and it is in the infi nity of the 
ground that unity originates. Hölderlin gives this fundamental insight 
in the incompatibility of unity and consciousness and in the I’s exis-
tential need for togetherness as a refl ection of the infi nite unity of the 
ground. In a pre-refl ective awareness of unity that is not entirely lost 
in I-hood it continues to strive for it. Th e arche-separation occurred so 
that we would “re-establish unity through ourselves.”38 For Hölderlin 
the amorphous, unconscious unity of Being is to develop into a con-
scious unity through ourselves. 
Henrich considers the multitude of human beings to be a source of 
self-relativization to the I, as we have seen.39 Karl Rahner, however, 
correctly points out that it forms the core of our humanity. In that 
respect, Rahner’s thinking is much closer related to Hölderlin’s. Rah-
ner also tries to think the unitary infi nity in and the infi nite worth of 
life here and now without divinizing the empirical I. For Rahner being 
an I also means to “subsist in ourselves as subjects, as separates, as 
opposed to” the world of objects.40 But even when the I sets itself apart 
in its acts of knowledge, at the same time it possesses an a priori power 
to reach beyond all separation towards the unitary, infi nite horizon of 
being that opens it to the unitary ground of reality. Th e I always carries 
along its sense of being united within and by an infi nite horizon. Th is 
inherent ability to transcend, which constitutes the foundation for our 
ability to think and to love, embeds the I in divine unity and makes 
it strive for loving togetherness, while retaining its individuality, both 
38 See 4.3. 
39 See 1.3.3. 
40 See 6.2.1.1. 
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as limitation to its claims to absoluteness and as confi rmation of its 
singularity.
Hence, with Hölderlin, we have now come to a view of the I as seek-
ing a balance between individuality and unity. Th e I has the ability 
to intuitively grasp the unity that underlies all worldly diff erentiation 
since I-hood originates in and intuits the possibility of being lived in 
togetherness from the start. Th us, an entirely diff erent model arises 
with unity as the essence of the human way of being, prior to individu-
ality. Is such a unity of self-conscious I’s that recognize their together-
ness not a ‘we’? Th is would imply that the point of departure should 
be we-hood instead of I-hood Whereas Fichte and Henrich speak of 
a pre-refl ective awareness “I am,” perhaps intellectual intuition is best 
conceived of as an experience of the interconnectedness of I’s in a 
meaningful whole: the realization “We are.” Hölderlin’s ‘we’ is to be 
the perfect balance between unity and individuality. ‘We’ is Being 
come to life, primordial unity realized, a peaceful harmony of I’s. Let 
us take a closer look at what such a togetherness of human I’s that is 
called ‘we’ might amount to from a ‘Hölderlinian’ point of view.
“We” is not an amorphous mass in which the I’s have merged, but it 
is more than a mere collection of individual I’s or the sum total of I’s. 
We-hood is constituted by the diff erent I’s involved that are somehow 
fundamentally united without the need to give up their independence. 
‘We’ implies the recognition of the singularity of every I, both as a 
homage to the individual worth of its participants and as a necessity 
for the fullness of its we-hood. ‘We’ is a unity that is dependent upon 
individuality, preserves it, and even enhances it. 
Furthermore, ‘we’ can always only be identifi ed as such from the inner 
perspective. Only I’s that participate in the unity, relate to the other 
participants, and confi rm their belonging can speak of ‘we.’ Th e sense
of we-hood fl uctuates in diff erent situations and with diff erent indi-
viduals involved. Certain groups are more profoundly connected then 
others a group of peace activists at a demonstration more than the 
visitors of a shopping mall, families more than colleagues. Nonethe-
less, we-hood is always dependent upon recognition of the together-
ness by the participating I’s.
We-hood is also more than the connection that is established by 
communication from a specifi c I to another well-defi ned I. We-hood is 
not a distinct opening from one I to another I: ‘we,’ as it is understood 
here, is not ‘me plus you.’ ‘We’ is more than an I that reaches out to 
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or is appealed to by another I. We-hood requires a general openness 
for the totality of the individual I’s that constitute the ‘we.’ Th is ‘we’ 
is beyond the grasp of each individual I. Real we-hood implies the I’s 
willingness to relinquish control over the other I’s and the interactions 
between the I’s. We-hood even requires the I’s willingness to sacrifi ce 
some of its self-suffi  ciency to the openness that is needed for a real 
‘we’ to unfold. Th is general openness may feel as a threat to the I’s 
independence and individuality to a certain degree. Hence, there is 
a tendency to close up, incurvatio in seipsum, and limit the general, 
inherent capacity for transcendence of I-hood to well-defi ned, control-
lable openings of one-on-one alliances that merely serve to confi rm 
the I’s unique I-hood. We-hood is not unaff ected by the interactions 
between the individual I’s, but these specifi c interactions do not con-
stitute we-hood. 
Th ere is a mutual dependence between each I and the ‘we.’ Th e I can 
only be an I thanks to the ‘we.’ It takes a ‘we’ for the young I to unfold, 
to be nourished into mature I-hood that can balance between selfh ood 
and unity, to open up for those I’s surrounding it, and help realize 
community. Moreover, those who can say ‘I’ need to be addressed as 
an I in order for their I-hood to be a lived, self-conscious I-hood. I-
hood always arises in a ‘we.’ ‘We’ is the common ground that encom-
passes and continues to nourish the individual I’s and is a constant 
reminder of the infi nity of possibilities of interaction between the I’s. 
We-hood encompasses the I’s and fi lls, so to say, the space that all the 
I’s and their particular one-on-one connections leave open. We-hood 
forms the core of I-hood. Th e participation in the we-hood of human-
ity is what makes us human; it is the ground of I-hood. 
Reversely, the ‘we’ needs I’s for its existence. Th e ‘we’ is dependent 
upon the I to support its we-hood, for the I to understand and express 
in its individual, free actions that the success of the  ‘we’ is the I’s ulti-
mate desire, that we-hood surpasses I-hood. Furthermore, the devel-
opment of the ‘we’ cannot be independent of the development of the 
individual I’s. Each I changes the ‘we.’ Each I that gets lost or hurt, 
refuses to open up, or sabotages the openness of the others diminishes 
the ‘we.’ In a ‘we’ every I has its own unique worth, and all I’s share 
in the responsibility for the ‘we’ to succeed. In that sense, the ‘we’ is 
dependent upon the I. For a ‘we’ to become real, the I’s have to realize 
themselves and their togetherness in acts of freedom. 
In line with the previous, Hölderlin maintains that the arche-sepa-
ration is also a necessity for Being, for pure, divine Oneness. Being is 
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unity, but a unity of nothingness. It longs for life, for consciousness, it 
longs to be a unity that can feel itself, that is conscious of its together-
ness. Pure Being needs I’s to come alive, for life on earth to become the 
Celebration of peace. Hence, the basic question of Hölderlin’s meta-
physics is not ‘Who am I?’ but ‘Who are we?’ or ‘What makes a good 
unity, peace?’ A peaceful ‘we’ can only be realized in I’s who freely 
unite. Th is ‘we’ will do full justice to each I’s individuality, and indi-
viduality will not form an obstacle for we-hood. It has been noted that 
whereas Schelling thinks in terms of overactive, all-determining I’s, 
Hölderlin might lean too much towards the I’s passive participation in 
a divine plan. If this new unity is thought as ‘we,’ free I-hood cannot 
remain a merely passive bystander. Th is observation may constitute 
a valuable correction of Hölderlin’s metaphysics. Human beings may 
only be the guests at the Celebration of peace and not its hosts or 
organizers; however, without guests there is no celebration. As par-
ticipants the I’s of the world are indispensable for the realization of a 
living conscious unity. 
In summary, a metaphysics of a unitary ground that respects daily 
conscious life only has a chance of succeeding when it does not start 
from an I that reaches into infi nity but from the recognition that I’s 
are grounded in and striving for infi nite unity. If an earthly I is to dis-
cover unity ever, it cannot be in the link of its empirical I-hood with 
absoluteness. Claims of infi nity can only be made in the modest rec-
ognition of all the other I’s groundedness in one and the same infi nite 
unity. Th e world as it has emerged, Macquarrie writes, 
seeks to return to its source, not in the sense of being swallowed up once 
more in the mystery from which it has emerged, but through forming a 
new and richer unity, a unity which necessarily includes distinctness.41 
Th is, to me, seems the type of unity that Hölderlin has in mind for the 
Celebration of peace. Th is is also the core of a metaphysics of ‘we.’ 
7.5. Who is God?
Four of the fi ve questions of this study have now been discussed. What 
remains is the question ‘Who is God?’ Th is is not only the toughest 
41 Macquarrie 1984, 175.
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one; it also implies that we have to deal with the fundamental diff er-
ence between the terms ‘God’ and ‘unitary ground’ that have been 
interchanged with minimal explanation so far. Nonetheless, the uni-
tary ground of I-hood and God are worlds apart in contemporary 
thought. Th e former belongs to the domain of philosophy and the lat-
ter to that of (monotheistic) religions. Th e choice of the term ‘God’ for 
this ground automatically puts the modern author on the ‘wrong’ side 
of the Kantian fence. In Henrich’s view, the metaphysical ground of 
I-hood is distinguished from the God of monotheistic traditions in 
that the latter is personal, which he characterizes as “equipped with 
reason, will, and commitment to people . . . opposed to the world.”42 
Such a God cannot be thought, only believed in, according to Hen-
rich. Th erefore he opts for a metaphysics of a non-personal, or I-less, 
unitary ground of (self-)consciousness, an ‘it’ that is beyond know-
ing, pure obscurity. However, is it really necessary to create such an 
unbridgeable divide between reason and faith, between philosophy and 
theology? Is there a chance for a metaphysics that follows Hölderlin 
in respecting the Christian tradition and drawing inspiration from it 
without restricting itself to its dogmatic discourse? Since the crucial 
diff erence between the terms ‘unitary ground’ and ‘God’ seems to be 
in God’s personhood, the fi rst issue to be looked into is the personal 
or impersonal nature of this unitary ground.
7.5.1. Impersonal or Personal Ground
Sallie McFague asserts, “Sometimes the attempt to relate God and the 
world in more unifi ed, interdependent ways is thought to require a 
sacrifi ce of the personal dimension of the divine.”43 Prima facie, that 
seems right. At least, this is what appears to occur in the course of the 
metaphysics of German idealism that is usually labeled as pantheis-
tic. Its ‘God’ diff ers considerably from the God preached in the 18th 
century Lutheran churches that constitute the religious background of 
Schelling and Hölderlin: God as a transcendent and personal being, a 
combination that tends to result in the image of the untouchable, high 
and mighty Monarch of blind faith and obedience. In the epoch of 
liberté, egalité, and fraternité, however, monarchs who rule from above 
have lost their popularity, their authority, and even their lives. At the 
42 See 6.1.3. 
43 McFague 1988, 18. 
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same time, a profound longing for religiosity in its most basic form 
of reconnecting with a (lost) Divinity is prominent especially in the 
more mystical setting of Württemberg pietism. Both elements form 
the backdrop for the enthusiastic revival of a concept of an immanent 
God who could be (all) in all here and now and who does not require 
a “salto mortale” into faith.44 
Th e idealistic motivation to bring God ‘down to earth’ is not a desire 
to debase God; it is an attempt to elevate human I’s and include them 
in this Divinity instead. Th e ultimate concern is to re-establish the 
infi nite worth of the I, of the individual human life. Th e mighty tyrant 
who subjects subjects to His alien, unreasonable authority is to become 
the immanent Holiness that liberates and divinizes autonomous sub-
jects. A God is thought who is in me, who is the depth of who I am, 
interior intimo meo to speak with Saint Augustine. Th is God is to raise 
the I into free and proud independence. Th is is achieved, more or less, 
by the metaphysics of German idealism. It succeeds in establishing a 
(tentative) line from the I to an Absolute in which all is grounded and 
united. Th is could be a God who is (all) in all and gives infi nite worth 
to the I.
Th en accidentally the roles reverse. Th e Absolute that holds me and 
all that is, becomes my absoluteness, the Absolute that I control in my 
(absolute) mind. Self-worth turns into arrogance, proud I-hood into 
hubris. Th e absolutization of the I not only results in a very lonely I; 
it also obscures the other aspect of God, the superior summo meo to 
quote Saint Augustine once again. Th ere is simply no longer room, nor 
the desire, to think a God who is ‘higher than me.’ How could there 
be? If I can reach into infi nity, what can be higher than I am? What 
can be superior to my own absoluteness? What, who, can be beyond 
me, face me, become my vis-à-vis? Such a metaphysics of absolute I-
hood that is its own God has been largely condemned by philosophers 
and theologians alike. Nonetheless, it somehow continues to resonate 
in the modern Western self-image, and it appears to have become 
part of our culture.45 Th e I has lost its superior summo meo but, and 
perhaps even worse, it has stopped seeing the sanctity of other I’s. It 
fi nds itself in a society of Alabanda’s, to use Hölderlin’s character, who 
are creating bloody chaos. It appears to be diffi  cult for the individual 
44 See Jacobi’s statement in 2.4. 
45 See, for example, Groot 2007, 19.
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human being but also for societies as a whole to fi nd a balance in the 
two contradictory aspects of the human way of being that Henrich has 
analyzed as subject and person, infi nity and contingency, self-worth 
and self-relativization. 
However, even if an idealistic concept of a merely immanent God, 
God as my absolute I-hood, fails, Henrich’s antidote of a metaphysics 
that results in pure obscurity is not satisfactory either. A concept of 
God is needed that does justice to the I’s inherent infi nity and puts it 
in perspective at the same time. It appears that the Christian tradition 
has a concept of God that corresponds with this fundamental ambiva-
lence. It has two essential, but paradoxical lines that are not easily inte-
grated. Th e God who is in me, who forms the ground of my very being 
– the immanent God – is simultaneously described as a personal and 
transcendent God. Th e personal God of the Bible is at the same time 
(all) in all. Even when there is little clarity on what God’s personhood 
entails, it is acknowledged that God is more than my most interior me. 
God is also a vis-à-vis, one who transcends me, who challenges me to 
transcend my own egocentricity, my incurvatio in seipsum. 
Th is desire to hold on to God’s personhood might inevitability lead 
to philosophical diffi  culties. Fichte words the most obvious philosoph-
ical danger with respect to the personal concept of God strikingly: 
Th is being is supposed to be distinct from both you and the world. It 
is supposed to act effi  caciously within the world, and it is supposed to 
do so in accordance with concepts. Accordingly, it must be capable of 
entertaining concepts; it must possess personality and consciousness. 
But what do you mean by ‘personality’ and ‘consciousness’ in this case? 
Are you talking about what you have discovered within yourself, about 
those aspects of yourself with which you have become familiar and have 
called ‘personality’ and ‘consciousness’? By paying the least attention to 
how you construct such concepts, however, you could learn that you 
simply do not and cannot think of personality and consciousness apart 
from limitation and fi nitude. Hence, by ascribing these predicates to it, 
you make this being into a fi nite being similar to yourself, and thus you 
have not succeeded in thinking God at all – which is what you wished 
to do – but simply a magnifi ed version of yourself.46 
God’s personhood cannot imply fi nite subjectivity with its daily limita-
tions in time and space that we are familiar with. Individual, gendered 
46 GA I, 5, 355.
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personhood cannot belong to God and extrapolation of earthly per-
sonhood into infi nity does not work, that much is obvious. 
However, as has been established in 7.3., instead of building a sys-
tem in which logic dictates, we should perhaps be resigned to the fact 
that reason tends toward oversimplifi cation and learn to live with 
a metaphysics that is as multifaceted and complex as conscious life 
itself. Such a metaphysics is not perfect clarity, but it sketches outlines, 
evokes intuitions of truth, like a work of art. Th is development from 
a strictly rational to a more evocative language is also what happens 
in Schelling’s Freiheitschrift . Even though his metaphysical solution 
that personhood consists in the combination of an autonomous being 
with an independent ground that completely interpenetrate each other 
seems an inadequate and rather artifi cial way of thinking this ground 
as personal, his characterization of God’s personhood as “having a 
life” that is subject to contradictory forces might serve to point in the 
right direction.
Hence, let us take another look at the two aspects of the God of 
the biblical stories and see where they correspond to the ambiguity 
inherent in conscious life. Th is God is (all) in all. Th e all-embracing 
totality, the ‘all-ness,’ provides a connection for all that is, and all who 
are, in a larger divine unitary ground that is more fundamental than 
experiences of isolation and opposition. To view all as ultimately one, 
grounded in divine unity, safeguards respect for every individual since 
all are somehow embedded in Divinity. It makes life here and now 
valuable, endowed with a touch of infi nity. Th is aspect can be accom-
modated in a metaphysics of a unitary ground. However, conscious 
life is more than being comfortably embedded in divine unity. It also 
implies ‘response-ability,’ to be able to adequately respond to the chal-
lenge of free, individual I-hood. Th is is what the aspect of a personal 
God adds that is crucial, also for a metaphysics in the 21st century. It 
is the beyondness of God, the aspect of God’s transcendence. God is a 
vis-à-vis, One who is beyond me, One who appeals to every I to tran-
scend itself and make its own, free contribution to the realization of a 
loving togetherness. Th e biblical concept of God precisely refl ects this 
complexity. On the one hand, people are assured of being embedded 
in God’s own being. On the other hand, God is a God of dialogue, a 
vis-à-vis, One who addresses me, appeals to me, challenges me to live 
life in peaceful togetherness with my neighbor: a personal God. Th is is 
the One that I turn to in prayer. One, who is not merely my inner self, 
but an Other as well. Both lines are indispensable for a  metaphysics 
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that wants to do justice to the complex relationship between the I and 
God.
Th erefore, the next task of this project is to make a suggestion towards 
a concept of a personal God who is simultaneously (all) in all. Th e best 
place to start might be where we ended in the discussion of I-hood: 
Hölderlin’s metaphysics that maintains that there is a need for a com-
bination of individuality and unity: for we-hood.
7.5.2. God as We?
In the preceding chapters, we have come to a philosophical concept of 
an all-unitary ground, a ground that is a true unity but in which also 
diff erentiation is fundamental. In 7.4., the relation between human 
I-hood and we-hood was explained in depth. I-hood is always lived 
in togetherness, in a ‘we,’ it has been determined with Hölderlin. An 
I is born into, is nurtured, and survives in a community of I’s. As 
it matures, it will make its own free and unique contribution to this 
‘we.’ In addition, the God of the Bible is both the unitary ground in 
whom every human being lives and the personal God who addresses 
me in my free singularity. Can this dual perspective of the human 
and the divine way of being be combined? Can We-hood really lead 
to a concept of God as both unitary and personal ground and ideal of 
I-hood? 
Th e fi rst thing to note is that there is an unmistakable parallel in 
Hölderlin’s view of I-hood as both unique individuality and striving 
for peaceful unity and the biblical view of human beings. Two striking 
examples are mentioned here. In the book Genesis where the human 
being is created, it is asserted that he does not fi nd happiness in his 
solitary I-hood. Another is created, distinctly diff erent but “fl esh of my 
fl esh” all the same.47 I’s are created to live in community. Humans are 
pictured as distinct, independent beings with fundamental openness, 
not merely for God but also for each other. Likewise, love of God as 
it is expressed in the fi rst commandment is immediately connected 
to one’s neighbor.48 Biblical references to the relationship between 
the I and God are always accompanied by the other I’s and the need 
for mutual openness. We are meant to transcend our individual 
47 Gen 2: 23.
48 Mark 12: 29–31. See also the Song of Solomon.
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I-hood both towards God and towards each other in one and the same 
movement. Transcendence is not the movement of the I away from 
the world but the I’s openness towards an all-encompassing unity, a 
communio that is grounded in and striving towards a divine ideal. 
Human beings are created not merely an I, but a ‘we.’ 
When the Judeo-Christian tradition states that people are created 
in God’s image, could this lead to the startling conclusion that God’s 
personhood is in some way constituted by We-hood? Could calling 
God ‘We’ be the point of departure for a metaphysics of a unitary and 
personal ground that is in line with a Christian concept of God? Let us 
once again elaborate on We-hood, but now in relation to God as the 
ground of all (human) beings. God’s We-hood might be clarifi ed with 
the metaphor of God’s motherhood. 
God is ‘We’ as a (pregnant) mother is a ‘we.’ She is one, a unity, but 
a unity already carrying the seed of diff erentiation inside. In mother-
hood-to-be lies the seed of independent, singular I-hood. (Pregnant) 
motherhood is a unity, a oneness that is internally diff erentiated. When 
the mother gives birth, the diff erence becomes more explicit. As soon 
as the umbilical cord is severed, the child that was until then an inti-
mate part of the mother’s body becomes a separate being. Even though 
there are two beings now, their unity continues to dominate for a while. 
Th e mother – (young) child relationship is a sort of symbiosis, a close 
relationship of mutual dependence. Th e child is fully dependent upon 
the mother for nourishment and care, if it is to stand a chance of sur-
vival. Th e mother’s dependence may be less pronounced prima facie. It 
is not as obvious as the physical dependence of the infant, but rather 
seems to exist at the psychological or emotional level. However, her 
motherhood per se, her being a mother, is entirely dependent upon 
the child. She will only survive as a mother, if her child lives. Hence, 
her motherhood is more than a psychological need; being a mother is 
fully dependent upon the real being of children.49 
As the child grows up, the diff erentiation becomes gradually more 
pronounced. Th e child starts to discover its own distinctness from its 
mother. From an early stage of greater physical independence, the 
49 One could argue that if the child dies a mother continues to be its mother. 
However, for full motherhood a child that develops a mature, independent life is 
necessary. 
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child evolves to independence of thoughts and feelings. In the course 
of this process, the mother’s relationship to the child changes as well. 
Th e unquestioned, utter unity undergoes a gradual transformation in 
a process of separation. It is a mother’s duty to equip her children for 
independent life without her constant care. She strives for independent 
I-hood in the child, for an existence that can proceed in her absence. 
Even though she cherishes the development of her children and takes 
great pride in their growing independent I-hood, most mothers fi nd 
that this ‘growing apart’ can be painful and fraught with danger at 
times. Her love and her body are no longer enough to guarantee the 
well-being of the child. Nonetheless, her involvement with this inde-
pendent being is far beyond a loving interest between two independent 
individuals. Th e child is her life.
Th is makes motherhood a vulnerable state of being that is chal-
lenged with each new pregnancy. Th e fi rst reason is that motherhood, 
the existence as a mother, is no longer in her hands alone. Th e suc-
cessful establishment of independent, unique I-hood in each and every 
one of her children is what makes the life of a mother succeed. As the 
child develops into independent, free I-hood with a life of its own, this 
unicity does not weaken the bond between mother and child in any 
way. On the contrary, the singularity, the unique development, is what 
fascinates the mother. Th e particular choices do not always delight, 
but the fact of independence forms the completion of motherhood. 
But this implies that her life has become inextricably intertwined with 
another, independent I. She can fl ourish only when the child does. Her 
being has become dependent upon the well-being of an independent I 
that she no longer has any control over. 
Another, but related, reason that motherhood is a vulnerable state 
of being is concerned with its inherent quality of unity. Th e utter and 
unquestioned unity has to evolve into a diff erent type of unity; a lov-
ing relationship between two independent I’s. Th e umbilical cord that 
is the fundamental and everlasting basis of the relationship does not 
suffi  ce for a mature mother-child bond. Sometimes, however, the only 
thing that seems to form the connection is the (indestructible) fact 
of this primordial one-ness. A mother will not stop being intimately 
involved with her child. However, she needs the mature child to will-
ingly engage in the relationship. Th ere is no longer a unity, if the child 
refuses to participate. Th ereby the child’s recognition of the mother 
becomes of greater importance as, with the potential for independent 
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life, the conscious, freely decided rejection of the mother becomes a 
possibility.
Mothers can have more than one child and in that sense mother-
hood does not depend upon each individual child. Nonetheless, the 
worth of the individual child for the mother is in no way lessened by 
the fact that others exist, nor does this fact threaten the child’s unique-
ness in her eyes. Each child has its own umbilical cord, so to say. No 
matter how many siblings exist, the singularity of each child is guar-
anteed for the mother. Furthermore, siblings are unifi ed in sharing the 
same mother. Is this their only point of connection, or are they united 
in something other than a common parentage? If the mother is the 
image of successful togetherness from the beginning, they are not only 
bound in the simple fact of a shared descent. Th eir origin is in itself 
the image of unity that comes alive in diff erentiation.
At this point, several remarks are in order. First, God is not a subject 
who becomes pregnant. God is (pregnant) Motherhood, (to-be-real-
ized) We-hood, from the start. It is important to conceive of God as 
this unitary ground of We-hood with the fundamental, essential pos-
sibility of diff erentiation otherwise the consequence is the philosophi-
cal diffi  culty as posed by Henrich. It would presuppose subjectivity in 
God with a type of consciousness that is fundamentally similar to ours 
and just as obscure concerning its origins.50 God’s personhood is not 
in a subjectivity that can bring forth other subjects; God’s personhood 
is in We-hood. Secondly, I do not wish to call God “Mother.” Th e term 
is too anthropomorphic, too explicitly gendered, too limited. God is 
not a subject who matures and becomes pregnant at some stage in 
Her life. God is ‘We,’ a personal, unitary ground carrying the potential 
for conscious, independent I-hood to arise. Th e unity and the diff er-
entiation are equiprimordial in God. Th erefore, if all I’s arise from a 
ground who is ‘We,’ both the potential for unity and for individuality 
is ‘inborn’ in each and every human being.51 Th is implies that I-hood 
is always striving for successful togetherness, the ideal of We-hood.
Let me draw the parallel between Gods We-hood and the metaphor 
of motherhood as sketched more explicitly. God as ‘We’ is the personal 
ground for every individual I. As independent I-hood matures, the 
50 See 6.1.3. 
51 Please note the interesting parallel between Schelling’s fi rst phase of the life of 
God as the world of ideas that is not the real world yet and the concept of pregnancy. 
See 3.4.1.
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diff erence between the I and its ground becomes more pronounced. 
Th e diff erence, the independence, is willed by this ground. God is 
‘We,’ a personal unity in which individual I-hood is enhanced and 
nourished. Each I is singular in its own unique connection with this 
We-hood of God; each I ‘stands out’ in the ‘We’ of God. Th e I remains 
dependent upon this ground to affi  rm its singularity, its unique worth, 
its entire independent life. God, this ground of We-hood, needs the 
free activity of the mature I’s that participate. Th e ‘We’ becomes more 
dependent upon the recognition of the I that We-hood is its ground 
as the I becomes more independent. Hence, each unique I has its own 
responsibility for the We-hood of God. Even when the I is grounded 
in the ‘We’ of God – hence can only arise in and survive thanks to 
it –, the We-hood of God is realized, lives, in the peaceful union of 
independent I’s. Such We-hood is not a sum-total of I’s; We-hood is 
the mysterious ground of unity and individuality that comes alive and 
strives towards perfection in each and every I of the world.
Before proceeding any further and elaborating on a metaphysics of 
‘We,’ let it be emphasized, perhaps unnecessarily, that calling God 
‘We’ does not imply that we are God. God is not to be identifi ed with 
any earthly ‘we.’ God’s We-hood surpasses the ‘we’ of any human 
group or category. God is not we-as-a-nation, we-as-a-specifi c-race, 
we-as-male, we-as-my-family, or we-as-believers, etc. God lives in all 
of the more or less successful ‘we’s’ of the world, but none of these 
‘we’s’ are God.52 God as ‘We’ is in the success of all the worldly ‘we’s.’ 
Every successful togetherness off ers a glimpse into the ideal ‘We’ of 
God. When Rahner writes that God is “the fundamental ground and 
the absolute future of all reality,” it could be rephrased as “God is the 
ground of earthly we-hood and the ideal of We-hood.”53 God is the 
one ground of each individual I and of the togetherness of I’s, and God 
52 In calling God “We,” I seem to be only including human togetherness in God. 
We-hood defi nitely needs conscious I-hood to be. However, consciousness is not a 
characteristic that a being either possesses or does not possess. It is a gliding scale. 
Within the whole of the cosmos, certain beings are aware of themselves as individu-
als and their ability to interact with other beings. Th is gives them a special role and 
responsibility in the We-hood. Nonetheless, we recognize a whole range of possible 
contributions of human I’s in terms of intellectual, emotional, and physical abilities 
and shortcomings. In the endless openness of God’s ideal We-hood, there is room 
for an unlimited range of singular individuals. I am convinced that no life form is 
excluded from the divine Oneness. 
53 See 6.2.2. 
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challenges every earthly I to realize a peaceful unity that enhances each 
individual I, to strive for perfect We-hood, for a togetherness of free, 
independent I’s who value their own and each other’s singularity.54
7.5.3. Th e One Infi nite Reality of We-hood
With the concept of We-hood in mind as it has been explained, let 
us return to our question about the feasibility of a metaphysics for 
the 21st century. We will follow Henrich fi rst in taking metaphysics 
as the eff ort to seek agreement between an all-encompassing unity 
that is relative to nothing, hence absolute, and the human need for 
self-explanation. Th e ground of subjectivity and the whole of subjects 
need to be integrated in one single thought construction. Individuals 
in their independence need to be thought within a whole in relation to 
which individual subjects are not originally independent and in which 
individuals are not ultimately isolated.55 We are to think a unity in 
which justice is done to each individual I and its unitary ground. Such 
a ground of self-consciousness cannot be thought separate from the 
subject. It must somehow be of such kind that it is an internal enabling 
of the subject’s self-activity and spontaneity. Th is ground is not an 
individual cause for each subject separately; it is rather the communal, 
continuously enabling ground of all subjects. Its unitary presence that 
allows for individuality opens the possibility of a togetherness that also 
enables the I to enhance itself. Is this not in line with a metaphysics 
of We-hood?
Secondly, let us go along with Hölderlin who states that religion 
is about reconnecting what once was one, “to fi nd One that gives us 
peace . . . as if the whole pain of our life consists in the separation of 
what belongs together.”56 Human beings long for a peaceful, harmoni-
ous togetherness, both in the world as a whole and in their own little 
microcosms. Th is peaceful unity implies that the singularity of their 
I-hood is recognized without being condemned to live life in the 
54 It should be noted that also according to the Christian tradition God’s person-
hood should not be thought as an I that opposes other I’s but is best described as 
togetherness of three persons, hence as ‘We.’ It would be interesting to study the 
connection between the concept of God as We and the Christian concept of the Holy 
Trinity. Likewise, the gospel of Saint John with its farewell speeches of Jesus Christ, 
in which the unity of the Father and the Son is emphasized, could be regarded in this 
light. Both topics are, however, beyond the scope of this research. 
55 See 6.1.2.; Henrich 2007, 265.
56 See 4.5. 
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solitary confi nement of the I. In Hölderlin’s view, religion is about 
longing for a unifi cation that is not contrary to I-hood. Hence, a term 
of successful unity is needed that is in line with the human way of 
being both an I and fundamentally together with other I’s. Hölderlin 
uses a term like Father Ether to express the unitary and the personal 
aspects of the One simultaneously. In order to prevent anthropomor-
phism and to ensure the inclusion of every human being, it would be 
better to avoid attaching a term to this unity that refers to only one 
category of humanity and fi nd a personal term that is abstract and 
familiar at the same time. Is not We-hood the concept that meets these 
requirements?
Th irdly, let us assume with Rahner that the medium in which God 
is experienced has shift ed from the objective world to our subjectivity. 
Th e mystery “breaks out of our own being” as an experience of tran-
scendence that is more original than and the basis of refl ection about 
God.57 Hence, the concept of God must be related to our subjectiv-
ity with its inherent ambiguity. Furthermore, it should somehow deal 
with what Rahner sees as “a fundamental problem for a contemporary 
understanding of Christianity,” namely 
how God can really be God and not simply an element of the world, and 
how, nevertheless, in our religious relationship to the world we are to 
understand him as not remaining outside the world.58 
Hence, a metaphysics that connects God and the I while doing justice 
to the singularity of both. Could it not be said that God is the ground 
and the ideal of We-hood?
A metaphysics of We-hood that fl ows from these requirements has 
several advantages. It respects the two lines in the Christian tradition 
of God’s personhood and all-ness that are both important but seem 
terribly diffi  cult to combine in our thinking. In this, it corrects an obvi-
ous simplifi cation in which God is merely an immanent ground, and it 
opens the eschatological perspective. ‘We’ is a familiar and beautifully 
simple term that shift s the focus away from the I as such, which seems 
a necessary antidote for the self-centeredness of modern life. None-
theless, ‘We’ is directly related to a philosophical concept of I-hood 
both as person and as subject. As person, an I is always in a particular 
57 See 6.1.1. 
58 SW 26, 88.
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community, a ‘we.’ As subject, the I can relate to the one infi nite real-
ity of ‘We’ as a whole. Hence, the I is embedded in We-hood on the 
one hand, and the I’s freedom vis-à-vis the ‘We’ makes We-hood the 
I’s most elementary responsibility in life at the same time. 
It is in line with the authors of the previous chapters to say, “All people 
relate to and participate in what we intuit as one and the same infi nite 
reality that grounds and surpasses each individual participant.” Let us 
see how this statement works out in a metaphysics of the one infi nite 
reality of God as ‘We.’ 
One infi nite reality
Th e human mind seems to possess an a priori, an unthematic but inev-
itable, knowing of or intuition for the infi nity of reality. Th is evokes 
a fundamental urge to know what reality is all about in its unitary 
totality. Th is one reality has physical aspects that can be studied by 
the methods of the (natural) sciences, but these sciences can neither 
enlighten us about the unitary totality as a whole in its oneness nor 
about the element of transcendence characteristic of and inherent in 
subjectivity. Calling this one reality infi nite suggests that it cannot be 
fully captured in laws of nature, nor its development predicted from 
these laws. Hence, the human mind, that which belongs to an indi-
vidual I, cannot control it nor learn to do so. We must concede, with 
Henrich, that such a ground of I-hood is unprovable within the limits 
of scientifi c knowledge, that therefore we can only start from our pri-
mary rationality, our basic understanding of (conscious) life.59 
Th e diff erence between a metaphysics of ‘We’ and naturalism is that 
the former dares to live without concrete answers and without reas-
surance that, given enough time, humankind will never be confused 
and frightened by its own contingent existence again. Th is one reality 
is a mystery, precisely in its infi nite oneness and its potential for free 
individual I-hood. It is not mystery in the sense of the yet unsolved, 
something to be overcome, but mystery as a real and lasting quality of 
a reality that is infi nite. Another major diff erence between a metaphys-
ics of ‘We’ and naturalism is the recognition of a measure of freedom 
in this one reality. It is not entirely ruled by the laws of nature, and 
neither is human activity. We are not merely machines that act in a 
59 See 6.1.2. 
 god – beyond me 423
specifi c way because we are determined to do so by laws of matter. 
Metaphysics says by defi nition that there is an aspect of ungraspabil-
ity in human reality, an aspect of infi nity that cannot be ignored and 
constitutes a challenge to human freedom. 
In calling this one infi nite reality ‘We,’ subjectivity as a non-material 
quality of this reality is explicitly included and the mysterious ability 
of I’s to unite is emphasized. ‘We’ expresses subjectivity, unity, and 
relationality. Th is makes ‘We’ as a term for this infi nite reality pref-
erable to Henrich’s “All-Unity,” which sounds too anonymous and 
impersonal and does not do justice to the real role of I’s that are open 
to each other and to this reality as a whole. ‘We’ is the personal unity 
prior to the plurality of all diff erent I’s. It is the common ground of 
all I-hood. ‘We’ is the subiectum of the multiple, empirical I’s, to para-
phrase Rahner.60 Th e infi nite ‘We’ is also the horizon that directs each 
I back at the actual well-being of each participating I. Th e ideal of We-
hood constitutes a challenge to every ‘we’ of the world. 
Intuiting the one-ness of this infi nite reality 
We can inquire about the unity of reality as a whole, hence we know 
of it, Rahner asserts. We must inquire about it, hence it is not fully 
known. Metaphysics is not and cannot be like scientifi c knowledge. 
Th ere are limits to what can be achieved and expressed by means of a 
limited rationality. Th e straitjacket of such rationality forces Hölderlin 
to give up on philosophy and concentrate on poetry instead. Nonethe-
less, even art needs interpretation, philosophical explanation, in order 
to prevent the ‘infi nity’ that it ‘embodies’ to be reduced to everyone’s 
private experience of absoluteness. Th erefore, a tentative metaphysical 
language that uses intuitive terms is indispensable for the aspect of 
infi nity to stay alive in a culture.
Calling this one infi nite reality ‘We,’ and not an ‘it’ in whatever 
form, appeals to a human intuition of actively taking part in the suc-
cess of this one reality. Moreover, the ‘we’s’ of the world are the start-
ing-point for our knowledge about the one infi nite reality of We-hood. 
Grounded in God’s We-hood, the I knows of, intuits ultimate We-
hood, or ideal We-hood, in the ‘we’s’ of the world. With Hölderlin, it 
can be asserted that people can catch glimpses of the ideal ‘We’ here 
60 Rahner says that the human I is the subiectum of its multiple, empirical objectivi-
ties. See 6.2.1.1. 
424 chapter seven
and now. Speaking of God as We-hood expresses the (eschatological) 
hope that the way in which I’s succeed in living together is a refl ection 
of a divine ideal of We-hood. Th e ‘we’s’ of the world are an appeal 
to realize true We-hood. Furthermore, calling this one infi nite reality 
‘We’ implies the refusal to accept dualism as the ultimate. No absolute 
divide exists between heaven and earth, between the subject and the 
things of the world, between seemingly opposed I’s, between me and 
God, between earthly we-hood and the ideal We-hood of God. Th is is 
not knowledge but a fundamental human intuition.
Both relating to and participating in this infi nite reality 
Relating and participating are two entirely diff erent perspectives that 
are mysteriously combined in I-hood. Th e I is both subject and per-
son in Henrich’s (adapted) sense of the duality of the Grundverhältnis. 
Conceiving of all of reality as infi nite ‘We’ does justice to both aspects 
of I-hood. 
On the one hand, subjecthood is the ability to “speculari” and relate 
to reality as whole and thereby distinguish itself from it. Th e I has 
its own unique relation to the ‘We,’ its own unique perspective. It 
can look at the ‘We,’ make judgments about it, and the I is free (to a 
certain extent) to determine its role in it. Th e I has a say in this ‘We’ 
and its unique role is of importance for the ‘We.’ Th us full credit is 
given to each I’s singularity. It also implies that I’s are not in competi-
tion. I-hood, as the individual’s capacity for infi nity, and its singular-
ity is not hampered by the unicity of other I’s. I-hood is not a matter 
of obtaining the best perspective; it is, from the start, one’s own best 
perspective, not to be interchanged, nor outdone by that of others. 
Furthermore, the I’s subjectivity constitutes its freedom vis-à-vis this 
infi nite reality of ‘We’ and its duty. Th is amounts to the I’s individual 
responsibility to contribute to the ideal of We-hood. It can only do 
this in its ability to ‘step out’ and freely decide how to ‘involve’ itself. 
An I is not merely the dependent party in the We-hood. If the ideal 
of We-hood is God, this means that the I is free vis-à-vis God. Con-
temporary religiosity is oft en focused on the religious experience, on 
perceiving, on feeling the Divine, hence on what the I receives. In the 
metaphor of God’s We-hood as motherhood, this refl ects an immature 
child-mother relationship with the mother as merely the giver. Ulti-
mately, however, religiosity is about the power to engage one’s (more 
or less handicapped) free I-hood to enhance the ‘We.’ Th is implies that 
God does not have full control over the ‘We.’ Th e ‘We’ has taken on 
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a life of its own, so to say. Th is means that God changes as the ‘We’ 
changes. Hence, to a degree God is dependent upon the free I’s. Th is 
makes God a vulnerable God. God’s We-hood is dependent upon the 
participating I’s, not only in their freedom to develop themselves but 
also in their willingness to open up for and contribute towards the 
ideal of We-hood, a unity that does full justice to each individual.
On the other hand, as person the I always remains in the ‘We.’ Even 
though the I can look at the whole of reality and make judgments 
about it, hence surpasses the whole, it can never detach itself from this 
one reality. Personhood implies remaining within this reality, always. 
No matter how high the I rises above it in its ‘tower of speculari,’ it 
always ‘takes this one reality with it.’ Th is ability to look at the whole, 
to relate to it, is part of this one reality. Even in its infi nite subjectiv-
ity, the I never surpasses the one infi nite reality of We-hood. Th e I 
can never become the absoluteness of reality, even if it can experience 
glimpses of it in its subjectivity. Th e I always remains embedded in 
this unitary ground. Reality as a whole surpasses the I’s surpassing of 
that reality. 
A reality that grounds and surpasses each individual participant
Th is reality is the ground of earthly we-hood and its unity lives in 
every individual I as the desire for ultimate peaceful togetherness. A 
metaphysics of ‘We’ does not lead to a religiosity that requires the 
ultimate denial of our worldly state of being. Calling this one infi nite 
reality ‘We’ ensures a sense of belonging in which each I aff ects this 
‘We’ here and now. Each I participates in this infi nite reality of ‘We,’ 
and the infi nity of this reality is present and expressed in each and 
every ‘we’ of the world. Th e fact that all belong to this one reality called 
‘We’ implies that there is no absolute divide between individual I’s and 
particular ‘we’s’ in this reality or between I’s and ‘we’s’ and the reality 
of ‘We’ as a whole. An I cannot prevent belonging to the ‘We’ of real-
ity, nor can it be excluded from it. Nonetheless, calling this one reality 
‘We’ emphasizes that it is impossible for an individual I to control this 
reality. Th e initiative in the ‘We’ cannot and does not lie with the I; it 
is the I’s ground.
German idealism has linked the infi nity of I-hood to the absolute-
ness in the ability to say I, in being a subject. Henrich endeavors to 
relativize the infi nite aspect of the I by placing it in the multitude of 
I’s in the world making the I a mere “world-thing.” Self-relativization, 
however, is in the knowledge that even in the infi nity of its I-hood the 
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I never gets beyond the reality of We-hood that is also the here and the 
now of its daily life. Th e infi nite ground of We-hood enables the I to 
rise above reality without ever losing touch with this ground. Even in 
its aspect of infi nity the I can never step out of this one, infi nite ‘We.’ 
It enables the I’s free relationship to the ‘We’ without ignoring the I’s 
ultimate dependence on this personal, unitary ground. Th e I cannot 
establish the We-hood that it is grounded in and dependent upon for 
its survival. Th is implies that the ideal of We-hood must somehow 
come to it. Th e ‘We’ surpasses the I, not only as the incalculable mul-
titude of other I’s and their varying worldly degrees of togetherness, 
but also in the givenness of the ability to transcend, to open up both 
in knowledge and in love, to become ‘We.’ 
Th is ‘We,’ God, is entirely beyond me, both in the infi nite unknow-
ability and in being given as my ground. Unknowable because this 
‘We’ cannot be grasped with the methods of this reality itself. We have 
a capacity for transcendence but the absolute range of the Vorgriff , to 
use Rahner’s term, does not imply the possibility of mastery of the 
‘We.’ Ideal We-hood as the horizon of the human way of being is by 
defi nition beyond our grasp while at the same time brought into view 
as the ultimate perspective of earthly ‘we’s.’ Th is one, infi nite reality 
of We-hood in which I participate is at the same time my vis-à-vis. 
God as ideal We-hood appeals to me to involve myself, to realize We-
on-earth. To God as this We-Mother-personal ground who wills my 
I-hood, my free ability to contribute to We-on-earth, I can appeal for 
strength to make my individual life succeed in togetherness and thus 
contribute to ideal of We-hood. 
Let us return to Hölderlin one last time. He is fully aware of the prob-
lems associated with a monistic philosophy of a unitary ground. If the 
ground is in the I, I-hood can easily take on absolute proportions and 
overshadow the potential for unity among I’s. Conscious I-hood can 
never reach into infi nite unity because subjectivity can only be the 
result of an opposition (subject-object). Th is philosophical aporia is 
the death sentence over his philosophical career. He turns to poetry to 
express the personal God-Father Ether of Christian religiosity whom 
he intuits as his real ground but for whom seems to be no room in a 
rational discourse. It is also in verse that he tries to clarify the eminent 
role of Christ, Der Einzige, which he seems to recognize and cherish 
and which his philosophy cannot accommodate. Finally, his eschatol-
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ogy of the new unity of I’s as pictured in Friedensfeier never fi nds its 
counterpart in metaphysical prose. 
Concerning the God-Father Ether who is both unitary and personal 
ground enough has been said in terms of God as the one infi nite real-
ity of We-hood, in my opinion. Th e second issue about the unique 
‘child’ Jesus Christ, who has fully realized the ideal of the simulta-
neity of unity and individuality, is an extremely interesting topic for 
further research. It is, however, beyond the scope of this study. Th e 
third and fi nal issue, the ideal We-hood that Hölderlin pictures in 
the Celebration of peace is worth returning to once more. Let us recall the
image of the festive hall with the entire family gathering around the 
table, sharing the copious meal and the Mother’s overfl owing hospital-
ity in this celebration of unity to which all have been invited. All the 
individual family members with their own lives and challenges, their 
own talents and shortcomings, their successes and failures, are pres-
ent. Th eir individual presence is what makes the gathering possible; 
the liveliness of the Celebration is dependent upon its members. Can 
you imagine the Mother’s tired, but intensely satisfi ed expression at 
this harmonious gathering of her mature off spring that She has been 
preparing all along? Her primordial unity has come alive in the togeth-
erness of these intimately related individuals. All of us who have expe-
rienced family dinners both intuit the ideal of the event as pictured by 
Hölderlin, and we all know that it takes hard work from every, single 
family member present to even approach this ideal of We-hood. 
APPENDIX A
WIE WENN AM FEIERTAGE (1799)
Wie wenn am Feiertage, das Feld zu sehn,
Ein Landmann geht, des Morgens, wenn
Aus heisser Nacht die kühlenden Blize fi elen
Die ganze Zeit und fern noch tönet der Donner,
In sein Gestade wieder tritt der Strom,
Und frisch der Boden grünt
Und von des Himmels erfreuendem Reegen
Der Weinstok trauft  und glänzend
In stiller Sonne stehn die Bäume des Haines:
So stehn sie unter günstiger Witterung
Sie die kein meister allein, die wunderbar
Allgegenwärtig erzieht in leichtem Umfangen
Die mächtige, die göttlichschöne Natur.
Drum wenn zu schlafen sie scheint zu Zeiten des Jahrs
Am Himmel oder unter den Pfl anzen oder den Völkern
So trauert der Dichter Angesicht auch,
Sie scheinen allein zu seyn, doch ahnen sie immer.
Denn ahnend ruhet sie selbst auch.
Jezt aber tagts! Ich harrt und sah es kommen,
Und was ich sah, des Heilige sei mein Wort,
Denn sie, sie selbst, die älter denn die Zeiten
Und über die Götter des Abends und Orients ist,
Die Natur ist jezt mit Waff enklang erwacht,
Und hoch vom Aether bis zum Abgrund nieder
Nach vestem Gezeze, wie einst, aus heiligem Chaos gezeugt,
Fühlt neu die Begeisterung sich,
Die Allerschaff ende wieder.
Und wie im Aug’ ein Feuer dem Manne glänzt,
Wenn hohes er entwarf; so ist
Von neuem an den Zeichen, den Th aten der Welt jezt
Ein Feuer angezündet in Seelen der Dichter.
Und was zuvor geschah, doch kaum gefühlt,
Ist off enbar erst jezt,
Und die uns lächelnd den Aker gebauet,
In Knechtsgestalt, sie sind erkannt,
Die Allebendigen, die Kräft e der Götter.
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Erfrägst du sie? im Liede wehet ihr Geist
Wenn es der Sonnen des Tags und warmer Erd
Entwächst, und Wettern, die in der Luft , und andern
Die vorbereiteter in Tiefen der Zeit,
Und deutungsvoller, und vernehmlicher uns
Hinwandeln zwischen Himmel und Erd und unter den Völkern.
Des gemeinsamen Geistes Gedanken sind,
Still endend in der Seele des Dichters,
Dass schnellbetroff en sie, Unendlichem
Bekannt seit langer Zeit, von Erinnerung
Erbebt, und ihr, von heilgem Stral entzündet,
Die Frucht in Liebe geboren, der Götter und Menschen Werk
Den Gesang, damit er beiden zeuge, glükt.
So fi el, wie Dichter sagen, da sie sichtbar
Den Gott zu sehen begehrte, sein Bliz auf Semeles Haus
Und die göttlichgetroff ne gebahr,
Die Frucht des Gewitters, den heiligen Bacchus.
Und daher trinken himmlisches Feuer jezt
Die Erdensöhne ohne Gefahr.
Doch uns gebührt es, undter Gottes Gewittern,
Ihr Dichter! Mit entblösstem Haupte zu stehen
Des Vaters Stral, ihn selbst, mit eigner Hand
Zu fassen und dem Volk ins Lied
Gehüllt die himmlische Gaabe zu reichen.
Denn sind nur reinen Herzens,
Wie Kinder, wir, sind schuldlos unsere Hände,
Des Vaters Stral, der reine versengt es nicht
Und tieferschüttert, die Leiden des Stärkeren
Mitleidend, bleibt in den hochherstürzenden Stürmen
Des Gottes, wenn er nahet, das Herz doch fest.
Doch weh mir! Wenn von
[selbgeschlagener Wunde das Herz mir blutet, und tief-
verloren der Frieden ist, und freibescheidenes Genügen,
und die Unruh, und der Mangel mich treibt zum
Überfl usse des Göttertisches, wenn rings um mich]
Weh mir!
Und sag ich gleich,
Ich sei genaht, die Himmlischen zu schauen,
Sie selbst, sie werfen mich tief unter die Lebenden
Den falschen Priester, ins Dunkel, dass ich
Das warnende Lied den Gelehrigen singe. Dort
APPENDIX B
NATUR UND KUNST (1801)
Du waltest hoch am Tag’ und es blühet dein
Gesez, du hältst die Waage, Saturnus Sohn!
Und theilst die Loos’ und ruhest froh im
Ruhm der unsterblichen Herrscherkünste.
Doch in den Abgrund, sagen die Sänger sich,
Habst du den heil’gen Vater, den eignen, einst
Verwiesen und es jammre drunten,
Da, wo die Wilden vor dir mit Recht sind,
Schuldlos der Gott der goldenen Zeit schon längst:
Einst mühelos, und grösser, wie du, wenn schon
Er kein Gebot aussprach und ihn der
Sterblichen keiner mit Nahmen nannte.
Herab denn! Oder schäme des Danks dich nicht!
Und willst du bleiben, diene dem Älteren,
Und gönn’ es ihm, dass ihn vor Allen,
Göttern und Menschen, der Sänger nenne!
Denn, wie aus dem Gewölke dein Bliz, so kömmt
Von ihm, was dein ist, siehe! so zeugt von ihm,
Was du gebeutst, und aus Saturnus
Frieden ist jegliche Macht erwachsen.
Und hab’ ich erst am Herzen Lebendiges
Gefühlt und dämmert, was du gestaltetest,
Und war in ihrer Wiege mir in
Wonne die wechselnde Zeit entschlummert:
Dann kenn’ ich dich, Kronion! Dann hör’ ich dich,
Den weisen Meister, welcher, wie wir, ein Sohn
Der Zeit, Geseze giebt und, was die
Heilige Dämmerung birgt, verkündet.
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Ich bitte dieses Blatt nur gutmüthig zu lesen. So wird
es sicher nicht unfaßlich, noch weniger anstößig seyn.
Sollten aber dennoch einige eine solche Sprache zu wenig
konventionell fi nden, so muß ich ihnen gestehen: ich
kann nicht anders. An einem schönen Tage läßt sich ja
fast jede Sangart hören, und die Natur, wovon es her ist,
nimmts auch wieder.
Der Verfasser gedenkt dem Publikum eine ganze
Sammlung von dergleichen Blättern vorzulegen, und
dieses soll irgend eine Probe seyn davon.
Der himmlischen, still wiederklingenden,
Der ruhigwandelnden Töne voll,
Und gelüft et ist der altgebaute,
Seeliggewohnte Saal; um grüne Teppiche duft et
Die Freudenwolk’ und weithinglänzend stehn,
Gereift ester Früchte voll und goldbekränzter Kelche,
Wohlangeordnet, eine prächtige Reihe,
Zur Seite da und dort aufsteigend über dem
Geebneten Boden die Tische.
Denn ferne kommend haben
Hieher, zur Abendstunde,
Sich liebende Gäste beschieden.
Und dämmernden Auges denk’ ich schon,
Vom ernsten Tagwerk lächelnd,
Ihn selbst zu sehn, den Fürsten des Fests.
Doch wenn du schon dein Ausland gern verläugnest,
Und als vom langen Heldenzuge müd,
Dein Auge senkst, vergessen, leichtbeschattet,
Und Freundesgestalt annimmst, du Allbekannter, doch
Beugt fast die Knie das Hohe. Nichts vor dir,
Nur Eines weiß ich, Sterbliches bist du nicht.
Ein Weiser mag mir manches erhellen; wo aber
Ein Gott noch auch erscheint,
Da ist doch andere Klarheit.
Von heute aber nicht, nicht unverkündet ist er;
Und einer, der nicht Fluth noch Flamme gescheuet,
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Erstaunet, da es stille worden, umsonst nicht, jezt,
Da Herrschaft  nirgend ist zu sehn bei Geistern und Menschen.
Das ist, sie hören das Werk,
Längst vorbereitend, von Morgen nach Abend, jezt erst,
Denn unermeßlich braußt, in der Tiefe verhallend,
Des Donnerers Echo, das tausendjährige Wetter,
Zu schlafen, übertönt von Friedenslauten, hinunter.
Ihr aber, theuergewordne, o ihr Tage der Unschuld,
Ihr bringt auch heute das Fest, ihr Lieben! und es blüht
Rings abendlich der Geist in dieser Stille;
Und rathen muß ich, und wäre silbergrau
Die Loke, o ihr Freunde!
Für Kränze zu sorgen und Mahl, jezt ewigen Jünglingen ähnlich.
Und manchen möcht’ ich laden, aber o du,
Der freundlichernst den Menschen zugethan,
Dort unter syrischer Palme,
Wo nahe lag die Stadt, am Brunnen gerne war;
Das Kornfeld rauschte rings, still athmete die Kühlung
Vom Schatten des geweiheten Gebirges,
Und die lieben Freunde, das treue Gewölk,
Umschatteten dich auch, damit der heiligkühne
Durch Wildniß mild dein Stral zu Menschen kam, o Jüngling!
Ach! aber dunkler umschattete, mitten im Wort, dich
Furchtbarentscheidend ein tödtlich Verhängniß. So ist schnell
Vergänglich alles Himmlische; aber umsonst nicht;
Denn schonend rührt des Maases allzeit kundig
Nur einen Augenblik die Wohnungen der Menschen
Ein Gott an, unversehn, und keiner weiß es, wenn?
Auch darf alsdann das Freche drüber gehn,
Und kommen muß zum heilgen Ort das Wilde
Von Enden fern, übt rauhbetastend den Wahn,
Und trift  daran ein Schiksaal, aber Dank,
Nie folgt der gleich hernach dem gottgegebnen Geschenke;
Tiefprüfend ist es zu fassen.
Auch wär’ uns, sparte der Gebende nicht
Schon längst vom Seegen des Heerds
Uns Gipfel und Boden entzündet.
Des Göttlichen aber empfi engen wir
Doch viel. Es ward die Flamm’ uns
In die Hände gegeben, und Ufer und Meersfl uth.
Viel mehr, denn menschlicher Weise
Sind jene mit uns, die fremden Kräft e, vertrauet.
Und es lehret Gestirn dich, das
Vor Augen dir ist, doch nimmer kannst du ihm gleichen.
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Vom Alllebendigen aber, von dem
Viel Freuden sind und Gesänge,
Ist einer ein Sohn, ein Ruhigmächtiger ist er,
Und nun erkennen wir ihn,
Nun, da wir kennen den Vater
Und Feiertage zu halten
Der hohe, der Geist
Der Welt sich zu Menschen geneigt hat.
Denn längst war der zum Herrn der Zeit zu groß
Und weit aus reichte sein Feld, wann hats ihn aber erschöpfet?
Einmal mag aber ein Gott auch Tagewerk erwählen,
Gleich Sterblichen und theilen alles Schiksaal.
Schiksaalgesez ist diß, daß Alle sich erfahren,
Daß, wenn die Stille kehrt, auch eine Sprache sei.
Wo aber wirkt der Geist, sind wir auch mit, und streiten,
Was wohl das Beste sei. So dünkt mir jezt das Beste,
Wenn nun vollendet sein Bild und fertig ist der Meister,
Und selbst verklärt davon aus seiner Werkstatt tritt,
Der stille Gott der Zeit und nur der Liebe Gesez,
Das schönausgleichende gilt von hier an bis zum Himmel.
Viel hat von Morgen an,
Seit ein Gespräch wir sind und hören voneinander,
Erfahren der Mensch; bald sind wir aber Gesang.
Und das Zeitbild, das der große Geist entfaltet,
Ein Zeichen liegts vor uns, daß zwischen ihm und andern
Ein Bündniß zwischen ihm und andern Mächten ist.
Nicht er allein, die Unerzeugten, Ew’gen
Sind kennbar alle daran, gleichwie auch an den Pfl anzen
Die Mutter Erde sich und Licht und Luft  sich kennet.
Zulezt ist aber doch, ihr heiligen Mächte, für euch
Das Liebeszeichen, das Zeugniß
Daß ihrs noch seiet, der Festtag,
Der Allversammelnde, wo Himmlische nicht
Im Wunder off enbar, noch ungesehn im Wetter,
Wo aber bei Gesang gastfreundlich untereinander
In Chören gegenwärtig, eine heilige Zahl
Die Seeligen in jeglicher Weise
Beisammen sind, und ihr Geliebtestes auch,
An dem sie hängen, nicht fehlt; denn darum rief ich
Zum Gastmahl, das bereitet ist,
Dich, Unvergeßlicher, dich, zum Abend der Zeit,
O Jüngling, dich zum Fürsten des Festes; und eher legt
Sich schlafen unser Geschlecht nicht,
Bis ihr Verheißenen all,
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All ihr Unsterblichen, uns
Von eurem Himmel zu sagen.
Da seid in unserem Hauße.
Leichtathmende Lüft e
Verkünden euch schon,
Euch kündet das rauchende Th al
Und der Boden, der vom Wetter noch dröhnet,
Doch Hoff nung röthet die Wangen,
Und vor der Th üre des Haußes
Sizt Mutter und Kind,
Und schauet den Frieden
Und wenige scheinen zu sterben
Es hält ein Ahnen die Seele,
Vom goldnen Lichte gesendet,
Hält ein Versprechen die Ältesten auf.
Wohl sind die Würze des Lebens,
Von oben bereitet und auch
Hinausgeführet, die Mühen.
Denn Alles gefällt jezt,
Einfältiges aber
Am meisten, denn die langgesuchte,
Die goldne Frucht,
Uraltem Stamm
In schütternden Stürmen entfallen,
Dann aber, als liebstes Gut, vom heiligen Schiksaal selbst,
Mit zärtlichen Waff en umschüzt,
Die Gestalt der Himmlischen ist es.
Wie die Löwin, hast du geklagt,
O Mutter, da du sie,
Natur, die Kinder verloren.
Denn es stahl sie, Allzuliebende, dir
Dein Feind, da du ihn fast
Wie die eigenen Söhne genommen,
Und Satyren die Götter gesellt hast.
So hast du manches gebaut,
Und manches begraben,
Denn es haßt dich, was
Du, vor der Zeit
Allkräft ige, zum Lichte gezogen.
Nun kennest, nun lässest du diß;
Denn gerne fühllos ruht,
Bis daß es reift , furchtsamgeschäfft  iges drunten.
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Het eerste hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift  gaat over het fi losofi sche 
enigma van het zelfb ewustzijn. Vanuit de subjectfi losofi e van Dieter 
Henrich (1927), die haar wortels heeft  in het gedachtegoed dat bekend 
staat als het Duits idealisme, wordt het ik-zijn nader bestudeerd. Hen-
rich introduceert de term Grundverhältnis als de tweespalt tussen 
enerzijds het ik als subject, dat in een familiariteit met zichzelf altijd 
tegenover de wereld als geheel staat en zich uniek weet in die ver-
houding. Anderzijds is het ik als persoon altijd tegelijkertijd ook in de 
wereld; Henrich spreekt zelfs over Weltding. In zijn elementaire ver-
houding tot zichzelf en de wereld bevindt het ik zich onontkoombaar 
in de tegenstrijdige ervaring van in de wereld en boven de wereld, van 
contingentie en oneindigheid. 
Als overgang naar de tijdsperiode waarop Henrich zijn theorie 
baseert, het Duits idealisme, wordt in het tweede hoofdstuk een fi loso-
fi sch historische schets gegeven van de verhitte discussie die oplaait aan 
het einde van de 18de eeuw omtrent de kenbaarheid van de grond van 
het ik. Twee bekende namen uit de geschiedenis van de fi losofi e, Kant 
en Spinoza, vormen hiervoor het achtergronddecor. Immanuel Kant 
heeft  met zijn Kritik der reine Vernunft  een duidelijke grens getrokken 
voor de metafysica: voorbij het empirische is geen kennis mogelijk. 
In dit dualisme laat hij een duidelijke opening voor het transcenden-
tale ik dat zich ergens op de grenslijn van twee gescheiden domeinen 
bevindt. Dit ik dat de mogelijkheid om het dualisme te overwinnen in 
zich lijkt te dragen wordt daarmee de focus van een nieuwe generatie 
denkers. Het is Baruch de Spinoza, al een eeuw dood en verguisd, die 
in een opleving van populariteit de jonge garde mogelijkheden biedt 
voor het denken van een eenheidsgrond die bereikbaar zou kunnen 
zijn voor het ik. Een intensieve fi losofi sche zoektocht komt op gang 
naar een synthese tussen het autonome, transcendentale ik van Kant 
en de Deus sive Natura van Spinoza.
Na het Duitse fi losofi sche landschap aan het einde van de 18de eeuw 
beschreven te hebben, wordt de aandacht in het derde hoofdstuk 
gericht op een van de jeugdige hoofdrolspelers: Friedrich Schelling. 
Hij is slechts vijft ien jaar oud wanneer hij zijn academische opleiding 
begint. Hij is een wonderkind dat zichzelf in staat acht om alles te 
denken: zelfs de absolute eenheidsgrond van al wat is. De producten 
van zijn ongebreidelde, ambitieuze schrijfdrift  in de eerste tien tot 
vijft ien jaar van zijn carrière vormen een prachtige illustratie van de 
fi losofi sche uitdagingen, oplossingen en mislukkingen met betrekking 
tot het denken van een absolute grond, vaak betiteld als het absolute 
idealisme. Vanuit verschillende invalshoeken poogt hij het Absolute 
te koppelen aan het denkende ik. Deze periode culmineert in zijn 
bekende Freiheitschrift  waarin hij kiest voor een meer evocatieve taal. 
Studiegenoot en tegenhanger van Schelling is Friedrich Hölderlin 
wiens metafysica het onderwerp vormt van het vierde hoofdstuk. Al 
vroeg in zijn studie komt hij tot de conclusie dat de eenheidsgrond van 
het ik, dat hij het Seyn noemt, per defi nitie onbereikbaar is voor het 
bewustzijn dat altijd berust op een scheiding (Urtheilung), namelijk 
tussen subject en object. Niettemin gelooft  hij dat de eenheid van het 
Seyn zich openbaart in het leven, in schoonheid, in jeugdige onschuld, 
in een intuïtie voor eenheid en vrede. Met name die laatste term is 
belangrijk in Hölderlin’s fi losofi e. Niet zozeer de vraag naar het singu-
liere ik en zijn absolute grond houdt hem bezig, maar de vraag naar de 
wijze waarop die originele eenheid gestalte kan krijgen in een wereld 
van schijnbaar afgezonderde en met elkaar strijdige ikken. Hij keert 
de fi losofi e de rug toe en kiest de weg van de poëzie. In de intuïtieve 
benadering van het gedicht ziet hij de mogelijkheid om de eenheids-
grond binnen het bereik van het ik te brengen. Het betreft  hier niet 
langer de cognitieve capaciteiten, het expliciete denkvermogen, maar 
eerder de religieuze, wellicht zelfs mystieke aanleg van het ik om niet 
geheel te vervreemden van de eenheid waaruit het is voortgekomen en 
ernaar terug te verlangen. 
In dit verband circuleert er in de kringen van deze denkers een 
term, geïntroduceerd door Kant, intellektuelle Anschauung genaamd. 
Het vormt het onderwerp van het vijfde hoofdstuk. In korte tijd onder-
gaat de term een wezenlijke transformatie. Wat Kant reserveert voor 
God als de mogelijkheid om niet alleen de fenomenen maar juist de 
Dingen-an-Sich te kennen, wordt door Fichte, de mentor van de jonge 
denkers uit de voorafgaande hoofdstukken, in verband gebracht met 
het ik; het is de intuïtie “ik ben!”. Schelling en Hölderlin interpreteren 
het vervolgens als een menselijk vermogen om “door te dringen” tot 
de eenheidsgrond van al wat is. Schelling ziet het als een fi losofi sche 
handgreep om het Absolute te vatten, terwijl het voor Hölderlin eerder 
een intuïtie, een aanvoelen van de onderliggende, goddelijke eenheid 
is. Beiden beschouwen het echter als een mogelijkheid om de Kan-
tiaanse kloof tussen het fysische en het metafysische, het ik en het 
Absolute, te overbruggen. De term verdwijnt al snel van het fi losofi -
sche toneel in het begin van de 19de eeuw en daarmee lijkt de dood van 
de rationele metafysica in zicht. Het goddelijk is het domein van geloof 
en theologie, niet van het denken en de fi losofi e. Deze kloof domineert 
tot op heden de verhouding tussen fi losofi e en theologie. 
Vandaar de tweedeling van het zesde hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift . 
De vraag of er in de 21ste eeuw nog ruimte is voor het metafysische 
denken kan door een fi losoof weliswaar bevestigend beantwoord wor-
den, volgens Henrich. Hij weigert zich neer te leggen bij het fi losofi -
sche materialisme, het naturalisme, dat in de moderne fi losofi e hoogtij 
viert. Echter deze grond kan op geen enkele wijze invulling krijgen 
zijns inziens. Juist de onkenbaarheid van deze grond, die hij beti-
telt als Dunkelheit, de onbeantwoordbare vraag van het ik naar zijn 
grond, naar de eenheid onder of voorbij de tweespalt van het leven 
in de Grundverhältnis, vormt volgens Henrich de aanzet tot religie. 
Hij acht het echter onmogelijk om binnen de grenzen van de fi losofi e 
enige nadere invulling te geven aan deze duistere grond. Om die reden 
wordt in het tweede deel van dit hoofdstuk de metafysica bestudeerd 
van een theoloog: Karl Rahner. Ook Rahner spreekt van deze grond 
als mysterie, ongrijpbaar voor het menselijke intellect. Niettemin acht 
hij het ik, de Hörer des Wortes, in staat om iets op te vangen van het 
domein voorbij-de-fysica. Dit hoofdstuk loopt uit op de vraag: Wat 
is nu het verschil tussen de absolute eenheidsgrond van het Duitse 
idealisme en de God van het Christendom?
Het slothoofdstuk gaat van de antwoorden van de auteurs op de 
vraag “Wie ben ik?” via de wijze waarop de besproken auteurs het 
ik verbinden met een absolute eenheidsgrond naar de vraag “Wie is 
God?”. Van Hölderlin wordt een belangrijke tussenstap overgenomen. 
Niet de directe lijn van het ik naar een absolute grond is een fi losofi sch 
begaanbare weg, maar eerder de ervaring van de eenheid, de vrede, 
van die grond in een wereld van schijnbare tegenstrijdigheid. Niet de 
vraag “Wie ben ik?” is de belangrijkste, maar eerder de vraag “Wie zijn 
wij?”. De titel “God – Beyond Me”, wellicht het best te vertalen met 
“God – het ik te boven”, vormt een dubbele kritiek op de moderne 
subjectfi losofi eën geworteld in het Duitse idealisme. Enerzijds is het 
een reactie op de arrogantie waarmee het absolute idealisme het 
goddelijke probeert te vangen binnen de grenzen van de menselijke 
cognitie. God gaat mij te boven. Anderzijds vormt het een afwijzing 
van het egocentrisme dat spreekt uit een fi losofi e die denkt dat een 
eenheidsgrond bereikt kan worden door of binnen een individueel ik 
met uitsluiting van een wereld van andere ikken. Een en ander resulteert 
in een metafysica van Wij-heid. De eenheidsgrond van het menselijke 
ik is een Wij. Als Wij is het goddelijke de wonderlijke aanzet tot zowel 
unieke individualiteit als eenheid. Zulk een concept van God relati-
veert niettemin de pretenties van een ik dat zichzelf verabsoluteert. Dit 
Wij is een eenheid die niet ten koste gaat van het individu, maar het 
ik voedt en helpt te groeien in zijn of haar unieke individualiteit. God 
als Wij begift igt ieder menselijk ik met het talent tot zowel eenheid als 
singulariteit. God als Wij is ook een oproep aan ieder werelds wij om 
de waarde van ieder participerend ik te respecteren.
